VMAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VMAJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2005] FCAFC 21

MIGRATION – judicial review – claims of detention and torture – claims rejected – psychological evidence of post-traumatic stress syndrome – failure to refer specifically to psychological evidence in rejection of claims of detention and torture – psychological evidence otherwise referred to in reasons – whether jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

VMAJ AND VMAK v THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
VID 684 OF 2004

WILCOX, FRENCH AND FINKELSTEIN JJ
16 FEBRUARY 2005
(Date of Publication of Reasons 24 February 2005)
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID684 OF 2004

On Appeal from a Decision of the Chief Federal Magistrate

BETWEEN:

VMAJ AND VMAK
APPELLANTS

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

WILCOX, FRENCH AND FINKELSTEIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 FEBRUARY 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellants are to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID684 OF 2004

On Appeal from a Decision of the Chief Federal Magistrate

BETWEEN:

VMAJ AND VMAK
APPELLANTS

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

WILCOX, FRENCH AND FINKELSTEIN JJ

DATE:

Date of Publication of Reasons:

16 FEBRUARY 2005

24 FEBRUARY 2005

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:
Introduction

  1. This appeal is brought by a mother and son who arrived in Australia on 19 February 2002 on Indian passports.  They entered Australia on visitors’ visas.  VMAJ, the mother, was born on 9 May 1960.  Her son, VMAK, was born on 9 June 1983.  On 30 April 2002, VMAJ made an application for a protection visa and included her son in the application.  Both claimed to be Sri Lankan nationals of Tamil ethnic origin.  The application was supported by copies of the passports on which they entered Australia and certified copies of their certificates of birth.  They asserted that the passports which they had used to enter Australia and which were on their face Indian passports were in fact forged.

  2. On 3 July 2002, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs refused the application for protection visas.  Both applicants sought review of that decision on 12 July 2002.  On 29 November 2002, the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate.

  3. On 16 January 2003, VMAJ and VMAK lodged an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The application was purportedly lodged under Pt 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). In truth it could only proceed as an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The provisions of Pt 8 which had conferred jurisdiction on the Court to entertain…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 21
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants in this case sought protection from the Federal Magistrates Court, contesting a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The dispute centred on the denial of a protection visa application, with the appellants arguing that the decision-making process was flawed due to procedural errors and an inadequate consideration of evidence, particularly psychological evidence provided by a clinical psychologist. The Tribunal's handling of evidence and its assessment of the appellant's credibility were the primary points of contention.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal erred in its handling of the evidence and whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound. Specifically, the court needed to assess if the Tribunal appropriately considered the psychological evidence provided by the clinical psychologist, Mr. Guy Coffey. This included evaluating the Tribunal's approach to inconsistencies between the appellant's oral and written accounts and its assessment of her credibility and mental health.

The court found that the Tribunal did not err in its consideration of the evidence. It held that the Tribunal correctly identified inconsistencies between the appellant's oral and written accounts and that these inconsistencies did not necessarily undermine her credibility. The court also found that the Tribunal appropriately assessed the psychological evidence, noting that the appellant suffered from depressive symptoms and anxiety related to traumatic experiences, but did not find that these symptoms precluded a rational assessment of her credibility. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and based on a proper consideration of all relevant evidence.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and for the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision upheld the Minister's initial refusal of the protection visa application, affirming the Tribunal's findings and approach.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants are to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Some of the matters put to the delegate and later to the Tribunal conflicted with the written submission in support of the application for a protection visa. It is not necessary to canvass the details of those inconsistencies here.Psychological Evidence before the Tribunal Amongst the materials submitted to the Tribunal was a report on the appellant written by a clinical psychologist, Mr Guy Coffey and dated 16 October 2002. Mr Coffey had seen the appellant on three occasions during August and October 2002. She had given him an account of her personal history which was in accordance with the written statement lodged in support of the application for a protection visa. In the report, which was written on the letterhead of ‘The Victorian Foundation for Survivors of Torture Inc’ and addressed to the appellant’s migration agent, Mr Coffey described the appellant’s demeanour during her interviews with him. He said that she expressed intense distress when discussing her husband and son and was unable to compose herself for several minutes. She was otherwise composed if despondent. Together with depressive symptoms, she described anxiety symptoms which appeared to derive from the family separation and earlier events including an episode when she claimed to have been held captive by the LTTE in 1990. She referred to this as among the ‘worst’ experiences she had been directly subject to. She gave Mr Coffey a brief account of forced labour and specific forms of torture which she endured, including interrogations, threats and the use of pythons to frighten and crush her. Mr Coffey said: ‘Her account was accompanied by fearfulness that bordered on terror. It does not appear that these experiences have in any way been worked through: it’s possible that their intensity has been reanimated by her current difficulties – a phenomenon we often witness in survivors of traumatic events when their circumstances become insecure.’ Mr Coffey reported the appellant saying that the many past events that troubled her intruded on her thinking like a movie in her head. The strength of her emotional reaction to recollections of trauma and intrusive memories and nightmares that she reported indicated, according to Mr Coffey, that she suffered from a post-traumatic reaction as well as depressed mood. He went on to say:‘ You have asked me to briefly comment on [the appellant’s] capacity to provide a coherent account of her experiences in relation to her protection claims. She is competent in the general sense that her memory is not generally impaired and she responds coherently to questions about her experiences. Two caveats are in order however: firstly when she becomes very emotionally aroused she appears confused and losses (sic) her train of thought, secondly, perhaps in order to protect herself from the distress associated with difficult experiences, she sometimes appears at first to provide elliptical or tangentially relevant responses to questions directed at such experiences: this can give the initial appearance of evasiveness about or a lack of detailed knowledge regarding events which she is subsequently able to more comprehensively describe.I appreciate that you are interested in whether my assessment of [the appellant’s] mental state tends to corroborate or run counter to her account of the events relevant to her protection claims. Nothing of course definitive can be said about this on the basis of my assessment and I can simply state the following. [The appellant] is depressed and also suffers from anxiety symptoms associated with a post-traumatic condition. Depression can emerge for a wide variety of reasons, but she attributes its genesis to a series of difficult experiences the most important of which is her separation from her husband and oldest son. Her distress regarding this matter was manifest during the interviews and it does not appear the separation has occurred voluntarily. Her post-traumatic symptoms indicate a series of traumatic experiences. The events that she describes, if true, would explain the presence of these symptoms. [The appellant] will require ongoing treatment which should involve psycho-therapy and the provision of anti-depressant medication.’

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX, FRENCH AND FINKELSTEIN JJ

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX, FRENCH AND FINKELSTEIN JJ