Winn v Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Winn v Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 292

Citation: Winn v Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 292
Appeal from: Winn v Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd [2008] FMCA 1430
Parties: JULENE WINN v BLUEPRINT INSTANT PRINTING PTY LTD
File number(s): VID 921 of 2008
Judge: RYAN J
Date of judgment: 31 March 2011
Date of hearing: 9 April 2010
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 70
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr T J Scotter
Solicitor for the Respondent: Herbert Geer Rundle

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 921 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

JULENE WINN
Appellant

AND:

BLUEPRINT INSTANT PRINTING PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 MARCH 2011

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The further amended notice of appeal filed herein on behalf of Julene Winn on 26 November 2009 be treated as an application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court on 17 October 2008 in proceedings MLG 1531 of 2007.

2.The deemed application for leave to appeal referred to in paragraph 1 of this Order be refused.

3.The applicant, Julene Winn pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the said deemed application for leave to appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 921 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

JULENE WINN
Appellant

AND:

BLUEPRINT INSTANT PRINTING PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

31 MARCH 2011

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 17 October 2008, Riley FM, in proceedings numbered MLG 1531 of 2007, dismissed an application by Julene Winn (“the appellant”), seeking a review of an order made by a Registrar on 11 February 2008.  On the same date, her Honour refused to grant the appellant an extension of time within which to appeal from the Registrar’s decision. 

  2. The Registrar’s orders had been made in the absence of the appellant who had sought, by an affidavit filed by facsimile transmission on 8 February 2008, an adjournment of her application to set aside a bankruptcy notice.  Exhibited to that affidavit were medical certificates to the effect that the appellant was suffering from hypertension and was therefore unable to attend Court on 11 February 2008 and would be unfit for normal work until 17 February 2008.  On 11 February 2008, the Registrar made an order dismissing the appellant’s application to set aside a bankruptcy notice numbered VN 1372 (“the first bankruptcy notice”) which had been issued at the instance of the respondent, Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd (“Blueprint”), on…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 292
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Winn v Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd, the appellant, Julene Winn, sought to appeal the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court in proceedings initiated by the respondent, Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd. The Federal Magistrates Court had issued orders that were interlocutory in nature, and the appellant filed a notice of appeal and subsequent amended notices of appeal. The primary issue before the court was whether the appellant had satisfied the criteria for leave to appeal the interlocutory orders of the Federal Magistrates Court. The court had to determine whether the decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused.

The court found that the appellant had failed to make out any of the grounds of appeal as outlined in her notices. The absence of legal representation at the hearing was not the determining factor for the Federal Magistrate's decision, and the reasons for the decision were well-founded. The court also noted that the legal representatives for the respondent were appropriately qualified under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The interlocutory nature of the orders meant that the appellant could only appeal by leave, and the court applied the test set out in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc to determine whether leave should be granted. The court concluded that the appellant had not satisfied the first limb of the test, and there was no substantial injustice that would result from refusing leave to appeal.

The court ordered that the further amended notice of appeal filed by the appellant on 26 November 2009 be treated as an application for leave to appeal, which was to be refused. The appellant was also ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal, with costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The further amended notice of appeal filed herein on behalf of Julene Winn on 26 November 2009 be treated as an application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court on 17 October 2008 in proceedings MLG 1531 of 2007.

2. The deemed application for leave to appeal referred to in paragraph 1 of this Order be refused.

3. The applicant, Julene Winn pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the said deemed application for leave to appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

I do not consider that the learned Federal Magistrate based her decision on the fact that the appellant did not have legal representation at the time of the hearing on 11 February 2008 in the sense that the absence of such representation was the sole, or a determining, factor in her exercising her discretion as she did. Her Honour correctly identified at [4] of her reasons that it had been claimed on behalf of the appellant on 6 December 2007 that she was represented by a firm of solicitors, White Cleland, and that, on 4 February 2008, White Cleland had filed a notice of ceasing to act. Her Honour also recited at [5] of her reasons that the appellant had, on 8 February 2008, applied by facsimile transmission for an adjournment on medical grounds of the hearing listed for 11 February 2008. There is in that recital no implied criticism of the appellant. Nor can any such implication be gathered from [6] of her Honour’s reasons which is reproduced at [21] above and is no more than a summary of the reasons for decision of the Registrar. That is indicated by the terms of the paragraph and the place which it occupies in the reasons as a whole under the heading “Background”. It is true that the learned Federal Magistrate went on to consider the matter of legal representation when examining whether the appellant had furnished an adequate explanation for her non-appearance, either in person or by counsel or solicitor, on 11 February 2008. Her Honour accepted at [8] of her reasons that the medical grounds indicated in the facsimile of 8 February 2008 constituted a satisfactory reason for the appellant’s non-attendance in person on 11 February 2008. However, the reasons below go on, correctly in my view, to indicate why there was no adequate explanation for the appellant’s failure to appear on 11 February 2008 by counsel or solicitor. As her Honour indicated at [9]-[11] of the reasons, the inference was available that, after 4 February 2008, when White Cleland ceased to act, the appellant could have instructed another legal practitioner to appear a week later, at least to support the application for an adjournment made by facsimile on 8 February 2008. The discretion to grant an extension of time within which to seek a review of the Registrar’s decision was unconfined so, consistently with what Mason J said in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, at 40, it was open to take into account the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the non-appearance on 11 February 2008. His Honour there said;In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard: see Reg v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd, adopting the earlier formulations of Dixon J in Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury, and Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning. (citations omitted)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

This ground is misconceived. Section 44 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) provides, so far as is relevant;A party to a proceeding before the Federal Magistrates Court is not entitled to be represented by another person unless:(a)under the Judiciary Act 1903, the other person is entitled to practise as a barrister or solicitor, or both, in a federal court; …Blueprint was represented at the hearing on 25 August 2008 by Ms L Barrett and at each of the hearings on 10 September and 13 October 2008 by Ms J Treleaven. Each of those practitioners was instructed by Herbert Geer Rundle, the solicitors on the record for Blueprint for the duration of the hearing. There is no evidence to suggest that any of those legal representatives of Blueprint was not entitled under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to practise as a barrister or solicitor or both, in a federal court.Conclusion In my view, the orders made by Riley FM on 17 October 2008 were interlocutory so that the appellant can only appeal from them by leave. In the circumstances, it is appropriate to treat the appellant’s notice of appeal filed 7 November 2008 and her successive amended notices of appeal, including that filed on 26 November 2009, as an application for leave to appeal on the grounds set out in those notices. On that basis, I am required to apply the two limbs of the test enunciated by a Full Court of this Court in Décor CorporationPty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 (“Décor Corporation v Dart”) by asking;(a)“whether, in all the circumstances, the decision [of the Federal Magistrates Court] is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered [on appeal]”; and(b)“whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong.” As the reasons outlined above reveal that the appellant has comprehensively failed to make out any of the grounds of appeal set out in her further amended notice of appeal filed on 26 November 2009, it follows that she has not satisfied the first limb of the test formulated in Décor Corporation v Dart. If I were wrong in characterising the orders of 17 October 2008, the reasons which I have explained would compel the dismissal of the appeal embodied in the appellant’s original notice of appeal and the successive amendments thereto. As well, because Blueprint has subsequently abandoned any attempt to rely on the first bankruptcy notice as a foundation for a creditor’s petition against the appellant, there can be no substantial injustice if leave to appeal be refused. Accordingly, leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court of 17 October 2008 must be refused with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.