Seymour v Jaeger [No 2]

Case [2020] WADC 15

JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   SEYMOUR -v- JAEGER [No 2] [2020] WADC 15

CORAM:   PRIOR DCJ

HEARD:   4 SEPTEMBER 2019

DELIVERED          :   11 FEBRUARY 2020

FILE NO/S:   APP 59 of 2018

BETWEEN:   MICHAEL THOMAS SEYMOUR

Appellant

AND

RUTH ELIZABETH JAEGER

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   MAGISTRATE MAHON

File Number            :   PER GCLM 3966 2017


Catchwords:

Appeal - Magistrates Court - Application to strike out defendant's defence and enter judgment for the plaintiff - Application for leave to file a counterclaim - Application by defendant for security for costs - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
District Court Rules 2005 (WA)
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA)
Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA)
Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Rules 2005 (WA)
Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : In person
Respondent : No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant : Not applicable
Respondent : Not applicable

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Alfaro v Brokesova [2013] WASCA 38

Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172

Avsar v Binning [2009] WASCA 219

Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464

Bryan E Fencott and Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194

Coxon v Wilson [2016] WASCA 48

Crawley Investments Pty Ltd v Noble Group Ltd [No 2] [2015] WASC 16

Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70; 148 CLR 658

Dodds v Kennedy [2011] WASCA 32

Fazio v The City of Melville [No 2] [2013] WADC 147

Field Camp Services Pty Ltd v Site Accommodation Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 118

Four Vanguard Services E Navagacao Lda v ENI Australia Ltd [2014] WASC 473

Googe v Spoljaric [2017] WADC 99

Hitchcock v Goldspan Investments Pty Ltd [No 3] [2015] WASC 277

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Jaddcal Pty Ltd v Minson [No 2] [2011] WASC 138

Jones v Darkan Hotel [2014] WASCA 133

Kimberley Downs Pty Ltd v The State of Western Australia (Unreported, WASC, Library No 6414, 25 August 1986)

Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34; (2004) 220 CLR 363

Manonai v Burns [2011] WASCA 165

Mickelberg v 6PR Southern Cross Radio Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 270

Morton Seed and Grain Pty Ltd v Corser and Corser [2006] WADC 90; (2006) 43 SR (WA) 182

Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513

Pettit v Evolution Mining Ltd [No 2] [2017] WADC 68

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589

Seymour v Jaegar [2019] WASCA 19

Seymour v Jaeger [2017] NSWSC 25

Titelius v Crowe [2017] WADC 116

Velez Pty Ltd v Tudor [2011] WASCA 218

Waite v Hennah [2019] WASC 468

Westonia Earthmoving Pty Ltd v Cliffs Asia Pacific Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2013]…

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AGLC
Seymour v Jaeger [No 2] [2020] WADC 15
Case
[2020] WADC 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Seymour v Jaeger [No 2], the appellant, Mr Seymour, appealed against the decision of a magistrate in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia, who had dismissed his application to strike out the defendant's defence and enter judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant, Mrs Jaeger, had filed a defence asserting that any agreement between the parties was illegal and unenforceable. The case involved multiple applications, including an application to strike out the defendant's defence and enter judgment for the plaintiff, an application for leave to file a counterclaim, and an application by the defendant for security for costs.

The legal issues before the court were whether the magistrate's reasons for his decision were adequate, whether the magistrate had erred in law in relation to the defence of illegality, and whether the doctrine of issue estoppel applied. The court examined whether the magistrate's reasons were sufficient to identify the facts accepted and the law applied in reaching the decision, and whether the magistrate had correctly assessed the defence of illegality. The court also considered whether the doctrine of issue estoppel precluded Mr Seymour from raising certain arguments.

The court held that the magistrate's reasons were adequate, as they identified the facts accepted and the law applied, and allowed Mr Seymour to ascertain the basis for the decision and determine whether he had grounds of appeal. The court found that the magistrate's assessment of the defence of illegality was sufficient for the application before him, as the issue of illegality involved factual matters to be determined at trial. The court further held that the doctrine of issue estoppel applied, precluding Mr Seymour from contending to the contrary of what had been put in issue and found against him in a prior judgment. Consequently, the court dismissed Mr Seymour's grounds of appeal.

The court dismissed Mr Seymour's appeal and affirmed the magistrate's decision. The orders of the Magistrates Court were upheld, and Mr Seymour was not granted the relief he sought. The court found that Mr Seymour had not demonstrated any legal, factual, or discretionary error on the part of the magistrate, and therefore, the appeal was without merit.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 31 of the MCA places limits on the requirement of a magistrate to provide reasons:31.Judgments, content of(1)The Court's reasons for a judgment in a case -(a)need only identify the facts that the Court has accepted in coming to its decision and give the reasons for doing so; and(b)need only identify the law that the Court has applied in coming to its decision and give the reasons for doing so; and(c)need not canvass all the evidence given in the case; and(d)need not canvass all the factual and legal arguments or issues arising in the case.(2)The fact that a judgment is given orally or in accordance with subsection (1) is not of itself a ground for reversing or modifying it on an appeal. In relation to the adequacy of reasons, in Velez Pty Ltd v Tudor[30] Murphy JA observed:Whether the content of reasons is adequate will depend on the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the jurisdiction being exercised … The court will look at the reasons as a whole and, if necessary in the context of the evidence, to determine whether they give a sense of what was intended in a way that achieves their required function and purpose …[30] Velez Pty Ltd v Tudor [2011] WASCA 218. In considering the magistrate's reasons, I give some weight to the fact that this was a decision on three interlocutory applications and the realities of work in a summary court described by Hall J in Manonai v Burns.[31][31] Manonai v Burns [2011] WASCA 165 [56]. In my view, the magistrate complied with the requirements in MCA s 31(1). The reasons were more than adequate for Mr Seymour to ascertain the basis for the decision and whether he had any grounds of appeal; and for me, sitting as the appeal court, to determine whether any errors of fact, law or discretion occurred. This ground of appeal is dismissed. The magistrate's reasons of 18 May 2018 indicate he was fully aware that a defence relied upon by Mrs Jaeger in the defence filed was that if an agreement was entered into by the parties it was illegal and unenforceable as it was in contravention of the LPA.[32] This defence was clearly referred to in the defence filed by Mrs Jaeger.[32] ts 63, 18 May 2018. It is not suggested that Mr Seymour holds a legal practice certificate and is an Australian legal practitioner. The real issue is what, if anything was Mr Seymour engaged to do by Mrs Jaeger? Was there an agreement? If so, to do what? Ultimately, the issue of illegality insofar as it involved matters of fact would be determined on the evidence. The magistrate's reasons in relation to the issue of illegality being raised as a defence were sufficient for the purpose of the application before him. In order for the magistrate to consider whether such a defence could be made out, credibility and factual findings would need to be made after considering the evidence of witnesses and exhibits tendered at the trial. This ground of appeal is dismissed. Issue estoppel arises when in further litigation a state of fact or law is alleged or denied, the existence of which is a matter necessarily decided by a prior judgment or order.[33] The prior judgment or order must be final and conclusive on the merits, not interlocutory, but completely effective unless and until it is rescinded, altered or amended. It is nonetheless final, although it may be appealed against.[34] The parties are thereby precluded from contending to the contrary that which has been put in issue by them and solemnly found against them.[35][33] Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589.[34] Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34; (2004) 220 CLR 363.[35] Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464, 531.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Seymour must demonstrate and satisfy me that there was some legal, factual, or discretionary error on the part of the magistrate: Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission.[8] If such an error has been made, I can substitute my decision for that of the magistrate. If no error is shown, I cannot intervene: Allesch v Maunz.[9][8] Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194, 203.[9] Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172 [23]. The fact that Mr Seymour is disappointed with the result does not mean that the appeal court is able to intervene. Mr Seymour must demonstrate that there has been error of a recognised genre that falls to be corrected and which entitles Mr Seymour to the orders or relief that he seeks: Avsar v Binning.[10][10] Avsar v Binning [2009] WASCA 219 [37]. So far as a discretionary error is concerned, the well-known principles enunciated in House v The King[11] are applicable. Before the magistrate's discretion should be reviewed, it must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion, such as acting on a wrong principle, allowing extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, mistaking the facts or failing to take into account some material consideration. Alternatively, if it appears upon the facts that it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion even though the error may not be discoverable.[12][11] House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499.[12] See also Dodds v Kennedy [2011] WASCA 32 [4]. In Norbis v Norbis[13] Mason and Deane JJ made the following comments elaborating on the principles set out in House:Because these assessments call for value judgments in respect of which there is room for reasonable differences of opinion, no particular opinion being uniquely right, the making of the order involves the exercise of a judicial discretion. The contrast is with an order the making of which is dictated by the application of a fixed rule to the facts on which its operation depends.The principles enunciated in House … were fashioned with a close eye on the characteristics of a discretionary order in the sense which we have outlined. If the questions involved lend themselves to differences of opinion which, within a given range, are legitimate and reasonable answers to the questions, it would be wrong to allow a court of appeal to set aside a judgment at first instance merely because there exists just such a difference of opinion between the judges on appeal and the judge at first instance. In conformity with the dictates of principled decision‑making, it would be wrong to determine the parties' rights by reference to a mere preference for a different result over that favoured by the judge at first instance, in the absence of error on his part. According to our conception of the appellate process, the existence of such an error, whether of law or fact, on the part of the court at first instance is an indispensable condition of a successful appeal.[13] Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513, 518 ‑ 519.