Wark v The State of Western Australia [No 2]

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   WARK -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [No 2] [2023] WASCA 67

CORAM:   BUSS P

HEARD:   19 MAY 2022

DELIVERED          :   2 MAY 2023

FILE NO/S:   CACR 41 of 2021

BETWEEN:   FRANCIS JOHN WARK

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

FILE NO/S:   CACR 62 of 2021

BETWEEN:   FRANCIS JOHN WARK

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   HALL J

File Number            :   IND 370 of 2016


Catchwords:

Courts and judicial system - Judges - Application for disqualification of judge on ground of apprehended bias - Presumed knowledge or awareness of hypothetical fair‑minded lay observer - Whether reasonable apprehension of bias

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 278 (repealed)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Refusal of disqualification

Category:    B

Representation:

CACR 41 of 2021

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr D Grace KC & Mr D N Ryan
Respondent : Ms A L Forrester SC & Ms K C Cook

Solicitors:

Appellant : Chelmsford Legal
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

CACR 62 of 2021

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr D Grace KC & Mr D N Ryan
Respondent : Ms A L Forrester SC & Ms K C Cook

Solicitors:

Appellant : Chelmsford Legal
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

BCM v The Queen [2013] HCA 48; (2013) 88 ALJR 101

Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225

British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283

Dansie v The Queen [2022] HCA 25; (2022) 403 ALR 221

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Filippou v The Queen [2015] HCA 29; (2015) 256 CLR 47

Fitzgerald v The Queen [2014] HCA 28; (2014) 88 ALJR 779

GAX v The Queen [2017] HCA 25; (2017) 91 ALJR 698

Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; (1990) 170 CLR 70

Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288

M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487

Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507

Morris v The Queen [1987] HCA 50; (1987) 163 CLR 454

Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12; (2020) 268 CLR 123

R v Baden‑Clay [2016] HCA 35; (2016) 258 CLR 308

R v Hillier [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618

R v Nguyen [2010] HCA 38; (2010) 242 CLR 491

Re JRL; ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39

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Details
Case
[2023] WASCA 67
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Wark v The State of Western Australia [No 2] involved the appellant, Wark, who was originally tried and convicted of wilful murder, but later convicted of manslaughter at a retrial. Wark appealed against the decision to allow the retrial, arguing that there was a perceived bias on the part of the trial judge. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether there was a real likelihood of perceived bias on the part of the trial judge, which would necessitate the quashing of the conviction. This involved examining the objective circumstances of the case, including the differences in evidence and exhibits between the original trial and the retrial, and whether these circumstances would lead a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend that the trial judge might not act impartially.

The court considered the principles set out in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng, which outline the elements necessary to establish a real likelihood of perceived bias. The court found that while there were significant differences in the evidence presented at the retrial, these differences were not sufficient to lead a fair-minded lay observer to conclude that the trial judge had prejudged the case. The court also noted that the objective circumstances, including the reasons for judgment provided by the original trial judge, did not support an apprehension of bias.

The court concluded that there was no real likelihood of perceived bias on the part of the trial judge. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction at the retrial was upheld. The court determined that the trial judge had not acted in a manner that would lead a fair-minded observer to doubt the impartiality of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng,[26] Hayne J observed that an assertion that a decision-maker has prejudged or will prejudge an issue, and an assertion that there is a real likelihood that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not act impartially and without prejudice, in effect makes a statement which has several distinct elements at its foundation. His Honour elaborated:First, there is the contention that the decision-maker has an opinion on a relevant aspect of the matter in issue in the particular case. Secondly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will apply that opinion to that matter in issue. Thirdly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will do so without giving the matter fresh consideration in the light of whatever may be the facts and arguments relevant to the particular case. Most importantly, there is the assumption that the question which is said to have been prejudged is one which should be considered afresh in relation to the particular case.[26] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 [185]. In my opinion, the hypothetical fair‑minded lay observer should be presumed to know or be aware of all the objective circumstances of the present case. The objective circumstances of the present case of which the hypothetical fair‑minded lay observer should be presumed to know or be aware of include:(a)The appellant's original trial before Jenkins J was a trial before her Honour alone without a jury. Her Honour published reasons for judgment which included the principles of law that she had applied and the findings of fact on which she had relied. Her Honour's verdict was not inscrutable.(b)The appellant's retrial before Hall J was a trial before his Honour and a jury. The jury was not obliged to deliver a judgment which included the principles of law that the jury had applied or the findings of fact on which the jury had relied. The jury's verdict was inscrutable.(c)At the original trial the appellant was charged with wilful murder and convicted of murder.(d)At the retrial the appellant was charged with murder and convicted of manslaughter. Further, the objective circumstances of the present case of which the hypothetical fair‑minded lay observer should be presumed to know or be aware of include:(a)There were material differences between the body of evidence given by the lay witnesses at the original trial and the body of evidence given by the lay witnesses at the retrial.(b)There were material differences between the body of evidence given by the police witnesses at the original trial and the body of evidence given by the police witnesses at the retrial.(c)There were material differences between the body of evidence given by the expert witnesses at the original trial and the body of evidence given by the expert witnesses at the retrial.(d)There were material differences between the body of exhibits tendered at the original trial and the body of exhibits tendered at the retrial.