JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: WARK -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [No 2] [2023] WASCA 67
CORAM: BUSS P
HEARD: 19 MAY 2022
DELIVERED : 2 MAY 2023
FILE NO/S: CACR 41 of 2021
BETWEEN: FRANCIS JOHN WARK
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
FILE NO/S: CACR 62 of 2021
BETWEEN: FRANCIS JOHN WARK
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: HALL J
File Number : IND 370 of 2016
Catchwords:
Courts and judicial system - Judges - Application for disqualification of judge on ground of apprehended bias - Presumed knowledge or awareness of hypothetical fair‑minded lay observer - Whether reasonable apprehension of bias
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA), s 278 (repealed)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A
Result:
Refusal of disqualification
Category: B
Representation:
CACR 41 of 2021
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr D Grace KC & Mr D N Ryan |
| Respondent | : | Ms A L Forrester SC & Ms K C Cook |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Chelmsford Legal |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
CACR 62 of 2021
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr D Grace KC & Mr D N Ryan |
| Respondent | : | Ms A L Forrester SC & Ms K C Cook |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Chelmsford Legal |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
BCM v The Queen [2013] HCA 48; (2013) 88 ALJR 101
Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225
British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283
Dansie v The Queen [2022] HCA 25; (2022) 403 ALR 221
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
Filippou v The Queen [2015] HCA 29; (2015) 256 CLR 47
Fitzgerald v The Queen [2014] HCA 28; (2014) 88 ALJR 779
GAX v The Queen [2017] HCA 25; (2017) 91 ALJR 698
Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; (1990) 170 CLR 70
Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288
M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487
Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507
Morris v The Queen [1987] HCA 50; (1987) 163 CLR 454
Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12; (2020) 268 CLR 123
R v Baden‑Clay [2016] HCA 35; (2016) 258 CLR 308
R v Hillier [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618
R v Nguyen [2010] HCA 38; (2010) 242 CLR 491
Re JRL; ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39
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- Case
- [2023] WASCA 67
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether there was a real likelihood of perceived bias on the part of the trial judge, which would necessitate the quashing of the conviction. This involved examining the objective circumstances of the case, including the differences in evidence and exhibits between the original trial and the retrial, and whether these circumstances would lead a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend that the trial judge might not act impartially.
The court considered the principles set out in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng, which outline the elements necessary to establish a real likelihood of perceived bias. The court found that while there were significant differences in the evidence presented at the retrial, these differences were not sufficient to lead a fair-minded lay observer to conclude that the trial judge had prejudged the case. The court also noted that the objective circumstances, including the reasons for judgment provided by the original trial judge, did not support an apprehension of bias.
The court concluded that there was no real likelihood of perceived bias on the part of the trial judge. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction at the retrial was upheld. The court determined that the trial judge had not acted in a manner that would lead a fair-minded observer to doubt the impartiality of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng,[26] Hayne J observed that an assertion that a decision-maker has prejudged or will prejudge an issue, and an assertion that there is a real likelihood that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not act impartially and without prejudice, in effect makes a statement which has several distinct elements at its foundation. His Honour elaborated:First, there is the contention that the decision-maker has an opinion on a relevant aspect of the matter in issue in the particular case. Secondly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will apply that opinion to that matter in issue. Thirdly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will do so without giving the matter fresh consideration in the light of whatever may be the facts and arguments relevant to the particular case. Most importantly, there is the assumption that the question which is said to have been prejudged is one which should be considered afresh in relation to the particular case.[26] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 [185]. In my opinion, the hypothetical fair‑minded lay observer should be presumed to know or be aware of all the objective circumstances of the present case. The objective circumstances of the present case of which the hypothetical fair‑minded lay observer should be presumed to know or be aware of include:(a)The appellant's original trial before Jenkins J was a trial before her Honour alone without a jury. Her Honour published reasons for judgment which included the principles of law that she had applied and the findings of fact on which she had relied. Her Honour's verdict was not inscrutable.(b)The appellant's retrial before Hall J was a trial before his Honour and a jury. The jury was not obliged to deliver a judgment which included the principles of law that the jury had applied or the findings of fact on which the jury had relied. The jury's verdict was inscrutable.(c)At the original trial the appellant was charged with wilful murder and convicted of murder.(d)At the retrial the appellant was charged with murder and convicted of manslaughter. Further, the objective circumstances of the present case of which the hypothetical fair‑minded lay observer should be presumed to know or be aware of include:(a)There were material differences between the body of evidence given by the lay witnesses at the original trial and the body of evidence given by the lay witnesses at the retrial.(b)There were material differences between the body of evidence given by the police witnesses at the original trial and the body of evidence given by the police witnesses at the retrial.(c)There were material differences between the body of evidence given by the expert witnesses at the original trial and the body of evidence given by the expert witnesses at the retrial.(d)There were material differences between the body of exhibits tendered at the original trial and the body of exhibits tendered at the retrial.