Winford v Permanent Nominees (Aust) Ltd ACN: 000 154 441

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WINFORD v PERMANENT NOMINEES (AUST) LTD ACN: 000 154 441 & ORS [2002] ACTSC 21 (28 March 2002)

CATCHWORDS

NEGLIGENCE – personal injury – claims against the Commonwealth – contractual indemnity – claim for contribution by a tortfeasor against the Commonwealth – contribution – Commonwealth as a joint tortfeasor – statutory removal of right of action – is a claim for indemnity or contribution “an action or other proceeding for damages . . . in respect of an injury sustained by an employee” - distinction between a contractual indemnity against damages, costs and other expenses and a claim for “damages” - distinction between contribution and indemnity.

McGregor, H McGregor on Damages 14th ed Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London, 1980 at 384

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)s 44, s 44(1)(a) and 45

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act1955 s 11 and s 12

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 64 and s 79

Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1994) 179 CLR 297

Commonwealth of Australia v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471

Austral Pacific Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Airservices Australia [2000] HCA 39; (2000) 203 CLR 136; 173 ALR 619

Commonwealth of Australia v Evans Deakin Industries Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 254

Pearce v Crown Equipment Pty Ltd (unreported, ACTSC 26 May 1995, SC 308 of 1993)

Birmingham and District Land Company v London and North Western Railway Company (1886) 34 Ch D 261

Westpac Banking Corporation v P & O Containers Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 320; 102 ALR 239

TheWorkers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation v JR Engineering Services Pty Ltd  [1995] SASC 4992

Penrith City Council v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 564

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589

No. SC 284 of 2000

Judge:               Higgins J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date:                  28 March 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  )
  )              No. SC 284 of 2000
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY  )

BETWEEN:MARIA WINFORD

Plaintiff

AND:PERMANENT NOMINEES (AUST) LTD ACN: 000 154 441

Defendant

COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA

First Third Party

OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY PTY LTD
  Second Third Party

K F (ACT) PTY LIMITED

Third Third Party

ORDER

Judge:  Higgins J
Date:  28 March 2002
Place:  Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The application by the First Third Party to determine in advance the points of law raised by it in its Amended Defence of 9 November 2001 be granted.

  1. Paragraphs 12 to 17 of  the Amended Defence be struck out.

  1. The relief sought in paragraph 18 is, at this stage, declined.

  1. The parties will be heard as to costs.

  1. This is an application to set aside, as disclosing no cause of action, a Third Party Notice issued by the Defendant to the First Third Party.

  1. The principal claim arises out of personal injury suffered by the Plaintiff in the course of her employment by the First Third Party.  She was injured on or about 12 February 1998 when she…

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Details
Case
[2002] ACTSC 21
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the plaintiff, Maria Winford, suffered personal injury while working for Otis Elevator Company Pty Ltd, the first third party. The incident occurred when Winford attempted to enter an elevator at her workplace but fell due to the elevator's failure to stop level with the outside floor. The defendant, Permanent Nominees (Aust) Ltd, is the owner of the building and had sublet the premises to the first third party. The central legal issue is whether the defendant is entitled to a contractual indemnity from the first third party under clause 14.1 of the Lease, given that the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) bars any claim against the Commonwealth in respect of an injury sustained by an employee.

The court held that the contractual indemnity claim is not barred by the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The indemnity clause in the Lease is enforceable as it pertains to the contractual obligation between the defendant and the first third party, rather than a claim for damages arising from the injury to the plaintiff. The distinction between a contractual indemnity and a claim for damages was established in precedent cases such as Birmingham and District Land Company v London and North Western Railway Company (1886) 34 Ch D 261. The court further clarified that the contractual indemnity is not limited to cases where the plaintiff could have sued the first third party, as the indemnity clause provides for a broader obligation.

The court granted the application by the first third party to determine the points of law raised in its Amended Defence of 9 November 2001. However, it struck out paragraphs 12 to 17 of the Amended Defence. The relief sought in paragraph 18 was declined at this stage. The parties will be heard regarding costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Maria Winford sustained personal injuries on or about 12 February 1998 when she fell into an elevator at her workplace, which had failed to stop level with the outside floor. The incident occurred while she was an employee of Otis Elevator Company Pty Ltd, the first third party in these proceedings. The building where the elevator was located is owned by Permanent Nominees (Aust) Ltd, the defendant, which had sublet the entire building to Otis Elevator pursuant to a registered Memorandum of Sub-Lease. K F (ACT) Pty Limited, the second third party, was the maintenance contractor for the elevator, and the third third party was responsible for its management. Winford's injuries prevented her from suing Otis Elevator, as her cause of action accrued after the provisions of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) came into effect, which bar any action for damages against the Commonwealth or its instrumentalities in respect of injuries sustained by an employee in the course of their employment.

Permanent Nominees has, by a Third Party Notice, sought contribution from Otis Elevator based on a contractual indemnity contained in the Lease between them. The indemnity clause obligates Otis Elevator to indemnify Permanent Nominees against all liability or loss arising from loss, damage, or injury to any person caused, or contributed to, by the negligence of Otis Elevator or its employees and agents. Otis Elevator argues that section 44 of the SRC Act bars any claim against it, whether by Permanent Nominees or any other person, for contribution, indemnity, or otherwise, in respect of Winford's injury. Permanent Nominees contends that the contractual indemnity is not caught by section 44 and should have its full force and effect according to its terms. The court must determine whether the claim for indemnity or contribution is "an action or other proceeding for damages...in respect of an injury sustained by an employee," which would be barred by section 44(1)(a) of the SRC Act.

The matter came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory as an application to set aside a Third Party Notice issued by the Defendant, Permanent Nominees (Aust) Ltd, to the First Third Party, Otis Elevator Company Pty Ltd. The Plaintiff, Maria Winford, alleged that she suffered personal injury while attempting to enter an elevator at her workplace, which was owned by the Defendant and sublet to the First Third Party. The Defendant sought contribution from the First Third Party based on a contractual indemnity contained in their Lease agreement. The First Third Party argued that section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) barred any claim against it, whether for contribution, indemnity, or otherwise, in respect of the injury to the Plaintiff. The case involved a complex interplay of statutory provisions, common law principles, and contractual obligations. The Supreme Court of the ACT heard the application on 15 November 2001 and delivered its judgment on 28 March 2002.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) bar a claim for contractual indemnity against the Commonwealth, its authorities, or their employees?
2. Can a claim for contribution be made against the Commonwealth or its authorities where the Commonwealth would not be liable in respect of the same damage if sued?
3. Does a claim for indemnity or contribution fall within the definition of "an action or other proceeding for damages . .. in respect of an injury sustained by an employee" as per section 44(1)(a) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)?
4. Is the distinction between a contractual indemnity and a claim for damages clear and applicable to the facts of this case?
5. Does the indemnity clause in the Lease between the Defendant and the First Third Party have full force and effect according to its terms, notwithstanding section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)?
6. Can the Defendant obtain a judgment for indemnity against the First Third Party in the current proceedings, or must it wait until the Plaintiff obtains a verdict against the Defendant?
7. Does the policy of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) preclude the Defendant from seeking indemnity from the First Third Party under the terms of the Lease?

Held
1. The court concluded that section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) does not bar a claim for contractual indemnity against the Commonwealth, its authorities, or their employees. The application to determine in advance the points of law was granted.
2. The court held that a claim for contribution cannot be made against the Commonwealth or its authorities where the Commonwealth would not be liable in respect of the same damage if sued.
3. The court determined that a claim for indemnity or contribution does not fall within the definition of "an action or other proceeding for damages...in respect of an injury sustained by an employee" as per section 44(1)(a) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).
4. The court found that the distinction between a contractual indemnity and a claim for damages is clear and applicable to the facts of this case.
5. The court held that the indemnity clause in the Lease between the Defendant and the First Third Party has full force and effect according to its terms, notwithstanding section 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).
6. The court decided that the Defendant can obtain a judgment for indemnity against the First Third Party in the current proceedings, and need not wait until the Plaintiff obtains a verdict against the Defendant.
7. The court concluded that the policy of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) does not preclude the Defendant from seeking indemnity from the First Third Party under the terms of the Lease.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court in Winford v Permanent Nominees (Aust) Ltd ACN: 000 154 441 considered several significant issues related to claims for indemnity and contribution against the Commonwealth and its authorities under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The court's reasoning was grounded in the interpretation of statutory provisions and their interaction with common law principles of indemnity and contribution.

First, the court examined whether section 44 of the SRC Act barred a claim for contractual indemnity against the Commonwealth, its authorities, or their employees. The court held that section 44 did not bar such claims if they did not constitute an "action or other proceeding for damages" in respect of an injury sustained by an employee. The court distinguished between contractual indemnity, which is a promise to pay money if certain events occur, and a claim for damages, which arises from a breach of contract. This distinction was supported by authorities such as McGregor on Damages and cases like Birmingham and District Land Company v London and North Western Railway Company.

Second, the court considered whether a claim for contribution could be made against the Commonwealth or its authorities where the Commonwealth would not be liable in respect of the same damage if sued. The court relied on the decision in Austral Pacific Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Airservices Australia, which held that a claim for contribution could not be made against the Commonwealth under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 if the Commonwealth would not have been liable in damages. However, this did not apply to claims for contractual indemnity, as they were not claims for damages.

Third, the court explored whether a claim for indemnity or contribution fell within the definition of "an action or other proceeding for damages... in respect of an injury sustained by an employee" as per section 44(1)(a) of the SRC Act. The court concluded that a claim for indemnity was not such an action or proceeding, as it was a contractual obligation to pay money if certain conditions were met, not a claim arising from a breach of contract. This reasoning was consistent with the High Court's decision in Austral Pacific, which distinguished between claims for contribution or indemnity and claims for damages.

Fourth, the court considered the distinction between a contractual indemnity and a claim for damages, and whether it was clear and applicable to the facts of this case. The court found that the contractual indemnity in the Lease between the Defendant and the First Third Party was enforceable according to its terms, as it was not precluded by section 44 of the SRC Act. The indemnity was a contractual promise, not a claim for damages, and thus was not barred by the statutory provisions.

Fifth, the court addressed whether the indemnity clause in the Lease had full force and effect notwithstanding section 44 of the SRC Act. The court held that the indemnity clause was valid and enforceable, as it was a contractual obligation independent of the statutory scheme. The policy of the SRC Act did not preclude the Defendant from seeking indemnity from the First Third Party under the terms of the Lease.

Sixth, the court considered whether the Defendant could obtain a judgment for indemnity against the First Third Party in the current proceedings or must wait until the Plaintiff obtained a verdict against the Defendant. The court concluded that the Defendant could seek indemnity in the current proceedings, as damages were not an adequate remedy and the First Third Party could be heard on the extent of its liability in the same proceedings.

Finally, the court addressed whether the policy of the SRC Act precluded the Defendant from seeking indemnity from the First Third Party under the terms of the Lease. The court held that the policy did not preclude such a claim, as the disadvantage to the First Third Party arose from its freely undertaken contractual bargain with the Defendant.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a contractual indemnity claim is not barred by section 44 of the SRC Act if it does not constitute an "action or other proceeding for damages" in respect of an injury sustained by an employee. The court distinguished between contractual indemnity, which is a promise to pay money if certain events occur, and a claim for damages, which arises from a breach of contract. The policy of the SRC Act does not preclude a party from seeking indemnity under a contractual indemnity clause.