Watson and Comcare (Compensation) [2020] AATA 5162 (22 December 2020)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2017/3377
Re:Colin Watson
APPLICANT
AndComcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Member D K Grigg
Date:22 December 2020
Place:Brisbane
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
...................................[SGD].....................................
Member D K Grigg
CATCHWORDS
COMPENSATION – employees – whether applicant entitled to compensation for permanent impairment – whether impairment became permanent prior to the commencement of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – application of the transitional provisions under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – whether section 24(2) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) is applicable to a determination of the permanency of an impairment prior to 1 December 1988 – whether permanency can be considered with hindsight – whether applicant suffered from a new impairment arising out of the same injury – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Social Security Act 1947 (Cth)
CASES
Bergersen and Comcare [2007] AATA 1373
Brennan v Comcare [1994] FCA 1147; (1994) 50 FCR 555
Cavanagh and Comcare [2008] AATA 553
Comcare v Levett (1995) 60 FCR 14
Comcare Australia v Maida [2002] FCA 1284; (2002) 36 AAR 69
Comcare Australia v Mathieson (2004) 39 AAR 450
Department of Defence v West (1998) 156 ALR 651; 85 FCR 491
Doering and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Compensation) [2019] AATA 752
Excell v Comcare [2008] FCA 757
Hunter Quarries v Mexon [2018] NSWCA 178
Jamieson and Comcare [2019] AATA 5424
MacFarlane and TNT Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2020] AATA 3721
McDonald v Director-General of Social Security [1984] FCA 59; (1984) 1 FCR 354
O’Keefe v Comcare [1988] FCA 603
Re George John Blackman v Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1990] FCA 295
Spradau and Comcare [2020] AATA 2054
Springhetti and Comcare [2007] AATA 1504THSV and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Verterans’ entitlements) [2018] AATA 3201
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Dr Harvey Marcovitch, Black’s Medical Dictionary (Bloomsbury, 43rd ed, 2017)
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 4th ed, 2000)
CONTENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
INTRODUCTION & CLAIMS HISTORY
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS
Compensation for a Permanent Impairment
Compensation for Non-economic Loss
1971 Act
Operation of section 124 of the Act
CONTENTIONS – SUMMARY
Mr Watson’s Contentions
Comcare’s Contentions
MR WATSON’S PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPAIRMENT – WHEN DID IT BECOME PERMANENT
Medical Evidence
Determining Permanency
Do the matters set out in section 24(2) of the Act need to be considered?
Can permanency be considered with the benefit of hindsight?
What is a permanent impairment?
CONSIDERATION
Did Mr Watson have a permanent impairment prior to 1 December 1988
Status of Mr Watson’s current condition
Is there an ongoing contribution from work?
Section 24(2) Factors
Duration of the impairment (section 24(2)(a), Act)
Likelihood of Improvement/Had Mr Watson undertaken all reasonable rehabilitative treatment for the impairment by 1 December 1988? (sections 24(2)(b) and 24(2)(c), Act)
Conclusion – Permanency
HAS MR WATSON SUFFERED…
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- AGLC
- Watson and Comcare (Compensation) [2020] AATA 5162
- Case
- [2020] AATA 5162
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were to determine when Mr Watson's condition became permanent and whether he had developed a new impairment arising from the same injury. These determinations were crucial for assessing his entitlement to compensation under sections 24 and 27 of the Act, particularly in light of the transitional provisions governing injuries sustained before the Act's commencement.
The Tribunal considered whether section 24(2) of the Act, which outlines factors to be considered in determining permanency, applied to impairments that became permanent before 1 December 1988. While Comcare argued that section 24(2) was not in force at that time and therefore inapplicable, the Tribunal disagreed, citing binding decisions such as *Brennan* and *Department of Defence v West*. These authorities established that section 24(2) is relevant for assessing permanency even for pre-commencement impairments, as the Act's transitional provisions create new rights in respect of past events. The Tribunal also considered the Full Federal Court's interpretation of section 124(3) of the Act in *Brennan* and *Comcare v Levett*, which clarified that an employee is disentitled to compensation if they were not entitled to a lump sum under the previous 1971 Act for an impairment that became permanent before 1 December 1988.
The Tribunal affirmed the reviewable decision, finding that Mr Watson's compensable condition was permanent prior to the commencement of the Act. Consequently, the 1971 Act applied, and Mr Watson was not entitled to compensation under the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth).
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Therefore, if the 1971 Act applies, because Mr Watson has an impairment which became permanent before the Commencement Date, compensation is not payable to Mr Watson.Operation of section 124 of the Act The Full Federal Court considered the operation of section 124 of the Act in Brennan v Comcare [1994] FCA 1147; (1994) 50 FCR 555 (“Brennan”). Burchett J explained that, by virtue of section 124(1) of the Act “subject to any qualification imposed by any other provision of Pt X, the date of the injury to which an impairment is attributable is irrelevant to the operation of s 24”.[15] The relevant qualification is provided for in section 124(3) of the Act. Burchett J held the wording of section 124(3) of the Act makes it clear that the 1988 Act applies regardless of when the impairment arose. He said that there may be more than one impairment arising out of the same injury at different times and that if Parliament had “intended to exclude the operation of the 1988 Act wherever an injury had resulted in any permanent impairment arising before the commencing date, it could easily have said so.”[16] Instead, section 124(3) of the Act provides what is compensable in that circumstance.[15] (1994) 50 FCR 555, at 557.[16] (1994) 50 FCR 555, at 557. Gummow J, also in Brennan, said in terms of whether the 1971 Act continues to apply, that the transitional provisions do not “preserve” old rights but instead create “new rights in respect of past events”.[17] Gummow J said three questions need to be answered in determining whether an applicant is excluded from receiving compensation under section 24 of the Act for a permanent impairment. Gummow J set out those questions as follows:[18][1]…The first is that there must have been an injury[2]…the injury must have resulted in an impairment[3]…[the impairment] must have been permanent, that is to say likely to continue indefinitely. That state of affairs must have been reached before the commencement date. [17] (1994) 50 FCR 555, at 562; see also Comcare v Levett (1995) 60 FCR 14, at 15.[18] (1994) 50 FCR 555, at 569-570. In Comcare v Levett (1995) 60 FCR 14 (“Levett”) the Full Federal Court was also concerned with the construction of section 124(3) of the Act and what was meant by "permanent impairment". The Full Federal Court held that section 124(3) of the Act disentitles an employee to compensation in two situations:[19]…first is when, as a matter of fact, the employee has received compensation of a lump sum. That has no relevance in the present case. The second is when the person was not entitled to receive compensation of a lump sum for an impairment which occurred while the 1971 Act was in force. Thus, the question becomes whether any impairment suffered by the respondent entitled him to a lump sum under the 1971 Act. (emphasis added)[19] (1995) 60 FCR 14, at 18. The Full Federal Court in Levett pointed out that at the stage where one is determining whether a lump sum would have been payable for an impairment under the 1971 Act, one is not concerned with “the question of whether impairment in s 124(3)(b) refers to permanent impairment or impairment simpliciter”.[20] Once it has been determined whether compensation would have been payable, then one turns to the consideration of whether the impairment concerned was a permanent impairment.[20] (1995) 60 FCR 14, at 18.CONTENTIONS – SUMMARY