Commissioner for Social Housing in the ACT & Canham

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ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

COMMISSIONER FOR SOCIAL HOUSING IN THE ACT & CANHAM (Residential Tenancies) [2012] ACAT 41

RT 11/584

Catchwords:             RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES – termination of residential tenancy agreement – interlocutory ruling on statutory construction - whether the Commissioner for Social Housing (“the Commissioner”) has discretion under section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 – whether the status of the Commissioner as a social housing provider under the Housing Assistance Act 1987 is relevant to consider the Commissioner’s discretion – interpretation of “may” – issues for statutory interpretation: social housing, governmental agreements on housing, and human rights

List of legislation:     Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 (NSW), s 23 and former s 68

Human Rights Act 2004, ss 12, 28 and 30

Legislation Act 2001, s 146

Residential Tenancies Act 1997, ss 48, 51 and 97, and term 70(c)

List of cases:              Canberra Fathers and Children Services v Watson
 
[2010] ACAT 74

CEO Housing v Janine Coonan [2010] NTMC 30

Commissioner for Social Housing v Faull [2008] ACTRTT 20

Commissioner for Social Housing v Radovanov [2011] ACAT 12

Commissioner for Housing of the ACT v Smith [1995] ACTSC 17

NSW Land and Housing Corporation v Adams (Tenancy)
[2004] NSWCTTT 801

NSW Land and Housing Corporation v Bullman [2006] NSWSC 733

NSW Land and Housing Corporation v Janiuk
(2007) NSWCTTT 632

R v Fearnside (2009) 3 ACTLR 25

List of Texts/Papers: Anforth, Christensen and Taylor, Residential Tenancies Law and Practice in NSW, 5th ed Fed Press

Otto, Homelessness and Human Rights; Engaging human rights; Discourses in the Australian context
[2002] ALTLawJ I 97
Watchirs and McKinnon, Five Years Experience of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT): Insights for human rights protection in Australia, (2010) 33 UNSWLJ 136.

Tribunal:                  Mr A. Anforth, Senior Member

Date of Ruling  5 July 2012

Interlocutory Ruling and Reasons

Overview of the case

  1. This matter concerns an application by the Commissioner for Social Housing (the Commissioner) for termination of a residential tenancy agreement under section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (the Act) by reason of certain acts of violence by the Respondent against a neighbour. Section 51 provides:

51       Damage, injury or intention to damage or injure

On application by a lessor, the ACAT may make a termination and possession order effective immediately if satisfied that the tenant has intentionally or recklessly caused or allowed, or is likely to cause or allow—

……..

(c)if the lessor is a corporation—injury to a representative of the    corporation or a member of a representative’s family; or

(d)serious or continuous interference with the quiet enjoyment       of        nearby premises by an occupier of the premises. (emphasis added)

  1. The parties have sought an interlocutory ruling on the construction of section 51 that bears directly on the facts of this case. In particular:

    (a)whether section 51 provides the Tribunal with any discretion not to evict a tenant found to have committed a ‘serious interference’ within the meaning of section 51(d); and

    (b)if so,…

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Details
Case
[2012] ACAT 41
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved the Commissioner for Social Housing in the Australian Capital Territory (the Commissioner) and Mr. Canham, a tenant. The dispute centred on the termination of Mr. Canham's residential tenancy agreement and the Commissioner's discretion under section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997. The matter was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The court was tasked with determining whether the Commissioner had the discretion to terminate the tenancy agreement and, if so, whether the Commissioner's role as a social housing provider under the Housing Assistance Act 1987 influenced the exercise of that discretion. The case also examined the interpretation of the word "may" in section 51 of the Act, which raises questions about statutory interpretation in the context of social housing, governmental agreements on housing, and human rights.

The central legal issues revolved around the scope of the Commissioner's discretion under section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 and the relevance of the Commissioner's status as a social housing provider. The court needed to decide whether the statutory language granted the Commissioner the discretion to terminate the tenancy agreement and, if so, whether this discretion was subject to any limitations or considerations arising from the Commissioner's role as a social housing provider. Additionally, the court examined the interpretation of the word "may" in the statutory context, which is crucial for understanding the extent of the Commissioner's powers in terminating residential tenancies.

The court considered the statutory language, legislative context, and the purpose of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997. The court held that the word "may" in section 51 of the Act confers discretion on the Commissioner to terminate a tenancy agreement. However, the court noted that the Commissioner's discretion must be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the legislative purpose and any relevant principles of social housing and human rights. The court found that the Commissioner's status as a social housing provider does not limit the exercise of this discretion but may inform the manner in which it is exercised. The court concluded that the Commissioner had the discretion to terminate the tenancy agreement but must do so in a manner that is fair and reasonable, taking into account the principles of social housing and human rights.

The court issued an interlocutory ruling, clarifying the scope of the Commissioner's discretion under section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 and the relevance of the Commissioner's role as a social housing provider. The court's decision provides important guidance on the interpretation of the statutory language and the exercise of the Commissioner's discretion in terminating residential tenancy agreements. The court's ruling ensures that the Commissioner's discretion is exercised in a manner that is consistent with the legislative purpose and any relevant principles of social housing and human rights. The matter is ongoing, and the court's final orders are yet to be determined.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involved a dispute over the termination of a residential tenancy agreement under the Residential Tenancies Act 1997. The tenant, who was a beneficiary of social housing, received a notice of termination from the Commissioner for Social Housing. The Commissioner, acting as the landlord, argued that the termination was justified and sought to enforce the notice. The tenant contested the termination, arguing that the Commissioner lacked the necessary discretion to terminate the agreement under section 51 of the Act. The tenant also raised concerns about the Commissioner's status as a social housing provider under the Housing Assistance Act 1987 and its potential impact on the interpretation of the discretion granted by the Residential Tenancies Act. The case centred on the interpretation of the word "may" in section 51 of the Act and the broader context of social housing, governmental agreements on housing, and human rights.

This matter came before the court as an interlocutory application seeking a ruling on the statutory construction of section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997. The application was filed by the Commissioner for Social Housing, who sought clarification on the extent of their discretion to terminate residential tenancy agreements. The court heard arguments from both parties and reviewed relevant statutes, including the Residential Tenancies Act and the Housing Assistance Act. The case did not proceed to a full hearing on the merits of the termination but focused solely on the interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Commissioner for Social Housing have discretion under section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 to terminate a residential tenancy agreement?
2. Is the status of the Commissioner as a social housing provider under the Housing Assistance Act 1987 relevant to the consideration of the Commissioner’s discretion under the Residential Tenancies Act?
3. What is the meaning of the word "may" in section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997?
4. How do social housing, governmental agreements on housing, and human rights inform the interpretation of "may" in section 51 of the Act?

Held
1. The Commissioner for Social Housing has discretion under section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 to terminate a residential tenancy agreement. The court concluded that the term "may" in section 51 confers discretionary power to the Commissioner.
2. The status of the Commissioner as a social housing provider under the Housing Assistance Act 1987 is not relevant to the consideration of the Commissioner’s discretion under the Residential Tenancies Act.
3. The word "may" in section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 signifies discretionary authority rather than a mandatory requirement.
4. Social housing, governmental agreements on housing, and human rights inform the interpretation of "may" in section 51 of the Act, leading to the conclusion that the Commissioner has the discretionary power to terminate the tenancy agreement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997, which states that the Commissioner "may" terminate a residential tenancy agreement. The court assessed whether this provision grants the Commissioner discretionary authority or imposes a mandatory obligation. The court found that the term "may" typically denotes discretion rather than compulsion, a conclusion supported by the ordinary meaning of the word and established legal principles. The court highlighted that if the legislature intended to impose a mandatory duty, it would have used clearer language. The court also emphasised that statutory interpretation should align with the broader context of social housing and the protection of vulnerable tenants, consistent with governmental agreements on housing and human rights principles. The court explicitly stated that the Commissioner’s status under the Housing Assistance Act 1987 does not influence the discretionary power conferred by section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act. The court's interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to provide flexibility in managing social housing while safeguarding tenants' rights. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the term "may" in section 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 grants the Commissioner for Social Housing discretionary authority to terminate a residential tenancy agreement, informed by the broader context of social housing and human rights.