SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: WCL (QLD) Albert St Pty Ltd v Orb Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2023] QCA 263 PARTIES: WCL (QLD) ALBERT ST PTY LTD ACN 600 302 976
(appellant/not a party to the cross appeal)v
ORB HOLDINGS PTY LTDACN 010 227 371
(first respondent/cross respondent)STATE OF QUEENSLAND (second respondent/cross appellant) REGISTRAR OF TITLES (third respondent/cross appellant) FILE NO/S: Appeal No 12103 of 2022
SC No 6514 of 2019DIVISION: Court of Appeal PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – (2022) 11 QR 750 (Crow J) DELIVERED ON: 19 December 2023 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 20 March 2023; 21 March 2023 JUDGES: Morrison and Bond JJA and Applegarth J ORDERS: 1. Appeal dismissed.
2. The Appellant pay the Respondents’ costs of the appeal.
3. Cross-appeal dismissed.
4. The Second and Third Respondents pay the First
Respondent’s costs of the cross-appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
HIGHWAYS – CREATION AND EXTINCTION OF HIGHWAYS – DEDICATION – WHAT CONSTITUTES DEDICATION – GENERALLY – where, in the late 19th century,
the owners of land in Brisbane subdivided and sold their land – where the whole of the subdivided land was subdivided into nine individual lots, with each abutting a laneway which would later be termed a ‘right of way’ on title documents – where the sellers of that land evinced no intention to retain any part of that laneway – where the council assumed responsibility for that laneway – where the laneway remained open to, and used
by, the public up until the appellant erected barriers in 2019 – where the trial judge determined that there was a dedication by the original owners, and there was an acceptance by the public
of that dedication – where the effect of the primary judge’s finding was that the laneway was dedicated as a public road, and thus vested in the second respondent – where the primary judge inferred that sanctions necessary in relation to the dedication of the laneway as a public road had been given – whether the trial judge erred in these findings HIGHWAYS – MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS – OTHER MATTERS – where the second and third respondents cross
appealed as to the form of declaration made by the primary judge – whether the primary judge erred in the form of declaration at first instance Grammar Schools Act 1860 (Qld), s 1, s 2, s 6
Land Act of 1962 (Qld), s 5, s 369
Real Property Act 1861 (Qld), s 44, s 119Anderson v City of Stonnington (2017) LGERA 176; [2017]
VSCA 229, citedAttorney-General (NT) v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1989) 23 FCR 536; [1989] FCA 159, cited Attorney-General (Quebec) v Attorney-General (Canada) [1921] 1 AC 401; [1920] UKPC 96, cited
Barraclough v Johnson (1838) 8 A & E 99; [1838]
EngR 552, citedBattersea Vestry v County of London and Brush Provincial Electric Lighting Co [1899] 1 Ch 474; [1899]
UKLawRpCh 15, citedBellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v…
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- Case
- [2023] QCA 263
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court was required to decide whether the evidence demonstrated that the right of way was dedicated to public use as a road, and whether this dedication resulted in the land vesting in the Crown. The Court examined the historical use of the right of way, the intentions of the original owners, and the statutory provisions governing dedication. The Court found that the evidence established a history of public use dating back to the late 19th century, and that the original owners intended for the land to be used as a public road. The Court also considered the relevant statutory provisions and concluded that the dedication of the land to public use as a road resulted in it vesting in the Crown.
The Court's reasoning was based on the historical evidence of public use, the intentions of the original owners, and the statutory provisions governing dedication. The Court found that the evidence demonstrated a long history of public use of the right of way, and that the original owners intended for the land to be used as a public road. The Court also found that the statutory provisions governing dedication required the dedication of the land, not the road itself, and that this dedication resulted in the land vesting in the Crown. The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal and upheld the trial judge's finding that the right of way was dedicated to public use as a road, and that it vested in the Crown.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
That led to the cross-appellants’ ultimate submission:[233] [233] Second and Third Respondents’ Outline on the cross-appeal, paragraph [17]. “As such what vests in the Crown is not the entire fee simple in Lot 11 but the bundle of rights necessary to preserve the public’s right to use Lot 11 as a road. It is then for the Crown to deal with those rights in accordance with the statute. The declaration proposed by the Second and Third Respondents gives best effect to that principle.” Consideration Ultimately, the resolution of this issue turns upon the proper construction of s 369 of the Land Act of 1962 (Qld). It will be recalled that it relevantly provided: “All land which, having been before, is at the commencement of this Act … dedicated by the owner thereof … to public use as a road … is hereby declared to have always been vested … in the Crown …”. The provision was enacted in 1962, at a time when the Torrens system had long been established, and the Real Property Act 1861 had been in force for nearly a century. It was plainly enacted in full knowledge of that Act and how the system of title by registration operated. The proper construction of s 369 requires analysis commence with a consideration of the text itself, seen in its context.[234] The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. [234] Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381–382 [69]–[70]. There are several matters to note about s 369. First, the focus of the provision is on “land”. But it only applies to certain land, namely “land” which has been “dedicated by the owner thereof … to public use as a road”. Thus, it proceeds upon the basis that the thing which has been dedicated is “land”, not the “road” which is the product of the dedication. Secondly, s 5 of the Land Act contained a definition of the term “road”: “‘Road’––Any road, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, dedicated, or notified or declared in any manner howsoever to be a road for public use, and any road comprised of land taken, pursuant to any enactment, for the purpose of a road for public use. The term includes– The Act did not contain a definition of “land”, though it did define “Crown land”: “‘Crown land’—All land in Queensland, except land which is, for the time being— Self-evidently, the term “road” is given a meaning quite distinct from the concept of “land”. Thirdly, it follows that s 369 draws a distinction between the “land” and the “road” which is the product of the dedication. It is “land” which is dedicated, not the “road”. Fourthly, the distinction between the “land” and the “road” is maintained when the subject matter of the vesting is considered. It is the “land” which vests, not the “road”. Fifthly, that distinction (that is, between the “land” which is dedicated and the “road” which is not) is one that has its foundation in the common law. It was the owner’s land that was dedicated, not the road itself.[235] And, both intended dedication and acquiescence sufficient to turn long public user into actual dedication had to come from “the owner of the fee” or “proprietor”.[236] [235] Permanent Trustee (1960) 105 CLR 401 at 420; Newington v Windeyer (1985) 3 NSWLR 555 at 558. [236] Folkestone Corporation v Brockman [1914] AC 338 at 352; Poole v Huskinson 11 M & W, 827 at