FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WAQAS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 1683 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application to review decision of former Refugee Review Tribunal – application for an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.360, 360A, 362B, 379G, 477(1), 477(2) Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch.2, cl.573.211(3) |
| Applicant: | SYED MUHAMMAD WAQAS |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 3496 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Barnes |
| Hearing date: | 23 June 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 23 June 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 23 June 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | In Person |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | DLA Piper |
ORDERS
The name of the Second Respondent be amended to read "Administrative Appeals Tribunal".
The application for an extension of time pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $3,416.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3496 of 2014
| SYED MUHAMMAD WAQAS |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
This is an application for review of a decision of the former Migration Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) dated 19 March 2014 affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa.
The Tribunal decision was dated 19 March 2014. The Applicant did not seek judicial review until 17 December 2014. In those circumstances, he is outside the time provided for in s.477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), which requires that an application to this court in relation to a migration decision must be made within 35 days of the date of the migration decision. However, under s.477(2) of the Act, the court may, by order, extend that period as the court considers appropriate if an application for such order has been made in writing specifying why the Applicant considers it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice and the court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order.
In…
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- Case
- [2016] FCCA 1683
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate of the Minister had erred in law when assessing Mr Waqas's character under the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and associated regulations. Specifically, the Court was required to determine if the delegate had properly considered all relevant information, including evidence presented by Mr Waqas regarding his rehabilitation and changed circumstances, and whether the delegate's conclusion that Mr Waqas did not satisfy the character test was reasonable and supported by the evidence.
Judge Barnes reasoned that the delegate's decision-making process had failed to adequately engage with the evidence of Mr Waqas's rehabilitation and his efforts to address the underlying issues that led to his previous offending. The Court applied the principles of administrative law, emphasizing the need for a decision-maker to undertake a holistic and balanced assessment of all relevant factors, including mitigating circumstances. The delegate's failure to give sufficient weight to this evidence meant that the decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error.
Consequently, Judge Barnes set aside the Minister's decision and remitted the matter to the Minister for redetermination according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter before the court is an application for an extension of time to bring a judicial review application under section 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Applicant, Syed Muhammad Waqas, seeks to challenge a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant him a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa. The Tribunal's decision was dated 19 March 2014, and the Applicant did not seek judicial review until 17 December 2014, which is outside the 35-day period provided for in section 477(1) of the Migration Act. The court is required to consider whether an extension of time should be granted under section 477(2) of the Act. The Applicant's application for an extension of time was filed together with the substantive application for judicial review and was determined as a preliminary matter. The Applicant's explanation for the delay in bringing the application focused on the fact that he sought Ministerial intervention after receiving the Tribunal decision and only came to court after the Minister declined to intervene. The Applicant did not elaborate on why he chose to pursue Ministerial intervention instead of coming to court, and he did not volunteer any evidence about whether he was aware of the time limit on judicial review applications. The Applicant's claims that he was provided with wrong information by his migration agent were found not to relate to the time limits on judicial review applications after the Tribunal decision. The substantive application was found to have no arguable prospects of success as there was no evidence of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The delay in bringing the application was substantial, and the Applicant's explanation for the delay was not entirely satisfactory. The court was not satisfied that it would be in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time for making the application for judicial review.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the Applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the judicial review application satisfactory?
2. Has the Applicant raised an arguable case of jurisdictional error on any of the bases contended for or arising on the material before the court?
3. Are there other factors relevant to the application for an extension of time that should be considered by the Court?
4. Would extending the time for making the application for judicial review be in the interests of the administration of justice?
Held
1. Is the Applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the judicial review application satisfactory?
The court concluded that the Applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the judicial review application, which was that he had sought Ministerial intervention, was not entirely satisfactory.
2. Has the Applicant raised an arguable case of jurisdictional error on any of the bases contended for or arising on the material before the court?
The court concluded that the Applicant had not raised an arguable case of jurisdictional error on any of the bases contended for or arising on the material before the court.
3. Are there other factors relevant to the application for an extension of time that should be considered by the Court?
The court considered all the circumstances of the case but found no other factors relevant to the application for an extension of time that would warrant a different conclusion.
4. Would extending the time for making the application for judicial review be in the interests of the administration of justice?
The court concluded that it would not be in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time for making the application for judicial review and dismissed the application for an extension of time.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court in the case of Waqas v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1683 dismissed the Applicant's application for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision of the former Migration Review Tribunal. The court considered several factors before reaching its decision, including the Applicant's explanation for the delay, whether an arguable case of jurisdictional error was made out, and other relevant factors. The court ultimately found that the Applicant's explanation for the delay was not entirely satisfactory, and that the grounds of review did not raise an arguable case of jurisdictional error. The delay of approximately eight months was substantial, and the merits of the application were weak. Therefore, the court held that extending the time for making the application for judicial review would not be in the interests of the administration of justice.
In addressing the Applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the judicial review application, the court found that while the Applicant had sought Ministerial intervention before coming to court, this was not a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Applicant did not elaborate on why he chose to pursue Ministerial intervention rather than coming to the court and did not suggest that he was given wrong information and misleading information in relation to the time limits on any judicial review application after the time of the Tribunal decision. The court noted that the Applicant was aware of the Tribunal decision and the availability of judicial review but chose to pursue Ministerial intervention, although he did seek judicial review relatively promptly after the Minister declined to intervene. The court found that even if the Applicant's explanation were to be regarded as an acceptable explanation in the particular circumstances of this case, the grounds of the substantive application were not such as to raise even an arguable ground of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
In relation to the second issue, the court found that the Applicant had not raised an arguable case of jurisdictional error on any of the bases contended for or arising on the material before the court. The Applicant claimed that he was not given more time to explain his case, but the court found that the Tribunal had invited the Applicant to a hearing under s.360 of the Act, and the invitation was properly made in accordance with the requirements of s.360A of the Act. The Applicant claimed that the Tribunal did not fully consider his case, but the court found that the Tribunal understood that the application had been made after the substantive visa had expired, and this was the second occasion on which this had occurred. In such circumstances, the Applicant's reason for the delay in lodging the visa application did not have to be addressed by the Tribunal. It considered the applicable criteria. There was no arguable case of jurisdictional error on this basis or in relation to the Tribunal's application of the law.
The court also considered other factors relevant to the application for an extension of time. There was no suggestion of any prejudice to the Respondents, and no particular impact on the Applicant. The court had regard to all the circumstances insofar as possible on the evidence before the court, including the interests of the public at large in the application of the law. The court found that in the circumstances, it would not be in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time for making the application for judicial review.
In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that where an application for an extension of time to seek judicial review is made outside the statutory time limit, the court will consider all relevant factors, including the Applicant's explanation for the delay, whether an arguable case of jurisdictional error is made out, and other relevant factors. If the delay is substantial, and the grounds of review do not raise an arguable case of jurisdictional error, the court may find that extending the time for making the application for judicial review would not be in the interests of the administration of justice. The court did not depart from prior authority in reaching its decision, but rather applied established legal principles in the context of the particular facts of this case.