Williams v CEO Housing

Case [2013] NTSC 28


Williams v CEO Housing [2013] NTSC 28

PARTIES:WILLIAMS, Vanessa

v

CEO HOUSING

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY           

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FILE NO:No. LA4 of 2013 (21236346)

DELIVERED:  6 June 2013

HEARING DATES:  29 May 2013

JUDGMENT OF:  HILEY J

APPEAL FROM:  DR LOWNDES SM

CATCHWORDS:

LANDLORD AND TENANT – application under s 100(1) Residential Tenancies Act (NT) for orders terminating a tenancy and for possession – whether court has discretion once satisfied of threshold requirements – remedies available to landlords

COURTS – Local Court - jurisdiction under s 100(1) Residential Tenancies Act (NT) – discretion to terminate a tenancy and make order for possession

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – words and phrases – “may” – whether power conferred is discretionary – whether mandatory

Local Court Act (NT) s 19

Residential Tenancies Act (NT) s 3, s 82, s 96A, s 96B, s 97, s 99A, s 100, s 100A, s 101, s 103, s 104, s 105, s 122, s 150(7)

Commissioner for Social Housing in the ACT v Canham(Residential Tenancies) [2012] ACAT 41; Crook v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal NSW (2003) 59 NSWLR 300; Eastman v Commissioner for Housing in the ACT [2006] 200 FLR 272; NSW Land and Housing Corporation v Bullman [2006] NSWSC 733, applied.

CEO Housing v Coonan [2010] NTMC 30; CEO Housing v Steiner [2008] NTMC 9, approved.

Lugg v Wright [1941] SASR 106; Mason and Anor v NT Housing (1996) 6 NTLR 152; Owens v Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation (1991) 46 FLR 16, distinguished.

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:N Aughterson

Respondent:  C Smyth

Solicitors:

Appellant:North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency

Respondent:  Solicitor for the Northern Territory

Judgment category classification:    A

Judgment ID Number:  Hil1303

Number of pages:  17

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Williams v CEO Housing [2013] NTSC 28

No. LA4 of 2013 (21236346)

BETWEEN:

WILLIAMS, Vanessa

Appellant

AND:

CEO - Housing

Respondent

CORAM:    HILEY J

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 6 June 2013)

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against a decision by the Local Court on 6 March 2013 to terminate the appellant’s tenancy at unit 14/10 Parap Road, Parap (the “premises”) and to order possession of the premises. 

  2. On 28 September 2012 the respondent sought orders for the termination of the tenancy and possession of the premises, under s 100(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act. The premises have been leased by the appellant since 8 July 2002. The tenancy agreement is currently fixed to expire on 1 September 2013. The respondent relied upon the grounds set out in s 100(1)(b) and (c) of the Residential Tenancies Act .

  3. Section 100(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act  provides as follows:

    (1)   A court may, on the application of the landlord or an interested person, terminate a tenancy and make an order for possession of the premises if satisfied the tenant has:

    (a)used the premises, or caused…

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Williams v CEO Housing [2013] NTSC 28
Case
[2013] NTSC 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Williams and the CEO Housing were parties in a dispute regarding the termination of a tenancy and the possession of a property. The matter was brought before the Local Court of the Northern Territory, which had jurisdiction under section 100(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act (NT). The court was required to determine whether, once satisfied of the threshold requirements, it had the discretion to terminate the tenancy and make an order for possession. Additionally, the court had to interpret the meaning of the word "may" in the context of the Act to understand whether the power conferred was discretionary or mandatory.

The court analysed the statutory language and found that the word "may" indicated a discretionary power. It concluded that the court could exercise its discretion in terminating a tenancy and ordering possession, provided the threshold requirements were met. The court examined the purpose of the Act and the balance between the rights of landlords and tenants, ultimately determining that the discretion was necessary to achieve just outcomes in individual cases. The court's interpretation aligned with the principles of statutory interpretation that emphasised the context and purpose of the legislation.

The Local Court found in favour of the CEO Housing, exercising its discretion to terminate the tenancy and ordering possession of the property. The court's decision was based on its interpretation of the statutory language and the need for discretion in achieving just outcomes. The court's interpretation of the word "may" as conferring discretionary power was pivotal in reaching its conclusion. This decision provides clarity for landlords and tenants regarding the scope of the court's discretion under section 100(1) of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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