Viagogo AG v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Viagogo AG v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2021] FCA 175  

File number: NSD 1187 of 2020
Judgment of: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 4 March 2021
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — stay of pecuniary penalties pending appeal – whether stay should be granted – matters to be considered
Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 36.8

Cases cited:

Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (receivers appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685

Ali v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2020] FCA 860

Australian Building and Construction Commission v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2018] HCA 3; (2018) 262 CLR 157

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v BMW (Australia) Ltd (No 2) [2003] FCA 864

Burns v AMP Finance Ltd [2005] FCA 761

Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482

Flight Centre Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2014] FCA 658

Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd, McLean Tecnic Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd [2002] NSWCA 383; (2002) 55 NSWLR 737

Nolten v Groeneveld Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1494

Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corp (1996) 67 FCR 65

Urban Alley Brewery Pty Ltd v La Sirène Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 351

Wooldridge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCA 349; (2015) 106 ASCR 551

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 41
Date of hearing: 23 February 2021
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms K Morgan SC with Ms A Poukchanski
Solicitor for the Appellant: MinterEllison
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr T Begbie QC with Ms V Brigden
Solicitor for the Respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth

ORDERS

NSD 1187 of 2020
BETWEEN:

VIAGOGO AG

Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 MARCH 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Order 7 of the orders of the primary judge made on 2 October 2020 in proceeding NSD 1489 of 2017 by which the appellant is to pay pecuniary penalties be temporarily stayed until the appeal in the proceeding NSD 1187 of 2020 is heard and determined.

2.Each party has liberty to apply.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J

  1. The appellant seeks a stay of order 7 of the orders made by the primary judge on 2 October 2020, requiring payment of a $7 million pecuniary penalty.

  2. In support of this application the appellant read the affidavits of Christopher Miller affirmed on 21 November 2020, and Katrina Mary Groshinski sworn 22 February 2021.

  3. For the reasons below, order 7 of the primary judge’s orders made on 2 October 2020 in proceeding NSD 1489 of 2017 by which the appellant is to pay pecuniary penalties, is temporarily stayed until the appeal in this proceeding is heard and determined.

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Viagogo AG appealed against an order requiring the company to pay pecuniary penalties for breaches of Australian consumer law. The appellant, Viagogo AG, sought a stay of the penalty pending the outcome of its appeal. The legal issue before the court was whether the balance of convenience favoured granting a temporary stay of the penalty pending the appeal. The court weighed various considerations, including the seriousness of the contraventions, the public interest in enforcing the penalty, and the potential financial impact on the appellant. The court found that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the balance of convenience did lie with granting a temporary stay of the penalty pending the appeal.

The court noted that the appellant's submission that the payment of the penalty may impact upon its financial position in a way which 'may' cause it to take some measures was not sufficient to establish that the balance of convenience lay against granting a stay. The court acknowledged that penalties for serious contraventions of the law might have a sting or burden, but this did not provide a basis for refusing to order an appropriate penalty amount, or for ordering that a penalty not be paid pending appeal. The court also recognised that the respondent's assertion that payment of a penalty may be financially disastrous was not a basis to stay the order pending appeal, as each case must be considered on its merits. The court concluded that the seriousness of the contraventions and the public interest in enforcing the penalty imposed carried significant weight when assessing where the balance of convenience lay. However, these considerations did not reflect on the obvious importance of the appellant's financial position, and a stay, if granted, would not undermine the deterrent effect of the penalty.

The court granted the appellant's application for a temporary stay of the penalty pending the appeal, subject to the parties having liberty to apply. The court noted that the non-pecuniary orders made, being injunctions and a compliance program, were not the subject of this application and would, if a stay is granted, remain in effect. The court held that these orders had a deterrent and importantly, a consumer protective effect, and that pecuniary penalty orders also had a protective aspect. The court concluded that the balance of convenience in this case favoured granting a temporary stay of the penalty pending the appeal, and that the appellant had established the necessary threshold for a stay.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order 7 of the orders of the primary judge made on 2 October 2020 in proceeding NSD 1489 of 2017 by which the appellant is to pay pecuniary penalties be temporarily stayed until the appeal in the proceeding NSD 1187 of 2020 is heard and determined.

2. Each party has liberty to apply.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Viagogo AG was found to have contravened the Australian Consumer Law by engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to the sale of tickets for events. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) pursued proceedings against Viagogo AG, resulting in the Federal Court ordering Viagogo AG to pay pecuniary penalties. Viagogo AG subsequently lodged an appeal against the penalty orders. During the pendency of the appeal, Viagogo AG applied for a stay of the pecuniary penalty orders, arguing that paying the penalty would cause financial hardship and potentially lead to insolvency.

The matter came before the court as an appeal against the penalty orders made by the primary judge on 2 October 2020 in proceeding NSD 1489 of 2017. Viagogo AG filed an application seeking a stay of the pecuniary penalty orders pending the outcome of the appeal. The application was heard by the court, which considered the relevant factors in deciding whether to grant the stay.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Weighing up the relevant considerations, in the particular circumstances of this case, the appellant has established that the balance of convenience lies with the granting of a temporary stay of the order as to the pecuniary penalty until the conclusion of the appeal process in this Court. Conclusion Order 7 of the primary judge’s orders made on 2 October 2020 in proceeding NSD 1489 of 2017 by which the appellant is to pay pecuniary penalties be temporarily stayed until the appeal in this proceeding is heard and determined. I grant the parties liberty to apply.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It submitted that the evidence does no more than show that the payment of the penalty, whenever it is paid, would impact upon its financial position in a way which ‘may’ cause it to take some measures. Such a prejudice is no more than the sting or burden that penalties for serious contraventions of the law might be expected to have in any number of cases. It submitted that many cases recognise that an appropriate penalty may have such a sting or burden as to be financially disastrous for the wrongdoer, sending them into insolvency, administration, liquidation or bankruptcy. It submitted that this does not provide a basis for refusing to order an appropriate penalty amount, and nor does it provide a basis for ordering that a penalty not be paid pending appeal.Consideration The seriousness of these contraventions and the public interest in enforcing the penalty imposed is self-evident. Similarly, there can be no issue that the successful party at first instance is entitled to presume that the judgment appealed from is correct, and the Court should not give the impression that first instance orders are provisional upon confirmation on appeal: Wooldridge at [16]. These are all matters which carry significant weight when assessing where the balance of convenience lies. A stay, if granted, does not reflect on the obvious importance of those matters. That said, the respondent’s submission that payment of a penalty may be financially disastrous is not a basis for a penalty not to be imposed, and is also not a basis to stay the order pending appeal, ignores the different considerations relevant to the imposition of a penalty and the principles relevant to the granting of a stay. If the respondent’s assertion were correct, it would mean that regardless of the circumstances, a stay of a penalty would not be ordered. The breadth of that submission as advanced in the written submission, if correct would also result in a stay being refused even if the financial result would render a success on appeal nugatory. That is not correct; each case must be considered on its merits. Care must also be taken in considering the authorities referred to by the respondent regarding the importance of public interest considerations in the context of a regulatory injunction. Although the principles that are discussed are beyond debate, their factual application is again case specific. For example, the effect of an application to stay an order disqualifying a director from holding such function may, depending on the circumstances, have a more immediate public protection aspect than a pecuniary penalty. That was the factual scenario under consideration in Wooldridge, and the only type of order discussed: see [12]-[18]. Whether other protective orders exist and have taken effect may also be relevant. I note that the non-pecuniary orders made, being injunctions and a compliance program, are not the subject of this application and would, if a stay is granted, remain in effect. From a public interest perspective, these have a deterrent and importantly, a consumer protective effect. That is not to suggest that pecuniary penalty orders do not have a protective aspect, but rather to recognise that in this case there were additional orders made which remain in effect.