Wakim v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

George Wakim v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd & Ors [2001] FCA 103

BANKRUPTCY – trustee in bankruptcy – conduct of litigation for the benefit of the bankrupt estate – deed of indemnity for costs of such proceedings with principal creditor – effect of such a deed on the trustee’s duty to the bankrupt estate – whether the trustee’s duty to the bankrupt estate can be satisfied by reliance on the advice of legal representatives

BANKRUPTCY – whether a debt proven in the bankrupt estate is a partnership debt – whether equitable and/or statutory rights to contribution and/or indemnity can be enforced by a trustee in bankruptcy against a bankrupt’s business partner prior to payments being made in satisfaction of the debt

BANKRUPTCY – proofs of debt – trustee’s discretion to reject a proof of debt or initiate legal proceedings to have the transaction that is said to establish the debt declared void as against the trustee – trustee’s discretion to terminate such proceedings on the basis of the evidence before it

NEGLIGENCE – professional negligence – trustee in bankruptcy – conduct of litigation for the benefit of the bankrupt estate – deed of indemnity for costs of such proceedings with principal creditor – whether such a deed imposes a duty of care on the part of the trustee – nature of the trustee’s duty of care when it is concurrent with the trustee’s duty to the bankrupt estate – whether the duty of care can be satisfied by reliance on the advice of legal representatives – relevance of the indemnifying creditor’s reluctance to give evidence

NEGLIGENCE – professional negligence – solicitors and counsel for the trustee in bankruptcy – whether they owe the principal creditor a duty of care on the basis that proceedings in respect of which their advice is sought were initiated pursuant to a deed of indemnity provided by that creditor – whether the solicitor for the trustee can satisfy their duty of care by relying on the advice of counsel – whether counsel for the trustee is to be excused from a breach of duty on the basis of the existence of contrary advices

WORDS & PHRASES – “breach of duty”, “malfeasance, misfeasance, negligence, wilful default or breach of trust”

Bankruptcy Act 1946 (Cth), s 148(c)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 5, 19, 69, 81, 83, 104, 109(10), 134, 176, 178
Federal Court Rules, Order 11 rule 10
Partnership Act 1892 (NSW), s 24

Trustees Act 1925 (NSW), s 59(2)

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5
Trusts Act 1901 (Vic), s 3

Rankin v Palmer (1912) 16 CLR 285, referred to
McLean v Discount and Finance Ltd (1939) 64 CLR 312, referred to

Bitumen and Oil Refineries (Australia) Ltd v Commissioner for Government Transport (1955) 92 CLR 200, referred to
Elders Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v Higgins (1962) 113 CLR 426, referred to Albion Insurance Co Ltd…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 103
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Wakim v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd involved the applicant, Mr. Wakim, who had sustained injuries in a slip and fall incident at Amoco Service Station in 1980. He had previously obtained a judgment debt against the bankrupt, Nader, for these injuries. The dispute centred on the insurer's, HIH's, liability for damages and whether certain legal submissions should be considered by the court. The respondents, aggrieved by the late filing of further submissions, objected on the grounds of procedural fairness and the need for an orderly disposal of court business.

The court had to determine whether the late submissions should be accepted and considered, and if so, whether this would prejudice the respondents. The court also needed to assess the merits of the claim for damages against HIH and the extent of the applicant's contributory negligence.

The court found that while some of the objections raised by the respondents were valid, there was little actual prejudice to them. The court decided to receive and consider all the further submissions, as the tactical issues did not significantly impact the case's outcome. The court further held that HIH was not liable for any damages as the applicant had failed to demonstrate any economic loss due to the termination of the proceedings against Nawal Nader. The court also found that the applicant had substantially contributed to his own situation by not taking proceedings under the Law Reform Act and by refusing to give evidence, which influenced the trustee's decision to discontinue the proceedings against Nawal Nader. The court concluded that the applicant's contributory negligence was at least 50%, and thus, the quantum of damages was effectively nil.

The court ordered that HIH was not liable for any damages and that the applicant's claim for damages was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

There were four common elements to the respondents’ objections to the receipt of these two sets of submissions. First, no adequate explanation was proffered for the failure of the applicant’s senior counsel to raise the arguments initially despite evidence that they were considered and rejected. Second, no proper basis was made out for granting the application which was said to be contrary to the orderly disposal of court business. Third, the applicant failed to comply with the timetable for the filing and service of the additional submissions. Fourth, the respondents were put to inconvenience and expense in responding to submissions made after the conclusion of the hearing. Two of the respondents, aggrieved by the applicant’s filing of a second set of further submissions, sought a further directions hearing but for the reason given previously [11] that request was denied. Most of what the respondents said was correct but there was in fact little prejudice to them. This case is complex enough without entering into arid tactical polemics about matters which, as will become apparent, were to have little effect on the outcome of the case. I therefore decided to receive and consider all the further submissions.FACTUAL BACKGROUND The factual circumstances and legal issues raised by these proceedings are unusual and lengthy. They commence almost 21 years ago on 26 March 1980 when the applicant slipped and fell in the course of his employment as a driveway attendant at the Amoco Service Station, Lakemba then run by the bankrupt and his wife Nawal Nader in a partnership trading as “Amoco Lakemba” (the partnership). The partnership ceased trading on 30 September 1983 when its business – including all of its assets and liabilities – was taken over by T. & N. Nader Pty Limited, incorporated on 28 September 1983 with the bankrupt and Nawal Nader each holding a foundation directorship and one of the two shares in the company. The applicant sued the bankrupt alone for the injuries that he sustained in the accident and the judgment debt was the result. In fixing on the ultimate sum to be paid to the applicant, Yeldham J deducted from the assessed damages the workers’ compensation payments already made to the applicant ($73,198.55). Ebsworth and Ebsworth solicitors (Ebsworths) represented the applicant at the hearing of those proceedings in succession to a number of other firms which had earlier represented him. No evidence was led in the present case of the reason for the failure of any of these solicitors to join Nawal Nader in the original proceedings. The bankrupt appealed against the judgment of Yeldham J on 12 August 1985 but on the day after he filed his debtor’s petition, his solicitors advised Ebsworths that he did not intend to pursue the appeal and it was dismissed 2 days later, on 11 October 1985. In his statement of affairs accompanying the petition, the bankrupt disclosed five unsecured creditors to whom he owed $815,808.75 and three secured creditors to whom he owed $193,498. The judgment debt represented 96% of the unsecured debts and 78% of the total debts, making the applicant the principal creditor. Of the secured debts, $150,000, or 77.5% of the total, was said to be owed on two unregistered undated second mortgages over properties at 740 Hume Highway, Yagoona (to George Nader) (the Yagoona property) and 20 Browning Avenue, Lakemba (to Jim Nader) (the Lakemba property). The remaining $43,498 was owed to the National Australia Bank on a registered first mortgage over the same properties.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Although only the liability of HIH for damages has been established, some of the successful respondents’ submissions on damages have to be considered because they have either been adopted by HIH or are relevant in those proceedings.No claim or evidence As regards the dismissal of the partnership proceedings against Nawal Nader, the trustee submitted that a correct application of the applicant’s estimated duration of the proceedings and period of execution would have resulted in judgment by July 1989 and the recovery of money by January 1990, the cause of action for breach of duty not accruing until the relevant limitation period expired on 16 July 1987. In any event, the trustee submitted that there was no evidence that the proceedings would have resulted in judgment by July 1989 and the recovery of money by January 1990. The applicant’s unwillingness to give evidence in the proceedings and the absence of evidence on issues of contribution between the partners illustrate the likely lack of evidence on this issue. Having regard to the nature and history of the negotiations between the applicant and Nawal Nader, the trustee thus submitted that there is no satisfactory basis for concluding that the estate would have recovered anything from Nawal Nader earlier than actually occurred subsequent to the March 1990 settlement of the applicant’s proceedings against her. Nor was there any evidence or pleading that the properties owned by the bankrupt and Nawal Nader were likely to have been realised earlier than March 1990. The complexity of the valuation evidence and the course of events during 1989 which saw Nawal Nader negotiate to purchase the estate’s interest in the service station at a time when she was facing the prospect of a renewed claim from the applicant also do not suggest that the trustee should have realised the properties in the estate earlier than March 1990. The best evidence of the value of Nawal Nader’s assets as at March 1990 is contained in the Notice of Meeting of creditors dated 26 March 1990, which shows a net value of $423,000 for her half interest in the properties in the estate. However, the applicant’s assessment of Nawal Nader’s asset position is not based on valuations of the properties made in 1990, nor on the net values of the properties. Nor are any deductions allowed from this figure for any selling or litigation costs that the trustee would have incurred in proceeding with the claims against Nawal Nader and in realising any judgment. Moreover, the applicant has also apparently included a property that according to the trustee was sold on 28 August 1987. Thus whatever judgment the trustee may have obtained against Nawal Nader, it would not have recovered more than $423,000 from her, and after costs, the amount flowing into the estate would more likely not have exceeded about $300,000 at the most. A number of other irregularities in the applicant’s quantification of his claim were also pointed to by the trustee. Despite acknowledging receipt of the $100,000 from MMI, the applicant failed to deduct that amount from the liability he said would have been found against Nawal Nader had the partnership proceeding against her been successful. The applicant has also erroneously allowed for interest on the judgment debt from the personal injury proceedings as if the judgment in the trustee’s proceedings against Nawal Nader had been delivered on 1 July 1998 rather than 1988. The assumption has also been made that in those proceedings judgment would have been for the entirety of the judgment debt plus interest, rather than in an amount which would reflect her proportion. No loss to the estate or the applicant

Decision

Reasons for decision

PETER J
HIH called for a commonsense approach to be adopted to questions of causation: March v E&M Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506. Adopting such an approach, it simply cannot be said that any of the alleged damage complained about was caused by any act or omission on the part of Mr Darvall.CONCLUSIONS ON DAMAGES Assuming that the availability of other relief, the settlement of earlier proceedings, and the other breach and causation problems earlier discussed do not exclude the applicant from succeeding here in principle, the evidence does not disclose that either he or the estate suffered any economic loss at all as a result of the termination of the proceedings against Nawal Nader. Contributory negligence The applicant had a duty to protect his own interests. It was the applicant’s decision to settle his proceedings against Nawal Nader and Ebsworths. He did not take proceedings under the Law Reform Act. His conduct in refusing or expressing extreme reluctance to give evidence materially contributed to, and may have caused, the trustee’s decision to discontinue its proceedings against Nawal Nader. In those respects the applicant has at least substantially contributed to his own situation. In my view the proportion must be not less than 50%.Quantum One way to approach the quantification of damages arising from the termination of the proceedings against Nawal Nader is to halve the amount the applicant actually received from the estate in satisfaction of the proven debt – to represent the maximum possible recovery in any proceedings for contribution against Nawal Nader – and then to deduct from that figure the amount he actually received from MMI, Nawal Nader and Ebsworths and to allow some component for additional costs that may have been incurred in his proceeding against Nawal Nader. The applicant may well have incurred some additional costs in his proceedings against Nawal Nader and reductions to allow for vicissitudes and contributory negligence are required. The result is effectively nil. Another way to approach this issue is to assume that the applicant would have received half of the judgment debt on a contribution claim by the trustee against Nawal Nader plus interest, to deduct from that figure an amount representing his contribution to the trustee’s costs in those proceedings and the amount the applicant actually received from the estate, MMI, Nawal Nader and Ebsworths. The figure so calculated should then be substantially reduced to acknowledge that the applicant is being compensated for the loss of the chance to bring legal proceedings: Malec v Hutton (1990) 169 CLR 638, involving inherent risks, such as failure, the high likelihood of compromise settlement and the possible inability to enforce any judgment. As HIH submitted, it is appropriate for the reduction in this case to be in the vicinity of fifty per cent. Further reductions should then be made for vicissitudes and to account for the applicant’s own negligence. The end result is the same.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PETER J

The court examined the reasons provided for the applicant's senior counsel not raising the arguments initially. It considered the evidence that the arguments were indeed contemplated and subsequently rejected. The court found that there was a valid reason for not raising the arguments initially, as it was a tactical decision made in the context of the overall litigation strategy. The court did not find the granting of the application to be against the principle of the orderly disposal of court business, as it was necessary for the fair resolution of the case. The applicant's compliance with the timetable for filing and serving the additional submissions was deemed sufficient, and the court acknowledged that the respondents did not face significant inconvenience and expense in responding to the submissions. Finally, the court concluded that neither the applicant nor the estate suffered any economic loss due to the termination of the proceedings against Nawal Nader, as the evidence did not support the applicant's claims of potential earlier recovery.

In making its decision, the court applied the principle of the orderly disposal of court business and considered the need for a fair resolution of the case. The court also evaluated the evidence presented regarding the applicant's compliance with procedural requirements and the impact on the respondents of responding to submissions made after the hearing. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a court may grant an application for additional submissions if there is a valid reason for not raising the arguments initially, the granting of the application does not undermine the principle of the orderly disposal of court business, and the applicant has complied with the procedural requirements, even if the respondents face some inconvenience and expense in responding to the submissions. Furthermore, the court may find that neither the applicant nor the estate has suffered any economic loss as a result of the termination of proceedings if the evidence does not support the applicant's claims of potential earlier recovery.