ING Bank (Australia) Limited v Haddad

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ING BANK (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED v HADDAD [2008] FMCA 1695
BANKRUPTCY – Creditor’s petition – default judgment – whether Court should go behind the judgment.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s.52
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s.101
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), ss.7, 9

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans (2005) 219 ALR 22
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans (No 2) [2005] FCA 978

Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343

Harrison v Charalambous [1999] FCA 902

In re Blythe; Ex parte Banner (1881) 17 Ch D 480

In Re Fraser; Ex parte Central Bank of London [1892] 2 QB 633
Joossé v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 137 FCR 576
Makhoul v Barnes (1995) 60 FCR 572
Petrie v Redmond (1942) 13 ABC 48
Re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whiskey Distillers Limited (1888) 22 QBD 83
Re Johnson and Another; Ex parte Greendale Engineering and Cables Pty Ltd (1967) 11 FLR 335
Re Marshall; Ex parte James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (8 July 1983 Federal Court, unreported)
Richardson v Leonard Cohen & Co [2008] FCA 1392
Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480
Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212
Yerkey and Another v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649

Applicant: ING BANK (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED
Respondent: LEILA HADDAD
File Number: SYG 1687 of 2008
Judgment of: Barnes FM
Hearing date: 3 October 2008
Last date for Submission: 17 October 2008
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 23 December 2008

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Spencer
Solicitors for the Applicant: Gadens Lawyers
Solicitors for the Respondent: John McEncroe & Co
Solicitors for the Supporting Creditor: Hugh & Associates

ORDERS

  1. That the preliminary question as to whether the Court ought to exercise its discretion to go behind the judgment on which the creditor’s petition is based be determined in the negative.

  2. The parties draft short minutes of order to give effect to the determination in order one and for the further conduct of the proceedings.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 1687 of 2008

ING BANK (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED

Applicant

And

LEILA HADDAD

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. On 2 July 2008 the applicant, ING Bank (Australia) Limited presented a creditor’s petition seeking that a sequestration order be made against the estate of the respondent, Leila Haddad.  The creditor’s petition relies on a debt in the sum of $570,674.60 said to be the balance due under a judgment entered in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 6 February 2008 pursuant to a loan agreement.  It is also claimed that the respondent further owes the petitioning creditor the amount of $143,818.42 for enforcement expenses and fees accrued on the account pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement.  The total debt due and owing is said to be $714,493.02. 

  2. The creditor’s petition discloses that the creditor holds security over a specified property of the debtor to the estimated amount of $130,000 leaving an unsecured debt of $584,492.02. 

  3. The creditor relies on an act of…

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Details
Case
[2008] FMCA 1695
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of ING Bank (Australia) Limited v Haddad involved a creditor's petition filed by ING Bank seeking to declare the respondent, Mrs. Haddad, bankrupt. The primary dispute centred on whether the court should exercise its discretion to look behind the judgment debt on which the creditor's petition was based. The court had to determine if there were sufficient grounds to question the validity of the underlying debt, despite it being established by a judgment.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Bankruptcy Court could exercise its discretion to go behind a judgment debt and whether there were substantial reasons to question the existence of the underlying debt. The court had to consider the principles established in previous cases such as Wren v Mahony, Corney v Brien, and Joossé v Commissioner of Taxation, which emphasised the court's obligation to ensure satisfactory proof of the debt and its discretion to look behind a judgment only under appropriate circumstances.

In deciding the case, the court considered the debtor's submissions and the circumstances of the case, including the history of the proceedings and the nature of the judgment debt. The court found that the debtor had not provided sufficient grounds to warrant the court exercising its discretion to look behind the judgment. The debtor's claims of lack of independent advice, misinterpretation of documents, and acting under duress did not constitute substantial reasons to question the validity of the underlying debt. Therefore, the court determined that it should not exercise its discretion to go behind the judgment.

The court issued an order dismissing the debtor's application to go behind the judgment. It directed the parties to draft minutes of order to give effect to this determination and to proceed with the further conduct of the proceedings accordingly.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

That the preliminary question as to whether the Court ought to exercise its discretion to go behind the judgment on which the creditor’s petition is based be determined in the negative.

2.

The parties draft short minutes of order to give effect to the determination in order one and for the further conduct of the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Notwithstanding the fact that this proposal was not raised until the start of the hearing and despite that fact that it would ordinarily not be appropriate “for the case to be split by a preliminary decision being made as to whether sufficient facts have been shown to suggest that an investigation into the judgment should be pursued” (Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480 at [17] per Lee and Hill JJ) (emphasis added), I considered, on balance, that it was appropriate to proceed in the manner suggested. I had regard to all the circumstances of this particular case, including the history of this matter and current state of proceedings in the Supreme Court (a matter to which I will return) and the fact that in the notice of intention to oppose the creditor’s petition filed on 20 August 2008 one of the grounds on which the debtor indicated an intention to oppose the creditor’s petition “relied” on s.52(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and asked the Court in general terms to “look behind the judgment relied on by the applicant.” Thus, even if the hearing of the creditor’s petition had proceeded, the issue of whether to go behind the judgment would have had to be determined. In the notice of intention to oppose the respondent also denied owing the applicant the amount relied on in the creditor’s petition and in taking issue with the act of bankruptcy relied on in the creditor’s petition: (a) says that at no stage did she execute documents for the applicant or any other entity or person did she have the benefit of an independent advice as to the nature of the document she was executing;(b) says that at no stage prior to or after executing documents for the applicant or any other entity or person did she have the benefit of having the documents interpreted for her in the Arabic language;(c) always acted in accordance with the wishes of her husband without exercising free will or having a say;(d) says that the loan that the applicant advanced were for the benefit of companies associated with her husband and other individuals and entities;(e) says that the loans advanced by the applicant to the respondent’s husband were advanced during a period when the applicant husband was undischarged bankrupt;(f) says that the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice and supporting affidavit filed within proceedings was prepared by others who undertook to attend court but failed to do so;(g) says that all defences and affidavits filed in the Supreme Court proceedings number 15326 of 2007 were prepared by others who undertook to attend court and follow up the matter on merits but failed to do so;(h) says that the judgment in proceedings number 15326 of 2007 is a default judgment which the respondent did not become aware of until her husband asked her to sign documents to do with the sale of properties owned by the respondent;(i) says that the respondent is one of a number of defendants in proceedings number 15326 of 2007.(j) says that pursuant to and in satisfaction of the default judgment obtained in proceedings number 15326 of 2007 the applicant sold the following real estate properties belonging to and registered in the name of the respondent:…(k) The applicant failed to account to the responds (sic) for the proceeds of sales.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Under s.52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act the petitioning creditor is obliged to prove that the debt or debts on which it relies is or are still owing. The Court has a discretion to accept a judgment as proof of the debt relied on to found the creditor’s petition. The court in bankruptcy has the power to go behind a judgment and enquire whether, notwithstanding the judgment, there is a debt due to the petitioning creditor. In the context of s.52(1) the court’s discretion was described in Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212 at 224 - 225 per Barwick CJ (with whom Windeyer and Owen JJ agreed) as follows:… the Bankruptcy Court may accept the judgment as satisfactory proof of the petitioning creditor's debt. In that sense that court has a discretion. It may or may not so accept the judgment. But it has been made quite clear by the decisions of the past that where reason is shown for questioning whether behind the judgment or as it is said, as the consideration for it, there was in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioning creditor, the Court of Bankruptcy can no longer accept the judgment as such satisfactory proof. It must then exercise its power, or if you will, its discretion to look at what is behind the judgment: to what is its consideration. It is not the law, in my opinion, that whether in any case the Court of Bankruptcy will consider whether there is satisfactory proof of the petitioning creditor's debt is a mere matter of its own discretion. Nothing in Corney v. Brien [37] lends support for such a view. Rather the emphasis is upon the paramount need to have satisfactory proof of the petitioning creditor's debt. The Court's discretion in my opinion is a discretion to accept the judgment as satisfactory proof of that debt. That discretion is not well exercised where substantial reasons are given for questioning whether behind that judgment there was in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioner. [Emphasis added]. The Court will not go behind a judgment as a matter of course, but only if appropriate circumstances are shown to exist (see Re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whiskey Distillers Limited (1888) 22 QBD 83 at 85 – 6 per Lord Esher and Joossé v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 137 FCR 576 at [3]). In Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 Fullagar J made the point (at 355) that “No precise rules exist as to what circumstances call for an exercise of the power” and referred to the reluctance of a court to re-open a matter in the absence of a prima facie case of fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice when the judgment in question had followed a trial at which both parties appeared. His Honour continued (at 357 – 358): “But, wherever the judgment in question is a judgment by default, it appears that the court will always "go behind" the judgment if there is what it regards as a bona-fide allegation that no real debt "lay behind" the judgment.” The majority in Corney v Brien (Dixon, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ) referred at 347 to the court’s undoubted jurisdiction “to go behind a judgment obtained by default or compromise or where fraud or collusion is alleged and inquire whether the judgment is founded on a real debt” and noted with approval the suggestion by Latham CJ in Petrie v Redmond (1942) 13 ABC 48 at 49 that “the court looks with suspicion on consent judgments and default judgments”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.