VJAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VJAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 468

MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – refusal to grant protection (class XA) visa – whether Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – relevant considerations – no jurisdictional error shown

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 91R, 474

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2, clause 866.221

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B

Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 referred to

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 applied

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441 applied

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 applied

Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 132 distinguished

Phyo Thet Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1451 distinguished

Kyaing v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1495 referred to

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 203 ALR 112 considered

Linett v McIntyre (2002) 117 FCR 189 referred to

Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 referred to

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 referred to

Pollocks v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 195 ALR 73 referred to

Islam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 525 referred to

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Islam [2001] FCA 1681 referred to

Than Zaw Oo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 348 referred to

VJAD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

V 711 of 2002

KENNY J

22 APRIL 2004

MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V711 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

VJAD
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 APRIL 2004

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The application made pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 475A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 20 August 2002 be dismissed.

2.   The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V711 OF 2002

1           BETWEEN:

VJAD
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

22 APRIL 2004

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE APPLICATION

  1. This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 475A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review by this Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 20 August 2002, although not handed down until 13 September 2002. The Tribunal’s decision affirmed the decision of the respondent’s…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 468
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of VJAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) under the Migration Act 1958. The applicant, a Burmese national, claimed refugee status on the basis of her political activities in Burma and her fear of persecution if she were to return. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the RRT had committed any jurisdictional error in its decision.

The legal issues before the court centred on whether the RRT had failed to consider certain relevant facts, specifically the applicant's participation in demonstrations in Australia and her period of hiding from 1991. The applicant argued that the RRT had not properly assessed the risk of persecution if she were to return to Burma based on her past activities. The court needed to examine if the RRT's findings were made without error and if it had correctly applied the relevant law.

The court found that the RRT had not erred in its decision-making process. It was open to the RRT to conclude that the applicant's involvement with the National League for Democracy (NLD) was minor and that her activities in Australia did not warrant attention from Burmese authorities. The court further held that the RRT's decision to reject the applicant's claims regarding her political activities in Burma was not an error of law. The RRT had considered all relevant material and did not ignore or misinterpret any significant evidence. The court concluded that the RRT's findings were within its jurisdiction and that the application for judicial review should be dismissed.

The court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs. This decision underscored the principle that the court may not substitute its own assessment of the merits of the case for that of the RRT. The findings of the RRT, if reasonably open on the material before it, were to be upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application made pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 475A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 20 August 2002 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal did not, in this case, commit an error of the kind referred to in S395/2002. In this case, McHugh and Kirby JJ said, at 123 [43], that a tribunal of fact erred by reasoning that, if an applicant has modified his or her conduct to avoid persecution in the past, then he or she can reasonably be expected, by the same means, to avoid persecution in the future. As their Honours observed, “[i]t is the threat of serious harm with its menacing implications that constitutes the persecutory conduct”: S395/2002 at 123 [43]; also 131 [80] per Gummow and Hayne JJ. This reasoning did not, however, inform any part of the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal did not, as the applicant’s counsel would have it, infer that the applicant was not at risk because she went into hiding from 1991. Rather, the Tribunal found that, if the applicant had any involvement with the NLD, it was “of a minor nature during the election campaign in 1990” and, if she was involved in delivering medical supplies to a rebel organisation, the Burmese government would not regard this as anti-government activity and, in any event, “the applicant never came to the attention of the authorities as a result of these activities”. It was open to the Tribunal, in the circumstances of this case, to make these findings of fact, without adopting the fallacies referred to by the High Court.conclusion For the reasons set out above, the applicant has not made out her case that the Tribunal failed to consider, as relevant considerations, that she was a “repetitive demonstrator” in Australia or that she was in hiding from 1991. Having regard to the grounds set out in the amended application filed on 4 March 2003, and to the matters advanced at the hearing in this Court on 1 December 2003, no jurisdictional error of the kind referred to in Plaintiff S157 and Applicants S134/2002 has been shown in the Tribunal’s decision in this case. By her submissions in this Court, the applicant effectively asks the Court to examine the making of particular findings of fact upon which the Tribunal acted. In this case, this is to ask the Court to assess the merits of the case, which the Court may not do. Specifically, I conclude that it was open to the Tribunal to find that:(i)The applicant was not involved in activities in Australia that gave her a profile that would warrant the attention of the authorities on her return to Burma. In so doing, it did not fail to take account of any consideration that it was bound to take into account.(ii)There is no real chance that the applicant will be of interest to the authorities if she was to return to Burma on account of her political activities in 1988, her involvement with the NLD in 1990, or her activities in Burma after 1995. In so doing, it did not fail to take account of any consideration that it was bound to take into account.In consequence, I would dismiss the application, on the basis that the applicant pays the respondent’s costs. Once again pro bono counsel has assisted the Court. The Court acknowledges the great service rendered to the Court and to litigants in person by members of the profession who agree to act without fee as counsel (or solicitor) in the presentation of argument or in the preparation of a case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As the respondent noted, this example was relevant to the applicant’s case because the Tribunal had concluded, earlier in its reasons, that any involvement with the NLD on her part was merely “of a minor nature during the election campaign in 1990”. The respondent submitted that, whilst the Tribunal accepted that the Burmese authorities kept surveillance over the political activities of Burmese in Australia, it rejected the applicant’s claim that there was a real chance that she would be persecuted in Burma merely because of her attendance at demonstrations against the Burmese government. As the respondent observed, on the applicant’s own account, she did not engage in political activity between 1991 and 1995. The respondent submitted that the Tribunal rejected, as it was entitled to do, the applicant’s claims concerning her activities after 1995.consideration The decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 (“Yusuf”) did not widen the concept of jurisdictional error as explained in Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179. In Yusuf at 352, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated the relevant law as follows:Adopting what was said in Craig, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion is not to make an error of law of the kind with which par (e) deals. That having been said, the addition of the qualification to par (e) is no reason to read the ground as a whole otherwise than according to the ordinary meaning of its language. If the Tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks itself a wrong question, ignores relevant material or relies on irrelevant material in such a way as affects the exercise of its powers, that will very often reveal that it has made an error in its understanding of the applicable law or has failed to apply that law correctly to the facts it found. If that is so, the ground in s 476(1)(e) is made out.For the reasons that follow, I reject the applicant’s submission that, in this case, the Tribunal ignored relevant material or asked itself the wrong question. There was, plainly enough, material before the Tribunal concerning the applicant’s participation in demonstrations in Australia (e.g., the applicant’s statutory declaration of 17 July 2002 and the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre letter of 17 July 2002). Indeed, the Tribunal referred to her participation in demonstrations in Australia in its reasons, under the heading “Claims and Evidence”. Under the same heading, the Tribunal specifically referred to the applicant’s statement that she was “in hiding” after 1991, although it did not state expressly whether it accepted or rejected her evidence in this regard. When the Tribunal’s reasons are read as a whole, it is clear that the Tribunal did not disregard the country information provided by DFAT, which referred to the status of repetitive demonstrators, but rather considered this information in light of the information provided by Mr Seth and the reported detention and interrogation of a Burmese with “a political profile” returning to Burma. In substance, as the respondent noted, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim that her attendance at demonstrations in Australia was sufficient to give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in Burma. The rejection of this aspect of the applicant’s case is consistent with the Tribunal’s statement, earlier in its reasons, that:It was put to the applicant that the Tribunal had information that the Burmese authorities were only interested in the leaders and organisers of political activities in Australia, and that her involvement was not in this category.