FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WONG v DONG LAI SUN MASSAGE PTY LTD | [2016] FCCA 18 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Whether leave for corporation not to be represented by a lawyer – consideration of factors. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Whether to issue a pro bono referral certificate for a corporation – consideration of factors – whether an administrative function – whether necessary to make orders. |
| Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss.56(2), 59(1), 140(2) Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.352, 570(2) Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) |
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- Case
- [2016] FCCA 18
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether to grant Dong Lai leave to be represented by a non-lawyer, considering the complexity of the substantive claims and the relevant rules of the Federal Circuit Court. Additionally, the court had to consider whether to issue a pro bono referral certificate for Dong Lai, which is an administrative function to facilitate legal advice and representation. The substantive application involved significant factual disputes regarding the nature of Ms Wong's employment, the reasons for her absence from work, the provision of medical certificates, and the calculation of her entitlements.
In its reasoning, the court applied the principles governing the exercise of discretion under Rule 9.04 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, which requires corporations to be represented by a lawyer unless leave is granted. Factors considered included the complexity of the matter, the financial position of the party, the potential prejudice to other parties, and the objects of the Act and Rules. The court found that the substantive application, involving multiple complex legal and factual issues such as the interpretation of employment contracts, statutory contraventions, and the impact of a workers' compensation settlement, was too complex to be effectively managed without legal representation. The court also noted potential issues with the admissibility of evidence due to the affidavits not appearing to comply with translation requirements.
Consequently, the court dismissed Dong Lai's application for leave for a non-lawyer to represent it. However, the court noted that pro bono referral certificates were to be issued to both parties to provide legal advice and representation at the hearing. No order was made as to costs, and liberty to apply was granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
That in relation to the Application in a Case filed by the respondent on 3 March 2015 it be dismissed insofar as it seeks leave under r.9.04 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCC Rules”) for a non-lawyer to carry on these proceedings for the respondent.
2.
There be no order as to costs.
3.
There be liberty to apply.
AND THE COURT NOTES that under r.12.02 of the FCC Rules pro bono referral certificates are to be issued to both the applicant and respondent to be provided with legal advice and representation at the hearing of the application on 13 April 2016.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH
PEG 145 of 2014
MAN WONG
Applicant
And
DONG LAI SUN MASSAGE PTY LTD T/A DONG LAI SUN MASSAGE AND BEAUTY
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Application in a Case
1.
The Court has before it an Application in a Case filed 3 March 2015 by the respondent Dong Lai Sun Massage Pty Ltd T/A Dong Lai Sun Massage And Beauty (“Dong Lai”) for:
a) leave to be granted by the Court under r.9.04 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCC Rules”) for Dong Lai, to carry on these proceeding otherwise than by a lawyer; and
b) the granting of a pro-bono referral certificate under r.12.02 of the FCC Rules for Dong Lai.
2.
The Application in a Case is supported by an affidavit by Dai Thu Vong, a director of Dong Lai, sworn on 20 February 2015 (“Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit”), in which she seeks permission to represent Dong Lai in the proceedings: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [14].
Substantive application
3.
In order to assess whether Dong Lai ought to be granted leave to carry on the proceedings other than by a lawyer it is necessary to set out, in some detail, the nature of the substantive application (“Application”).
4.
The applicant, Man Wong (“Ms Wong”) claims in her Claim Form 2 (“Form 2”) that she was dismissed from employment in contravention of s.352 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“FW Act”) because of a temporary absence due to an injury she sustained in the course of her employment. The remedy sought is $43226.10 in total. That sum is said to be calculated on the following basis:
$30 per/hour x 1.5 loading overtime @ 364 hours = $13137.00
Design of treatment and massage price list @ 8.2hours = $295.80
Open and manage facebook and instagram sites @ 344 hours = $9128
Poster and coupon and notice design @ 8 hours = 288.60
Total = $22849.40
Underpayment of normal pay $17634.70
Money borrowed from applicant by employer = $2742
Total in full = $43226.10
(Transcribed from Form 2 without amendment.)
The Application is supported by an affidavit sworn by Ms Wong on 14 January 2015 (“Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit”).
5.
In support of the Application Ms Wong asserts that:
a) she entered into a contract of employment (“Employment Contract”) as a Therapeutic Massage Therapist on a full time basis, for a period of at least four years from the commencement date, with the commencement date under the Employment Contract being the date of the grant of the requisite visa (nominally a “457 Visa”, being a visa granted under cl.457 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Migration Regulations”)) by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (as it then was) (“Department”): Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [8] and Annexure “A”;
b) she performed additional duties outside of the scope of her Employment Contract and was not paid any remuneration for them: Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [9]-[10];
c) she was not payed the salary agreed in the Employment Contract: Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [11];
d) she was issued with a cheque by Dong Lai, asked to give the amount indicated on the cheque back to Dong Lai in cash, and then was paid back a lesser amount in cash as her wages. Ms Wong asked why she was not being paid the amount set out in her Employment Contract, and was told it was standard practice and the money deducted was a kind of bond: Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [12]-[13];
e) just before Christmas 2013 Ms Wong loaned Dong Lai four weeks wages ($3656 in total): Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [16];
f) on 31 January 2014 she was repaid $914 (being one week’s wages): Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [17];
g) on 8 February 2014 after serving one client Ms Wong noticed red swelling on her right elbow. This become progressively worse after serving two further clients and after the third client the pain was unbearable and Ms Wong asked to leave work early. She saw a doctor the following Monday (10 February 2014) who told her she had inflammation in her muscles and advised her to take a break from work. Ms Wong then rang Dong Lai and requested sick leave, which was granted and she was asked to bring a “sick note” when she returned to work. She saw the doctor two or three times a week: Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [19]-[21];
h) she “bumped into” Ms Vong on several occasions and showed her “receipts” from her doctor: Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [21];
i) her elbow had not recovered by the time she received a letter terminating her Employment Contract on 14 March 2015 (“Termination Letter”), and she had difficulty getting assistance cover from WorkCover because Dong Lai told WorkCover the injury was not work related: Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [22];
j) she attended her doctor from 24 February 2014 to 1 August 2014, and the “receipts” indicate those attendances were a “result of workers compensation”, and that she also attended physiotherapy, acupuncture, and had an ultrasound: Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [23]-[24];
k) she had received a text message from Ms Vong’s daughter, had had calls from private numbers, and heard knocking sounds at her door, and this had all made her anxious: Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [27] and Annexure I; and
l) due to the termination of her Employment Contract she had to “switch to” a student visa in order to remain in Australia: Wong’s January 2015 Affidavit at [28].
6.
In its Defence filed on 4 July 2014 Dong Lai states that:
a) in December 2013 Dong Lai informed Ms Wong that the business was not doing well financially and was not in a position to employ her after her 457 Visa was granted;
b) Ms Wong’s 457 Visa was granted on 5 February 2014;
c) on 8 February 2014 Ms Wong said that she was leaving work early because she was going out with friends who were visiting Perth and she was not coming in the next day as she wanted to show them around Perth, and also that since she had woken up that morning her arm had been slightly red and sore;
d) on 11 February 2014:
i) Ms Wong failed to attend for work, but met with Ms Vong, at the latter’s house;
ii) Dong Lai advised Ms Wong that her 457 Visa had been granted but that Dong Lai was not in a position to employ her;
iii) Ms Wong offered to buy Dong Lai’s business, and Dong Lai said it would organise the paperwork and enquire about the process; and
iv) Dong Lai asked Ms Wong why she had not come to work, and Ms Wong said that her arm was sore, she had a stomach ache and her boyfriend was unwell;
e) between 12 and 17 February 2014 Ms Wong did not attend work or offer any explanation for her absence;
f) between 18 and 22 February Ms Wong visited Dong Lai’s business premises approximately three times, and on each of these occasions:
i) did not undertake any work;
ii) told Dong Lai she was organising the takeover of the business and requested documents related to council approval for small business development;
iii) when asked about her absence from work, stated her arm was sore; and
iv) when asked for medical certificates, said that she would bring them;
g) between 23 February 2014 and 14 March 2014 Ms Wong again did not attend work nor offer any explanation for her absence;
h) at no point between 8 February 2014 and 14 March 2014 did Ms Wong advise Dong Lai that she was not fit for work because of injury or provide any medical certificates;
i) after Ms Wong’s Employment Contract was terminated she provided Dong Lai with a worker’s compensation claim form signed on 1 March 2014, which annexed medical certificates dated 5, 11, 18 and 28 March 2014;
j) Ms Wong had adequate earlier opportunity to provide the medical certificates but did not do so;
k) Ms Wong was employed on a casual basis by Dong Lai until the grant of her 457 Visa on 5 February 2014;
l) Ms Wong signed weekly timesheet records that recorded her hours of pay, rate of pay, tax and superannuation;
m) Ms Wong never worked overtime;
n) Ms Wong was never asked to perform any design or social media work for Dong Lai; and
o) Ms Wong has never lent any money to Dong Lai.
7.
On 3 March 2015 Ms Vong, in her capacity as a director of Dong Lai, filed an affidavit sworn 20 February 2015 in support of Dong Lai’s Defence (“Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit”). Ms Vong asserted the following:
a) there had been a prior relationship in which Ms Vong had been employed at a business called Dong Lai Fu which Ms Vong and her husband had operated, and in which Ms Wong had been casually employed: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [8]-[26];
b) in or around May 2013 Dong Lai was established as a new business in premises in Wembley: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [34]-[37];
c) Ms Wong frequently visited Ms Vong at home and on one occasion, seemingly around early June 2013, Ms Vong mentioned to Ms Wong that she had started a new business, being Dong Lai, which would be a massage parlour, and Ms Wong asked if she could be sponsored under a 457 Visa by Dong Lai: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [38]-[40];
d) there were discussions between Ms Vong and Ms Wong concerning the requirements for a 457 Visa, and Ms Wong utilised the services of a migration agent recommended by Ms Vong, with whom Ms Wong, her boyfriend, Ms Vong and her husband met at Ms Vong’s home to discuss the 457 Visa process and conditions: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [41]-[46];
e) an arrangement was entered into between Ms Wong, and the migration agent, in relation to which Ms Vong says that she paid approximately $3,000 for “government fees” to the migration agent, and that she understands that Ms Wong covered the remaining fees, which would appear to be a sum slightly in excess of $9,000: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [47]-[51] and Annexure C;
f) on or around 24 June 2013 the Employment Contract was entered into, and Ms Vong understood that it would not come into effect until the grant of the 457 Visa: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [52]-[54] and Annexure D;
g) Dong Lai commenced business on 1 August 2013: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [55];
h) she considers that Ms Wong’s first day at work at Dong Lai was 17 September 2013 this being the day that she filled out a Tax File Number Declaration: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [58] and annexure E;
i) she agreed to pay Ms Wong a casual rate of $30 an hour for the work that Ms Wong performed as an employee on a casual basis pending the outcome of her 457 Visa application, and thereafter Ms Wong came to work on a regular basis usually between the hours of 11.00am to 6.30pm for about two weeks: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [61]-[62];
j) from on or around October 2013 Ms Wong began to work less frequently and less consistently at Dong Lai: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [67];
k) in or about mid-December 2013 Ms Vong spoke to Ms Wong and told her that Dong Lai was not doing very well financially and that it would not be able to employ her full time when her 457 Visa was granted: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [74]-[75];
l) Ms Wong was offered a termination payment of two weeks’ salary, to which she agreed with one week paid in or around late December 2013, and the remaining week to be paid later when funds became available to Dong Lai: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [76]-[77];
m) as a result of approaches from Ms Wong in January 2014 Ms Vong agreed to assist Ms Wong in obtaining work until she found another sponsor for her 457 Visa: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [78]-[79];
n) consequently, on 8 February 2014 Ms Wong serviced two customers for about 60 minutes each, and between those two services Ms Wong approached Ms Vong and asked if she could leave early from work as she wanted to go out to dinner with her boyfriend and some of her friends who were visiting Perth. She also showed Ms Vong, just before she left work that day, that she had some redness on her arm which she thought was an insect bite, and which she told Ms Vong she had first noticed in the morning when she got out of bed: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [80]-[84];
o) Ms Wong also told Ms Vong that she would be having 9 February 2014 off as well as she wanted to show her friends around Perth: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [87];
p) on 11 February 2014 Ms Vong was informed that Ms Wong’s 457 Visa had been granted as at 5 February 2014, and Ms Vong called Ms Wong at about 5.00pm on 11 February 2014 to inform her of the 457 Visa approval, and to invite her to meet at Ms Vong’s home to discuss it: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [88] and [91];
q) at around 9.30pm on 11 February 2014 Ms Vong and her husband, and Ms Wong and her boyfriend, met at Ms Vong’s home and Ms Vong told Ms Wong that she would need to look for another sponsor as Dong Lai was not financially able to employ her full time, and because of her previous work ethic and behaviour being unreasonable: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [92]-[93];
r) there were subsequent discussions in which Ms Vong says that Ms Wong pleaded to be employed on a full time basis, and suggested that she could be paid her salary by cheque and then repay the money to Dong Lai in cash to make the finances better, a proposition which Ms Vong says she rejected as illegal and because she did not want to do something like that: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [94]-[95];
s) there was also discussion according to Ms Vong about Ms Wong purchasing part of the business of Dong Lai and the arrangements surrounding how that might be achieved, with Ms Vong saying that she told Ms Wong that she would have to arrange this, and all of the relevant approvals, herself: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [96]-[101];
t) Ms Wong did not attend for work subsequently, but on various dates in February 2014 was in contact with Ms Vong concerning Council approval and regulation documents in relation to the business and the possibility of Ms Vong purchasing the business, in whole or in part: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [105]-[116];
u) during the course of the discussions in February 2014, Ms Vong enquired, on or around 18 February 2014, as to why Ms Wong had not come to work and was told that Ms Wong’s arm was sore, as a consequence of which Ms Vong requested medical certificates or documentation for Ms Wong’s absence from work, and suggested that there were other things that she could do in the business such as answering the telephone and attend the front desk: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [109]-[110];
v) she says that Ms Wong subsequently made contact with the migration agent, as a consequence of which Ms Vong was ultimately informed by the migration agent on or around 2 March 2014 that Ms Wong was intending to open a massage shop at another shopping centre, but that Ms Vong should wait a week or so before taking any action to see if Ms Wong would return to work: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [123]-[124];
w) the migration agent subsequently assisted Ms Vong to prepare the Termination Letter which was sent to Ms Wong on or around 15 March 2014, the terms of which were as follows:
I refer to the offer of employment for you to work as a massage therapist at Dong Lai Massage, on which you based your application to the Immigration Department for a subclass 457 temporary working visa. You will recall that it was stipulated in the Contract of Employment signed by us both on 24 June 2013, that you were to commence employment immediately your visa was granted by the Immigration Department.
Whilst waiting for the visa to be granted I did employ you on a casual basis, and your visa was eventually granted on 5 February 2014.
From the time you were advised that the visa was granted, you have not attended for work. You did advised me that you had a sore arm, but have not produced any doctor’s certificate to substantiate this, and you have not indicated during the past five weeks when you would be prepared to attend for work.
As you have not attended for work at all under the terms of the Contract of Employment, I consider that the Contract is not now applicable and I now formally advise you that your services are no longer required. As it happens, the business has not been viable and has been losing money since establishment so that I would not, in any event, be in a position to employ you.
I am required to inform the Immigration Department that you are no longer employed, but as you know, your working visa could continue if you are able to find another sponsor. I wish you success in continuing with your visa to work in Australia, and in your future employment as a massage therapist.
Transcribed without amendment: see Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [127]-[128] and Annexure I;
x) there were subsequent discussions between Ms Vong, Ms Wong and Ms Wong’s boyfriend concerning the Termination Letter and a termination payment, and in respect of the latter a dispute as to whether or not Dong Lai owed Ms Wong one additional week in accordance with the agreement that Ms Vong says was entered into, or an additional two weeks in addition to that week: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [134]-[135];
y) following advice from the migration agent Dong Lai sent a letter to the Department on or around 25 March 2015 which seemingly reported the termination of Ms Wong’s Employment Contract to the Department: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [136]-[139];
z) a meeting was arranged and took place on or around 30 March 2014 between Ms Wong and her boyfriend, and Ms Vong and her husband, at which there were discussions concerning transferring the 457 Visa to a new business if the business was sold, and there were further discussions concerning the termination payment Ms Vong alleged she was owed, and a demand from Ms Wong’s boyfriend that payment of $2,742 be made immediately: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [144]-[147];
aa) during the course of the discussion Ms Vong confirmed that she had reported the termination of Ms Wong’s Employment Contract to the Department and that she further understood that the 457 Visa had been cancelled as from 25 March 2014: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [146];
bb) she did not meet the demand for payment made by Ms Wong’s boyfriend, and Ms Wong’s boyfriend then referred to a stack of papers which he and Ms Wong had brought to the meeting and indicated that Dong Lai would have to lodge those papers, which related to workers’ compensation, or otherwise deal with the consequences: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [148]-[149];
cc) upon looking at the papers Ms Vong discovered that they related to medical certificates and a workers’ compensation claim form signed by Ms Wong dated 1 March 2014, which Ms Vong says is the first time that she knew of any workers’ compensation claim or alleged injury, and it was the first time she had sighted any medical certificates or other documentation relating to the alleged injury or treatment of Ms Wong: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [150]-[151];
dd) the workers’ compensation claim was subsequently settled between Ms Wong and the workers’ compensation insurer, the insurer advising Dong Lai as follows:
We have agreed to settle the claim with Nikki Wong for $14,600. The settlement includes part of her wages and medical expenses in relation to her alleged injury. The settlement is purely commercial as we have not made a decision on liability.
Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [155] and Annexure M;
ee) she denies that Dong Lai ever required Ms Wong to perform additional tasks relating to marketing and Facebook and material designs or that she was ever approached for additional wages for any such work, or that any bond money was taken from Ms Wong’s wages, or that Ms Wong was entitled to overtime payment on casual employment, or that Dong Lai (or Ms Vong) borrowed any money whatsoever from Ms Wong: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [158]-[163];
ff) that she agreed to pay the termination payment, even though Ms Wong was a casual worker, because she considered her to be a friend and treated her like a daughter and wished to help her out: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [164];
gg) that Ms Wong was sometimes paid in cash and sometimes by cheque as recorded in the wages sheet signed by Ms Wong: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [166];
hh) that no medical certificate was ever received by Dong Lai until the meeting of 30 March 2014: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [167]; and
ii) that Ms Vong did not ask her daughter to send any messages to Ms Wong, and did not know anything about the message sent until after it was sent, and that she never called Ms Wong on silent or private numbers or knocked on her door at all: Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit at [168]-[169].
8.
Ms Wong swore a further affidavit on 31 August 2015, filed on 8 September 2015, in accordance with orders made by the Court in relation to the substantive application (“Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit”). It suffices to observe that it takes issue with much of the factual matrix set out in Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit, and Ms Wong alleges that:
a) she was on a working holiday visa and therefore already had a “requisite visa” allowing her to be employed for the purposes of the Employment Contract: Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit at [9];
b) an E-Tax File Number Declaration held by Dong Lai has been altered, as to the date of signature by the payee (that is Ms Wong): Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit at [11];
c) the E-Tax File Number Declaration form shows that she was working on a full time and not a casual basis: Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit at [12];
d) she did endeavour to present a medical certificate to Dong Lai as early as 18 February 2014, but it was not accepted: Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit at [25], and there were several subsequent attempts to submit medical certificates, and Dong Lai asked that they all be submitted together after recovery: Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit at [33]; and
e) a superannuation payment account was not established until after Ms Wong had her Employment Contract terminated: Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit at [54].
9.
Otherwise, as observed above, Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit not only disputes most of the significant matters of fact in issue between the parties, but also contains material which is arguably by way of submission in relation to the matters in issue.
Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit
10.
In support of Dong Lai’s Application in a Case, Ms Vong swore a further affidavit on 20 February 2015, also filed on 3 March 2015 (“Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit”) in which she relevantly asserts that:
a) she is a director of Dong Lai: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [1];
b) a law firm has previously been engaged to represent her (by which she presumably means Dong Lai) in these proceedings, however, their engagement was terminated prior to the mediation conference before a Registrar of this Court on 16 September 2014 due to costs: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [5];
c) she did not have sufficient money to pay outstanding accounts with the law firm or to pay an additional retainer for further representation: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [7];
d) she has been “receiving general legal advice” (from whom is not specified), but due to costs no further lawyer has been formally engaged: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [8]-[9];
e) she works as an office cleaner one shift a night from 8.00pm to 1.00am and earns approximately $550 a week: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [10] and [12];
f) she lives with her daughter and has car finance expenses of $480 per month: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [13];
g) she has endeavoured to secure legal aid (presumably for Dong Lai) but has been unsuccessful: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [15];
h) she has been unable to obtain sufficient legal advice and cannot afford to do so: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [16]; and
i) concedes that the matters raised are complicated but asserts that Ms Wong is using the proceedings for vexatious and frivolous purposes: Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit at [17].
Submissions
11.
At the hearing of the Application in a Case Ms Vong was granted leave to appear and argue the Application in a Case for Dong Lai.
12.
Ms Vong sought to rely on Vong’s Application in a Case Affidavit. Ms Vong made no submissions relevant to whether or not Dong Lai should be represented other than by a lawyer or granted a pro bono referral certificate.
13.
Ms Wong said she had “[n]o objection” to Dong Lai’s Application in a Case.
14.
The transcript, brief as it is, does indicate that there may be difficulties at hearing, particularly insofar as Ms Vong had difficulty in addressing the relevant issue as to whether Dong Lai should be represented other than by a lawyer or be granted a pro bono referral certificate. It is also not immediately apparent that Ms Wong, in stating that she had no objection to the Application in a Case by Dong Lai, understood what the import of doing so might be.
Consideration – leave to appear other than by a non-lawyer
Legislative provisions
15.
Section 44 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (“FCCA Act”) provides as follows:
A party to a proceeding before the Federal Magistrates Court is not entitled to be represented by another person unless:
(a) under the Judiciary Act 1903, the other person is entitled to practise as a barrister or solicitor, or both, in a federal court; or
(b) under the regulations, the other person is taken to be an authorised representative; or
(c) another law of the Commonwealth authorises the other person to represent the party.
16.
Rule 9.04 of the FCC Rules provides as follows:
Except as provided by or under an Act or regulations made under an Act, or with the leave of the Court, a corporation may not start or carry on a proceeding otherwise than by a lawyer.
17.
There is nothing in the FW Act or the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) which precludes a corporation from seeking leave to appear other than by a lawyer under r.9.04 of the FCC Rules: Hall v Cadillac Transport Repairs Pty Ltd [2011] FMCA 189 at [16]-[23] per Lucev FM. Indeed, the requirement that a corporation must not proceed other than by a lawyer “cannot be ignored”: Anying Group Pty Ltd v Wang [2012] FCA 702 at [19] per Flick J.
The purpose underlying restrictions on appearance
18.
The purpose underlying such legislative provisions is to ensure that in accordance with the interests of justice and the administration of justice the Court is assisted by those qualified and experienced in arguing legal disputes and who have ethical duties to clients and the courts: Groundwater v Territory Insurance Office [2004] FMCA 381; (2004) 183 FLR 437 at [40] per Brown FM; Alcantara & Anor v Buildpower Pty Ltd [2010] FMCA 626; (2010) 199 IR 73 at [10] per Lucev FM (“Alcantara”). Lawyers may also be of considerable assistance to the Court in the proper assessment of fact: Re Molnar Engineering Pty Ltd v Burns (1984) 3 FCR 68 at 74 per Smithers J (“Molnar Engineering”). Incorporation confers many benefits on those connected with a corporation; and also imposes some corresponding burdens, one of which is that in litigation a corporation must normally be represented by a lawyer: Termi-Mesh Australia Pty Ltd v Josu Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1241 at [14] per French J; Fair Work Ombudsman v Konsulteq Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] FCCA 1315 at [11] per Judge Lucev (“Konsulteq”) (and the other cases there cited).
19.
In determining whether to grant leave under r.9.04 of the FCC Rules, the applicability of a number of factors, including the following, are to be considered:
a) the relative complexity or simplicity of a matter;
b) whether a non-lawyer appears, or has previously appeared, for any of the parties;
c) the objects and purposes of the FCCA Act and FCC Rules, including the impact of those objects and purposes on case management considerations;
d) whether a party can be effectively represented without a lawyer appearing, and whether prejudice will be suffered by any party by reason of the appearance or non-appearance of a lawyer for a party;
e) whether there has been appropriate opportunity to arrange legal representation;
f) the financial position of a party; and
g) whether the granting of leave to appear is opposed.
Konsulteq at [12] per Judge Lucev (and cases there cited)
20.
Discretion of the kind contained in r.9.04 of the FCC Rules must be exercised judicially and having regard to all relevant considerations: Molnar Engineering FCR at 73 per Smithers J; Alcantara at [12] per Lucev FM. In the exercise of such discretion it is not necessary for each factor to be given equal weight.
Nature of the matter
21.
Ms Wong’s primary claim is that she was dismissed from employment with Dong Lai in contravention of s.352 of the FW Act because of a temporary absence due to an injury sustained in the course of her employment. Section 352 of the FW Act provides that:
An employer must not dismiss an employee because the employee is temporarily absent from work because of illness or injury of a kind prescribed by the regulations.
22.
Relevantly, reg.3.01(2) of the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) (“FW Regulations”) provides that a prescribed kind of injury exists if the employee provides a medical certificate for the illness or injury within 24 hours after the commencement of the absence or “(b) such longer period as is reasonable in the circumstances.” Ms Wong relies on reg.3.01(2)(b) of the FW Regulations to establish the prescribed kind of injury resulting in the alleged temporary absence from work. For Dong Lai to have acted in breach of s.352 of the FW Act there must have been an awareness that the absence was because of Ms Wong’s alleged injury, and the absence must be the reason for the termination of the Employment Contract. Dong Lai will succeed in avoiding an adverse finding under s.352 of the FW Act if it proves either that it did not know the reason for the absence or that it did not terminate the employment by reason of the absence: Sperandio v Lynch [2006] FCA 1648; (2006) 160 IR 360 at [91] per Jessup J, provided that the medical certificate was provided within a reasonable time after the first 24 hours of the absence, as is contended by Ms Wong, who says that the medical certificate was provided on 10 February 2014: Claim Form, Part G. Ms Wong also contends that ongoing medical certificates were periodically offered to Dong Lai thereafter, but rejected. There is a fundamental factual dispute in this regard as Dong Lai says that no medical certificate was provided until after the Termination Letter had been sent to Ms Wong. There is, therefore, a fundamental, and significant, dispute on a critical issue of fact, which, on the evidence as it presently stands, will probably fall to be determined on the credibility of either Ms Wong or Ms Vong. Whilst determining what is reasonable in the circumstances is a question of fact, the failure to provide a medical certificate, if that be the fact, until after an employee’s employment is terminated may be unreasonable: see Picos v HealthEngine Pty Ltd & Anor [2015] FCCA 1983 at [42] per Judge Lucev. The Court notes that no reliance appears to be placed on reg.3.01(4) of the FW Regulations to establish the existence of a prescribed kind of injury for Ms Wong.
23.
Were the Application limited to the claim of a contravention of s.352 of the FW Act by Dong Lai, the matter might be of such a nature as to allow the Court to determine it without any legal assistance, notwithstanding the significant factual dispute about whether or not, and when, a medical certificate or certificates was or were provided by Ms Wong. However, the mix of pleadings and affidavits in this case, gives rise to a number of issues, the nature of which adds significant complexity. Those issues include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a) firstly, whether or not for that part of the employment prior to the granting of the 457 Visa, Ms Wong was entitled to work, as is asserted by her in Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit at [9], or not, and if the latter, then whether any alleged Employment Contract might be voided, in whole or in part, by reason of illegality;
b) secondly, whether or not, if there was employment, it was on a full time or casual basis, and if so, from what date the Employment Contract took effect having regard to the claim by Ms Wong that she was entitled to work under her existing working holiday visa prior to the granting of the 457 Visa;
c) thirdly, there appear to be significant disputes over the hours worked, whether Ms Wong was entitled to overtime, and whether, in fact, hours have been recorded properly, or recorded at all, in the context of a claim for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime, over a period of more than seven months;
d) fourthly, whether, and to what extent, Ms Wong is entitled to payment on termination of the Employment Contract which did exist, noting that termination by Dong Lai on not less than four weeks’ notice in writing under clause 15 of the Employment Contract can only occur in the limited circumstances set out in clause 15, and, relevantly, where Ms Wong is “in breach of any of the terms of this Contract”: Employment Contract, clause 15(i). Whether Ms Wong was in breach of the requirement to work full time for a maximum of 38 ordinary hours per week might be dependent upon whether or not notice of any alleged injury was in fact given by Ms Wong to Dong Lai, and might therefore be bound up with the answer to the issues in relation to the claim under s.352 of the FW Act;
e) fifthly, whether Ms Wong has any entitlement to payment for additional duties, and whether or not she performed those duties, and if so how or on what basis they are to be remunerated, presuming that the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the issue within the scope of its ancillary jurisdiction;
f) sixthly, whether or not a loan was made by Ms Wong to Dong Lai, and whether Ms Wong is entitled to an order for repayment of the loan, again assuming that this is a matter within the Court’s ancillary jurisdiction;
g) seventhly, subject to the outcome of the claim under s.352 of the FW Act, and the issue as to whether any notice of the injury was given to Dong Lai by Ms Wong, whether Ms Wong might, if no such notice had been given, have repudiated or abandoned her employment, and therefore forfeited her right to be paid wages under the Employment Contract: Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435; and
h) finally, the effect of the payment of a sum of $14,000 by way of a workers’ compensation settlement to Ms Wong, paid, on the basis of the evidence as it stands, both in relation to lost wages and medical expenses, and how much, if any, of the settlement might be attributed to, or offset against, any wages held to be owing to Ms Wong by Dong Lai, if the Court determines that Ms Wong has been underpaid.
24.
In relation to the issue of abandonment of employment referred to in subparagraph (g) of the preceding paragraph, the Court notes that in a small claims matter under the FW Act, a dispute concerning abandonment of employment led, in part, to the Court being satisfied that it was appropriate to grant leave to lawyers to appear in small claims proceedings under the FW Act: Cangemi v Specialist Diagnostic Pathology Services Pty Ltd T/as Western Diagnostic Pathology [2014] FCCA 187.
25.
There may also be complications in relation to the admissibility of evidence at hearing. At this stage, no objections to the admissibility of evidence have been foreshadowed, and in the absence of an appearance by a lawyer for either of the parties, it may be that the Court has to determine whether evidence is relevant or hearsay, and therefore inadmissible: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“Evidence Act”), ss.56(2) and 59(1). In circumstances where neither party, or even one party, was not represented by a lawyer, it would be left to the Court to explain the nature of the evidence and the possible reasons for it not being admitted. Effectively, the Court might be put in the position of both advocate and Judge.
26.
A further complication with the evidence is that Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit and Ms Wong’s August 2015 Affidavit do not arguably comply with the terms of r.15.27 of the FCC Rules as, on the evidence to date, neither Ms Wong nor Ms Vong are capable of reading or understanding English, and the relevant translator’s certificate does not appear as an alternative form of jurat to those affidavits. In the case of Ms Vong’s February 2015 Affidavit that is concerning given that it has apparently been sworn before one Soo Yong Yoon, said to be a qualified solicitor, in which case the requirement for a translator’s jurat in accordance with the FCC Rules ought to have been known and explained by the solicitor, and complied with.
27.
In ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Haddad [2008] FMCA 1695 at [30] per Barnes FM the affidavit of a witness who did not have an adequate command of English, and in which the relevant translator’s certificate did not appear in the form of an alternative jurat, was not accepted for the purposes of providing evidentiary support for matters related to a notice of intention to oppose a creditor’s petition.
28.
In MZYIZ v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.2) [2010] FMCA 755 at [11] per Turner FM (“MZYIZ (No.2)”) the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia held affidavits filed in support of an extension of time by a Tamil speaking applicant for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to be inadmissible in circumstances where the applicant was not able to read the material, which was in English, and no translator’s certification was included in the relevant affidavits. Later, however, the affidavits were read to the applicant in Court through an interpreter and he gave evidence that the contents were true and correct: MZYIZ (No.2) at [12] per Turner FM.
29.
In Shible & Mead [2010] FMCAfam 354 (“Shible”) the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia admitted into evidence an affidavit which did not comply with r.15.27 of the then
Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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