Vero Insurance Ltd v Baycorp Advantage Ltd

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Vero Insurance v Baycorp Advantage [2004]  NSWCA 390

FILE NUMBER(S):
41068/03

HEARING DATE(S):               14 October 2004

JUDGMENT DATE: 06/12/2004

PARTIES:
Vero Insurance Limited
Baycorp Advantage Limited

JUDGMENT OF:       Giles JA Tobias JA McColl JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Equity Division

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          SC 50035

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Einstein J

COUNSEL:
A: Mr D Davies SC / B McManus
R: Mr M A Pembroke SC / T M Faulkner

SOLICITORS:
A: Hunt & Hunt, Sydney
R: Allens Arthur Robinson, Sydney

CATCHWORDS:
INSURANCE - Directors and officers insurance policy - Claim against officers - Deed of settlement - Whether any loss to officers - Whether any legal liability under deed of settlement - Joint and several liability - "On behalf of itself and each of the other defendants in the proceedings"
INSURANCE - Loss by judgment or settlement - Reasonableness of settlement figure
INSURANCE - Defence costs indemnified - Another party besides insured benefited from defence - Whether all defence costs can be claimed

LEGISLATION CITED:
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth)
Supreme Court Rules 1970
New South Wales Barristers' Rules

DECISION:
(1) Appeal allowed in part
(2) Set aside the answers to separate Questions 1, 2 and 3 in Order 1 made by Einstein J on 28 October 2003 and substitute therefor the following
Separate Question 1 -- No
Separate Question 2 -- Does not arise
Separate Question 3 -- Does not arise
(3) Order that each party pay its own costs of the appeal.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 41068/03
CL 50035/03

GILES JA
TOBIAS JA
McCOLL JA

Monday 6 December 2004

VERO INSURANCE LIMITED v BAYCORP ADVANTAGE LIMITED

Judgment

  1. GILES JA: I agree with Tobias JA.

  2. TOBIAS JA: On 28 October 2003 Einstein J answered in favour of the respondent four separate questions which had been ordered to be decided in advance of all other issues in the proceedings between the parties.  Those proceedings concerned a claim by the respondent for indemnity under Directors and Officers Insurance Policy No. F1000082ZF8 (the policy) issued by the appellant then known as Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Australia Limited. 

  3. The appellant had refused to indemnify the respondent with respect to the settlement for the sum of $10 million relating to three sets of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria (collectively, the proceedings) to which the respondent and a number of its officers were defendants and with respect to an amount in respect of Defence Costs (as defined in the policy) incurred by the defendants in defending and settling those proceedings. 

    The agreed facts

  4. The hearing of the separate questions proceeded upon a Statement of Agreed Facts which, for present purposes, may be summarised as follows:

    (a)On or about 24 December 1999, the appellant issued the policy for the period 26 October 1999 to 26 October 2002.  At all material times each of the respondent, Credit Advantage Limited and Design Advantage…

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Details
Case
[2004] NSWCA 390
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Vero Insurance Ltd appealed from a decision of Einstein J concerning an indemnity under a directors and officers insurance policy. The dispute arose from Vero's refusal to indemnify Baycorp Advantage Ltd for a $10 million settlement sum paid to resolve proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria, and for approximately $7 million in defence costs incurred by Baycorp and its officers. Baycorp and several of its officers were defendants in these proceedings, which involved claims of wrongful acts. Vero had initially provided indemnity to the officers, but later disputed the extent of its liability for the settlement and defence costs.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the settlement payment of $10 million constituted a "loss" to the officers under the policy, and whether the officers had incurred any legal liability under a Deed of Settlement that would trigger indemnity. Additionally, the court considered whether the defence costs claimed were fully indemnifiable, particularly where another party besides the insured benefited from those defence efforts. The court also had to determine the proper construction of the Deed of Settlement, specifically whether it created joint and several liability for the settlement amount among the officers.

The Court of Appeal allowed Vero's appeal in part. It set aside the primary judge's answers to separate questions concerning the officers' liability under the Deed of Settlement. The Court found that the officers did not incur legal liability under the Deed for the $10 million settlement sum, and therefore, the question of whether this constituted a loss under the policy did not arise. The reasoning focused on the construction of the Deed, concluding that the officers did not assume personal liability for the entire settlement amount, despite the primary judge's interpretation that the wording suggested joint and several liability. The Court determined that the officers' agreement to assist in pursuing indemnification did not equate to accepting personal liability for the settlement.

Consequently, the Court ordered that the appeal be allowed in part, substituting new answers for the primary judge's determination of the separate questions. The Court found that the officers had not incurred legal liability under the Deed of Settlement, and therefore, the questions regarding loss and the reasonableness of the settlement amount did not arise. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Appeal allowed in part

(2) Set aside the answers to separate Questions 1, 2 and 3 in Order 1 made by Einstein J on 28 October 2003 and substitute therefor the following

Separate Question 1 -- No

Separate Question 2 -- Does not arise

Separate Question 3 -- Does not arise

(3) Order that each party pay its own costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant had refused to indemnify the respondent with respect to the settlement for the sum of $10 million relating to three sets of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria (collectively, the proceedings) to which the respondent and a number of its officers were defendants and with respect to an amount in respect of Defence Costs (as defined in the policy) incurred by the defendants in defending and settling those proceedings. The agreed facts The hearing of the separate questions proceeded upon a Statement of Agreed Facts which, for present purposes, may be summarised as follows:(a)On or about 24 December 1999, the appellant issued the policy for the period 26 October 1999 to 26 October 2002. At all material times each of the respondent, Credit Advantage Limited and Design Advantage Pty Limited was an Insured Entity within the definition of that term in the policy.(b)At all material times each of David Grafton, Brian Gatfield, John Martin, Bruce Bargon, Angela Blair and Geoffrey Kimpton (collectively, the officers) was an Insured Person within the definition of that term in the policy.(c)The respondent indemnified the officers pursuant to the terms of a Deed of Indemnity and Defence Costs entered into with each.(d)In or about May 2000 a Claim (as defined in the policy) arising from an actual or alleged Wrongful Act (as defined in the policy) was first made against the officers other than Geoffrey Kimpton.(e)On or about 1 June 2000 the Claim was notified in writing to the appellant.(f)As a result of the allegations the subject of the Claim, the following proceedings were commenced in the Supreme Court of Victoria:(i)Commercial List Proceedings No. 2086 of 2000 instituted by Killorgan Investments Pty Limited (Killorgan) against David Grafton, Brian Gatfield, John Martin, Bruce Bargon and others (the modification proceedings);(ii)Commercial List Proceedings No. 6833 of 2000 instituted by Marcus Price (Price) against David Grafton, Brian Gatfield and others (the wrongful dismissal proceedings); and(iii)Commercial List Proceedings No. 6887 of 2000 instituted by Price against David Grafton, Angela Blair and others (the defamation proceedings) (g)On 21 December 2000, the appellant wrote to the respondent's broker. I interpolate here that by that letter the appellant advised that indemnity under the policy was available to each of the officers (other than Mr Kimpton) in respect of the allegations made against each of them jointly and severally in the claim brought by Killorgan and in the two claims brought by Price(h)On or about 7 November 2001 a Claim arising from an actual or alleged Wrongful Act (as defined in the policy) was first made against Geoffrey Kimpton. Price then added Mr Kimpton as a further defendant to the statement of claim in the defamation proceedings.(i)In or about November 2001 the matters set out in the preceding paragraph were notified in writing to the appellant who, on 16 January 2002, through their solicitors informed (I interpolate) the respondent's solicitors that the claim now made against Mr Kimpton in the defamation proceedings would be subject to the indemnity previously granted pursuant to the appellant's letter of 21 December 2000.(j)At all material times the appellant elected not to exercise its entitlement to take over and conduct the defence or settlement of the Claims as provided for in Claims Condition 2 under the heading "Conduct of the Claim" in the policy or at all. (k)In or around June 2000, the defendants to the proceedings retained Malleson Stephen Jaques (Mallesons) as their joint representative to defend, investigate, monitor and settle the proceedings. As and from that time legal and expert fees, costs, charges and expenses in defending, investigating, monitoring and settling the proceedings were incurred by Mallesons on behalf of the respondent and the officers in the sum of approximately $7 million. The respondent paid this sum.(l)On or about 4 October 2002 the defendants (including the respondent and the officers) entered into a Deed of Settlement (the Deed) pursuant to the terms of which the respondent paid a total of $10 million to Killorgan and Price in settlement of the proceedings.Separate questions for determination

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is common ground that each of the counterparts executed by each officer had annexed to it as forming part of the Deed the following statement signed by each officer:"I agree that, in consideration for Baycorp Advantage Limited agreeing to pay on my behalf the sums referred to in clause 2.1 of the Deed of Settlement between myself, Marcus Price and others dated about 4 October 2002, I will provide all assistance and cooperation which Baycorp Advantage Limited may reasonably require in order to pursue indemnification from its insurer, Royal & Sun Alliance, in relation to the amount paid by it."The primary judge's decision on the issue within Question 1 The primary judge considered (at [24]) that the proper approach to the construction of the Deed was to ascertain the parties' objective intent. In particular, he said, it was necessary to pay attention to the context of clause 2.1. That context, as set out in the recitals to the Deed, was the settlement of the proceedings brought by the plaintiffs against not only the respondent but also the officers. His Honour noted that the Deed provided for the discontinuance of the proceedings against the officers and for their release and discharge. Accordingly, they were to receive valuable benefits under the Deed. It would be surprising, according to his Honour, that in a context where the plaintiffs were negotiating settlement of the proceedings, they would have been prepared to accept the promise only by the respondent to pay the settlement sum but not the promise of each of the officers who were also going to benefit from the settlement. The primary judge accepted the respondent's submissions with respect to the proper construction of clause 2.1 of the Deed. He considered that that construction had the advantage that the words in clause 2.1 - "on behalf of itself and each of the other defendants" - had work to do. The appellant's construction, his Honour found (at [26]), had the clear disadvantage that this phase would be unnecessary. In other words, if the promise to pay was confined to the respondent alone then there was no necessity to insert the words in question. The primary judge also relied upon the agreement of each director to which I referred in [25] above. He considered (at [27]) that the words "to pay on my behalf" in that agreement clearly denoted the acceptance of a liability on the part of the officer on whose behalf the payment was being made. On the other hand, his Honour did not (at [28]) consider that clause 3.2 of the Deed, which contemplated the respondent and the officers pursuing indemnification from the appellant, as requiring a contrary construction. Further, at [30] he rejected a submission by the appellant that the difficulty of accepting that clause 2.1 created a joint and several liability of the officers to pay $10 million was that officers, such as Messrs. Kimpton and Blair, who had only been sued in the defamation proceedings which had been settled for only $600,000, would have been liable in relation to the whole $10 million.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.