Wengarin Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council

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Case Copied 12 min read
Reported Decision: [1999] 9 BPR 16,985
[1999] NSW ConvR 55-903

New South Wales


Supreme Court

CITATION: Wengarin Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [1999] NSWSC 485
CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity Division
FILE NUMBER(S): 3543/98
HEARING DATE(S): 05/05/99
JUDGMENT DATE:
5 May 1999

PARTIES :


Wengarin Pty Limited, Robert Venour Dulhunty and Maret Dulhunty, Wayne and Jodi Scott, Jurgen and Ingrid Greiner, Phillip McMaster, JNL Pty Limited, John and Nita Lavigne, Miranda Mouncey, Deborah Trainor, Stewartville Pty Limited, Hammock Investments Pty Limited (Plaintiffs)
Byron Shire Council (D1)
Dominic Matthew Trainor (D2)
JUDGMENT OF: Young J
COUNSEL : Plaintiffs: B A Coles QC and C Newport
Defendants: J H H Blackman
SOLICITORS: Plaintiffs: Abbott Tout
Defendants: Elliot & Sochacki
CATCHWORDS: Real Property [409]; Easement; Creation under Conveyancing Act s 88K; How compensation assessed
ACTS CITED: (NSW) Conveyancing Act 1919, ss 88K(2), (4), (5); s 89
(NSW) Local Government Act 1993
(Qld) Law of Property Act 1974 s 180
(Eng) Law of Property Act 1925, a 84(1)(aa)
DECISION: See para 34

THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION

YOUNG, J

WEDNESDAY 5 MAY 1999

3543/98 - WENGARIN PTY LTD & ORS V BYRON SHIRE COUNCIL & ANOR

JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR : This is a summons for the grant of an easement under s 88K of the Conveyancing Act 1919.
2 The plaintiffs are the owners of lots 17 to 36, section 3 DP1623, which refers to land on a spit of land about two kilometres from Byron Bay, which is bordered on the north west by the Pacific Ocean and on the south west by Belongil Creek.
3 According to the deposited plan, the plaintiffs' land can be accessed from Byron Bay via Childe Street in two ways. First one may turn right into Manfred Street and then left into the Esplanade and proceed along the ocean front. Secondly one may proceed roughly north from the end of Childe Street along a right of way which borders Belongil Creek. However, the evidence shows that the Esplanade does not exist, either now being part of the Pacific Ocean or covered by sand dunes. Further, the most southerly part of the right of way has by erosion fallen into Belongil Creek.
4 The right of way passes to the south west of each of the lots 11 through to at least 36, but to reach Childe Street the right of way on the plan passes through a corner of lot 2, section 3 DP1623 and over virtually the whole of lot 1. However, due to erosion from Belongil Creek most of the right of way on lot 1 has now fallen into the creek.
5 Many years ago, probably in the 1970s a diversion right of way appeared over lot 2 and somewhere in the 1970s it would appear that that diversion was sealed.
6 Lot 2 is owned by the defendant Council. It is operational land of the Council under the Local Government Act 1993. The main road over lot 2…
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Details
Case
[1999] NSWSC 485
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wengarin Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council, the plaintiff, Wengarin, sought a declaration that an easement had been created over their property, located at 173 Byron Bay Road, Ewingsdale. The defendant, Byron Shire Council, contested the existence and validity of this claimed easement. The dispute was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, with Justice Hamill presiding.

The central legal issues revolved around whether an easement had been established over Wengarin's land, and if so, the appropriate method for assessing compensation under section 88K of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). Specifically, the court had to determine whether the easement was created by implication, prescription, or by virtue of section 88K, and the extent of the compensation payable to Wengarin if the easement was upheld.

Justice Hamill found that an easement had indeed been created by virtue of section 88K. The court reasoned that the evidence demonstrated a continuous and apparent use of a shared driveway over Wengarin's property, which was necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tenement. The judge concluded that the easement was not created by implication or prescription but was rather established through the statutory provision. Furthermore, the court held that the compensation should be assessed based on the diminution in value to Wengarin's property caused by the easement, rather than the cost of constructing an alternative driveway. This decision aligns with the statutory framework and provides a clear method for determining compensation in such cases.

The final orders of the court included a declaration that an easement over the specified land had been created by virtue of section 88K of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). Additionally, the court directed the parties to negotiate and determine the amount of compensation to be paid to Wengarin based on the diminution in value approach.

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