WINFORD v PERMANENT NOMINEES (AUST) LTD ACN: 000 154 441 & ORS [2002] ACTSC 21 (28 March 2002)
CATCHWORDS
NEGLIGENCE – personal injury – claims against the Commonwealth – contractual indemnity – claim for contribution by a tortfeasor against the Commonwealth – contribution – Commonwealth as a joint tortfeasor – statutory removal of right of action – is a claim for indemnity or contribution “an action or other proceeding for damages . . . in respect of an injury sustained by an employee” - distinction between a contractual indemnity against damages, costs and other expenses and a claim for “damages” - distinction between contribution and indemnity.
McGregor, H McGregor on Damages 14th ed Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London, 1980 at 384
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)s 44, s 44(1)(a) and 45
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act1955 s 11 and s 12
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 64 and s 79
Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1994) 179 CLR 297
Commonwealth of Australia v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471
Austral Pacific Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Airservices Australia [2000] HCA 39; (2000) 203 CLR 136; 173 ALR 619
Commonwealth of Australia v Evans Deakin Industries Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 254
Pearce v Crown Equipment Pty Ltd (unreported, ACTSC 26 May 1995, SC 308 of 1993)
Birmingham and District Land Company v London and North Western Railway Company (1886) 34 Ch D 261
Westpac Banking Corporation v P & O Containers Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 320; 102 ALR 239
Penrith City Council v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 564
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589
No. SC 284 of 2000
Judge: Higgins J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 28 March 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SC 284 of 2000
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN:MARIA WINFORD
Plaintiff
AND:PERMANENT NOMINEES (AUST) LTD ACN: 000 154 441
Defendant
COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA
First Third Party
OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY PTY LTD
Second Third PartyK F (ACT) PTY LIMITED
Third Third Party
ORDER
Judge: Higgins J
Date: 28 March 2002
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application by the First Third Party to determine in advance the points of law raised by it in its Amended Defence of 9 November 2001 be granted.
Paragraphs 12 to 17 of the Amended Defence be struck out.
The relief sought in paragraph 18 is, at this stage, declined.
The parties will be heard as to costs.
This is an application to set aside, as disclosing no cause of action, a Third Party Notice issued by the Defendant to the First Third Party.
The principal claim arises out of personal injury suffered by the Plaintiff in the course of her employment by the First Third Party. She was injured on or about 12 February 1998 when she…
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- Case
- [2002] ACTSC 21
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the contractual indemnity claim is not barred by the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The indemnity clause in the Lease is enforceable as it pertains to the contractual obligation between the defendant and the first third party, rather than a claim for damages arising from the injury to the plaintiff. The distinction between a contractual indemnity and a claim for damages was established in precedent cases such as Birmingham and District Land Company v London and North Western Railway Company (1886) 34 Ch D 261. The court further clarified that the contractual indemnity is not limited to cases where the plaintiff could have sued the first third party, as the indemnity clause provides for a broader obligation.
The court granted the application by the first third party to determine the points of law raised in its Amended Defence of 9 November 2001. However, it struck out paragraphs 12 to 17 of the Amended Defence. The relief sought in paragraph 18 was declined at this stage. The parties will be heard regarding costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Permanent Nominees has, by a Third Party Notice, sought contribution from Otis Elevator based on a contractual indemnity contained in the Lease between them. The indemnity clause obligates Otis Elevator to indemnify Permanent Nominees against all liability or loss arising from loss, damage, or injury to any person caused, or contributed to, by the negligence of Otis Elevator or its employees and agents. Otis Elevator argues that section 44 of the SRC Act bars any claim against it, whether by Permanent Nominees or any other person, for contribution, indemnity, or otherwise, in respect of Winford's injury. Permanent Nominees contends that the contractual indemnity is not caught by section 44 and should have its full force and effect according to its terms. The court must determine whether the claim for indemnity or contribution is "an action or other proceeding for damages...in respect of an injury sustained by an employee," which would be barred by section 44(1)(a) of the SRC Act.
The matter came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory as an application to set aside a Third Party Notice issued by the Defendant, Permanent Nominees (Aust) Ltd, to the First Third Party, Otis Elevator Company Pty Ltd. The Plaintiff, Maria Winford, alleged that she suffered personal injury while attempting to enter an elevator at her workplace, which was owned by the Defendant and sublet to the First Third Party. The Defendant sought contribution from the First Third Party based on a contractual indemnity contained in their Lease agreement. The First Third Party argued that section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) barred any claim against it, whether for contribution, indemnity, or otherwise, in respect of the injury to the Plaintiff. The case involved a complex interplay of statutory provisions, common law principles, and contractual obligations. The Supreme Court of the ACT heard the application on 15 November 2001 and delivered its judgment on 28 March 2002.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) bar a claim for contractual indemnity against the Commonwealth, its authorities, or their employees?
2. Can a claim for contribution be made against the Commonwealth or its authorities where the Commonwealth would not be liable in respect of the same damage if sued?
3. Does a claim for indemnity or contribution fall within the definition of "an action or other proceeding for damages . .. in respect of an injury sustained by an employee" as per section 44(1)(a) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)?
4. Is the distinction between a contractual indemnity and a claim for damages clear and applicable to the facts of this case?
5. Does the indemnity clause in the Lease between the Defendant and the First Third Party have full force and effect according to its terms, notwithstanding section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)?
6. Can the Defendant obtain a judgment for indemnity against the First Third Party in the current proceedings, or must it wait until the Plaintiff obtains a verdict against the Defendant?
7. Does the policy of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) preclude the Defendant from seeking indemnity from the First Third Party under the terms of the Lease?
Held
1. The court concluded that section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) does not bar a claim for contractual indemnity against the Commonwealth, its authorities, or their employees. The application to determine in advance the points of law was granted.
2. The court held that a claim for contribution cannot be made against the Commonwealth or its authorities where the Commonwealth would not be liable in respect of the same damage if sued.
3. The court determined that a claim for indemnity or contribution does not fall within the definition of "an action or other proceeding for damages...in respect of an injury sustained by an employee" as per section 44(1)(a) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).
4. The court found that the distinction between a contractual indemnity and a claim for damages is clear and applicable to the facts of this case.
5. The court held that the indemnity clause in the Lease between the Defendant and the First Third Party has full force and effect according to its terms, notwithstanding section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).
6. The court decided that the Defendant can obtain a judgment for indemnity against the First Third Party in the current proceedings, and need not wait until the Plaintiff obtains a verdict against the Defendant.
7. The court concluded that the policy of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) does not preclude the Defendant from seeking indemnity from the First Third Party under the terms of the Lease.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in Winford v Permanent Nominees (Aust) Ltd ACN: 000 154 441 considered several significant issues related to claims for indemnity and contribution against the Commonwealth and its authorities under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The court's reasoning was grounded in the interpretation of statutory provisions and their interaction with common law principles of indemnity and contribution.
First, the court examined whether section 44 of the SRC Act barred a claim for contractual indemnity against the Commonwealth, its authorities, or their employees. The court held that section 44 did not bar such claims if they did not constitute an "action or other proceeding for damages" in respect of an injury sustained by an employee. The court distinguished between contractual indemnity, which is a promise to pay money if certain events occur, and a claim for damages, which arises from a breach of contract. This distinction was supported by authorities such as McGregor on Damages and cases like Birmingham and District Land Company v London and North Western Railway Company.
Second, the court considered whether a claim for contribution could be made against the Commonwealth or its authorities where the Commonwealth would not be liable in respect of the same damage if sued. The court relied on the decision in Austral Pacific Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Airservices Australia, which held that a claim for contribution could not be made against the Commonwealth under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 if the Commonwealth would not have been liable in damages. However, this did not apply to claims for contractual indemnity, as they were not claims for damages.
Third, the court explored whether a claim for indemnity or contribution fell within the definition of "an action or other proceeding for damages... in respect of an injury sustained by an employee" as per section 44(1)(a) of the SRC Act. The court concluded that a claim for indemnity was not such an action or proceeding, as it was a contractual obligation to pay money if certain conditions were met, not a claim arising from a breach of contract. This reasoning was consistent with the High Court's decision in Austral Pacific, which distinguished between claims for contribution or indemnity and claims for damages.
Fourth, the court considered the distinction between a contractual indemnity and a claim for damages, and whether it was clear and applicable to the facts of this case. The court found that the contractual indemnity in the Lease between the Defendant and the First Third Party was enforceable according to its terms, as it was not precluded by section 44 of the SRC Act. The indemnity was a contractual promise, not a claim for damages, and thus was not barred by the statutory provisions.
Fifth, the court addressed whether the indemnity clause in the Lease had full force and effect notwithstanding section 44 of the SRC Act. The court held that the indemnity clause was valid and enforceable, as it was a contractual obligation independent of the statutory scheme. The policy of the SRC Act did not preclude the Defendant from seeking indemnity from the First Third Party under the terms of the Lease.
Sixth, the court considered whether the Defendant could obtain a judgment for indemnity against the First Third Party in the current proceedings or must wait until the Plaintiff obtained a verdict against the Defendant. The court concluded that the Defendant could seek indemnity in the current proceedings, as damages were not an adequate remedy and the First Third Party could be heard on the extent of its liability in the same proceedings.
Finally, the court addressed whether the policy of the SRC Act precluded the Defendant from seeking indemnity from the First Third Party under the terms of the Lease. The court held that the policy did not preclude such a claim, as the disadvantage to the First Third Party arose from its freely undertaken contractual bargain with the Defendant.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a contractual indemnity claim is not barred by section 44 of the SRC Act if it does not constitute an "action or other proceeding for damages" in respect of an injury sustained by an employee. The court distinguished between contractual indemnity, which is a promise to pay money if certain events occur, and a claim for damages, which arises from a breach of contract. The policy of the SRC Act does not preclude a party from seeking indemnity under a contractual indemnity clause.