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Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde

Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde [2001] FCA 61
JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – declarations – purpose of declarations – preliminary determination of issues – whether appropriate to make purported declarations recording summary of conclusions in reasons for judgment – whether appeal lies from such purported declarations
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s 178
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 21, 24
Federal Court Rules, O 29 r 2
Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd v Gill (1993) 46 FCR 90, cited
Landsal Pty Ltd (In liq) v REI Building Society (1993) 41 FCR 421, cited
Driclad Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 121 CLR 45, cited
WARRAMUNDA VILLAGE INC v PRYDE
V 768 OF 2000
GRAY, BRANSON AND NORTH JJ
9 FEBRUARY 2001
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V768 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

WARRAMUNDA VILLAGE INC
APPELLANT

AND:

DIANNE PRYDE
FIRST RESPONDENT

BERYL ANDERSON
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GRAY, BRANSON AND NORTH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

9 FEBRUARY 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT the notice of appeal filed on 6 October 2000 be set aside.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V768 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

WARRAMUNDA VILLAGE INC
APPELLANT

AND:

DIANNE PRYDE
FIRST RESPONDENT

BERYL ANDERSON
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GRAY, BRANSON AND NORTH JJ

DATE:

9 FEBRUARY 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:

The proceeding with which these reasons for judgment are concerned was commenced by notice of appeal filed in the Court on 6 October 2000. According to the notice of appeal, the appellant sought to appeal from the whole of the judgment of a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia given on 15 September 2000, in a proceeding in which the two respondents to the notice of appeal were applicants and the appellant was respondent.
That judgment was given in a proceeding commenced in the Federal Court of Australia by application. The amended application described the proceeding as an application under s 178 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“the WR Act”). In summary terms, the relief sought was as follows:
·the imposition of penalties on the respondent in respect of breaches of two named awards
·orders that the appellant pay a specified sum to the first applicant and another specified sum to the second applicant
·interest pursuant to s 179A of the WR Act
·an order under s 356(b) of the WR Act that any penalty be paid to the applicants.
On the pleadings, there appeared to be no issue that the appellant is an incorporated association, bound by each of the specified awards, one in succession to the other, in respect of its employment of the two respondents. The amended statement of claim referred to various clauses of the awards, relating to overtime…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2001] FCA 61
Decision Date: 9 FEBRUARY 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Warramunda Village Inc sought to appeal a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia, who had made several declarations in relation to breaches of employment awards by the appellant in relation to two employees. The respondents, Dianne Pryde and Beryl Anderson, had brought an application under section 178 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) for the imposition of penalties for breaches of the awards by the appellant and for orders that the appellant pay the applicants certain sums as underpayments. The trial judge found that the awards applied to sleepover shifts, but made no findings as to whether either of the respondents worked a sleepover shift on any particular day, or whether any such day was a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday. The trial judge made several declarations, but no other orders.

The legal issues the court was required to decide included whether the declarations made by the trial judge were binding declarations of right within the meaning of section 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and whether an appeal lay from the trial judge's order. The court considered that the declarations were not binding declarations of right, and did not purport to declare the rights of the parties in any respect. The court found that the declarations were no more than summary expressions of conclusions that the trial judge had reached in his reasons for judgment, and that the order made by the trial judge was not one from which an appeal lay.

The court set aside the notice of appeal filed by the appellant on 6 October 2000. The original application remained pending before the trial judge, and there was no need for any order remitting anything to his Honour. The court reached this conclusion with considerable regret, as it would have amounted to giving an advisory opinion in the course of a proceeding to resolve the question whether a sleepover shift was or was not governed by the provisions of the two awards.

Orders