JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION -v- NINAN [No 3] [2016] WASC 250
CORAM: CHANEY J
HEARD: ON THE PAPERS
DELIVERED : 15 AUGUST 2016
FILE NO/S: CIV 2202 of 2014
BETWEEN: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION
Plaintiff
AND
GEORGE NINAN
First DefendantMOLLY GEORGE
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Security for costs - Counterclaim by defendants - Defendants resident outside jurisdiction - Defendants impecunious - Strength of claim
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 25 r 1, O 25 r 2, O 25 r 3, O 25 r 4
Result:
Security for costs ordered
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: No appearance
First Defendant : No appearance
Second Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Jackson McDonald
First Defendant : In person
Second Defendant : In person
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Bryan E Fencott & Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497
KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189
Mabrouk Minerals Pty Ltd v Mabrouk Holdings Ltd [2008] WASC 132
Ninan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] WASCA 94
Westpac Banking Corporation v Ninan [2014] WASC 456
Westpac Banking Corporation v Ninan [No 2] [2015] WASC 315
CHANEY J: On 5 December 2014, summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff on its claim in this action: see Westpac Banking Corporation v Ninan [2014] WASC 456. The judgment required delivery of vacant possession to the plaintiff of a property in Dawesville, and for payment of an amount due under a loan agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants. Before summary judgment was entered, a defence and counterclaim was lodged by the defendants. The defence and counterclaim consists of a long and somewhat disjointed narrative. It is not apparent whether the various matters referred to are pleaded by way of defence or by way of counterclaim or both. In granting summary judgment I dealt with eight matters which the defendants contended amounted to a defence to the summary judgment application. I concluded that none of those eight matters was capable of being an arguable defence to the action. The counterclaim remained unresolved after summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff.
The defendants appealed against the orders for summary judgment. On 13 May 2015, Newnes JA ordered that the defendants provide security for costs of the appeal in the sum of $16,000 by 10 June 2015: see Ninan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] WASCA 94. An application for review of that decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 5 June 2015, and the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs of the appeal. On 11 June 2015, the appeal against the summary judgment application was dismissed as a result of the failure by the defendants to pay the amount specified by Newnes JA as security.
The defendants subsequently filed an application in these proceedings for discovery in relation to their counterclaim. Shortly afterwards, the plaintiff filed this application…
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- Case
- [2016] WASC 250
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles governing the granting of security for costs, noting that the discretion to order such security is broad and depends on all relevant circumstances. The court had to weigh the strength of the plaintiff's claim, the availability of assets within the jurisdiction, and the likelihood of enforcement of any costs order against the defendants. Additionally, the court considered the defendants' impecuniosity and whether the application for security was being used as a tactic to prevent them from litigating their counterclaim. The court determined that the application for security for costs should be dealt with before the application for discovery, as previously decided in Westpac Banking Corporation v Ninan [No 2] [2015] WASC 315.
Ultimately, the court found that the plaintiff's claim had a reasonable prospect of success, and the defendants' counterclaim was not strong enough to warrant declining the application for security for costs. The court noted that the defendants were impecunious, and the application for security was not oppressive but rather a legitimate consideration given their financial situation and residency outside Australia. The court ordered the defendants to provide security for costs as a condition of proceeding with their counterclaim.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
A dispute arose as to whether the application for security for costs should be dealt with before the defendants' application for discovery. Because Mr Ninan was unable, through ill‑health, to appear as arranged by telephone, to argue that issue, I dealt with it on the papers. On 20 August 2015, I delivered reasons for my conclusion that the application for security for costs should be dealt with first: see Westpac Banking Corporation v Ninan [No 2] [2015] WASC 315. The defendants applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the decision to deal with the question of security for costs first. That application for leave to appeal was dismissed on 3 November 2015. The parties subsequently filed submissions in relation to the application for security for costs, and it is that application to which these reasons are directed. Order 25 r 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) provides that the court may order security for costs to be given by a plaintiff, but no order shall be made merely on account of the poverty of the plaintiff or the likely inability of the plaintiff to pay any costs which might be awarded against him. Order 25 r 2 provides that the court may order security for costs where a plaintiff is ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction. The term 'plaintiff' includes a defendant who counterclaims in respect of a claim not arising out of the claim against him - see O 25 r 4. Mr and Mrs Ninan are resident outside Australia and currently reside in Bangkok, having previously resided in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. Order 25 r 3 provides that, in exercising the discretion to grant security for costs, the court is required to take into consideration the prima facie merits of the claim, what property within the jurisdiction may be available to satisfy any order for costs against the plaintiff and whether the normal processes of the court would be available within the jurisdiction for enforcement of any order for costs made against the plaintiff. Those considerations are not exhaustive. As Newnes J (as he then was) observed in Mabrouk Minerals Pty Ltd v Mabrouk Holdings Ltd [2008] WASC 132 [57]:It is well‑established that the discretion to order security for costs is unfettered and depends upon an examination of all of the relevant circumstances. The circumstances in which the discretion should be exercised cannot be stated exhaustively. They will vary from case to case and the weight to be given to any circumstance in a particular case will depend not only upon its own intrinsic persuasiveness but upon the impact of the other circumstances which have to be weighed: PS Chellaram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 102 ALR 321, 323. In KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189, Beazley J referred to the review of authorities in Bryan E Fencott & Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497, 509 and identified the following guidelines which the court typically takes into account (197):Notwithstanding the broad unfettered discretion with which the Court approaches an application for security for costs, there are a number of well established guidelines which the court typically takes into account in determining any such application. They are:1.That such applications should be brought promptly. This is a principle of longstanding: see Grant v The Banque Franco‑Egyptienne (1876) 1 CPD 143; see also Smail v Burton [1975] VR 776 per Gillard J at 777; Caruso Australia Pty Ltd v Portec (Australia) Pty Ltd (1984) 1 FCR 311 at 313; Bryan E Fencott at 514 …2.That regard is to be had to the strength and bona fides of the applicant's case are relevant considerations: see M A Productions Pty Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd (1982) 7 ACLR 97 at 100; Bryan E Fencott at 514. As a general rule, where a claim is prima facie regular on its face and discloses a cause of action, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court should proceed on the basis that the claim is bona fide with a reasonable prospect of success. (Bryan E Fencott at 514).3.Whether the applicant's impecuniosity was caused by the respondent's conduct subject of the claim: see M A Productions v Austarama Television at 100.4.Whether the respondent's application for security is oppressive, in the sense that it is being used merely to deny an impecunious applicant a right to litigate: see M A Productions v Austarama Television at 100; Yandil Holdings Pty Ltd v Insurance Co of North America (1985) 3 ACLC 542 per Clarke J at 545; Bryan E Fencott at 513. In Yandil Holdings at 545 Clarke J stated the principle in these terms:'[t]he fact that the ordering of security will frustrate the plaintiff's rights to litigate its claim because of its financial condition does not automatically lead to the refusal of an order. Nonetheless it will usually operate as a powerful factor in favour of exercising the court's discretion in the plaintiff's favour.'