WorldAudio Limited v Australian Communications and Media Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WorldAudio Limited v Australian Communications and Media Authority

[2006] FCA 8

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – applicants held radiocommunications apparatus licence for purposes of radio broadcast – broadcast activity undertaken from location other than transmission site specified in condition of the licence – request to Authority to vary that licence condition to accord with reality as to location of broadcast – Authority refused to vary licence condition – Authority refused to reconsider and to give reasons for that refusal – application for review of those alleged decisions – objection to competency of application for review – whether refusals constituted decisions made under an enactment

Radiocommunications Act 1992 (Cth) ss 107, 111, 285 and 286
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 40
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3, 5 and 7
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 417 and 427

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 referred to
Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 56 FCR 50 applied
WAGJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 227 discussed
WAJQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 79 discussed
Bedlington v Chong (1998) 87 FCR 75 distinguished
Brownsville Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 169 distinguished
Carter v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs [2005] FCA 667 distinguished
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 213 ALR 724 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 411 discussed

R Meagher, D Heydon and M Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines & Remedies, (4th ed)

WORLDAUDIO LIMITED & AUSCOAST BROADCASTING PTY LTD v AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY

NSD 1257 of 2005

CONTI J
16 JANUARY 2006
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1257 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

WORLDAUDIO LIMITED
FIRST APPLICANT

AUSCOAST BROADCASTING PTY LIMITED
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CONTI J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 JANUARY 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The proceedings be stood over to a date to be fixed by agreement between the parties (or in the absence of agreement by the Court) for the purpose of making such declarations and orders as may be appropriate to give effect to these reasons for judgment. 

2.   Draft orders giving effect to these reasons for judgment are to be submitted to my Associate by each party within 14 days.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1257 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

WORLDAUDIO LIMITED
FIRST APPLICANT

AUSCOAST BROADCASTING PTY LIMITED
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CONTI J

DATE:

16 JANUARY 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The circumstances of the applicants to the present dispute and the nature…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 8
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

WorldAudio Limited (WAL) challenged a decision by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) regarding the conditions of its 1620 licence. WAL sought a variation to the site condition of its licence, which ACMA refused. The case was brought to the Federal Court of Australia to determine if the court had jurisdiction to review ACMA's refusal and subsequent decision not to reconsider the matter.

The central legal issues involved whether ACMA's refusal to exercise its power constituted a decision under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act) and whether the court had the jurisdiction to review such a decision. ACMA argued that its officer had terminated WAL's request without considering all relevant issues, but the court found no substantial difference between this case and previous cases like Right to Life, where such refusals were deemed reviewable. The court found that the refusal had the practical effect of being an ultimate decision, and hence bore the character of finality.

The court rejected ACMA's objections to its competency to review the decisions, holding that ACMA's decision not to vary the site condition was a decision concerning the conditions of the 1620 licence. The court found that the statutory language permitted reconsideration of such decisions, and thus the court had jurisdiction to review ACMA's actions.

The court ordered the proceedings to be stood over to a date to be fixed by agreement between the parties or by the court itself. Additionally, each party was required to submit draft orders within 14 days to give effect to the court's reasons for judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceedings be stood over to a date to be fixed by agreement between the parties (or in the absence of agreement by the Court) for the purpose of making such declarations and orders as may be appropriate to give effect to these reasons for judgment.

2. Draft orders giving effect to these reasons for judgment are to be submitted to my Associate by each party within 14 days.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

CONTI J
The Authority did not dispute that a refusal to exercise a power may constitute a decision…made…under an enactment, for the purposes of the ADJR Act. Nevertheless it sought to distinguish Right to Life on the basis that in the circumstances of that case, as opposed to the present case, the decision-maker had purported to consider ‘the full gamut…of all the relevant issues’. The Authority’s contention was that its officer in this instance had in effect ‘terminated the request [made by WAL for a variation in the site condition of the 1620 licence] at the first hurdle’, without considering all of the issues that the Authority would normally take into account in assessing a variation. I am not persuaded that such contention of the Authority is sound, and that there is in any event any viable difference between the circumstances relevantly in Right to Life and those here prevailing. In both instances the decision-maker received a request for a decision to be made to a certain effect, and in both instances there was no provision made under the relevant legislation for such requests to be made by formal application. Moreover in both cases, detailed reasons for that request were given by the entity in favour of the decision it sought to be made. Most importantly for the outcome of this objection to competency, it was put by the applicants that the refusal of the Authority to make a decision in the terms requested by WAL had the practical effect of constituting an ultimate or operative decision, and hence one which bore the character of finality. The applicants’ contentions in relation to what it termed the Authority’s second decision made on 18 August 2005 It becomes necessary to consider next the implications of the Authority’s so‑called ‘second decision’, being that said by the applicants to have been made on 18 August 2005 not to reconsider its first decision of 30 June 2005, to the effect that it would not exercise its discretionary statutory power to alter the condition on the 1620 licence so as to change the site of the licence. The Authority’s objection to the Court’s competency to review the second decision rested however on its objection to competency of review of the first decision, and was therefore said by the applicants to encounter the same or similar difficulties which I have already described in relation to the first decision. The applicants contended that ‘[t]he plain words of para 285(g) [of the Act] also tell against the [Authority]’. The opening words to s 285, which I have of course already extracted, but nevertheless merit further emphasis, are that ‘[a]n application may be made to [the Authority] for reconsideration of any of the following decisions’, the notion of reconsideration being of wide import. Moreover the ensuing language of sub‑paragraph (g) includes the word concerning, which was also said by the applicants to be of wide import, such that there could be no contextual reason to construe s 285(g) narrowly. Hence the applicants contended on that basis that the Authority’s decision not to vary the site condition at the centre of the disputation was clearly a decision concerning the conditions of the 1620 licence, that licence being of course an apparatus licence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CONTI J