SZFED v Minister for Immigration - [2005] FMCA 907

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZFED v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION

[2005] FMCA 907

MIGRATION – Visa – protection visa – Refugee Review Tribunal – application for review of decision of the RRT affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa – applicant a citizen of Iran – where RRT referred applicant to a psychiatrist for examination – bad faith – an allegation of bad faith is a serious matter involving personal fault on the part of the decision-maker – allegations of bad faith not to be made lightly and must be clearly alleged and proved.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s. 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 475A
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
MALV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 30
NALZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCADC 32
S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 203 ALR 112
SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749
SGLB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 176
VMAJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCFCA 21

Applicant:

SZFED

Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

File Number:

SGY 3552 of 2004

Judgment of:

Scarlett FM

Hearing date:

16 June 2005

Date of Last Submission:

16 June 2005

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

16 June 2005

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant:

In person

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr Johnson

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Clayton Utz

ORDERS

The application is dismissed.
The Applicant is to pay the Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,000.00 and I allow one (1) month to pay.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 3552 of 2004

SZFED

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The decision was made on 18 October and handed down on 10 November 2004. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal was to affirm the decision of a delegate of the minister not to grant a protection visa to the applicant.
The applicant is a citizen of Iran. He arrived in Australia on 18 December 2002 and on 24 January 2003 he lodged an application for a protection class XA visa. On 15 April in that year a delegate of the minister refused his application for a protection visa.

On 16 May 2003 the applicant applied for a review of that decision.
The Refugee Review Tribunal conducted a hearing of the application for review at which herein the applicant attended. The applicant, it will be recalled, had sought protection, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution for convention reasons, namely political and religious opinions. The applicant attended the hearing. He also submitted a detailed statutory declaration made on 22 January 2003 which declaration was taken before his solicitor, Ms Hodgkinson.
The applicant attended the hearing on 19 December 2003 and his solicitors forwarded to the Tribunal on 30 January 2004 a bundle of further documentation. That included a letter from Pastor John G Rhodes of the Hope Sydney Christian Church, an email from a George Antwi, who was a care group leader from the Hope of Bangkok Church, a pamphlet from that church, a document prepared by the applicant as to his religious beliefs, and photographs of the applicant and Mr George Antwi and a copy of Mr Antwi's name card.
There was a degree of correspondence between the Refugee Review Tribunal and the applicant's solicitors. The correspondence related to, amongst other things, a further submission prepared by the applicant and forwarded to the Tribunal, a letter from the applicant's solicitor seeking an extension of time and correspondence relating to the applicant's attendance at Health Services Australia at Surry Hills for an interview with a psychiatrist, Dr Pryor. This was for the purpose of an examination as part of the review process. This is a somewhat unusual step and was originally covered in a letter dated 24 February 2004 from the Refugee Review Tribunal to the applicant's solicitor, Ms Hodgkinson.
The letter referred to some detailed submissions forwarded by the applicant and the relevant two paragraphs of the letter said this:
You will be aware of the language used in the submissions and the applicant's statements at the hearing and of the potential of these to give rise to concerns about the applicant's understanding of the proceedings and ability to present his case for refugee status.

In view of your role as the applicant's legal representative and your involvement throughout this matter, the Tribunal would appreciate your views on any such concerns regarding the applicant's competency with respect to the pursuit of his application.
The applicant's solicitor replied by letter of 5 March 2004. The relevant parts of that letter say as follows:
We are instructed that the applicant was emotionally stressed at the hearing as we submitted undoubtedly the case with most people who appear before the Tribunal. We would appreciate if you would particularise your concerns as to the applicant's competency and understanding of the proceedings so that we might address same.
The Tribunal replied on 15 March in a letter attaching a copy of the applicant's submissions saying:
The Tribunal has highlighted sections of these submissions which caused concern because of the content, language and tone.
The submissions were quite lengthy and, as I said, they were highlighted in a variety of places.
What then happened is that the applicant after some other correspondence attended an interview with the psychiatrist, Dr Michael Pryor.
It is not relevant to set out the lengthy history given by the psychiatrist, but it is relevant to quote from the paragraph headed Mental Status Examination on page 164 of the court book which refers to the applicant:
He came to the appointment on time. He attended the appointment alone. There had been no recent history of substance or therapeutic medication intake. There was no evidence of substance intoxication or withdrawal. His grooming, hygiene levels and attire were within normal limits. There was no bizarre quality to his attire or presentation. His behaviour was appropriate. He greeted me warmly. There was no psychomotor agitation and retardation. He spoke in good English. He spoke coherently, appropriately and at normal rate and volume.

His speech was not pressured; his speech was easy to follow.
The doctor went on to describe other observations of his examination of the applicant. In the paragraph on the same page of the court book the doctor said under the heading Diagnosis and Severity:
He currently has no diagnosable psychiatric illness. He does not appear to have suffered from any diagnosable illness historically. He describes having a hyperthymic temperament, but at no stage appears to have a mood disorder or a bipolar disorder. He has never been psychotic.
In the Tribunal's request of Dr Pryor to examine the applicant the Tribunal asked three questions. Dr Pryor quotes these questions at page 165 of the court book and sets out his replies. I will read them onto the record in that order:
(1) Whether the applicant is currently suffering from any diagnosable psychiatric or psychological disorder?
No, there is no current diagnosable psychiatric or psychological disorder. Please see number 2 above.
(2) Whether the applicant has the ability to separate fact from fiction.
He is not psychotic. He is not delusional. He is not hallucinating. His cognitive functions are intact. He can communicate clearly and unambiguously. I judge him to be able to have the ability to separate facts from fiction.
(3) Whether the applicant's written submissions suggest any delusional characteristics relating to the applicant's state of mind.
He reported, when asked, that he had written the submissions "the way I speak". He stated that he had done this because although able to speak English, English is not his first language and he has some difficulty expressing himself in formal written English.
In the doctor's final paragraph he said:
On my perusal of his written submissions I did not find evidence of delusions or of thought disorder.
The Refugee Review Tribunal made its decision on 18 October 2004 and released the decision on 10 November 2004. The decision of the Tribunal is a relatively lengthy one. The text commences at page 191 of the court book and goes through to page 244. On page 243 at point 5 the Tribunal says:
I am not satisfied that the Iranian authorities have any adverse interest in the applicant currently or that they would have any interest in him if he were to return to Iran, notwithstanding his application for refugee status. Overall, I am not satisfied that there is a real chance the applicant would be persecuted for a convention reason if he returns to Iran. I am not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason.
The applicant has lodged an application for review of that decision and has supported that application with an amended application which sets out two grounds and incorporates what is in fact a detailed submission. The grounds of the application are given by the applicant as these:
(1) The decision-maker was not acting in good faith in making the decision.
(2) The decision is not reasonably capable of reference to the decision-making power given to a decision-maker.
The applicant confirmed in the submission part of his document that he had obtained legal advice from a barrister about his prospects of success. He indicated his understanding that a court of Australia would not permit him simply to challenge findings of fact and set out his understanding that in Australian law it is for the administrative decision-maker – in this case the Tribunal – to conduct an examination of the evidence and draw factual conclusions. He went on to say that he understood that a court would only interfere with an administrative decision if the decision-maker had made errors of law which affected its exercise of power.
He then went on to set out by quoting what appears to be verbatim an opinion which the barrister whom he consulted had provided for him. In that opinion the barrister concerned apparently raised three questions, being these:
a)Did the Tribunal consider whether he would have to modify his behaviour to avoid persecution were he to return to Iran?
He could hardly stroll around Tehran saying that he believes that mullahs should be executed. I note that the issue of the circumstances in which a person may be expected to modify their behaviour is considered by the Full Court in NALZ v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 32.
b)Did the Tribunal really understand the concept of political opinion?
An opinion that mullahs should be killed is inherently political.
c)Whether or not the applicant is a genuine Christian, does he have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of religion, being his particular beliefs, whether or not they are consistent with orthodox Christianity?
This question was not addressed by the Tribunal.
The applicant in the balance of his submissions quotes from a variety of parts of the decision, including parts of his own earlier submissions. I have had the opportunity of reading an outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent minister prepared by Mr Johnson of counsel. In those written submissions counsel set out what he perceived to be various grounds of the application and sets out his answers to them. Dealing with the first matter headed Competence; Memory, counsel said at paragraph 6:
In his submissions the applicant suggests that psychiatric examination was only justified to see whether he had memory difficulties that could affect what can be expected of him in evidence. The Tribunal is not constrained in the way that he suggests.
The Tribunal did have the applicant examined by a psychiatrist and at court book 237.7 it held that it was satisfied that the applicant presented his case in a competent manner, that he was able to fully participate in the hearing and that he was able to address his claims fully during the hearing. At court book 237.8 the Tribunal found it was not satisfied the applicant was suffering from a poor memory when he attended the hearing. Counsel went on to refer the court to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12, paragraph 45 where Gummow and Hayne JJ held that there was no foundation for the assumption that there was some competency requirement as to the satisfaction of which the Tribunal must be convinced before an applicant can take part or continue to take part in proceedings before the Tribunal.
I was also referred to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in VMAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 21 at 30. This was also a case where there had been evidence as to a psychologist's observations and conclusions about the appellant relating to her recounting and recollecting her detention torture.
In the submissions counsel went on to refer to what he calls S395 issues, referring to the decision of the High Court of Australia in S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 203 ALR 112 and the reference to NALV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 320. It was counsel's view that neither case assisted the applicant as the Tribunal was not obliging the applicant to suppress, whether unreasonably or otherwise, any convention characteristic or the expression of that characteristic. He went on to say that any society might impose some limits upon freedom of speech without the action being considered persecution for a convention reason. He also submitted that the Tribunal had just not been satisfied that the applicant had been detained or harmed by reason of any actual or imputed political opinion.
Turning to the question that was set out under the heading Religion – Alleged Bias – Alleged Bad Faith, counsel took issue with what he saw was an applicant's claim that it was an indicator of bias that the Tribunal found that if the applicant wished to attend church in Tehran, notwithstanding that he was a convert from Islam to Christianity, that he would be able to do so. Counsel also pointed out an allegation of bad faith is a serious matter involving personal fault on the part of the decision-maker in which the presence or absence of dishonesty will often be crucial. An allegation of bad faith is not to be lightly made and it must be clearly alleged and proved. It will only ever be made out in rare and extreme circumstances. I was referred to the decision of SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749.
Counsel submitted that there was no irrationality found in the decision as alleged by the applicant and eve if it were it would not of itself suffice to show bad faith.
The applicant answered a number of questions which were asked from the bench about his claim and made further oral submissions. I heard oral submissions from counsel and an oral submission from the applicant in reply. I asked the applicant about his claim that the Refugee Review Tribunal was not acting in good faith. He submitted that the decision of the Tribunal was infected by the fact the member of the Tribunal took a personal dislike to the language which he used and the tone of his submission. He said that she described his tone as arrogant and that this, in his view, affected her judgment and that of itself was an indication of bad faith.
The applicant was also aggrieved as to the fact that the Tribunal had taken the decision to refer him to a psychiatrist for an examination.

He was of the view, and maintained the view, that he was sent to the psychiatrist because the delegate wanted to determine if indeed he had a short memory or not. He told the court the psychiatrist was somewhat surprised to see that he had been referred. He pointed out that he was not referred because of short-term memory. He pointed out that the psychiatrist gave him, in effect, a clean bill of psychiatric health, that he was not delusional and, as a result, took exception to the fact that the Tribunal member still disbelieved his assertions.
He also took the view that the Refugee Review Tribunal did not examine his claims by reference to the opinions of professional people. Whilst he was not submitting that the Tribunal has the obligation in every case to obtain expert evidence, he was of the view that if the Tribunal member was unclear about the nature of the case which he was arguing – and it was his view that the Tribunal member was unclear – then it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to obtain assistance from those people who could help the Tribunal to understand the substance of his case. If, for instance, the Tribunal had an objection to the evidence or the material of Pastor Rhodes as to his religious views, then it would be incumbent upon the Tribunal to seek assistance from further experts, say a pastor. If it was a view as to the applicant's political view, then it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to obtain expert evidence from a political analyst.
The applicant made it clear that he was aware that he could not challenge the factual findings, but he said that he was arguing the facts upon which the Tribunal had based its decision.
In the respondent counsel's oral submission the point was made that the Tribunal was not dismissing the applicant's evidence out of hand, but in fact taking its role very seriously. I was referred to the use of the words "arrogant" and "bad attitude" relating to the applicant. It is fair that those matters should be seen in context. Mr Johnson referred the court to the applicant's original statutory declaration which is found at pages 29 through to 34 of the court book. In paragraph 8 at page 30 the applicant had been describing how when he wished to cross the border from Iran into Turkey he was detained by security officers at a checkpoint and was held for some three days. During that time he was blindfolded and interrogated. In paragraph 8 he says:
On the third day I was blindfolded again taken to another room. There was a person in the room with me. He had searched my luggage and found some photographs and pictures of me performing martial arts. He asked me some questions and wanted me to tell him why I had been taken into custody. I said that I believed that it was because of my bad attitude and the arrogant way in which I had answered the questions I was asked and also my lack of religious understanding of Islam. He told me that it must have been much more serious than that and I would not be sent to this place because of my attitude or my religious knowledge. This place was reserved for people who are considered to be politically harmful and dangerous to the government and I was in serious trouble. He asked me some questions about my martial arts exercises and then he told me that he also practised martial arts. He told me that he was a teacher in tae kwon do. He told me that I was very lucky to be investigated by him because I was able to talk to this man because we were both involved in martial arts. This man told me that he could continue to investigate me but that he had decided not to and give me a chance but I had to sign an acknowledgment and an apology, which I did. I had to apologise for my bad attitude and to promise to pray and work on my religious understanding and to acknowledge that if I was ever detained again for political reasons that I knew that I would have no excuse and I would be in serious trouble.

The Tribunal referred to that paragraph at page 238 of the court book in the Tribunal's decision. Mr Johnson submitted that there was in fact nothing wrong or there had been shown to be nothing wrong in the way in which the hearing was conducted. No transcript of the hearing was provided and there was no evidence to show that the hearing was conducted in any way that was other than appropriate. He submitted that it was not the role of the Tribunal to conduct further examinations and certainly not the role of the Tribunal to obtain expert evidence relating to the applicant's claims. Certainly it was a situation that the Tribunal had taken the step of seeking a psychiatric examination of the applicant based, first of all, on what it saw as his behaviour or his words during the hearing, but also on his submissions which were in somewhat flowery language and did contain some extreme opinions such as the one that is constantly being referred to in the applicant's written statement that he believed that all mullahs should be killed.
In reply the applicant reiterated that the respondent seemed to believe that he was sent to the psychiatrist because of his claims of having a memory problem, that that was not in fact so. He saw it as something more serious than that. He submitted that the questions to the psychiatrist were in fact designed to harm him and that this was illustrative of bad faith on the part of the Tribunal. His view was that if the Refugee Review Tribunal needed to ask help from expert people, then it should do so if the Tribunal member was not clear as to what the applicant was submitting.
Taking all these matters into consideration and having read the significant amount of material that was available, I would make it clear that it is the Tribunal that is the fact-finding party in these proceedings. It is not open to a court conducting a judicial review to reconsider the facts and make its own conclusion. It is important, however, to consider what facts the Tribunal must be satisfied about. The very purpose of the Tribunal, the question that must constantly be asked is, whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason if he were to return to his home country, Iran. If a person has a well-founded fear of persecution for something which is totally unconnected to a convention reason the Tribunal will not be satisfied or should not be satisfied.
It is not a task of the Tribunal in examining the facts to determine whether or not it is satisfied that the facts in the applicant's background have been proved. What an applicant has to prove is that he or she has a well-founded fear. Clearly, if the grounds upon which a fear is founded appear to be outlandish or wrong, then clearly an applicant would not prove that his or her fear is well-founded. But it is the fear and the well-foundedness of the fear that must be found by the fact‑finding power of the Tribunal. It is not up to the Tribunal and it is not possible for a Tribunal to conduct its own investigations of fact situations that occurred in another country. What the Tribunal has to be satisfied about is the evidence of the applicant as the applicant says or whether they relate directly to a convention reason. This is the question the Tribunal must always ask.
What the court does on conducting a judicial review is to look at not whether or not it takes its own view of facts, but the consideration of those facts by the Tribunal and whether any jurisdictional error has been made out. It is important to consider facts in context.
It should be remembered that the applicant has made two main claims in his application as to grounds. First, that the decision-maker was not acting in good faith in making the decision, and second, that the decision is not reasonably capable of reference to the decision-making power given to the decision-maker.
Turning now to not acting in good faith, in my view, the respondent's submissions set out what must be proved in a lack of good faith allegation. It is not an allegation to be made lightly because it does involve a personal fault on the part of the decision-maker. It is seldom, if ever, that lack of good faith or apprehended bias can be found just from a perusal of the decision. The applicant in this case submitted that it was his inference that his answers and his method of expressing himself were not to the decision-maker's taste and she took a personal disliking to these things, and, as such, that affected her decision.

That is highly conjectural, speculative in fact. In my view, it has not been proven.
There is no transcript and there is in fact no allegation that the hearing was conducted in an improper way. The applicant is saying that the decision was made in bad faith because of the Tribunal's reaction to his presentation and his method of presentation. Looking at the claims of being arrogant and having a bad attitude, true it is that the applicant said that he would become arrogant where people are talking nonsense or things that he did not believe in. It should be recalled that these words were originally used in a circumstance where the applicant had been detained for three days at a checkpoint and accused of a variety of failings in a country that quite clearly is not the democracy and land of free speech which the applicant, quite frankly, says that Australia is.
The applicant was in detention. He was being interrogated. He was not in a position of power at all. What the paragraph which I have previously quoted sets out was that the applicant was endeavouring to point out to his interrogator not that he was a dangerous person but that he was arrogant and had a bad attitude which caused people to misunderstand his motives which was how he got into trouble. It is quite understandable that a person in such a circumstance would take a relatively laid-back position such as that. He was hardly in a position to call the shots; he wanted to be released. If that meant admitting to faults that he did not necessarily have, it is not surprising to see why he would do so.
At page 238 of the court book the Tribunal member makes it quite clear that she understands those statements were made in that context. There is no suggestion in the decision that the applicant himself had a bad attitude or acted arrogantly when dealing with the Tribunal, even though some of the statements that he made and his written submissions were considered to be rather outlandish by the Tribunal member. I would comment that during the proceedings before me today the applicant behaved at all times in a polite and reasonable manner and argued his case articulately and politely. He was not at all offensive and indeed he was able to argue a case and reply to matters put by counsel for the respondent in submissions.
It is not the case that the reference to the psychiatrist was made because of any claim of short memory. It is clear from the court book at page 158 that there were three questions upon which the Tribunal wanted Dr Pryor's opinion. They were whether the applicant was suffering from any diagnosable psychiatric illness or psychological disorder, whether he had the ability to separate fact from fiction, and whether his written submissions suggested any delusional characteristics relating to the applicant's state of mind. As can be seen, the psychiatrist answered the first question in the negative, the second question in the affirmative and the third question in the negative.

In my view, the Tribunal showed that it accepted that this was the psychiatric finding and that the applicant was therefore capable of arguing his case.
It is unusual for a Tribunal to refer someone for psychiatric examination. It is not, however, unheard of and there is no reason why in an appropriate case the Tribunal should not act in that way. In my view, the decisions of VMAJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (supra) and SGLB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 176 give support to that. It may well be, as Mr Johnson of counsel suggested, that perhaps the Tribunal was being somewhat over-cautious. In my view, that appears to be the situation, but I say this not having been present at the Tribunal hearing. I have had the opportunity of reading the applicant's submissions. They are certainly written in flowery language and contain some extreme or even absolute views. In my view, however, the explanations given in writing by the applicant's solicitor, Ms Hodgkinson, that the applicant was emotionally stressed at the hearing, that English is not his first language, he is a person with somewhat forthright views, all make very good sense to me.
The applicant was clearly unimpressed at being referred to psychiatric examination and quite clearly Dr Pryor's examination made it quite clear that there was just nothing psychologically ill or psychiatrically wrong with him and he was perfectly competent to be able to understand the process. But, in fairness, the Tribunal has accepted that. I am not satisfied that there is any evidence from which I can infer bad faith or any apprehension of bias.
The argument the Tribunal member should have sought advice from experts such as a pastor or a political analyst in examining the applicant's claim, to my mind, must also fail. It is not the role of the Tribunal to do so and indeed it should not be necessary. Mr Johnson of counsel has pointed out that the Tribunal members acquire a degree of expertise even if they do not have it to start with in that their task is to conduct hearings relating to claims by applicants. What they have to do is satisfy themselves whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason if he or she were to be returned to his or her country of origin. They must, therefore, acquire a degree of expertise. If they did not, then there is no doubt that this court would be constantly referring all of their matters back to them for rehearing.
There is nothing that is suggested in the evidence before the Tribunal that there was a need to obtain an opinion from a political analyst or that there was a need to obtain further religious evidence. Bearing in mind the task of the Tribunal to satisfy itself whether or not an applicant has a well-founded fear, the material presented should have spoken for itself, along with the applicant's own evidence. The fact is that the Tribunal considered this material and, as can be seen by the detail to which the Tribunal has gone, I am of the view that the Tribunal has considered this matter in a considerable amount of detail. It is not a proposition which can be sustained that if a person returns from a psychiatric examination arranged by the Tribunal with a clean bill of psychiatric health showing that he is in fact not delusional, that it must follow that all his assertions must be accepted.
That is just not the case at all. A person may well be capable of providing evidence about his or her own case and yet at the end of the hearing after consideration of all of the evidence a decision-maker may well be satisfied or may well not be satisfied that that person's case must be accepted. That, to my mind, is what has happened here.

The applicant who is an articulate man with a very good command of the English language, even though it is not his first language, was understandably aggrieved at not having his claims accepted, especially after he had been referred to a psychiatrist and had cooperated with the psychiatric examination and had been certainly shown by the psychiatrist not to be delusional or mentally disordered or in any way psychotic or mentally unwell. In my view, there were reasons why it was easy to understand that the applicant felt aggrieved, but that is not of itself sufficient to establish that the Tribunal did not investigate his case thoroughly. The evidence shows that it did.
There is no jurisdictional error. The application must be dismissed.
In the circumstances I have considered the lump sum of $6,000.00 which is sought. This is a case where it was appropriate, to my mind, to brief counsel and I certify for counsel. This is a case where there was a considerably greater amount of material than was normally available. There was a lengthy submission prepared by the applicant as part of his amended application based, at least in part, on his own legal advice. It is a case where there were some written and oral submissions required in reply and a very lengthy judgment by the Refugee Review Tribunal; considerably greater than the normal decision. There were a couple of unusual facets such as the referral to the psychiatrist, Dr Pryor, which needed some consideration.
I am of the view that the amount that is sought is within the range that would be considered appropriate, bearing in mind schedule 1 of the Federal Magistrates Court Costs Rules. I have indicated that, to my mind, the general federal law scale is as appropriate in matters under the Migration Act as it is in any other matter of a general federal law nature which is dealt with by this court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs fixed in the sum of $6,000.00. I allow a month to pay.

I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM

Associate:

Date: 27 June 2005