FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw (No 2) [2014] FCA 438
Citation: Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd (No 2) v Renshaw [2014] FCA 438 Parties: QUEENSLAND MINING CORPORATION LIMITED (ACN 109 962 469) v HOWARD VICTOR RENSHAW, BUTMALL PTY LIMITED (ACN 060 658 639) and 23 MARTIN PLACE PTY LIMITED (ACN 145 097 258) File number: NSD 1308 of 2013 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 5 May 2014 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – Whether declaration ought to be made that plaintiff contravened s 200B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – Whether declaration is a precondition for making an order under s 200J – Whether the making of a declaration has any utility or is otherwise appropriate – Whether beneficial interest in benefit paid to a trustee is held on trust by the beneficiaries for the giver by force of s 200J – Whether good cause exists to justify not making an award of interest by virtue of plaintiff’s involvement in breach of s 200B – Where judgment pronounced prior to making final orders –Whether an order extending the time within which to appeal is required Legislation: Constitution, s 73
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 200B, 200J
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 4, 21, 24(1), 51A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 36.03Cases cited: Ah Toy v Registrar of Companies (NT) (1985) 10 FCR 280
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Kokos International Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 5
Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60
Khazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian; In the Matter of Frontier Architects Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2011) 197 FCR 113
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v
Kokos International Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 5
Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw [2014] FCA 365
Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde (2001) 105 FCR 437Date of hearing: 5-6 February 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 24 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr R Scruby Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Kemp Strang Lawyers Counsel for the First and Second Defendants: Mr M Watts Solicitor for the First and Second Defendants: Haylen McKenzie Solicitors Solicitor for the Third Defendant: MacKellars Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1308 of 2013
BETWEEN: QUEENSLAND MINING CORPORATION LIMITED (ACN 109 962 469)
PlaintiffAND: HOWARD VICTOR RENSHAW
First DefendantBUTMALL PTY LIMITED (ACN 060 658 639)
Second Defendant23 MARTIN PLACE PTY LIMITED (ACN 145 097 258)
Third Defendant
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 MAY 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.The First Defendant holds an amount of $270,000.00 on trust for the Plaintiff pursuant to section 200J(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
2.The Second Defendant holds an amount of $264,000.00 on trust for the Plaintiff pursuant to section 200J(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
3.The First and Second Defendants hold an amount of $143,333.00 on trust for…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw (No 2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] FCA 438
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether a declaration was necessary for recovery of the termination benefits under s 200J, and whether there was a statutory precondition requiring such a declaration. The Renshaw defendants argued that a declaration was necessary for the recovery of the monies under s 200J as these monies were payable only if there was a contravention of s 200B. QMCL, on the other hand, opposed the declaration, stating that it was not pleaded, not the subject of submissions at trial, and would lack utility. The court found that there was no statutory precondition requiring a declaration before an order could be made under s 200J. The court held that it was sufficient to find that the statutory criteria for an order under s 200J were satisfied, as it had done in its earlier substantive reasons. Consequently, the court concluded that the declaration was not necessary and lacked utility.
The court further reasoned that making a declaration in this case would not be appropriate due to several factors. Firstly, there was no public body with an interest in seeking such relief. Secondly, the declaration would merely restate one of the conclusions reached in the court's reasons for judgment. Thirdly, given that s 200B creates an offence of strict liability, the court deemed it inappropriate to make such a declaration in the context of the present proceedings. Additionally, the issue of the declaration was raised for the first time in submissions after the reasons had been published, without any explanation, raising questions about the fairness of permitting the issue to be raised at such a late stage.
The court ordered that judgment be entered against the First Defendant for $270,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest, against the Second Defendant for $264,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest, and against both the First and Second Defendants for $143,333.00 plus pre-judgment interest. The Third Defendant was ordered to pay $50,333.00 held by them, with a restraint on enforcing the judgment up to the amount of $93,000.00 upon payment. The First and Second Defendants were also ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the cross-claim.
Orders
Orders of the court
4. Judgment be entered against the First Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff in the amount of $270,000.00 together with pre-judgment interest pursuant to section 51A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) from 23 October 2012 to the date of judgment as agreed or assessed.
5. Judgment be entered against the Second Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff in the amount of $264,000.00 together with pre-judgment interest pursuant to section 51A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) from 23 October 2012 to the date of judgment as agreed or assessed.
6. Judgment be entered against the First and Second Defendants in favour of the Plaintiff in the amount of $143,333.00 together with pre-judgment interest pursuant to section 51A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) from 23 October 2012 to the date of judgment as agreed or assessed.
7. The sum of $50,333.00 held by the Third Defendant subject to undertakings given by the Third Defendant to the Court on 24 October 2013 be paid forthwith by the Third Defendant to the Plaintiff.
8. Upon payment of the sum referred to in order 7 above, the Plaintiff is restrained from enforcing the judgment referred to in order 6 above save to the extent that it may enforce judgment up to the amount of $93,000.00.
9. The First and Second Defendants are to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the Cross-Claim.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Furthermore, while accepting that QMCL should be entitled to its costs on the counterclaim, the Renshaw defendants included short submissions to the effect that the parties should bear their own costs on the application for recovery of the termination benefits under s 200J of the Corporations Act. Notwithstanding that I had intimated that I would award QMCL its costs at [186] of my reasons, I consider that it is fair in all of the circumstances to permit the Renshaw defendants to raise the issue. Accordingly, following receipt of the Renshaw defendants’ submissions, the Court advised the parties that it would hear short oral submissions on the question of costs on 5 May 2014 when these reasons were to be delivered and final orders otherwise made.2. SHOULD A DECLARATION BE MADE THAT S 200B HAS BEEN CONTRAVENED? The Renshaw defendants seek a declaration that QMCL has contravened s 200B(1) of the Corporations Act by making the termination payments. They contend that the order is “necessary” in order for the monies to be recovered under s 200J because those monies are payable only if there is a contravention of s 200B. It is their submission that “[w]ithout the declaration, there is no authority for orders under section 200J.” The declaration is opposed by QMCL on the grounds that the declaration was not pleaded; nor was it the subject of submissions at trial. Furthermore, it is said that the declaration would lack any utility and is therefore contrary to authority (citing Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 582). It is clear that s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) gives the Court power to grant a declaration of right in any matter within its jurisdiction. There are, however, a number of significant difficulties which stand in the way of such a declaration being granted in this case. The short point is that there is no statutory precondition requiring the making of a declaration that s 200B of the Corporations Act has been contravened before an order can be made under s 200J. It is sufficient in law for me to find that the statutory criteria which must be met before an order can be made under s 200J are satisfied, as I have found in my substantive reasons published on 10 April 2014 inter alia at [2]. It follows that the sole ground on which the declaration was sought is, in my view, mistaken. Nor do I accept that there would be any utility in making the declaration, or that it would otherwise be appropriate. First, this is not a case in which a public body charged with enforcing the Corporations Act has a real interest in seeking such relief: cf, eg, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Kokos International Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 5 at [48] (French J, as his Honour then was). Secondly, the declaration would do no more than state in a summary form, one of the conclusions reached by the Court in its reasons for judgment, albeit a conclusion from which the rights and liabilities in question flowed: Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde (2001) 105 FCR 437 at 440 [8] (Gray, Branson and North JJ). Thirdly, given that s 200B creates an offence of strict liability, I do not consider that it is appropriate in the context of the present proceedings to make such a declaration. Finally, the question of whether a declaration should be made was raised for the first time only in submissions after reasons had been published on 10 April 2014 for which no explanation has been given. This raises serious questions as to the fairness in permitting the issue to be raised at this late stage. 3. THE APPROPRIATE FORM OF ORDERS FOR THE REPAYMENT OF MONIES