Darley (No 4)
[2023] FedCFamC1A 158
•18 September 2023
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Darley (No 4) [2023] FedCFamC1A 158
Appeal from: Darley & Darley (No 8) [2023] FedCFamC1F 574 Appeal number: NAA 200 of 2023 File number: BRC 2317 of 2013 Judgment of: ALDRIDGE, HARPER & RIETHMULLER JJ Date of judgment: 18 September 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – Where mother seeks leave to appeal from orders dismissing two Applications – Contravention against the father – Where an injunction was previously made pursuant to s 102Q of the Family Law Act (Cth) prohibiting the mother from instituting proceedings against the father or Independent Children’s Lawyer without first obtaining leave pursuant to s 102QE – Primary judge was not satisfied mother’s Application – Contravention was not vexatious and dismissed mother’s application – Where mother must satisfy the Court that her proposed appeal is not vexatious – Where grounds of proposed appeal are without merit – Court satisfied mother’s proposed appeal lacks any reasonable ground – Court not satisfied appeal is not vexatious – Leave refused – Application in an Appeal dismissed. Legislation: Crimes Act1914 (Cth) ss 35, 36
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pts VII, XIB, Div 12A, ss 67ZN, 69ZQ 102Q(1), 102QE, 102QE(2), 102QF, 102QF(2), 102QG(4)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 7, 26(1), 26(2)(a)(i), 28(3)(e)(i)
Federal Court and Federal Circuit and Family Court Regulations 2022 (Cth) s 4.02(1)(b)
Cases cited: Attorney-General (NSW) v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481; [1988] NSWCA 8
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55
Darley (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1A 112
Darley (No 3) [2023] FedCFamC1A 126
Doughty-Cowell v Kyriazis [2018] VSCA 216
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2020] HCA 63
Goldsmith & Stinson (No 2) (2023) FLC 94-134; [2023] FedCFamC1A 25
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2000] HCA 48
Marsden & Winch (2013) FLC 93-560; [2013] FamCAFC 177
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17
Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98
SCVG (2020) FLC 93-967; [2020] FamCAFC 147
Spencer [2022] FedCFamC1A 131
State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Stenouse Ltd (1993) Aust Torts Reports 81-423
Number of paragraphs: 39 Date of hearing: 30 August 2023 Place: Melbourne, delivered in Sydney The Applicant: Litigant in person ORDERS
NAA 200 of 2023
BRC 2317 of 2013FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS DARLEY
Applicant
ORDER MADE BY:
ALDRIDGE, HARPER & RIETHMULLER JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
18 SEPTEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application in an Appeal filed 28 July 2023 be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Darley (No 4) has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALDRIDGE, HARPER & RIETHMULLER JJ:
INTRODUCTION
By Application in an Appeal filed on 28 July 2023, the applicant mother (“mother”) seeks leave to file an appeal from a judgment and orders of a single judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) delivered on 10 July 2023 (“primary judgment”).
The relevant order was made in the following terms on 10 July 2023:
1.The Application in a Proceeding filed 5 July 2022, as amended by an oral application, for leave to institute proceedings for contravention as particularised in the Application – Contravention signed 26 June 2022 and the Application – Contravention signed 3 July 2023 (as exhibited to [the mother’s] affidavit filed by leave on 5 July 2023) is dismissed.
The Application in an Appeal is dismissed for the following reasons.
In accordance with the Court’s practice, her application for leave to institute proceedings was heard before it had been served upon the proposed respondent father (“father”) prior to being heard. Her application was listed to hear oral argument on 30 August 2023. On the morning of the hearing, the mother emailed to the Court 12 pages of submissions in writing (“Further Submissions”). At the hearing of the mother’s application, she sought to rely upon her proposed Notice of Appeal and the Further Submissions in lieu of oral argument (as she indicated she was suffering from a lung infection). The Court acceded to this approach.
BACKGROUND
The mother has been before this Court on numerous occasions. Some background has been set out in several recent judgments of the Full Court (Darley (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1A 112 at [3]–[5]; Darley (No 3) [2023] FedCFamC1A 126 at [5]–[7]).
Final parenting orders had been made by the primary judge on 12 December 2018. On 23 August 2019, the mother was declared a vexatious litigant under Pt XIB of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) and was enjoined from instituting proceedings without leave by an order in the following terms:
1.Pursuant to s 102QB(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) the … mother be prohibited from instituting proceedings against [the father] or the independent children’s lawyer, under this Act in a court having jurisdiction under this Act without first obtaining leave pursuant to s 102QE of the Act.
The primary judge explained, in terms we adopt, the immediate circumstances leading to the primary judgment as follows:
3. On 5 July 2022, [the mother] filed an Application in a Proceeding (“the July 2022 Application”) by which she sought leave to institute parenting proceedings and, amongst other relief, leave to institute proceedings alleging that [the father] had contravened final parentings orders I made on 12 December 2018 (“the December 2018 orders”) after a trial which occupied seven days across 2017 and 2018.
4. The July 2022 Application was relied on by [the mother], at least in part, in answer to contravention proceedings which had been instituted against her by [the father] when he filed an Application – Contravention on 23 May 2022 (“the May 2022 Contravention Application”).
5. The May 2022 Contravention Application, by which [the father] alleged that [the mother] had contravened the terms of the December 2018 orders by failing to provide Y to spend time with him, was first before me on 11 July 2022. At that time, the parents’ older daughter X had been living with [the father] since early December 2021 (and had not spent time with [the mother] since then), whilst their younger daughter, Y, remained living with [the mother]. When [the mother] first made me aware of the existence of the July 2022 Application – it not having been listed before me on 11 July 2022 – it had been listed to be heard by Carew J on 28 July 2022.
(Footnotes omitted)
The primary judgment thus determined and dismissed the mother’s application for leave to bring her two contravention applications against the father.
DISPOSITION
Section 102QE(2) of the Act provides:
(2) The applicant may apply to the court for leave to institute proceedings that are subject to [an order pursuant to s 102QB(2)].
It is settled that leave is required pursuant to s 102QE(2) to institute an appeal. In SCVG (2020) FLC 93-967 (“SCVG”) at [24] the Full Court explained:
24. The taking of any step or the making of an application to start an appeal is itself defined in s 102Q(1) of the Act as a form of fresh proceedings (par (a) of the definition of “institute”), the institution of which is caught by Part XIB (Pencious & Searle [2017] FamCAFC 210; (2017) FLC 93-805 at [77]–[88]) and, since the proposed appeal is from an order which prevents another application being made…without leave, it is caught by the terms of the…injunction.
In determining the mother’s application, several other provisions of Pt XIB of the Act should be mentioned. Section 102QF(2) provides:
(2)The court must make an order dismissing an application under section 102QE for leave to institute proceedings if it considers the proceedings are vexatious proceedings.
Section 102QG(4) then provides:
(4)The court may grant leave only if it is satisfied the proceedings are not vexatious proceedings.
It can be seen that s 102QF(2) of the Act requires the Court to dismiss an application for leave under s 102QE “if it considers the proceedings are vexatious proceedings”, while s 102QG(4) of the Act permits the Court to grant leave “only if it is satisfied the proceedings are not vexatious proceedings”. The difference between the two subsections appears to be that s 102QF(2) imposes an onus to establish that the given proceedings are vexatious, while s 102QG(4) imposes an obligation on an applicant seeking leave to satisfy the Court the proposed proceedings are not vexatious. A failure to satisfy the Court means the discretion to grant leave is not enlivened. This is the import of the phrase “only if” used in s 102QG(4).
The expression “vexatious proceedings” is defined inclusively in s 102Q(1) of the Act as follows:
vexatious proceedings includes:
(a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and
(b)proceedings instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and
(c)proceedings instituted or pursued in a court or tribunal without reasonable ground; and
(d)proceedings conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.
The primary judge was not satisfied the mother’s contravention application was “not vexatious”. Accordingly, she was refused leave by reason of s 102QG(4) of the Act because she had no discretion to grant leave.
We note that s 26(2)(a)(i) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (“the FCFCA Act”) prohibits the bringing of any appeal from a judgment that is a determination of an application “for leave or special leave to institute proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1)”. It appears to us that this subparagraph denies the mother any right to appeal from the primary judge’s decision, which clearly determined an application for leave to institute proceedings in Division 1. However, as we will explain, since there is also clearly some tension between the wording of s 26(2)(a)(i) of the FCFCA Act and reg 4.02(1)(b) of the Federal Court and Federal Circuit and Family Court Regulations 2022 (Cth) (“the 2022 Regulations”), the operation of s 26(2)(a)(i) was not the subject of any argument, and we are satisfied leave should be refused for the reasons which follow, we express no concluded view.
Appeals only lie from a “judgment” (s 26(1) of the FCFCA Act), which is defined in s 7 of the FCFCA Act as “a judgment, decree or order, whether final or interlocutory, a decision or a sentence, and includes a decree within the meaning of [the Act]”. However, leave to appeal from specific types of “judgment” is necessary under the FCFCA Act. For present purposes, by reason of s 28(3)(e)(i) of the FCFCA Act, leave is required to appeal from “a prescribed judgment…constituted by a single Judge”. Regulation 4.02(1)(b) of the 2022 Regulations stipulates, as a prescribed judgment, that “an order under section 102PE, 102QF or 102QG” of the Act requires leave to appeal. As noted, the primary judge’s order refusing leave was made pursuant to s 102QG(4) of the Act.
In short, therefore, the applicant requires leave pursuant to s 102QE of the Act to institute her proposed appeal and she requires leave to appeal pursuant to s 28(3)(e)(i) of the FCFCA Act by reason of reg 4.02(1)(b) of the 2022 Regulations (see Spencer [2022] FedCFamC1A 131 at [9]).
The question of leave to appeal in this Court is subject to well known conjunctive criteria. Recently, in Goldsmith & Stinson (No 2) (2023) FLC 94-134, the Full Court explained the principles as follows:
45. If leave to appeal is required, the test adopted in this Court is a conjunctive one, namely, whether the decision of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt so as to warrant its reconsideration by the Full Court and, if so, whether a substantial injustice would occur if leave were not granted: Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692 at [57]; Moy & Pao (2022) FLC 94-073 at [11]. The merits of the proposed appeal are relevant to the success of an application for leave to appeal: Ebner & Pappas (2014) FLC 93-619 at [39]; Harford & Spalding [2022] FedCFamC1A 78 at [16].
(Emphasis in original)
However, leave to institute an appeal pursuant to s 102QE of the Act raises some different considerations. This is because, as explained, instituting an appeal is caught by the injunction made pursuant to s 102QB(2), and by reason of s 102QF(2), the Court is obliged to dismiss the application for leave if it considers the appeal to be vexatious, or it is deprived of jurisdiction to grant leave by reason of s 102QG(4) unless satisfied the appeal is not vexatious. If either subsection was satisfied, the proposed appeal could not be instituted and the application for leave pursuant to s 102QE would have to be refused. It would be an odd result if the Court could then grant leave to appeal according to ordinary criteria for the purposes of s 28(3)(e)(i) of the FCFCA Act. For example, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the Court determines a proposed appeal was either vexatious or could not be satisfied it was not vexatious, but nonetheless conclude a substantial injustice would occur if leave were not granted. This raises a question of what purpose reg 4.02(1)(b) of the 2022 Regulations serves. It may be that if the Court is satisfied the proposed appeal is not vexatious, the applicant must then satisfy the conventional conjunctive test for leave to appeal as well.
However, for present purposes, we conclude the primary question is, therefore, whether the mother has satisfied us that her proposed appeal is not vexatious, before any question of leave to appeal according to the conjunctive test needs to be addressed, although similar considerations may apply.
The relevant state of satisfaction is to be reached upon consideration of the mother’s material, without receiving any responding or contradicting material or arguments. Being satisfied that a proposed appeal is not vexatious requires concluding it does not fall within any of the categories of “vexatious proceedings” specified in s 102Q(1) of the Act. This conclusion requires a level of negative certainty which is not reached if the mother’s material suggests her proposed appeal is either probably, or even may be, vexatious.
We conclude the mother has failed to reach the requisite level of negative certainty. In particular, we find the proposed appeal lacks any reasonable ground, or would be instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment.
The primary judge, in her reasons, sets out the purposes of the mother’s proposed contravention proceedings, as put forward by the mother herself, as follows:
18. Doing the best I can, it seemed to me that [the mother’s] purposes were:
(a) to ensure that findings of fact about various contentions (which will be the subject of evidence given at the trial listed to commence on 28 August 2023 before me) are made before the trial commences so that they can be used to provide bases for the making of those parenting orders which [the mother] asserts are now in the children’s best interests; and
(b) given [the mother’s] assertion that, in determining the previous proceedings by the December 2018 order, I failed to make various findings of fact which she sought be made:
(i) to ensure that findings of fact about various contentions (which will be the subject of evidence given at the trial listed to commence on 28 August 2023 before me) are, in fact, made as the disposition of the applications for contravention (if commenced) would require such findings of fact to be made; and
(ii) to prevent a repetition of the 2018 failures to make findings of fact from reoccurring; and
(c) to ensure that, before the 28 August 2023 trial commences, there are findings on the record that [the father] contravened the December 2018 orders without reasonable excuse – because this is relevant to the determination of those parenting orders now in the children’s best interests and because such findings are relevant to the assessment of [the father’s] credit; and
(d) to ensure that the correct facts are stated on the record; and
(e) to address her concerns that findings of fact will not be made at the upcoming trial; and
(f) to address the failure in the past to make findings that [the father] has committed perjury, filed a “false verified statement” and attempted to pervert the course of justice; and
(g) to ensure that, given the children are both now living with [the father] despite the terms of the December 2018 order requiring that they live with her, a finding is made that [the father] is in breach of the December 2018 order; and
(h) to ensure that findings of fact are made about the alleged contraventions before the trial proceeds so that there is not a repeat of the past situation where she was “punished” by being the subject of a vexatious proceedings order; and
(i) to address failings in the system; and
(j) to ensure that findings are made that [the father] has told different stories to different judicial officers about the same matters, which will go to a consideration of his credit at the upcoming trial; and
(k) on the premise that any instituted applications for contravention can be heard and determined before the trial commences: to narrow the purview of the trial as findings of fact made in the determination of the contravention applications can be used at the trial (and thus obviate the necessity for the Court to consider that evidence at trial); and
(l) to provide a basis for her application at trial that [the father] be the subject of a vexatious proceedings order prohibiting him from instituting proceedings in a court having jurisdiction under the Act.
It is important to emphasise that the primary judge elicited these purposes from the evidence, concessions and arguments of the mother.
The primary judge identified well known bases upon which proceedings may constitute an abuse of process in her reasons:
23. Proceedings may be an abuse of process of the court where they:
(a) are unreasonably oppressive and unfair to the other party; and/or
(b) will bring the administration of justice into disrepute and/or
(c) seek to re-litigate something that has already been determined in previous proceedings; and/or
(d) are brought for collateral purposes and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise.
(Footnotes omitted)
She cited in footnotes: State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Stenouse Ltd (1993) Aust Torts Reports 81-423 at 64,086–64,089; Attorney-General (NSW) v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 per Roden J at 487, as referred to by the Full Court in Marsden & Winch (2013) FLC 93-560 at [150] and SCVG at [33], [39]–[46], [50] and [51].
Her Honour then concluded that:
24. Given the history of the consideration of the application for leave to institute contravention proceedings, the nature of the contraventions alleged and the time at which they are alleged to have occurred, [the mother’s] purposes in seeking the exercise of the discretion in favour of the grant of leave to enable the prosecution of the same and that it is accepted that the evidence to be adduced in support of any application for contravention against [the father] will be the same as the evidence relied on by [the mother] at the trial of the proceedings listed to commence on 28 August 2023 (such that whatever relevant findings of fact can then be made, including in relation to any non-compliance with the December 2018 order and/or whether any such non-compliance was reasonable in the circumstances in which it occurred), I am not persuaded that the applications for contravention which [the mother] seeks leave to institute are not vexatious proceedings in the circumstances which now exist.
It follows from the primary judge’s reasons, she took the view that the mother’s proposed contravention applications were likely to constitute an abuse of process, according to well known authority and based upon the mother’s purposes identified by the primary judge. With respect, we agree this view was soundly based. It is, therefore, difficult to see how the primary judge could have reached any conclusion other than that the mother had failed to demonstrate her proposed contravention applications were not vexatious. When we turn to the proposed grounds of appeal, it is obvious that the mother does not raise any ground which challenges the correctness of the matters upon which the primary judge relied to reach that conclusion. Rather, the grounds wander into numerous areas, none of which have any bearing on the decision that is the subject of the proposed appeal. A brief survey will explain why this is so.
Grounds 6, 7 and 8 all assert some form of bias on the part of the primary judge, such as acting in a manner partisan towards the father, failing to determine he committed perjury, misled the Court, perverted the course of justice, and a failure to observe her judicial oath by bearing ill will towards the mother. It is convenient to deal with these grounds together. They should also be dealt with first because assertions of judicial bias “strike at the validity and acceptability” of the process and its outcome (Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 at [117]).
The mother did not distinguish actual and apprehended bias which made her evidence and arguments difficult to discern. To establish actual bias, the mother must show the primary judge was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [72]). A finding of bias is a grave matter, requires cogent evidence and is rarely made (Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98 at [68]). The test for apprehended bias is well known and requires consideration of “whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide” (Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11] (“Johnson v Johnson”). Two limbs must be satisfied. First, the “identification of what it is said might lead a [decision maker] to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits” and, secondly, there “must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits” (Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [8]). It should be emphasised that the relevant reasonable apprehension is not that of, and is not determined by, the subjective perceptions of any party to the proceedings, although the impression that might reasonably be made on the parties by the facts is not completely ignored (Johnson v Johnson at [52]). At issue is the objectively determined reasonable apprehension of a hypothetical fair-minded observer. The presumptive state of mind of the hypothetical observer is “that of a layperson (not a lawyer) informed as to the relevant facts of the case and sufficiently knowledgeable and informed to be capable of bringing a rational and reasonable assessment to bear” (Doughty-Cowell v Kyriazis [2018] VSCA 216 at [79]).
The mother’s affidavit in support of her Application in an Appeal, and her Further Submissions, were replete with numerous allegations about the conduct of the primary judge, with numerous transcript references. It is unnecessary to rehearse these in detail. It appeared to be the gravamen of the mother’s argument that there could be no dispute about the father’s contravention of parenting orders, and therefore the primary judge was obliged to grant leave and hear her contravention applications.
However, the allegations at the heart of Grounds 6 to 8 are baseless or irrelevant. The primary judge was engaged in determining whether to grant leave pursuant to s 102QE of the Act, and whether the mother had satisfied her that the contravention applications were not vexatious. The mother failed to do so. Her submissions before us failed to engage with the reasons which the primary judge gave for her decision. As already pointed out, on the basis of the mother’s own concessions, that it was open to the primary judge to conclude the mother had not shown her proposed contravention applications were not vexatious, it is hard to see how the primary judge could have concluded otherwise. There is no merit in proposed Grounds 6, 7 and 8.
Turning then to the remaining grounds, Ground 1 asserts the primary judge erred by failing to apply s 67ZN and 69ZQ of the Act. These sections fall in Div 12A of Pt VII of the Act. But Div 12A applies only to proceedings or parts of proceedings which are under Pt VII. The mother’s application for leave was made pursuant to s 102QE which falls under Pt XIB of the Act. Division 12A has no application. Grounds 2 and 4 are difficult to understand but appear to assert error by the primary judge in choosing to list the proceedings for trial. These grounds not only fail to raise any recognisable error, they fail to engage with any part of the decision that is the subject of the proposed appeal. Ground 3 asserts the primary judge erred in finding the proposed contravention applications were vexatious pursuant to s 102QF(2) of the Act. However, this bears no relationship to the primary judgment in which the primary judge acted under s 102QG(4) of the Act.
Ground 5 asserts error on behalf of the primary judge for “enacting” s 102NA of the Act. It was not clear what this meant but on any view, s 102NA has nothing to do with the primary judgment.
Ground 9 alleges error because the primary judge failed to apply the “Paramountcy Principle”. This appeared to be a reference to the best interest of child being the paramount consideration in making parenting orders (s 60CA of the Act). But again, this is misconceived, because the mother was seeking leave under Pt XIB of the Act, not parenting orders under Pt VII, into which s 60CA falls. The mother did not explain how the paramountcy principle should have informed the primary judge’s reasoning to reach a conclusion that the proposed contravention applications were not vexatious.
Ground 10 raises the allegation that the primary judge committed a criminal offence by aiding and abetting the father in committing offences: namely, perjury, fabricating evidence, misleading the Court and “by omission in failing to make finding of fact is directly knowingly concerned in the commission of the offence” in breach of s 35 and s 36 of the Crimes Act1914 (Cth). Apart from the problem that this ground must assume the mother’s allegations against the father are true, of which this assumption could not be made good on the material before us, the assertion of criminal conduct by the primary judge is entirely baseless and again bears no relation to the primary judgment sought to be appealed from. The mother did not explain either in her affidavit or Further Submissions how a federal criminal code could apply to a judge of a federal superior court of record in the discharge of her judicial functions. The mother clearly misconceives not only what happened before the primary judge but also the fundamental immunities of judicial officers.
The mother’s material therefore satisfies us to a reasonable level of certainty that she seeks leave to institute and pursue an appeal which is a proceeding that lacks any reasonable ground. Accordingly, we are not persuaded her proposed appeal is not vexatious. Leave should be refused.
In addition, the same reasons which lead to the conclusion that the mother’s proposed appeal lacks any reasonable grounds encourages certainty that her appeal would be instituted to harass or annoy and cause delay. This conclusion is supported by her evidence and further submissions which, as already pointed out, contain numerous irrelevant and baseless allegations.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, leave to institute the appeal should be declined. The Application in an Appeal should be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Aldridge, Harper & Riethmuller. Associate:
Dated: 18 September 2023
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