Vaughan (No 4)
[2025] FedCFamC1F 480
•21 July 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Vaughan (No 4) [2025] FedCFamC1F 480
File number: ADC 5154 of 2022 Judgment of: KARI J Date of judgment: 21 July 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – HARMFUL PROCEEDINGS – Where a harmful proceedings order has been made directed to the father – Where the father seeks leave to file an Application in a Proceeding – Where the father’s proposed orders are an abuse of process and doomed to fail – Where the Court considers the application is vexatious – Leave refused – Application dismissed Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 102QAC, 102QAE, 102QAF, 102QAG
Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 10.27
Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth)
Cases cited: Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106
Charisteas & Charisteas (2022) FLC 94-109
Darley & Darley (No 8) [2023] FedCFamC1F 574
Darley (No 4) [2023] FedCFamC1A 158
Geelong School Supplies Pty Ltd v Dean (2006) 237 ALR 612
Porter v Dyer (2022) 402 ALR 659
Sampson & Hartnett (Provision of Transcript) (2013) FLC 93-542
Uttar [2025] FedCFamC1A 121
Vaughan & Vaughan (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 455 Vaughan & Vaughan (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 129
Vaughan & Vaughan (Unreported, Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1), Appeals Judicial Registrar Thomas, 15 April 2025)
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 35 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Place: Adelaide The Applicant: Litigant in person ORDERS
ADC 5154 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR VAUGHAN
Applicant
ORDER MADE BY:
KARI J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The father’s application for leave pursuant to s 102QAE of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to commence proceedings as set out in the proposed Application in a Proceeding dated 18 July 2025, is refused.
2.The proposed Application in a Proceeding dated 18 July 2025 is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Vaughan has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KARI J:
INTRODUCTION
The substantive proceedings between the parties concern the question of property settlement together with parenting arrangements for the parties’ five children.
On 10 July 2025, the Court delivered extensive reasons and made a raft of orders pertaining to interlocutory and parenting issues (Vaughan & Vaughan (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 455). Relevantly, for present purposes, the Court made a harmful proceedings order directed to the father pursuant to s 102QAC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
A little over a week after the making of the harmful proceedings order, on 18 July 2025, the father e-filed an Application in a Proceeding in which, amongst other things, he has sought leave to file an Application in a Proceeding. Mistakenly in his proposed application, the father has relied on s 102QAC of the Act for such leave, as against the applicable s 102QAE of the Act.
As these reasons bear out, leave to the father to file the Application in a Proceeding is refused and the proposed application shall be dismissed.
The application for leave has been determined on the papers, without an oral hearing, as permitted by s 102QAF(3) of the Act.
BACKGROUD
These proceedings have a significant history. It is not proposed to repeat that history in these reasons, given the significant detail traversed in the reasons delivered in these proceedings on 28 February 2025 (Vaughan & Vaughan (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 129) and, more recently, on 10 July 2025. These reasons are to be read with both of those earlier reasons recently delivered in these proceedings.
Parenting orders were made on 28 February 2025 that provided for the children to spend supervised time with the father. Those orders were reinforced by the orders made on 10 July 2025. Throughout the proceedings, the father has asked the Court to make orders that he spend unsupervised time with the children. His applications in that regard have all been dismissed. In addition, the father has also pursued a range of additional parenting orders including but not limited to the children’s extracurricular activities, the provision of mobile telephones and injunctions directed to restraining the mother from relocating with the children. All of those additional parenting orders pursued by the father were unsuccessful. Indeed, as the reasons of 10 July 2025 establish, all of the orders pursued by the father were entirely without merit, and, in part, grounded the Court considering it appropriate to make a harmful proceedings order.
On 10 July 2025 the Court also made a raft of financial orders. In essence those orders were directed to ensuring the mother receives a payment by way of partial property settlement as first ordered on 27 March 2024. As those reasons bear out, the Court was satisfied that the father has not only failed to comply with orders of the Court for the payment of these funds to the mother, but additionally the Court was satisfied that the father has frustrated the default mechanism for the sale of property from which the mother was to receive the payment in the event of the father’s default. The property which was to be sold to effect the payment to the mother, by agreement, was the former matrimonial home at Suburb C, in which the father presently resides. The orders of 10 July 2025 did not abandon the orders for the sale of the former matrimonial home, as this sale was not something that the father opposed. Rather, orders were made for vacant blocks of land at Town E (held across two separate titles) to be sold, with the mother to receive the funds owing to her from the proceeds of that sale, and otherwise the funds to be preserved pending further order of the Court (or agreement between the parties). The circumstances relating to the ownership of the Town E blocks are opaque as a consequence of the father’s failure to comply with his obligations for disclosure and, additionally, his failure to comply with a range of orders made by the Court, including orders for a single expert valuation of the Town E property and orders for the preparation of financial statements for a self-managed superannuation fund, which the father asserts owns at least one of the vacant blocks of land at Town E.
As a consequence of the father’s contumelious failure to comply with orders of the Court, orders were made on 10 July 2025, at the request of the mother, pursuant to r 10.27 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”), prohibiting the father from taking any further step in the financial proceedings until such time that he has complied with the orders for the sale of the former matrimonial home.
In addition, on 10 July 2025, orders were made dismissing the father’s unmeritorious application to discharge the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) appointed in the proceedings.
Of significance for present purposes, on 10 July 2025 the Court also made a harmful proceedings order within the meaning of s 102QAC of the Act directed to the father in the following terms:
HARMFUL PROCEEDINGS
18.Pursuant to s 102QAC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) the father is prohibited, without leave of the Court, from instituting proceedings under the Act in any court having jurisdiction under the Act, against or in relation to the mother.
19. Should the father seek leave to institute proceedings pursuant to s 102QAE of the Act, the mother is NOT to be notified:
(a) That an application has been made; and/or
(b) Dismissed by this Honourable Court.
THE CURRENT APPLICATION
By the Application in a Proceeding signed by the father and lodged with the Court on 18 July 2025, the father has sought the following orders:
1.The Applicant Father be granted leave pursuant to s 102QAC of the Family Law Act 1975 to file this Application.
2.That the operation and enforcement of Orders 7 to 12 and 14 to 19 inclusive made by Justice Kari on 10 July 2025 be stayed until the final determination of the appeal.
3.That the Independent Children’s Lawyer be ordered to file and serve a response to the questions emailed to him by the father on 23 June 2025, such response to be provided within 14 days of the date of these orders.
4.That the Court Child Expert [Ms P] be ordered to file and serve written answers to the questions contained in the document exhibited to the affidavit of the father filed in support of this application, such answers to be provided within 21 days of the date of these orders.
5.The necessary orders be granted to allow the Child Expert appointed by the Father to access the children to prepare their report.
6.That [Ms RR], solicitor for the mother be required to file a written response to the allegations contained in the affidavit of the father attached to this Application show cause why she should not be restrained from further acting in these proceedings.
7.The Applicant father be granted access to the CD Audio of hearings in this matter.
8.That no costs be awarded against the father in respect of this application.
In that Application, the father has incorrectly sought leave to file the aforementioned application pursuant to s 102QAC of the Act, despite Order 19 of the orders of 10 July 2025 making it clear that leave ought be sought pursuant to s 102QAE of the Act.
Despite this irregularity, the Court will approach the father’s application as an application for leave pursuant to s 102QAE of the Act; particularly as the affidavit sworn by the father in support of the application correctly refers to s 102QAE of the Act.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The power of the Court to make a harmful proceedings order as provided by s 102QAC of the Act was created by the amendments to the Act which came into force on 6 May 2024 as a consequence of the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth).
As discussed in the reasons delivered on 10 July 2025 (at [208]) the power given to the Court to make a harmful proceedings order is in part directed to the prevention of “frequent and unnecessary applications” so as to “limit systems abuse, which is a form of family violence” (Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth)).
Significantly, once a harmful proceedings order has been made, leave is required for the filing of any further proceedings under the Act.
Sections 102QAE, 102QAF and 102QAG govern the making of applications for leave once a harmful proceedings order has been made, in the following terms:
102QAE Application for leave to institute proceedings
(1) This section applies to a person (the applicant) who is:
(a) subject to a harmful proceedings order prohibiting the person from instituting further proceedings under this Act in a court having jurisdiction under this Act; or
(b) acting in concert with another person who is subject to an order mentioned in paragraph (a).
(2) The applicant may apply to the court for leave to institute proceedings that are subject to the order.
(3) The applicant must file an affidavit with the application that:
(a) lists all the occasions on which the applicant has applied for leave under this section; and
(b) discloses all relevant facts about the application, whether supporting or adverse to the application, that are known to the applicant.
(4) The applicant must not serve a copy of the application or affidavit on a person unless an order is made under section 102QAG. If the order is made, the applicant must serve the copy in accordance with the order.
102QAF Dismissing application for leave
(1) The court may make an order dismissing an application under section 102QAE for leave to institute proceedings if it considers the affidavit does not substantially comply with subsection 102QAE(3).
(2) The court must make an order dismissing an application under section 102QAE for leave to institute proceedings if it considers the proceedings are vexatious proceedings.
(3) The court may dismiss the application without an oral hearing (either with or without the consent of the applicant).
(4) The court may make an order under this section in Chambers.
102QAG Granting application for leave
(1) The court may make an order granting the application for leave only if it is satisfied that the proceedings are not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process, and have reasonable prospects of success.
(2) An order under subsection (1) may be made subject to the conditions the court considers appropriate.
(Notes omitted)
DISCUSSION
Section 102QAE(3) requires a party applying for leave to institute proceedings after the making of a harmful proceedings order, to file an affidavit in support of the application for leave. The section also prescribes the form of the affidavit that is to be filed. In particular, the affidavit of the applicant is required to list all of the occasions on which the applicant has sought leave to institute proceedings, and the applicant is required to disclose “all relevant facts about the applications whether supporting or adverse to the application, that are known to the applicant”.
Importantly, s 102QAF(1) invests the Court with the power to dismiss the application if the affidavit does not comply with the requirements of s 102QAE(3).
The father has provided an affidavit in support of his application. The affidavit meets the requirements of s 102QAE(3). By that affidavit, the father deposed:
Introduction
1.I am the Respondent Father in the main proceedings.
2.This is the first occasion I have filed for leave under section 102QAE of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Stay of Orders
3.I will within the required time period be lodging an Appeal against the orders of Her Honour Justice Kari made on 10 July 2025 including in relation to orders 7 to 12 and 13 to 19 in this Application.
4.The orders are required to be stayed to avoid irreversible harm to the asset pool, for my best financial interests as a party and to avoid unnecessary costs being incurred.
5.I have made extensive written and oral submissions on these issues.
ICL Questions to Answer
6.On 23 June 2025 I sent an email to the Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL), attaching a list of specific questions requiring the outcome of his interviews with the children in which occurred in April 2025, exhibited and marked “[MRV1]”.
7.On 14 July 2025, I sent a follow-up email to the ICL stating that the recent orders made by the Court were not retrospective and that unless the ICL responded by close of business that day, I would seek an order requiring him to answer the questions. A copy of this follow-up email is exhibited and marked “[MRV2]”, I have had no response from the ICL to either email.
8.I am concerned the ICL based on what I view is his demonstrated bias against the father having a relationship with the children that he will shape his reporting on those views depending on what the Family Report due within the next few months will say.
Court Child Expert
9.On 4 August 2023, the Court Child Expert, [Ms P], a social worker not a psychologist, prepared and released the family report in this proceeding.
10.I formed the view that the report was fundamentally flawed. I communicated these concerns to the Family Court by email to its Customer service email address on 2 May 2025, exhibited and marked “[MRV3]”.
11.I received an emailed letter in response on 15 May 2025 from the Director Court Child Services QLD/SA/NT.
12.Although the letter thanked me for providing feedback it indicated no action will be taken by the Director Court Child Services, exhibited and market “[MRV4]”.
13.In light of the Court’s reliance on the report and the Family Court’s indication that it would take no action, I am left with no alternative but to seek an order requiring the expert to answer specific questions to clarify how certain errors arose and to assist in determining whether further procedural or professional issues need to be addressed.
14.Exhibited and marked “[MRV5]” is the list of questions I seek the Court to order the Court Child Expert to answer.
15.Seek to appoint my own professionally qualifies Child Expert on the grounds elucidated in my email to the Court Children’s Service date d 4 July 2025, exhibited and marked “[MRV6]”.
Removal of Mother’s Solicitor
16.In the Court Child Expert report dated 4 August 2023 the mother states at paragraph 7 “There has been no formal time spending with [Mr Vaughan] since [Ms Vaughan] and the children moved out of the marital home. [Ms Vaughan] stated her lawyer advised “not to let the dad see the children.”
17.I have previously in an Affidavit exhibited an SMS from [MS SS] a close friend of the Applicant Mother who during that period of time was acting as a go between us. In that SMS she told me she had heard the mother’s solicitor saying you will need to cut of access to the children.
18.I lodged a complaint with the solicitor’s professional body, exhibited and attached at “[MRV7]” is the email summarizing my relevant communications with [MS SS] on this email
19.The Legal Professional Conduct Commissioner in a letter closed my complaint stating that it was a matter for the family court to investigate “[MRV8]”.
CD Audio Recording of Hearings
20.I emailed Adelaide Registry providing multiple grounds why I should be granted access to the CD Audio of the hearings, annexed and exhibited with the letters “[MRV9]”.
21.On 8 July 2025 annexed and exhibited with the letters “[MRV10]” is an email from the Adelaide Registry stating that access to audio had been denied. together with the email chain from myself providing multiple ground as to why I should be granted access.
(As per the original)
Compliance with s 102QAE(3), however, is not the only factor to be taken into account when considering any application for leave to institute proceedings. Importantly:
(a)Section 102QAF(2) provides that the Court must dismiss any application for leave if the court considers the proposed proceedings to be vexatious; and
(b)Section 102QAG provides that the Court may make an order granting leave only if the proceedings are not “frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process”.
The onus for establishing that the proceedings are not “frivolous vexatious or an abuse of process” rests with the applicant for leave; here, the father (Darley (No 4) [2023] FedCFamC1A 158 at [13]).
As recently discussed by Schonell J in Uttar [2025] FedCFamC1A 121:
17. Vexatious proceedings are defined in s 102Q(1) of the Act to include:
(a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and
(b)proceedings instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and
(c)proceedings instituted or pursued in a court or tribunal without reasonable ground; and
(d)proceedings conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.
18.Proceedings will constitute an abuse of process if they can clearly be seen to be “foredoomed” to fail (Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393)…
As discussed by Hogan J in Darley & Darley (No 8) [2023] FedCFamC1F 574 (at [23]):
23.Proceedings may be an abuse of process of the court where they:
(a) are unreasonably oppressive and unfair to the other party; and/or
(b) will bring the administration of justice into disrepute and/or
(c) seek to re-litigate something that has already been determined in previous proceedings; and/or
(d) are brought for collateral purposes and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise.
(Footnotes omitted)
For all of the reasons that follow I am satisfied that the proposed application by the father is vexatious because I consider each order sought in the proposed application to be an abuse of process.
In relation to paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the proposed application:
(a)The Court cannot require the ICL, the Court Child Expert nor the mother’s solicitor to answer any questions posed by the father in the manner he proposes at paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the proposed application.
(b)Of course, the Court Child Expert may be subject to cross examination at any final hearing in the proceedings, and at that juncture the father will be permitted to ask the Court Child Expert any questions (subject to any objection) that are relevant to the issues in dispute in the proceedings.
(c)Therefore the father’s proposed orders requiring the ICL, the mother’s solicitor and the Court Child Expert to answer questions are an abuse of process, because each of those orders are foredoomed to fail.
(d)It follows that where the Court cannot require the mother’s solicitor to answer questions posed by the father, there is no basis for the Court to require the solicitor to “show cause” as to “why she should not be restrained from further acting in the proceedings”, as suggested by the father in paragraph 6 of the proposed application.
(e)Moreover, whilst the Court has discretion to restrain solicitors from acting for a party, the basis for disqualification has been described as “exceptional” and one which ought be exercised with “appropriate caution” (Geelong School Supplies Pty Ltd v Dean (2006) 237 ALR 612 at [35] per Young J).
(f)Importantly, the father in his affidavit has failed to address any of the relevant legal principles established in the authorities for determining applications of this nature (see, for example: Porter v Dyer (2022) 402 ALR 659 at [113] and Charisteas & Charisteas (2022) FLC 94-109 at [38]–[39]). As such it does not appear that there is any credible and cogent basis for the father to seek to disqualify the mother’s solicitor from representing her in these proceedings.
(g)I am therefore satisfied that any order sought by the father that would have the effect of restraining the mother’s solicitor from representing her in the proceedings is an abuse of process because it would be “foredoomed” to fail.
(h)In addition, the Court would have to have some overarching concern that any application by the father to restrain the mother’s solicitors from acting for her, in the absence of a credible and cogent foundation for doing so, has at its heart a more nefarious intention; namely to cause disruption and distress to the mother and a delay of the proceedings.
In relation to paragraph 5 of the proposed application:
(a)It appears that the father intends to instruct his own expert to prepare a report in the proceedings.
(b)What the proposed application ignores is that the Court made orders on 28 February 2025 for the preparation of the Family Report (Orders 5-10).
(c)At the time of making that order, the Court was cognisant of the complaints that the father makes regarding the Court Child Expert, Ms P, many of which are repeated in the affidavit filed in support of his proposed application.
(d)Significantly, the father attempted to commence an appeal of Order 5 made 28 February 2025. Because he was late in filing his Notice of Appeal, the father was required to bring an Application in an Appeal to commence the appeal out of time. That application was heard on 7 April 2025 with orders made dismissing the application and, as a consequence, the proposed appeal on 15 April 2025 (Vaughan & Vaughan (Unreported, Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1), Appeals Judicial Registrar Thomas, 15 April 2025).
(e)The order the father would ask the Court to make, on any view, appears to be an attempt to subvert the Court’s orders for the preparation of a family report, and/or more egregiously, the father proposes to instruct another expert to interview the children and prepare a report.
(f)On any view, the father’s proposals in this regard are an abuse of process as they are entirely without merit and “foredoomed” to fail.
In relation to paragraph 7 of the father’s proposed application in which he seeks a “CD Audio of hearings in this matter”:
(a)It appears from the communication annexed to the father’s affidavit that:
(i)He asked the Court to provide him with a complimentary copy of transcript and/or audio from “hearings” without identifying which “hearings” he was referring to.
(ii)These requests were denied by the Court.
(iii)The father requested that the Court provide him with transcript because he could not afford the “obscene fees charged” for obtaining transcript.
(iv)The father requested that the Court provide him with access to “hearing recordings” because he asserted that “In hearings involving no witnesses and consisting solely of legal argument, the CD contains only faceless voices and cannot reasonably be considered sensitive or confidential in the way evidentiary testimony might be”.
(v)The father requested that the Court provide him with “off-site” access of the audio recording of hearings to “reduce costs” and to enable him to identify relevant sections “for transcript preparation or procedural submissions and then those excerpts be provided without cost to the parties”.
(vi)The focus of the father’s desire to obtain transcripts, or access to the audio recordings of hearings to support a “pending application concerning alleged bias and procedural unfairness”.
(b)In his affidavit in support of this order, there has been no attempt by the father (either in his requests made to the registry for the provision of transcript or audio annexed to the affidavit and/or in his proposed application, which identifies any basis, beyond a bold assertion that he requires the transcript and/or audio in support of a “pending application”) to identify why he should be provided with a complimentary copy of transcript and/or audio. It is not clear what application the father intends to make and nor has any such application been made (noting that in any event he would require leave to file any such application as a consequence of the harmful proceedings order made 10 July 2025).
(c)The further difficulty with the father’s request in the proposed application is that it appears to relate to a number of hearings, without an identification as to which specific hearings are the focus of the application. Where there have been no less than 54 published orders in these proceedings, most of which were made in open Court at the conclusion of a hearing, conceivably, the request for the provision of transcript is not only wide and excessive, but also a costly imposition on the Court without any apparent foundation or focus.
(d)More importantly, however, there is no requirement for the Court to provide transcript to parties. Whilst the Court does have discretion to provide transcript to parties, this is a discretion that is exercised in exceptional circumstances, and only if the interests of justice require it. Impecuniosity in and of itself is not a sufficient basis. (Sampson & Hartnett (Provision of Transcript) (2013) FLC 93-542).
(e)For all of the reasons identified, the interests of justice do not speak in support of the Court providing the father with transcript, rather, they point against it.
(f)Absent more, all of the same factors pointing against the provision of transcript can also be said in relation to providing the father access to any audio recording of the hearing.
(g)Of additional concern in relation to the audio recordings, is that the Court apprehends that the father may wish to have off-site access so that he can prepare his own transcript for use in these proceedings. A circumstance which is not one the Court would endorse.
(h)In addition, the father’s assertion that access to recordings that only contain legal argument “cannot be reasonably considered sensitive or confidential in the way evidentiary testimony might be” is troubling, given the provisions of Part XIVB of the Act, and the Court’s apprehension that the father may wish to have access to recordings of hearings, again, for nefarious purposes, including communication of an account of the proceedings to the public.
(i)I accordingly consider that the proposed orders sought by the father are an abuse of process because they are foredoomed to fail, and are possibly bought for some unknown collateral purpose, possibly including communication by the father to the public of an account of the proceedings.
The only aspect of the father’s proposed application that could conceivably have potential merit, is proposed order 2, in which he seeks a stay of Orders 7-12 and 14-19 of the orders made 10 July 2025, pending appeal.
Those orders relate to the sale, by the mother, of the Town E property to effect the payment of monies to the wife pursuant to the orders of 27 March 2024 (Orders 7-12), together with various orders including orders for the father to provide documents to enable the preparation of financial statements and taxation returns for the self-managed superannuation fund, an order empowering a Registrar to sign documents in lieu of the father, and the order made pursuant to r 10.27 prohibiting the father from taking any further step in the financial proceedings until he has complied with orders made earlier in the proceedings for the sale of the former matrimonial home (Orders 14-19).
The difficulty, however, with the father’s application for a stay pending appeal is that the father has not addressed any of the well-established principles that might exercise the Court’s discretion to grant a stay (Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106 at [18]). Importantly, where the father had not provided any draft of his proposed Notice of Appeal, nor set out in his affidavit the grounds of any proposed appeal, the Court is unable to assess the “strength of the proposed appeal”.
I am therefore satisfied that proposed order 2 is also an abuse of process and foredoomed to fail on the evidence presently before the Court.
It follows that there can be no order for costs against the father, in circumstances where in accordance with Order 19 made 10 July 2025, the mother was not to be notified of an application for leave made by the father, and the Court has determined the application for leave on the papers. Accordingly, paragraph 8 of the proposed application is otiose.
For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that the father’s proposed application is an abuse of process and doomed to fail. As such, the proposed application is vexatious within the terms of s 102QAF(1) of the Act, and must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Kari. Associate:
Dated: 21 July 2025
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