FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Viagogo AG v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2021] FCA 175
ORDERS
NSD 1187 of 2020 BETWEEN: VIAGOGO AG
Appellant
AND: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 MARCH 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Order 7 of the orders of the primary judge made on 2 October 2020 in proceeding NSD 1489 of 2017 by which the appellant is to pay pecuniary penalties be temporarily stayed until the appeal in the proceeding NSD 1187 of 2020 is heard and determined.
2.Each party has liberty to apply.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J
The appellant seeks a stay of order 7 of the orders made by the primary judge on 2 October 2020, requiring payment of a $7 million pecuniary penalty.
In support of this application the appellant read the affidavits of Christopher Miller affirmed on 21 November 2020, and Katrina Mary Groshinski sworn 22 February 2021.
For the reasons below, order 7 of the primary judge’s orders made on 2 October 2020 in proceeding NSD 1489 of 2017 by which the appellant is to pay pecuniary penalties, is temporarily stayed until the appeal in this proceeding is heard and determined.
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 175
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court noted that the appellant's submission that the payment of the penalty may impact upon its financial position in a way which 'may' cause it to take some measures was not sufficient to establish that the balance of convenience lay against granting a stay. The court acknowledged that penalties for serious contraventions of the law might have a sting or burden, but this did not provide a basis for refusing to order an appropriate penalty amount, or for ordering that a penalty not be paid pending appeal. The court also recognised that the respondent's assertion that payment of a penalty may be financially disastrous was not a basis to stay the order pending appeal, as each case must be considered on its merits. The court concluded that the seriousness of the contraventions and the public interest in enforcing the penalty imposed carried significant weight when assessing where the balance of convenience lay. However, these considerations did not reflect on the obvious importance of the appellant's financial position, and a stay, if granted, would not undermine the deterrent effect of the penalty.
The court granted the appellant's application for a temporary stay of the penalty pending the appeal, subject to the parties having liberty to apply. The court noted that the non-pecuniary orders made, being injunctions and a compliance program, were not the subject of this application and would, if a stay is granted, remain in effect. The court held that these orders had a deterrent and importantly, a consumer protective effect, and that pecuniary penalty orders also had a protective aspect. The court concluded that the balance of convenience in this case favoured granting a temporary stay of the penalty pending the appeal, and that the appellant had established the necessary threshold for a stay.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order 7 of the orders of the primary judge made on 2 October 2020 in proceeding NSD 1489 of 2017 by which the appellant is to pay pecuniary penalties be temporarily stayed until the appeal in the proceeding NSD 1187 of 2020 is heard and determined.
2. Each party has liberty to apply.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an appeal against the penalty orders made by the primary judge on 2 October 2020 in proceeding NSD 1489 of 2017. Viagogo AG filed an application seeking a stay of the pecuniary penalty orders pending the outcome of the appeal. The application was heard by the court, which considered the relevant factors in deciding whether to grant the stay.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It submitted that the evidence does no more than show that the payment of the penalty, whenever it is paid, would impact upon its financial position in a way which ‘may’ cause it to take some measures. Such a prejudice is no more than the sting or burden that penalties for serious contraventions of the law might be expected to have in any number of cases. It submitted that many cases recognise that an appropriate penalty may have such a sting or burden as to be financially disastrous for the wrongdoer, sending them into insolvency, administration, liquidation or bankruptcy. It submitted that this does not provide a basis for refusing to order an appropriate penalty amount, and nor does it provide a basis for ordering that a penalty not be paid pending appeal.Consideration The seriousness of these contraventions and the public interest in enforcing the penalty imposed is self-evident. Similarly, there can be no issue that the successful party at first instance is entitled to presume that the judgment appealed from is correct, and the Court should not give the impression that first instance orders are provisional upon confirmation on appeal: Wooldridge at [16]. These are all matters which carry significant weight when assessing where the balance of convenience lies. A stay, if granted, does not reflect on the obvious importance of those matters. That said, the respondent’s submission that payment of a penalty may be financially disastrous is not a basis for a penalty not to be imposed, and is also not a basis to stay the order pending appeal, ignores the different considerations relevant to the imposition of a penalty and the principles relevant to the granting of a stay. If the respondent’s assertion were correct, it would mean that regardless of the circumstances, a stay of a penalty would not be ordered. The breadth of that submission as advanced in the written submission, if correct would also result in a stay being refused even if the financial result would render a success on appeal nugatory. That is not correct; each case must be considered on its merits. Care must also be taken in considering the authorities referred to by the respondent regarding the importance of public interest considerations in the context of a regulatory injunction. Although the principles that are discussed are beyond debate, their factual application is again case specific. For example, the effect of an application to stay an order disqualifying a director from holding such function may, depending on the circumstances, have a more immediate public protection aspect than a pecuniary penalty. That was the factual scenario under consideration in Wooldridge, and the only type of order discussed: see [12]-[18]. Whether other protective orders exist and have taken effect may also be relevant. I note that the non-pecuniary orders made, being injunctions and a compliance program, are not the subject of this application and would, if a stay is granted, remain in effect. From a public interest perspective, these have a deterrent and importantly, a consumer protective effect. That is not to suggest that pecuniary penalty orders do not have a protective aspect, but rather to recognise that in this case there were additional orders made which remain in effect.