Wakefield v Commissioner of State Revenue

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Wakefield & Ors v Commissioner of State Revenue [2019] QSC 85

PARTIES:

MARIA LOUISE WAKEFIELD; NIKITA JOY ANDERSON; PHILLIP WILLIAM ANDERSON; SHARON MAY DA SILVA AND DALLAS JOHN ANDERSON

(Appellants)

v

COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 8420 of 2017

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

4 April 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

22 February 2019

JUDGE:

Bowskill J

ORDERS:

1.       The appeal is allowed.

2.       The reassessments are disallowed, and the original assessments are restored.

3.       The respondent refund the overpaid duty, penalties and interest to the appellants.

4.       The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of and incidental to this appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

TAXES AND DUTIES – STAMP DUTIES – APPEAL, CASE STATED ETC – QUEENSLAND – where a registered owner subdivided land and transferred separate lots to each of the appellants – where the appellants self-assessed the transfer duty payable – where the respondent issued reassessments to the appellants on the basis that the transactions should be aggregated under s 30 of the Duties Act 2001 (Qld) – where the respondent disallowed the appellants’ objections to the reassessment – where the appellants appeal the reassessments under s 69 of the Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld) – what is the nature of an appeal to the Supreme Court under s 69 of the Taxation Administration Act 2001

TAXES AND DUTIES – STAMP DUTIES – ASSESSMENT AND AMOUNT PAYABLE INCLUDING FINES – GENERALLY – QUEENSLAND – where the appellants were the transferor’s four children and one of her grandchildren – where the transfers were by way of gift, contained in separate instruments and not conditional on each other – where the respondent aggregated transfer duty under s 30 of the Duties Act 2001 (Qld) – whether the transfers form, evidence, give effect to or arise from what is substantially one arrangement – whether the respondent erred in aggregating the transactions under s 30 of the Duties Act 2001 (Qld)

Duties Act 2001 (Qld) s 30
Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld) s 69, s 70, s 70A, s 70B, s 70C
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 748, r 765, r 766, r 782, r 785

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353
Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616
Clancy & Ors v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) (1998) 40 ATR 1089
Feez Ruthning v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax [2003] 2 Qd R 41
Jeffrey v Commissioner of Stamps (1980) 23 SASR 398
Logan v Woongarra Shire Council [1983] 2 Qd R 689
Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1
Old Reynella Village Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (SA) (1989) 51 SASR 378
Orica IC Assets Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2011) 82 ATR 18; [2011] QSC 001
Pryke v Commissioner of State Revenue [2006] ATC 4604; [2006] QSC 226
Quetel Pty Ltd v Commissioner…

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Details
Case
[2019] QSC 85
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Wakefield v Commissioner of State Revenue concerned an appeal by the appellants against reassessments issued by the Commissioner of State Revenue under the Duties Act 2001 (Qld). The appellants, who were the transferor's four children and one of her grandchildren, had self-assessed the transfer duty payable on separate lots of land transferred to them by the transferor. The Commissioner issued reassessments to the appellants, aggregating the transactions under s 30 of the Duties Act. The Commissioner disallowed the appellants' objections to the reassessments, leading the appellants to appeal the reassessments under s 69 of the Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld). The central legal issue in the case was whether the Commissioner's decision to aggregate the transactions under s 30 of the Duties Act was correct.

The court examined the nature of an appeal under s 69 of the Taxation Administration Act, determining that such an appeal is a rehearing rather than a hearing de novo. The court also considered the proper construction of s 30 of the Duties Act, finding that for the section to apply, there must be a unifying factor that brings the dutiable transactions within the section, such as a unity of purpose or some other relationship between the transactions. The court held that the application of s 30 is a question of fact, taking into account all relevant circumstances relating to the dutiable transactions. The court concluded that the Commissioner's decision to aggregate the transactions under s 30 of the Duties Act was incorrect.

In its decision, the court allowed the appeal, disallowed the reassessments, and restored the original assessments. The court ordered the Commissioner to refund the overpaid duty, penalties, and interest to the appellants and to pay the appellants' costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The reassessments are disallowed, and the original assessments are restored.

3. The respondent refund the overpaid duty, penalties and interest to the appellants.

4. The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of and incidental to this appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having regard to words of s 30, in their context, and the various authorities, the relevant principles are as follows.1.In order for s 30 to apply, there must be “some unifying factor” that brings the dutiable transactions within the section. That unifying factor may be the purpose or objective of either (or both) the transferor(s) or the transferee(s) (a unity of purpose) or it may be some other relationship, connection or interdependence between the transactions.[51]The words of s 30 support the need for a “unifying factor” to be shown, having regard to the use of the word “together” in s 30(1); the phrase “substantially 1 arrangement”, emphasising the adjective “1”[52]; and the need to take into account “all relevant circumstances relating to the dutiable transactions”, words which are apt, including having regard to the specific circumstances identified in s 30(4), to invite consideration of circumstances which connect the dutiable transactions in some way.[53]2.“Arrangement” is a word of wide, but not unlimited meaning. It was described, albeit in the context of a different provision of the previous Stamp Act, as “a comprehensive word which extends to embrace all kinds of concerted action by which persons may arrange their affairs for a particular purpose or to produce a particular result”.[54] An arrangement is something less than a legally enforceable contract or agreement; it may be an understanding or a plan which is not enforceable.[55] It may be inferred from the circumstances. The arrangement need not be bilateral, as between the transferor(s) and the transferee(s), but may be unilateral, having regard to the objectives of the party(ies) on either side of the transactions.[56] But in either case, an arrangement, in its ordinary meaning, connotes a plan, with a purpose or objective, of some kind. 3.The use of the word “substantially”, in the phrase “what is, substantially 1 arrangement”, invites consideration of the substance of the dutiable transactions, looked at together, as opposed to the form, to determine whether the transactions, together, form etc what is, substantially (or really or essentially), one arrangement, although as a matter of form they may appear as separate transactions.[57] 4.The determination to be made under s 30(1) is a question of fact, involving matters of degree,[58] taking into account all relevant circumstances relating to the dutiable transactions (s 30(3)) including, but not limited to, the factors identified in s 30(4).[59] The circumstances that are relevant will depend on the individual case, but the phrase “relating to” is broad enough to encompass circumstances surrounding the dutiable transactions, not merely the transactions themselves.5.The objectives, actions and conduct of both the transferor(s) and transferee(s) are potentially relevant. Under the Duties Act the obligation to pay transfer duty falls on all parties to a dutiable transaction.[60] There is nothing in the words of s 30, particularly s 30(3) and (4), which supports a construction that the primary focus is on the objectives, actions or conduct of the transferee(s).[61]Was the Commissioner’s conclusion as to the application of s 30 correct?[51] Jeffrey v Commissioner of Stamps (1980) 23 SASR 398 at 405 per Jacobs J. See also Quetel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1993] 2 Qd R 57 at 90 per Mackenzie J, accepting the importance of identification of a relationship between the transactions, in the context of considering whether agreements were in substance one transaction of sale.[52] As Jacobs J did in Jeffrey at 405.[53] Cf Camp Seabee Properties Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2014] QCAT 258 at [47]-[49]. To the extent it was held in Camp Seabee that a “unifying factor”, such as identified in Jeffrey’s case, is not required (as opposed to a narrower conclusion, that a “unity of purpose” is not always required), I respectfully disagree. [54] Quetel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1993] 2 Qd R 57 at 80 per Mackenzie J (in relation to s 49C(2)(d) of the Stamp Act 1894).[55] Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 at 7-8.[56] Re Chief Commissioner of State Revenue and Pacific General Securities Ltd and Finmore Holdings Pty Ltd (2004) 58 ATR 17 at [34]; cf Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Lutovi Investments Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 434, for example at 443 per Gibbs and Mason JJ (construing the word “arrangement” where it was followed with the words “entered into”, as referring to an arrangement which is bilateral or multilateral). See also Re Chief Commissioner of State Revenue and Pacific General Securities Ltd and Finmore Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) (2005) 63 ATR 127 at [17].[57] Jeffrey v Commissioner of Stamps (1980) 23 SASR 398 at 406 per Jacobs J. Cf Camp Seabee Properties Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2014] QCAT 258 at [37]-[39], where it was said the word “substantially” broadens, enhances and extends the application of the section. To the extent that this is to say something different from what is set out above, I respectfully disagree with this analysis, preferring the construction given to the meaning of substantially in Jeffrey, reflecting as this does the ordinary meaning of the word, in its context.[58] Jeffrey v Commissioner of Stamps (1980) 23 SASR 398 at 406 per Jacobs J, disagreeing in this respect with observations in Attorney-General v Cohen which suggested it was a question of law; see also Old Reynella Village Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (1989) 51 SASR 378 at 381 per Mohr J, agreeing with Jacobs J.[59] See also Re Chief Commissioner of State Revenue and Pacific General Securities Ltd and Finmore Holdings Pty Ltd (2004) 58 ATR 17 at [39]-[46], endorsing the “multi-factored analysis” illustrated by Jacobs J’s decision in Jeffrey.[60] See s 17(2) of the Duties Act; cf the observations in Re Chief Commissioner of State Revenue and Pacific General Securities Ltd and Finmore Holdings Pty Ltd (2004) 58 ATR 17 at [46] and [47], that the factors to be considered may well involve, entirely, a consideration of the conduct of the purchasers and their beneficiaries, given that the liability to pay the duty was borne by the transferee.[61] In this respect, I respectfully consider that the statement in Rawlings v Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] QCAT 10 at [12], that “the intention of the transferor or vendor is not relevant” is incorrect.The decision to disallow the appellants’ objection

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The issues in this appeal are:1.What is the nature of an appeal under s 69 of the Taxation Administration Act?2.What is the proper construction of s 30 of the Duties Act?3.Was the Commissioner’s decision as to the application of s 30 of the Duties Act in this case correct?What is the nature of an appeal under s 69 of the Taxation Administration Act? For the Commissioner, it was submitted an appeal under s 69 of the Taxation Administration Act is an appeal by way of rehearing, as opposed to a hearing de novo. In terms of what is meant by “rehearing”, the Commissioner referred to the distinction identified in Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23] between a rehearing, in which the powers of the appellate court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence now before the court, the decision the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error; and a hearing de novo, in which those powers may be exercised regardless of error.[11] [11] See also Lacey v Attorney-General (2011) 242 CLR 573 at [57] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (where the different classes of appeal are described). For the appellants it was also submitted the nature of the appeal is a rehearing, but the solicitor for the appellants referred to a “rehearing” in the sense of a “new hearing on fresh materials” (by reference to Universal Supermodels Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2018] QSC 257, discussed below). These submissions reflect the fact that the words “appeal” and “rehearing” can carry different meanings in different statutory contexts.[12] [12] Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1 at [290] per Hayne J; Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573 at [57]; Turnbull v New South Wales Medical Board [1976] 2 NSWLR 281 at 297-298 per Glass JA. See also Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [20] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ and Ku-ring-gai Council v Bunnings Properties Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 28 at [145]-[148] per Preston CJ of LEC, with whom Beazley P agreed. Relevantly, the statutory context here begins with the Taxation Administration Act, the main purpose of which is to make general provision about the administration and enforcement of revenue laws (s 3(1)).[13] The Act provides for the appointment of the Commissioner of State Revenue, who is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the tax laws (s 8(1)).[14] The Commissioner is empowered to make an assessment of a taxpayer’s liability for tax, including where tax payable is permitted to be self-assessed under a revenue law (s 11(2)). The Commissioner is also empowered to make a reassessment of a taxpayer’s liability for tax (ss 17 and 18). The Commissioner makes an assessment “on the available information the commissioner considers relevant” (s 27). A taxpayer who is dissatisfied with an assessment, or a reassessment, may object to the assessment (s 63). The objection must be in writing, state the grounds of the objection, and be accompanied by copies of all material relevant to decide the objection (s 65). The objector has the onus of proving the objector’s case (s 66). The Commissioner must allow the objection completely, or partly, or disallow it (s 67(1)), and then give written notice of the Commissioner’s decision (s 68).[13] Revenue law means a law declared under s 6 to be a revenue law (schedule 2); the Duties Act 2001 is a revenue law.[14] Tax law means a revenue law or the Taxation Administration Act (schedule 2).