Waysco Pty Ltd v Danjohn Investments Pty Ltd
[2024] ATMO 13
•25 January 2024
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Waysco Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application number 2142423 (class 9) - GREEN BANK (composite) - in the name of Danjohn Investments Pty Ltd
Delegate: | Benjamin Goldsworthy |
Representation: | Opponent: Jogias Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys Applicant: Madison Marcus Law Firm |
Decision: | 2024 ATMO 13 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – opposition under section 52 – ss 42(b), 58, 60 and 62A pursued – s 58 established for some goods – other grounds not established – amendment to goods – trade mark to proceed to registration. |
Background
On 10 December 2020 (‘Relevant Date’) an application for a trade mark was filed under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)[1] in the name of Danjohn Investments Pty Ltd (‘Applicant’) with the following details:
Trade mark:
(‘Trade Mark’)
Goods: class 9: Electricity generating solar cells and panels; Solar batteries; Solar batteries for domestic use; Solar batteries for industrial use; Solar cells for electricity generation; Solar collectors for electricity generation; Solar energy collectors for electricity generation; Solar energy operating apparatus; Solar panels for electricity generation; Solar panels for the production of electricity (‘Applicant’s Goods’)
[1] Unless specified otherwise, a reference in these reasons to a section is a reference to such in the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) and a reference to a regulation is a reference to such in the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth).
The Trade Mark was examined under s 31 and acceptance was advertised on 11 May 2021. On 2 July 2021, Waysco Pty Ltd (‘Opponent’) filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose and on 2 August 2021 filed its Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’). On 26 October 2021, the Applicant filed its Notice of Intention to Defend.
On 5 February 2022, this office contacted the parties noting that the time for the Opponent to file evidence in support ended on 28 January 2022. The Opponent did not file evidence in support.
On 3 May 2022, the Applicant filed its Evidence in Answer (‘EIA’) being a declaration of John Bebawy, General Manager at the Applicant, dated 2 May 2022 (‘Bebawy-1’).
On 19 July 2022, this office contacted the parties noting that the period for filing evidence in reply ended on 9 July 2022. The Opponent did not file evidence in reply.
Both parties requested to be heard by written submissions only. On 3 October 2023, the Opponent filed its written submissions (‘Opponent’s Submissions’) by Madhu Jogia of Jogias Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys. The Opponent also filed a declaration of Scott Leaver, sole director and shareholder of the Opponent, dated 28 September 2023, with Appendixes A to D (‘Leaver’).
On 11 October 2023 and the Applicant filed its written submissions (‘Applicant’s Submissions’) by Elizabeth Densley of Madison Marcus Law Firm.[2] On the same day the Applicant also filed a declaration of John Bebawy which is undated (‘Bebawy-2’). I am to the decide the matter as a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks.
[2] The Applicant’s Submissions were filed as an attachment to a declaration of John Bebawy, signed and dated 10 October 2023. This declaration appears to in fact be the Applicant’s written submissions and I treat this declaration as such.
Grounds and onus
The Opponent bears the onus of establishing at least one ground of opposition.[3] The standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard of the balance of probabilities.[4]
[3] Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58, [32] (Keane CJ, Stone and Jagot J).
[4] Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [133] (Besanko, Jagot and Edelman JJ).
The SGP nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 58, 60 and 62A.[5]
Evidence
[5] The Opponent rectified its SGP deleting a ground of opposition under s 58A. However, Section 58A appears to have been mentioned in some of the evidence and submissions of the parties. As s 44 was not formally argued as a ground of opposition I have not considered s 58A to have been seriously contested.
EIA
Bebawy-1 is a mixture of statements about the background of the Applicant and assertions about the applicability of the grounds of opposition. It states that the Applicant has been trading under the name Green Bank and Green Bank Solar Australia since 2016 in connection with the Applicant’s Goods.[6] It asserts that there is a contrast between the Applicant’s business of providing goods and the Opponent’s business of retailing and installing third-party goods. I summarise the relevant attachments to Bebawy-1 from here.
[6] Bebawy-1, [1] and [3].
An extract of the Applicant’s website (‘Mirage Website Extract’), dated 5 August 2021, shows the following trade mark in relation to batteries:
(‘Battery Trade Mark’)
An extract of the Opponent’s website (‘Opponent’s Website), dated 5 February 2022, shows the following trade mark in relation to retail services for third-party batteries and solar panels:
(‘Opponent’s Trade Mark’)
Referring to two invoices attached to Bebawy-1, Bebawy-1 submits that, ‘[o]ne example of use [of the Trade Mark] is on invoices dated back to 2017 (enclosed). This date is significantly earlier than any past use by the Opponent of its mark’.[7] One such invoice is dated 29 November 2017 (‘Invoice-1’). Invoice-1 lists a solar panel; solar battery; off grid inverter; brackets, cables and rails for tin roof; and combiner box as goods sold and contains the Trade Mark in the header. There is no issuer apparent on Invoice-1. The ‘bill to’ details for Invoice-1 are specified as being ‘Mr. Coptic africa care’ and its shipping destination is listed as Melbourne.
[7] Bebawy-1, [3] (emphasis omitted).
Another invoice is dated 17 December 2017 (‘Invoice-2’). Invoice-2 includes a ‘Solar Panel 350W’ whereas Invoice-1 includes a ‘Solar Panel 550W’. Otherwise, the price, goods and quantities of goods listed for Invoice-1 and Invoice-2 appear identical. The Trade Mark appears at the top of Invoice-2. Invoice-2 appears to have been issued by a company named Greenspan Design & Construction Pty Ltd (‘Greenspan’) with the ACN 130 730 488. The ‘bill to’ details are purportedly redacted. However, I am able observe the details ‘Hands for homeless Orphans incorporated’, the Australian Business Number (‘ABN’) 64 189 137 893 and the name ‘Coptic Africa care’. There is no explanation of why these details have been purportedly redacted and no shipping destination has been listed.
I note that Invoice-1 and Invoice-2 appear to have the same invoice number.[8] However, they are each dated on different dates. Each invoice is one page and labelled as being ‘Page 1 of 1’. I note that I read Invoice-1 and Invoice-2 as being separate invoices.
[8] Invoice-1 is numbered ‘00231’ and Invoice-2 is numbered ‘00 231’.
Leaver
Leaver makes various factual statements. It also makes various assertions about the grounds of opposition. It asserts that the Opponent has used the trade mark Greenbank Solar since April 2018, referencing invoices at Appendixes A and A2 to Leaver. Leaver asserts that there is a reputation in the ‘the Greenbank Solar’ trade mark.
Appendixes A and A2 display the Opponent’s Trade Mark, each dated 9 April 2018 and 11 August 2022.
Appendix B to Leaver is an Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) database extract of the business name details for the Opponent’s business name GREENBANK SOLAR, showing registration of that business name occurred on 30 March 2019.
Appendix C to Leaver consists of extracts of a various screen captures of websites showing the Opponent’s Trade Mark and customer reviews on websites featuring the Opponent’s Trade Mark. Some customer reviews are dated between November 2019 and February 2021. The customer reviews all appear to relate to the retail and installation of solar goods of other traders. A screen capture of the Opponent’s Website, dated 7 May 2019, shows the Opponent’s Website displaying the Opponent’s Trade Mark though the goods or services offered is not clear. The Opponent’s Website appears to have been otherwise undeveloped at this date.
Appendix D to Leaver consists of emails from an employee of the Applicant addressed to Mr Leaver referring customer enquiries initially made to the Applicant. One document shows the customer contacting the Applicant instead of the Opponent. Leaver asserts that,
By conduct in the last 60 days, the Applicant has forwarded to the Opponent several email enquiries made to the Applicant, on to the Opponent that the Applicant knows originate from the customers of the Opponent, or, in the alternative originate in the Opponent’s established geographical hinterland where the Opponent’s reputation provides them with market-coverage and customer-base (Appendix D).[9]
[9] Leaver, [7] (emphasis omitted).
Applicant’s Submissions and Bebawy-2
The Applicant’s Submissions contain various factual statements about use of the Trade Mark and a chronology of key events in this matter,[10] most relevant of these key events are:
29 November 2017 ‘The Applicant issues first invoice containing the [Trade Mark]. The Applicant continues issuing invoices containing the [Trade Mark] throughout 2017, 2018 and 2019’
14 August 2019 ‘The Applicant is registered as a company under the name “Danjohn Investment Pty Ltd” [(‘Applicant’s Registration Date’)]’.
1 July 2020 ‘The Applicant changed their business name to “Mirage IT Solutions Pty Ltd”’
[10] Applicant’s Submissions, [6].
Bebawy-2 consists solely of annexures which I summarise below:
- JB-01 being undated images of the Trade Mark and separately batteries bearing the Battery Trade Mark.
- JB-02 being an invoice from the website dated 21 March 2017, for ‘Green Bank Company logo (Design)’ and addressed to ‘Green Bank, Australia’. There is no specification of to whom ‘Green Bank’ refers.
- JB-03 being invoices and quotes each bearing the Trade Mark and appearing with the various details other than those of the Applicant including in relation various solar panels and solar batteries. Some invoices do contain Applicant’s ACN alongside a different name to that of the Applicant. The invoices are dated from November 2017 to 2019. The earliest two invoices are reproductions of Invoice-1 and Invoice-2.
- JB-04 being the same screen capture as the Mirage Website Extract, also dated 5 August 2021.
- JB-05 being an ASIC database extract business name details for the business name GREENBANK SOLAR AUSTRALIA, registered on 6 March 2021, held by a company named Mirage IT Solutions Pty Ltd (‘Mirage’).
- JB-06 being Mirage’s ABN details and a list of its business names.
Preliminary Issue
Leaver and Bebawy-2 were filed after the periods for evidence had ended. As such they were filed out of time. The Opponent’s Submissions and the Applicant’s Submissions also each refer to factual statements not provided in the period for evidence. Whilst none of the parties addressed the issue of evidence filed out of time, for completeness I address this issue. Material filed out of time may be considered by the hearing officer pursuant to reg 21.15(4). Part 51.2.5 of the Trade Marks Office Manual of Practice and Procedure notes that a party must make a compelling case for giving such material weight when deciding the opposition.
There are no compelling reasons provided for why I should give any weight to material in Leaver or Bebawy-2. There is no explanation about why Leaver or Bebawy-2 are crucial or why these were provided out of time. All information in Bebawy-2 was available to the Applicant at time that the EIA was to be filed. Bebawy-2 is also not in compliance with the requirements for declarations as it is not signed or dated.[11] Material in Leaver appears to have been available to the Opponent before the end of the period for EIA other than the evidence of communications between the Applicant and Opponent which is dated in August and September 2023. Regardless, none of the contents of either Leaver or Bebawy-2 would change the outcome in this matter. I do not give weight to either Leaver or Bebawy-2.
[11] Regulation 21.6(1).
I do give weight to the statement in the Applicant’s Submissions about the Applicant’s Registration Date because that goes to the s 58 ground of opposition in terms of whether the Applicant first used of the Trade Mark. To the extent that each of the written submissions otherwise contains factual statements not provided in periods for evidence, they do not change the outcome and I do not give weight to those factual statements.
Consideration
Section 58
Section 58 provides that, ‘registration of a trade mark may be opposed on the ground that the applicant is not the owner of the trade mark’. The term ‘owner’ is not defined. However, it is well established that the owner of a trade mark is the person who first uses it in Australia, or first files a trade mark for it in Australia, whichever is the earlier.
To make out this ground it must be established that:
- a person other than the Applicant used the Trade Mark, or a trade mark with additions or alterations which do not substantially affect the identity of the Trade Mark,[12] in the course of trade in Australia; and
- the use was before the filing date of the Trade Mark (here the Relevant Date), or before use of the Trade Mark by the Applicant, whichever is the earlier; and
- the use was in relation to the Applicant’s Goods or in relation to goods considered to be the same kind of thing as the Applicant’s Goods.[13]
[12] Carnival Cruise Lines Inc v Sitmar Cruises Ltd [1994] FCA 936 (Gummow J). See also, s 7(1).
[13] Re Hicks Trade Mark (1897) 22 VLR 636 (Holroyd J) (‘Re Hicks Trade Mark’).
For the s 58 ground of opposition, the Opponent relies on its own use of the ‘Greenbank Solar Marks’.[14] The ‘Greenbank Solar Marks’ appears to refer to both the word trade mark GREENBANK SOLAR and the Opponent’s Trade Mark.[15] The Opponent also submits that an entity other than the Applicant is the owner of the Trade Mark and relies on Invoice-1 and Invoice-2.[16]
[14] Opponent’s Submissions, [2.1].
[15] Opponent’s Submissions, [2.1], [1(e)] and [1(b)] referencing Appendix B to Leaver.
[16] Opponent’s Submissions, [2.2(g)]-[2.2(o)].
In its header Invoice-2 bears an identical trade mark to the Trade Mark. Invoice-2 also lists Greenspan as the issuer beside an ACN that is different to that provided for the Applicant.[17] An ACN is ordinarily a unique identifier of a single entity.[18] Greenspan appears to be a person other than the Applicant. Therefore, Invoice-2 appears to have been issued by a person other that the Applicant.
[17] The application for the Trade Mark provides ACN 635 532 008 for the Applicant.
[18] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Chapter 1, Part 1.5.3, and ss 9 ‘ACN’ and 118.
The Applicant submits that, ‘the inclusion of business entities associated with the Applicant on some invoices perhaps proves that the Applicant was not consistent or sophisticated in its administrative practices. However, this cannot lead to a finding that the invoices proffered by the Applicant are false’.[19] There is otherwise no explanation about why Invoice-2 has an issuer other than the Applicant. Even so, I recall that, ‘nexus or “unity of purpose” is not an answer to identification of the owner of a mark at the time an application for registration is made and does not answer a ground of opposition under s 58 of the ... Act’.[20] Noting the Applicant’s Registration Date, which I consider to refer to the Applicant, the Applicant did not exist as at the issuing dates of Invoice-1 and Invoice-2. Therefore, it is likely that Greenspan issued Invoice-2, thereby using the Trade Mark on the date specified for the goods listed therein, namely 17 December 2017. The Applicant’s Registration Date also means that Invoice-1, whilst dated earlier than Invoice-2, cannot be relied upon as demonstrating a use of the Trade Mark by the Applicant that was earlier than Greenspan’s use of the Trade Mark established by Invoice-2. Accordingly, across all evidence, the earliest use of any trade mark shown is that of Greenspan in relation to solar panels, solar batteries, off grid inverters, brackets cables, rails for tin roof and a combiner box.
[19] Applicant’s Submissions, [17].
[20] PDP Capital Pty Ltd v Grasshopper Ventures Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1078, [334] (Markovic J).
I should next consider whether the use of the Trade Mark in Invoice-2 is in relation to the Applicant’s Goods or in relation to goods considered to be the ‘same kind of thing’ as the Applicant’s Goods. To be the ‘same kind of thing’, the goods in relation to which the Trade Mark has been used must be ‘essentially the same’ as the Applicant’s Goods, though they may differ in size, shape and name.[21] I should focus on whether they are the ‘true equivalent kind of thing or article’.[22]
[21] Colorado Group Ltd v Strandbags Group Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 184, [14] (Kenny J).
[22] Ibid [89] (Allsop J).
I consider that a solar battery, as listed in Invoice-2 and the Applicant’s solar batteries; solar batteries for domestic use; solar batteries for industrial use are true equivalents. I also consider that a solar panel, as listed on the Invoice-2, and the Applicant’s electricity generating solar panels; solar panels for electricity generation; solar panels for the production of electricity to be true equivalents. A solar panel; solar battery; off grid inverter; brackets, cables and rails for tin roof; and a combiner box are all included in the Applicant’s solar energy operating apparatus.
The Applicant’s electricity generating solar cells; solar cells for electricity generation; solar collectors for electricity generation; solar energy collectors for electricity generation are all forms of solar cells or solar collectors. A solar cell is ordinarily a component part of a solar panel.[23] I am not satisfied that these are the same kind of thing as any of the items listed in Invoice-2. Whilst a solar collector and solar panel both may collect energy, they ordinarily function differently. A solar collector involves the collection of heat, whereas a solar panel converts sunlight as such into electricity. A solar battery and inverter, which are also listed on Invoice-2, both appear to have different functions to a solar cell or solar collector.[24] Regardless, the parties provided little direct evidence about the goods and I note that it is the Opponent that has the onus. I am not satisfied that the goods listed on Invoice-2 are the same kind of thing as the Applicant’s electricity generating solar cells; solar cells for electricity generation; solar collectors for electricity generation; solar energy collectors for electricity generation.
[23] Macquarie Dictionary (Online, accessed 19 December 2023) ‘solar panel’ and ‘solar cell’.
[24] Bebawy-1, 13-14.
In summary, the evidence shows use of the Trade Mark by Greenspan in respect of the same kind of thing as the Applicant’s Goods which I list at paragraph 32 of these written reasons. Greenspan’s use of the Trade Mark is before the Relevant Date and before the earliest documented use of the Trade Mark by the Applicant in the evidence. Therefore, I am satisfied that a person other the Applicant was the owner of the Trade Mark in respect of electricity generating solar cells, solar cells for electricity generation, solar collectors for electricity generation, solar energy collectors for electricity generation. Accordingly, the ground of opposition under s 58 has been established in relation to those goods.
For completeness I note that the Opponent provides no evidence of use of the Trade Mark, or a trade mark which is substantially identical to the Trade Mark, by it or any other person, in relation to the same kind of thing as the remainder of Applicant’s Goods, namely Electricity generating solar cells; Solar cells for electricity generation; Solar collectors for electricity generation; Solar energy collectors for electricity generation (‘Remaining Goods’). From here I consider whether any of the remaining grounds of opposition have been established in respect of the Remaining Goods.
Section 60
The Opponent relies upon s 60, which provides:
60 Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia
The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:
(a) another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and
(b) because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
Note: For priority date see section 12.
To establish this ground of opposition the Opponent must demonstrate that a reputation has been acquired in another trade mark in Australia as at the Relevant Date. The Opponent then must show that because of that reputation, the use of the Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. The reputation must not be assumed, it rather must be established as a matter of fact by the Opponent.[25] A reputation can be demonstrated by various means including quantum of sales or advertising and promotional activities.[26] Advertisements or other appearances of the other trade mark at trade fairs, on television, radio or in magazines and newspapers may also be relevant. Sometimes a reputation is established by a high volume of sales, often across a wide geographical space, together with substantial advertising expenditures and other promotions of the relevant trade mark.[27] The reputation required is one of which a significant or substantial number of persons would be aware,[28] or a ‘significant section of the public’[29] and it must exist at the Relevant Date.
[25] ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd [1992] FCA 176, [77] (Lockhart J).
[26] Rodney Jane Racing Pty Ltd v Monster Energy Company [2019] FCA 923, [83] (O’Bryan J).
[27] McCormick & Company Inc v McCormick [2000] FCA 1335, [86] (Kenny J).
[28] Renaud Cointreau & Cie v Cordon Bleu International Ltee [2001] FCA 1170, [74]-[75] (Moore, Tamberlin and Goldberg JJ).
[29] Fry Consulting Pty Ltd v Sports Warehouse Inc (No 2) [2012] FCA 81, [121] (Dodds-Streeton J).
The Opponent relies on an alleged reputation in GREENBANK and the Opponent’s Trade Mark. Nothing close to the kind of evidence required to establish a reputation acquired in a trade mark has been provided by the Opponent. The Opponent has not established a reputation in any trade mark.
Accordingly, the Opponent has not established the ground of opposition under s 60.
Section 42(b)
Section 42(b) provides,
An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if… its use would be contrary to law.
The requirement is that the use of the Trade Mark would, not could, be contrary to law.[30] The Opponent relies on (1) ss 18 and 29 of the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’);[31] and (2) the common law of passing off. Section 18 of the ACL concerns conduct or representations that have, or are likely to, mislead or deceive. Section 29 of the ACL concerns representations that are false or misleading. There is no material difference between the expression ‘mislead or deceive’ in s 18 of the ACL and ‘false or misleading’ in s 29 of the ACL.[32]
[30] Advantage-Rent-A-Car Inc v Advantage Car Rental Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 683, [28] (Madgwick J).
[31] Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Schedule 2.
[32] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 634, [40] (Allsop CJ).
It follows from my discussion of the s 60 ground of opposition and the lack of a reputation, that it is not likely that the stricter test of the ACL,[33] and its predecessor, would be met. Without a reputation, I am not satisfied that use of the Trade Mark is likely to mislead or deceive, or amount to a false or misleading impression under ss 18 and 29 of the ACL. As I am not satisfied that ss 18 and 29 of the ACL would be contravened, it follows that I am not satisfied that use of the Trade Mark would amount to passing off.[34] Therefore, use of the Trade Mark would not be contrary to law under the ACL or by the common law of passing off.
[33] Weili Mu v Guotai Huang [2021] ATMO 113, [35]-[36] (Hearing Officer Smith).
[34] Re Equity Access Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1989] FCA 506, [40] (Hill J).
Accordingly, the Opponent has not established the ground of opposition under s 42(b).
Section 62A
Section 62A provides a ground of opposition where an application is made in bad faith. Here I should determine whether, ‘in all the particular circumstances, the applicant’s knowledge was such that the decision to apply for registration at the relevant date would be regarded as in bad faith by persons adopting proper standards’.[35] The determination is to be made as at the Relevant Date though events occurring after that date may be considered to infer the Applicant’s knowledge and intentions as at the Relevant Date. I should consider whether, in the light of any knowledge, the Applicant’s behaviour fell short of acceptable commercial standards.[36]
[35] Fry Consulting (n 29) [167] (Dodds-Streeton J).
[36] DC Comics v Cheqout Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 478, [62] and [77] (Bennett J).
I refer to my conclusion that the Opponent has not established a reputation in any trade mark. None of the circumstances relating to the emails enquiries at Appendix D to Leaver otherwise demonstrate that the Applicant’s conduct fails short of commercial standards. The Opponent has not discharged the onus to show the conduct of the Applicant would be regarded as in bad faith by persons adopting proper standards.
Accordingly, the Opponent has not established a ground of opposition under s 62A.
Decision
Section 55 relevantly provides:
55 Decision
(1) Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:
(a) to refuse to register the trade mark; or
(b) to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;
having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.
The Opponent has established the ground of opposition under s 58 in respect of some of the Applicant’s Goods. On 8 January 2024 I contacted the representative for the Applicant expressing my intention to refuse the application for the Trade Mark unless the Applicant agreed to the following amendment to the specification of goods (the strikethrough indicates deletion):
Class 9: Electricity generating solar cells;
and panels; Solar batteries; Solar batteries for domestic use; Solar batteries for industrial use;Solar cells for electricity generation; Solar collectors for electricity generation; Solar energy collectors for electricity generation;Solar energy operating apparatus; Solar panels for electricity generation; Solar panels for the production of electricityOn 19 January 2024 the Applicant’s attorney confirmed that the Applicant agreed to the amendment. Accordingly, the Trade Mark may proceed to registration with the amendment after the relevant appeal period.
Costs
Both parties sought costs. Each party has had some measure of success and I decline to make an award of costs.
Benjamin Goldsworthy
Hearing Officer
Oppositions and Hearings
Trade Marks and Designs
25 January 2024
0
13
0