FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VJAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 468
MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – refusal to grant protection (class XA) visa – whether Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – relevant considerations – no jurisdictional error shown
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 91R, 474
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2, clause 866.221
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 referred to
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 applied
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 applied
Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 132 distinguished
Phyo Thet Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1451 distinguished
Kyaing v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1495 referred to
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 203 ALR 112 considered
Linett v McIntyre (2002) 117 FCR 189 referred to
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 referred to
Pollocks v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 195 ALR 73 referred to
Islam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 525 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Islam [2001] FCA 1681 referred to
Than Zaw Oo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 348 referred to
VJAD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
V 711 of 2002
KENNY J
22 APRIL 2004
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V711 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
VJAD
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 APRIL 2004
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application made pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 475A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 20 August 2002 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V711 OF 2002
1 BETWEEN:
VJAD
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
22 APRIL 2004
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE APPLICATION
This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 475A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review by this Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 20 August 2002, although not handed down until 13 September 2002. The Tribunal’s decision affirmed the decision of the respondent’s…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read VJAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indige... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2004] FCA 468
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court centred on whether the RRT had failed to consider certain relevant facts, specifically the applicant's participation in demonstrations in Australia and her period of hiding from 1991. The applicant argued that the RRT had not properly assessed the risk of persecution if she were to return to Burma based on her past activities. The court needed to examine if the RRT's findings were made without error and if it had correctly applied the relevant law.
The court found that the RRT had not erred in its decision-making process. It was open to the RRT to conclude that the applicant's involvement with the National League for Democracy (NLD) was minor and that her activities in Australia did not warrant attention from Burmese authorities. The court further held that the RRT's decision to reject the applicant's claims regarding her political activities in Burma was not an error of law. The RRT had considered all relevant material and did not ignore or misinterpret any significant evidence. The court concluded that the RRT's findings were within its jurisdiction and that the application for judicial review should be dismissed.
The court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs. This decision underscored the principle that the court may not substitute its own assessment of the merits of the case for that of the RRT. The findings of the RRT, if reasonably open on the material before it, were to be upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application made pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 475A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 20 August 2002 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As the respondent noted, this example was relevant to the applicant’s case because the Tribunal had concluded, earlier in its reasons, that any involvement with the NLD on her part was merely “of a minor nature during the election campaign in 1990”. The respondent submitted that, whilst the Tribunal accepted that the Burmese authorities kept surveillance over the political activities of Burmese in Australia, it rejected the applicant’s claim that there was a real chance that she would be persecuted in Burma merely because of her attendance at demonstrations against the Burmese government. As the respondent observed, on the applicant’s own account, she did not engage in political activity between 1991 and 1995. The respondent submitted that the Tribunal rejected, as it was entitled to do, the applicant’s claims concerning her activities after 1995.consideration The decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 (“Yusuf”) did not widen the concept of jurisdictional error as explained in Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179. In Yusuf at 352, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated the relevant law as follows:Adopting what was said in Craig, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion is not to make an error of law of the kind with which par (e) deals. That having been said, the addition of the qualification to par (e) is no reason to read the ground as a whole otherwise than according to the ordinary meaning of its language. If the Tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks itself a wrong question, ignores relevant material or relies on irrelevant material in such a way as affects the exercise of its powers, that will very often reveal that it has made an error in its understanding of the applicable law or has failed to apply that law correctly to the facts it found. If that is so, the ground in s 476(1)(e) is made out.For the reasons that follow, I reject the applicant’s submission that, in this case, the Tribunal ignored relevant material or asked itself the wrong question. There was, plainly enough, material before the Tribunal concerning the applicant’s participation in demonstrations in Australia (e.g., the applicant’s statutory declaration of 17 July 2002 and the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre letter of 17 July 2002). Indeed, the Tribunal referred to her participation in demonstrations in Australia in its reasons, under the heading “Claims and Evidence”. Under the same heading, the Tribunal specifically referred to the applicant’s statement that she was “in hiding” after 1991, although it did not state expressly whether it accepted or rejected her evidence in this regard. When the Tribunal’s reasons are read as a whole, it is clear that the Tribunal did not disregard the country information provided by DFAT, which referred to the status of repetitive demonstrators, but rather considered this information in light of the information provided by Mr Seth and the reported detention and interrogation of a Burmese with “a political profile” returning to Burma. In substance, as the respondent noted, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim that her attendance at demonstrations in Australia was sufficient to give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in Burma. The rejection of this aspect of the applicant’s case is consistent with the Tribunal’s statement, earlier in its reasons, that:It was put to the applicant that the Tribunal had information that the Burmese authorities were only interested in the leaders and organisers of political activities in Australia, and that her involvement was not in this category.