WCL (QLD) Albert St Pty Ltd v Orb Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  WCL (QLD) Albert St Pty Ltd v Orb Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors
[2023] QCA 263
PARTIES:  WCL (QLD) ALBERT ST PTY LTD
ACN 600 302 976
(appellant/not a party to the cross appeal)
v
ORB HOLDINGS PTY LTD
ACN 010 227 371
(first respondent/cross respondent)
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(second respondent/cross appellant)
REGISTRAR OF TITLES
(third respondent/cross appellant)
FILE NO/S:  Appeal No 12103 of 2022
SC No 6514 of 2019
DIVISION:  Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:  General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING 
COURT:  Supreme Court at Brisbane – (2022) 11 QR 750 (Crow J)
DELIVERED ON:  19 December 2023
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  20 March 2023; 21 March 2023
JUDGES:  Morrison and Bond JJA and Applegarth J
ORDERS:  1. Appeal dismissed.
2. The Appellant pay the Respondents’ costs of the

appeal.

3.    Cross-appeal dismissed.

4.   The Second and Third Respondents pay the First

Respondent’s costs of the cross-appeal.

CATCHWORDS: 

HIGHWAYS – CREATION AND EXTINCTION OF HIGHWAYS – DEDICATION – WHAT CONSTITUTES DEDICATION – GENERALLY – where, in the late 19th century,

the owners of land in Brisbane subdivided and sold their land
– where the whole of the subdivided land was subdivided into
nine individual lots, with each abutting a laneway which would
later be termed a ‘right of way’ on title documents – where the
sellers of that land evinced no intention to retain any part of

that laneway – where the council assumed responsibility for that laneway – where the laneway remained open to, and used

by, the public up until the appellant erected barriers in 2019 –

where the trial judge determined that there was a dedication by the original owners, and there was an acceptance by the public

of that dedication – where the effect of the primary judge’s
finding was that the laneway was dedicated as a public road,
and thus vested in the second respondent – where the primary
judge inferred that sanctions necessary in relation to the
dedication of the laneway as a public road had been given –
whether the trial judge erred in these findings

HIGHWAYS – MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS – OTHER MATTERS – where the second and third respondents cross

appealed as to the form of declaration made by the primary
judge – whether the primary judge erred in the form of
declaration at first instance
Grammar Schools Act 1860 (Qld), s 1, s 2, s 6
Land Act of 1962 (Qld), s 5, s 369
Real Property Act 1861 (Qld), s 44, s 119
Anderson v City of Stonnington (2017) LGERA 176; [2017]
VSCA 229, cited
Attorney-General (NT) v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs
(1989) 23 FCR 536; [1989] FCA 159, cited
Attorney-General (Quebec) v Attorney-General (Canada)
[1921] 1 AC 401; [1920] UKPC 96, cited
Barraclough v Johnson (1838) 8 A & E 99; [1838]
EngR 552, cited
Battersea Vestry v County of London and Brush Provincial
Electric Lighting Co [1899] 1 Ch 474; [1899]
UKLawRpCh 15, cited
Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v…
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Details
Case
[2023] QCA 263
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of WCL (QLD) Albert St Pty Ltd v Orb Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors involves a dispute over the creation and extinction of a highway, specifically the dedication of a right of way to public use. The matter was heard in the Queensland Court of Appeal. The central issue before the Court was whether the right of way, known as Lot 11, was dedicated to public use as a road, and if so, whether it vested in the Crown. The trial judge had previously found that the land in question was dedicated to public use, but the appellant challenged this finding on appeal.

The Court was required to decide whether the evidence demonstrated that the right of way was dedicated to public use as a road, and whether this dedication resulted in the land vesting in the Crown. The Court examined the historical use of the right of way, the intentions of the original owners, and the statutory provisions governing dedication. The Court found that the evidence established a history of public use dating back to the late 19th century, and that the original owners intended for the land to be used as a public road. The Court also considered the relevant statutory provisions and concluded that the dedication of the land to public use as a road resulted in it vesting in the Crown.

The Court's reasoning was based on the historical evidence of public use, the intentions of the original owners, and the statutory provisions governing dedication. The Court found that the evidence demonstrated a long history of public use of the right of way, and that the original owners intended for the land to be used as a public road. The Court also found that the statutory provisions governing dedication required the dedication of the land, not the road itself, and that this dedication resulted in the land vesting in the Crown. The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal and upheld the trial judge's finding that the right of way was dedicated to public use as a road, and that it vested in the Crown.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Therefore, evidence of use by the invitees and licensees of the business established along the Right of Way will not suffice to prove the requisite use by the public. Evidence of use by the public The trial judge accepted the evidence of a number of witnesses who deposed to aspects of use by the public. Use from 1963 was established by Mr Matthews.[61] He said that members of the public used Beatrice Lane (as the Right of Way was then known) to access buildings on original Lot 12,[62] which was a carpark. The carpark was used by the public. In the face of only gentle challenge to his evidence, he said that Beatrice Lane had experienced a lot of public use since 1963. [61] Primary Judgment at [80]–[85], [177]–[178]. [62] Lot 12 was never an adjoining owner of the Right of Way in the sense used in Newington. That evidence was, it is true, disconnected in time from the 1924 cut-off and earlier. However, it was open to find that it was a continuation of a use which had long prevailed, and thereby supporting the conclusion that similar use occurred prior to Historians, Dr Beanland and Dr Cook, gave evidence of the results of their researches. The trial judge accepted their evidence, preferring Dr Beanland on the question of public use.[64] Part of the evidence was as to: [64] Primary Judgment at [88]–[90]. The trial judge found that: “[107] The heavy use to which the area was put in the industrial period from the 1880s to 1910, in my view, supports the conclusions of Dr Beanland that the laneway area of Lot 11 has always been open to the public [and] was commonly used by the public.” His Honour also noted that it was common ground that Lot 11 was open to the public until 1994.[67] [67] Primary Judgment at [178]. The trial judge rejected the two reasons proffered by Dr Cook for concluding that Lot 11 was not used by the public. The first was that the laneway did not actually provide a shortcut. As to that, his Honour noted that Lot 11 was always open and found:[68] [68] Primary Judgment at [108]. “That some persons would utilise the laneway cannot be discounted as a general proposition, nor the likelihood that members of the public might simply wish to satisfy their curiosity by walking the laneway to see what was there. This would apply generally but also in times of the construction of the very substantial buildings which occurred in and about the subject land.” The second was that the public would not wish to traverse upon an area which was a busy working site. As to that his Honour found that the point:[69] [69] Primary Judgment at [109]. Citations omitted. “ … suffers from the irony, as it was put by senior counsel for the applicant, that it is to argue that the area was so busy and so frequently attended upon by so many different types of persons that others would be unlikely ... [to] use Lot 11 as a thoroughfare.” More generally, his Honour found:[70] [70] Primary Judgment at [111]. “[111] … with such large businesses, or the use of the Masonic Hall by many persons, the nature of the use of the laneway to all intents and purposes would take the appearance of being a public laneway. It would, in my view, be extremely difficult to accept that a member of public, seeing dozens of persons access an open laneway area which appears as an ordinary road, would think that area was not a public roadway and use it as such.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

In 1872, Mr Hart purchased Lot 7 and constructed his home on it.[2] [2] Orb Holdings Pty Ltd v WCL (Qld) Albert St Pty Ltd (2022) 11 QR 750, [15] (Primary Judgment). In 1874 the Trustees of the Brisbane Grammar School purchased and became registered proprietor of Lots 8, 9, 10, and 11.[3] [3] I will refer to these Lots, by their number, as the original Lots. Hereafter, I will refer to the Trustees The Trustees originally intended that the land be used as the relocated site for the Brisbane Grammar School, but that plan changed, and, in 1876, the Trustees resolved to sell those four Lots by subdividing them. Original Lots 8–11 were to be split longitudinally into nine new Lots: At the heart of this case is what was done at the rear of the new Lots. The approved plan of sub-division, RP1073, created a laneway which ran from Margaret Street along the back of Lots 1–5, then turned left to exit into Albert Street, along the back of Lots 6–9 and down the long side of Lot 5. The plan of subdivision, RP1073, is central to many issues in the case. It appears below in the form in which it was filed in the Titles Office.[4] Approval of the subdivision by the City Council was not a requirement at that time. Several features of the plan can be noted: Upon the filing of RP1073, Lots 1 to 9 were created, and certificates of title issued for Lots 1 to 9 only. There was neither a lot number nor a certificate of title issued for the Reserve or for the Right of Way. The Reserve was subsequently created as Lot 10 on 26 March 1886. The Right of Way was subsequently created as Lot 11 in 1994.[5] [5] For convenience, at different times throughout this judgment, I will refer to the “Right of Way” by that name, or as either “Lot 11”, or “Beatrice Lane”. It is the “RIGHT OF WAY” on the subdivision plan RP1073 which is at the heart of the issues on the appeal. Subsequently, the Trustees sold the subdivided lots on RP1073: Subsequently: On 16 March 1886, a further plan of subdivision, RP1074, was lodged by the Trustees, and a certificate of title for the Reserve was created. The Reserve was designated as Lot 10. Sir Charles Lilley signed RP1074 on behalf of the Trustees. Both RP1074 and the certificate of title identify the Reserve as adjoining the Right of Way. On 10 March 1886, Mr Hart (the owner of original Lot 7 on section 37) purchased Lot 10 (the Reserve). The effect of this sale was that Mr Hart could thereafter access the Right of Way directly from his property. The Trustees did not sell the area of land labelled “Right of Way” on RP1073. None of the certificates of title for the Lots created as part of RP1073 contained a reference to the subdivision plan RP1073, nor a reference to any easement rights, but each certificate of title referred to the Right of Way as a “right of way” defining the boundary of the Lots. The Reserve was not noted on any certificate of title. The area shown as “Right of Way” on the subdivision plan was not only used as a means of access to Lots 1–9 by the owners of those Lots, but also by the public as a road.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

That led to the cross-appellants’ ultimate submission:[233] [233] Second and Third Respondents’ Outline on the cross-appeal, paragraph [17]. “As such what vests in the Crown is not the entire fee simple in Lot 11 but the bundle of rights necessary to preserve the public’s right to use Lot 11 as a road. It is then for the Crown to deal with those rights in accordance with the statute. The declaration proposed by the Second and Third Respondents gives best effect to that principle.” Consideration Ultimately, the resolution of this issue turns upon the proper construction of s 369 of the Land Act of 1962 (Qld). It will be recalled that it relevantly provided: “All land which, having been before, is at the commencement of this Act … dedicated by the owner thereof … to public use as a road … is hereby declared to have always been vested … in the Crown …”. The provision was enacted in 1962, at a time when the Torrens system had long been established, and the Real Property Act 1861 had been in force for nearly a century. It was plainly enacted in full knowledge of that Act and how the system of title by registration operated. The proper construction of s 369 requires analysis commence with a consideration of the text itself, seen in its context.[234] The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. [234] Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381–382 [69]–[70]. There are several matters to note about s 369. First, the focus of the provision is on “land”. But it only applies to certain land, namely “land” which has been “dedicated by the owner thereof … to public use as a road”. Thus, it proceeds upon the basis that the thing which has been dedicated is “land”, not the “road” which is the product of the dedication. Secondly, s 5 of the Land Act contained a definition of the term “road”: “‘Road’––Any road, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, dedicated, or notified or declared in any manner howsoever to be a road for public use, and any road comprised of land taken, pursuant to any enactment, for the purpose of a road for public use. The term includes– The Act did not contain a definition of “land”, though it did define “Crown land”: “‘Crown land’—All land in Queensland, except land which is, for the time being— Self-evidently, the term “road” is given a meaning quite distinct from the concept of “land”. Thirdly, it follows that s 369 draws a distinction between the “land” and the “road” which is the product of the dedication. It is “land” which is dedicated, not the “road”. Fourthly, the distinction between the “land” and the “road” is maintained when the subject matter of the vesting is considered. It is the “land” which vests, not the “road”. Fifthly, that distinction (that is, between the “land” which is dedicated and the “road” which is not) is one that has its foundation in the common law. It was the owner’s land that was dedicated, not the road itself.[235] And, both intended dedication and acquiescence sufficient to turn long public user into actual dedication had to come from “the owner of the fee” or “proprietor”.[236] [235] Permanent Trustee (1960) 105 CLR 401 at 420; Newington v Windeyer (1985) 3 NSWLR 555 at 558. [236] Folkestone Corporation v Brockman [1914] AC 338 at 352; Poole v Huskinson 11 M & W, 827 at