Vaughan & Vaughan (No 3) - [2025] FedCFamC1F 455

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Vaughan & Vaughan (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 455

File number(s): ADC 5154 of 2022

Judgment of: KARI J

Date of judgment: 10 July 2025

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Child related proceedings – Where interlocutory parenting orders were made 28 February 2025 for the father to spend supervised time with four children in an “on-site unsupervised” program at a children’s contact service – Where the father has since filed four separate interlocutory parenting applications – Where the service can no longer facilitate time – Where the risk factors previously identified have not been ameliorated – Where the Court is not bound by the proposals of the parties nor the Independent Children’s Lawyer – Supervised time to remain – Minor variation to previous order

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Independent Children’s Lawyer – Where the father served the Independent Children's Lawyer (“ICL”) with a Notice to Admit – Where the ICL seeks dismissal of the Notice to Admit – Where the father asks the Court to discharge the ICL – Where the ICL has discharged their obligations pursuant to s 68L of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Notice to Admit uplifted and father’s application dismissed

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Where the father is in default of orders made in March 2024 to pay to the mother the sum of $50,000 – Where the orders provided for the sale of the former matrimonial home in default of payment – Where the father has frustrated the default provisions of the orders – Where the mother seeks orders for the sale of alternate property – Orders made for alternate property to be sold and the mother to be paid the partial property settlement from the proceeds of sale

FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Default – Where the father has failed to comply with orders – Where the mother seeks an order pursuant to r 10.27 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) – Order made prohibiting the father from taking any further step in the financial proceedings until the sale of the former matrimonial home

FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Harmful proceedings – Where the Court apprehends the litigation is being unnecessarily delayed by the continual filing of applications and documents by the father – Where much of the father’s communications with the mother’s solicitors and ICL are derogatory, inflammatory, offensive and contain threats – Where the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the mother and/or children would suffer harm if the father instituted further proceedings – Order made pursuant to s 102QAC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) prohibiting the father from instituting proceedings under the Act

Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt XIB, ss 68LA, 71B, 79, 80, 102QAC

Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth)

Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) Pt 8.1, rr 8.01, 10.26, 10.27

Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth)

Cases cited:
Garside [2024] FedCFamC1A 250

Holinski & Holinski [2025] FedCFamC1F 143

Lamport & Garside [2024] FedCFamC2F 1007

Lim & Zong (2021) FLC 94-048

Oberlin& Infeld (2021) FLC 94-017

Re JJT; Ex parte Victoria Legal Aid (1998) 195 CLR 184

U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238

Vaughan & Vaughan (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 371

Vaughan & Vaughan (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 129

Division: Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs: 219

Date of hearing: 28 November 2024, 9 May 2025, 2 July 2025

Place: Adelaide

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Tredrea

Solicitor for the Applicant: Camatta Lempens Pty Ltd

The Respondent: Litigant in person

Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Mr Hemsley

Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Legal Services Commission of South Australia
ORDERS

ADC 5154 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MS VAUGHAN

Applicant

AND:
MR VAUGHAN

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

ORDER MADE BY:

KARI J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
PARENTING
1.Order 1 made 28 February 2025 be varied to provide:
(a)The father shall spend supervised time with the children W born 2008, X born 2010, Z born 2012 and Y born 2012 (“collectively referred to as “the children”) at a contact service nominated by the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) on the following basis:
(i)Time spending shall take place at dates and times as can be accommodated by the service, provided however that such time occur each alternate weekend and that it not exceed a period of two hours on each occasion;
(ii)The parties shall both comply with the prescribed terms of the service;
(iii)The children are not to leave the premises of the service; and
(iv)The father is restrained by injunction from discussing these proceedings, or any issue arising in the proceedings with the children at any such time spending.

2.All interlocutory parenting applications filed by the parents be dismissed, save and except as to costs.

THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
3.The Notice to Admit filed by the father on 1 April 2025 directed to the ICL be uplifted from the court file.
4.The Application in a Proceeding filed by the ICL on 9 April 2025 otherwise be dismissed, save and except as to costs.
5.The Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed by the father on 5 May 2025, directed to the ICL, be dismissed.

FINANCIAL
6.Order 5(c) made 27 March 2024 be discharged.
7.The mother shall forthwith do all things to place the property situate at Lots 1 and 2 D Street, Town E in the State of South Australia (the “Town E property”) on the market for sale, with the mother to be the sole trustee for sale and authorised by these orders to sign all documents on behalf of the parties to effect such sale, with a copy of these orders evidencing such entitlement on the part of the mother.
8.The mother shall provide to the selling agent and conveyancer instructed by her in relation to the sale of the Town E property a copy of these orders.
9.The mother shall follow all reasonable advice provided by the selling agent engaged by her in respect to the sale of the Town E property including but not limited to the presentation of the property for sale, the mode of sale and the reserve price (if any).
10.The father shall, insofar as is necessary, execute all documents necessary to facilitate the sale of the Town E property.
11.The father is restrained by injunction from:
(a)Physically attending upon the Town E property;
(b)Contacting the selling agent engaged by the mother for the purposes of the sale of the Town E property;
(c)Contacting any person (other than a member of the father’s family) who has expressed any interest in the purchase of the Town E property; and
(d)Taking any action to attempt to delay or frustrate the sale of the Town E property.

12.Upon the sale of the Town E property, the proceeds of sale shall be disbursed as follows:
(a)Payment of all sales costs and commissions;
(b)To discharge any mortgage or any other charges secured or registered over the Town E property;
(c)Payment to the mother in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000) by way of partial property settlement in accordance with Order 2 made 27 March 2024;
(d)The balance to be held in the Trust Account of Camatta Lempens for and on behalf of the parties pending further order of the Court or agreement between the parties in writing.

13.Forthwith after the sale of the Town E property, the mother shall engage such accountant necessary to:
(a)Cause such accounts, taxation returns, ASIC documentation and the like to be prepared in order for the Vaughan Superannuation Fund (the "SMSF") to be brought into compliance with all requirements of the Australian Taxation Office and ASIC, as applicable;
(b)Cause to be provided to the mother and the father a copy of all such accounts of the SMSF, including, but not limited to, financial statements for the years 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024;
(c)Advise the mother and the father in writing upon the amount of net proceeds of sale of the Town E property required to be deposited into the bank account of the SMSF; and
(d)Advise in writing the mother and the father the quantum of any Capital Gains Tax liability accruing to each of them and to the SMSF as a result of the sale of the Town E property.

14.The father shall provide such documents to the accountants engaged by the mother pursuant to Order 13 as requested by them within fourteen (14) days of any such request made to the father in writing, and shall execute all documents required of him by such accountants in respect to the matters specified in Order 13(a).
15.Notwithstanding Order 12(d), the mother is authorised to pay from the funds held in the trust account of Camatta Lempens:
(a)The amount as advised by the accountants pursuant to Order 13(c), into the bank account of the SMSF; and
(b)All accounts for fees rendered by the accountants engaged by her pursuant to Order 13.

16.In the event that the father fails or neglects to sign any document or do anything necessary to give effect to the terms of these Orders the pursuant to s 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) a Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia is hereby empowered to sign such document or do such thing in the name of the Respondent as may be necessary to give effect to this Order.
17.Pursuant to r 10.27 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), the father is prohibited from taking any further step in the financial proceedings until the occurrence of the following events:
(a)The sale of the property at B Street, Suburb C in the State of South Australia (“the Suburb C property”);
(b)The disclosure by the father to the solicitors for the mother, Camatta Lempens, of a copy of the Settlement Statement in respect to the sale of the Suburb C property; and
(c)The deposit by the father of all the proceeds of the sale of the Suburb C property into the Trust Account of Camatta Lempens, solicitors for the mother.

HARMFUL PROCEEDINGS
18.Pursuant to s 102QAC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) the father is prohibited, without leave of the Court, from instituting proceedings under the Act in any court having jurisdiction under the Act, against or in relation to the mother.
19.Should the father seek leave to institute proceedings pursuant to s 102QAE of the Act, the mother is NOT to be notified:
(a)That an application has been made; and/or
(b)Dismissed by this Honourable Court.

PROCEDURAL
20.The proceedings be listed for mention and case management on a date to be fixed following the publication of the Family Report ordered on 28 February 2025.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Vaughan & Vaughan has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KARI J:
INTRODUCTION

The substantive proceedings between the parties concern the question of property settlement together with parenting arrangements for the parties’ five children.
The substantive proceedings have stalled significantly as a result of interlocutory disputes that have arisen.
These reasons concern four distinct topics which are the subject of interlocutory proceedings. Those interlocutory proceedings have consumed a significant amount of court time, which has been disproportionate to the substantive issues in dispute in these proceedings. Those four topics are:
(a)Parenting arrangements for the children subsequent to orders made by the Court on 28 February 2025;
(b)Financial relief subsequent to orders fist made by the Court on 27 March 2024;
(c)Applications pertaining to the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) culminating in an application by the father to have the ICL discharged; and
(d)The question of whether a harmful proceedings order ought be made in relation to the father within the meaning of s 102QAC(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
Orders shall be made in relation to each topic which ostensibly provide for:
(a)A slight variation of the parenting orders made 28 February 2025;
(b)The sale of real property at Town E to facilitate the mother receiving the payment by way of partial property settlement, pursuant to orders first made on 27 March 2024;
(c)Dismissal of the applications made by the father concerning the ICL and otherwise uplifting the Notice to Admit the father served on the ICL; and
(d)A harmful proceedings order directed to the father.
These reasons are to be read together with the reasons and orders made on 28 February 2025 (Vaughan & Vaughan (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 129). As shall be discussed throughout these reasons:
(a)Parenting orders were made that day, which are the subject of further applications; and
(b)Financial orders were not made that day, despite financial proceedings being before the Court, as a result of an application by the mother to re-open the proceedings.
From the outset, I again comment with concern as to the state of these proceedings, much as I did in the reasons published 28 February 2025 (at [20]-[22]). These issues are raised because they in large part ground the Court’s concerns and the reasons for the making of the harmful proceedings order directed to the father.
The court file now consists of 225 filed documents. This is an extraordinary volume of documents generally, but specifically in circumstances where the proceedings have not progressed out of interlocutory warfare towards a final hearing. I observe that 40 additional documents have been filed in the proceedings and ten sets of orders have been published since the reasons delivered 28 February 2025. I lamented in those earlier reasons (much as Judge Dickson did in reasons she published on 27 March 2024) that the proceedings were likely to be having a deleterious impact on the parties, their finances and their co-parenting relationship (at [20]). It is now my apprehension that the conduct of the litigation since that time, particularly by the father is very likely to have been entirely ruinous upon any prospect of a functional co-parenting relationship.
When regard is had to the costs notice filed by the mother on 1 July 2025, it is evident that the mother has incurred significant legal costs. The mother’s costs presently total $278,669, of which only a nominal amount has been paid by her. When the current tranche of interlocutory proceedings were first heard in November 2024, the mother’s costs were $219,384 (mother’s costs notice filed 27 November 2024). In short, the mother has incurred the eye watering sum of approximately $60,000 on these interlocutory proceedings since that hearing. More shall be said about this issue later in these reasons.
CONDUCT OF THE HEARINGS ON 9 MAY 2025 AND 2 JULY 2025
From the outset I record that the conduct of the recent hearings in these proceedings on 9 May and 2 July 2025 was striking so far as the conduct of the father is concerned.
This is because the father was determined not to have the Court engage with him and raise concerns with him in order that he address them during his submissions.
Instead, at both hearings, at the insistence of the father and given the option of how the hearing was to be conducted, the father requested that I sit “mute” during his submissions. Unfortunately, however, this was not at all helpful in understanding the father’s position. This is because his submissions, were more akin to a soliloquy of unvarnished and often non-sensical complaints, rhetorical questions, and statements, with little connection to the issues in dispute.
Importantly, however, I record that at the hearing on 2 July 2025 the Court took the time not only to explain the process of the hearing, the issues to be determined, but in addition where necessary interrupted the father’s submissions to give him the opportunity to address the relevant legal principles.
In addition, at the hearing on 2 July 2025, the father acknowledged that all of the communications before the Court (some of which is referred to in detail throughout these reasons) is an accurate record of the communications written by him and exchanged between the relevant players.
PARENTING
Introduction
The parenting aspect of these reasons relates to four separate interlocutory parenting applications made by the father regarding the parties’ five children; albeit that no orders are sought in relation to the eldest of the five children in circumstances where she is 16 years of age and not currently living with either of the parents.
The parenting orders made on 28 February 2025 provided for the children to spend supervised time with the father at the “on-site unsupervised” service operated by the FF Children's Contact Centre at Suburb R (Order 1). In addition, an order was made for the preparation of a Family Report (Order 5).
As the reasons of 28 February 2025 bear out, the Court considered that these arrangements best promoted the safety of the children, and ought be in place until any final hearing in the proceedings (at [107]), when all of the evidence could be tested, including that of any expert.
The father sought to appeal the parenting orders made on 28 February 2025, however he did not comply with the timeframe for doing so. As a result, on 31 March 2025, the father filed an Application in an Appeal seeking an extension of time in which to appeal some, but not all, of the orders made 28 February 2025. The Application in an Appeal was summarily dismissed by the Appeal Judicial Registrar on 15 April 2025 (together with an Application in an Appeal in which an extension of time was sought to appeal costs orders made in the proceedings on 18 September 2024.)
Inexplicably, and despite these events the father has filed four separate additional interlocutory parenting applications since the orders made 28 February 2025. The main focus of these applications has been the father’s pursuit of unsupervised time spending with the children on terms he dictates. However, the question of the father spending unsupervised time with the children was the subject of the father’s earlier interlocutory applications before the Court and was determined by the orders made on 28 February 2025. Other than the “on-site unsupervised” service provided for in those orders no longer being available, nothing has changed since the making of the orders on 28 February 2025 so as to warrant the Court being satisfied that the risk factors identified by the Court in the reasons delivered 28 February 2025, have changed and/or been ameliorated.

The Court observed in the reasons delivered 28 February 2025 (at [91]):
… At this juncture however, and given the interlocutory nature of the proceedings and the inability to make findings without the evidence of the parties and any expert being tested (as would occur at a final hearing), and in the absence of tangible evidence supporting the Court adopting a different approach, the Court shall continue to afford the opinions of the Court Child Expert some significant weight, and err on the side of caution with respect to the parenting arrangements for these children, as has been the case to date by each judicial officer that has grappled with the complex dynamic of this family.
As discussed in the reasons delivered 28 February 2025, the Court held significant concerns about risk factors presented by both parents. However, on balance, the Court was of the view that the risks posed by the father were such that they could only be ameliorated by orders for the supervision of his time with the children.
Documents before the Court for the purposes of the parenting applications
The father relied on the following documents for the purposes of the current tranche of parenting applications:
(a)Notice to Admit directed to the mother and filed by the father on 27 March 2025;
(b)Notice to Admit directed to the ICL and filed by the father on 1 April 2025;
(c)His Application in a Proceeding sealed 8 April 2025;
(d)His affidavit filed 4 April 2025;
(e)His Application in a Proceeding sealed 16 April 2025;
(f)His affidavit filed 15 April 2025;
(g)His Application in a Proceeding sealed 8 May 2025;
(h)His affidavit filed 2 May 2025;
(i)His Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 5 May 2025;
(j)His affidavit filed 5 May 2025;
(k)His Application in a Proceeding sealed 6 June 2025
(l)His affidavit filed 2 June 2025;
(m)The Outline of Case document filed by the father on 20 June 2025;
(n)The written submissions filed by the father on 30 June 2025; and
(o)His affidavit handed to the Court at the commencement of the hearing on 2 July 2025 and subsequently filed.
The mother relied on the following documents for the purposes of the current parenting applications:
(a)Notice Disputing a Fact or Document filed by the mother on 2 April 2025;
(b)The written submissions filed by the mother on 16 April 2025;
(c)Her Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 16 May 2025;
(d)Her affidavit filed 16 May 2025;
(e)The written submissions filed by the mother on 20 June 2025; and
(f)Her Costs Notice filed 1 July 2025.
The ICL relied on the following documents for the purposes of the current parenting applications:
(a)The affidavit of the ICL filed 2 April 2025;
(b)Application in a Proceeding filed by the ICL on 9 April 2025;
(c)The affidavit of the ICL filed 9 April 2025;
(d)The Case Outline filed by the ICL on 16 April 2025;
(e)The affidavit of the ICL filed on 30 May 2025;
(f)The affidavit of the ICL filed on 2 June 2025;
(g)The Outline of Case Document filed by the ICL on 20 June 2025; and
(h)The Costs Notice filed by the ICL on 2 July 2025.
Events which have taken place since the Orders of 28 February 2025
To understand the applications that have been filed by the father since the orders of 28 February 2025 and the discussion that follows, something first needs to be understood about the events that have unfolded since that time. I have attempted to pull together the events in focussed topics, to try and make sense of the voluminous material that has been filed. My failure to refer to any specific document filed should not be taken as a failure to consider that document. Rather, all of the material filed in the parenting proceedings since the orders made 28 February 2025 has been considered.
Time Spending, the children’s extracurricular activities
There appear to be two distinct topics which are the primary focus of the father’s interlocutory parenting applications:
(a)Firstly, his time spending with the children; and
(b)Secondly, issues pertaining to the children’s participation in extracurricular activities.
On 2 April 2025 the ICL filed an affidavit in which he variously annexed communications between himself and the Children’s Contact Service (“the contact service”) setting out the enquiries made by the ICL as to the progress of the father’s time spending with the children following the orders of 28 February 2025. It is apparent from documents annexed to that affidavit that the contact service advised the ICL that the father’s time spending had ceased by 21 March 2025, with the service advising that there was no “capacity” for the service to offer further visits.
In the father’s affidavit filed 4 April 2025, the father annexed various communications between the parties. Of significance regarding the father’s time spending with the children, the father annexed correspondence from the mother’s solicitors to himself and the ICL on 26 March 2025 in which the mother’s solicitors identified that they were making enquiries of “other contact centres in the area, as to their availability for unsupervised visits, and also the potential for change over services, if available” (Annexure “MRV6” to the father’s affidavit filed 4 April 2025).
The father’s affidavit sealed 4 April 2025 also served as a vehicle for the father to raise his concerns about the children’s lack of enrolment and continuation of their respective extracurricular sporting activities.
In the father’s affidavit filed 2 May 2025 the father annexed a letter from the mother’s solicitor to the father and the ICL dated 9 April 2025 (Annexure “MRV2” to the father’s affidavit filed 2 May 2025) in which on behalf of the mother:
(a)An open offer was made proposing that the father spend unsupervised time with the children each alternate Saturday from 2.30 pm until 5.00 pm with handover to occur at the OO Children's Contact Centre.
(b)They identified that there was a four week wait time before the supervised handover service could be utilised following enrolment.
(c)They identified that the mother had enrolled the children Y and Z in netball at their previous clubs.
(d)They identified that the mother had enrolled the child “[X]” in playing tennis to meet his expressed desire to her that he play tennis.
In the affidavit filed by the ICL on 30 May 2025, the ICL relevantly annexed communications he had received from the father. On the topic of the children’s extracurricular activities, and presumably in response to the mother’s letter of offer dated 9 April 2025, the father set out:
The children would have never indicated they did not want to play sport, the mother is falsely represented they did.
I will arrange for [X] to play soccer, upon checking with the tennis coach given I trust nothing now the abusive child says to her children or anyone else, and instruct the soccer club to contact me direct and to send me the invoices.
What sort of disgusting mother lies to her children to cover her abusive agenda?
I will
(As per the original)
(Annexure “ICL-13” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025)
By her affidavit filed 16 May 2025 the mother variously deposed:
(a)She had made an offer to the father by letter dated 9 April 2025 that he spend two and a half hours with the children each alternate weekend in a supervised setting – however when regard is had to this letter it can be seen that the offer is for unsupervised time spending with handovers to occur at the OO Children's Contact Centre.
(b)She has no intention of relocating the children overseas.
(c)The child V is living independently with friends and is employed as an apprentice.
(d)The child X is enrolled to play tennis as he does not wish to play soccer this year, and that she cannot afford to pay both soccer and tennis fees due to the lack of child support paid by the father.
(e)The children Y and Z are enrolled to play netball at their previous club, at which the father was banned from attending courtside.
In the father’s affidavit filed 2 June 2025, he annexed a series of communications between the parties regarding time spending. When regard is had to the same it appears that:
(a)In early 2025, the mother made an offer to the father that he sped time with the children as a one-off occasion to celebrate the children Y and Z’s birthdays in early 2025 between 12 noon and 2.00 pm, with the time to take place inside McDonalds at Suburb R (Annexure “MRV2” to the father’s affidavit filed 2 June 2025).
(b)The father declined this request that same day, and instead proposed time take place at the OO Children’s Contact Service (Annexure “MRV3” to the father’s affidavit filed 2 June 2025). The father concluded his response with the following missive:
Be under no doubt if I am not given access this weekend with a proper supervised handover at the [OO Children’s Contact Centre] then I will seek to take further legal steps including a fresh application and a Notice of Child Abuse and if the ICL does not agree then it is one more item to add to my long list of complaints against him which I have already necessary detail for.
(c)The mother renewed her offer for time spending at McDonalds by letter dated […] 2025 (Annexure “MRV7” to the father’s affidavit filed 2 June 2025).
(d)The father rejected this offer by email that same day at 1.50 pm (Annexure “MRV8” to the father’s affidavit filed 2 June 2025).
From the submissions heard in the hearing, it is understood that no time spending occurred between the children and the father for a birthday celebration in early 2025. It is observed, that in his communication to the mother responding to this offer in early 2025, no mention was made by the father as to whether the contact service was available for the time spending that he proposed and/or that he had made such arrangements with the service.
It is also understood that the mother’s offer for regular unsupervised time spending first made in her letter of 9 April 2025 has not been taken up by the father and this time between the children and the father has not occurred.
It would appear that in making these offers for time spending between the children and the father, the mother was attempting to broker an impasse and facilitate the children’s relationship with the father, despite the risks identified by the Court in the reasons of 28 February 2025.
The father’s communications in response to the mother’s proposals, appear nothing short of dismissive, belligerent and a vehicle to denigrate and disparage the mother. This is particularly so, when the Court understands that the father has dogmatically pursued unsupervised time spending with the children; the very thing the mother was offering. None of these matters reflect well on the father.
At the commencement of the hearing on 2 July 2025, the Court received (over the objection of the mother) an additional affidavit sworn by the father on 30 June 2025. Relevantly, the father set out that the child Y had attended his home in the week commencing 21 June 2025. The father deposes that the mother took Y to the father’s home at her request.
Father’s apprehension the mother wishes to relocate the children to New Zealand
It is apparent from the affidavit filed by the father on 15 April 2025 that he has concerns that the mother plans to relocate with the children to New Zealand.
It would appear that the genesis of the father’s concerns about the mother relocating to New Zealand lies in communications the father has had with the mother’s former boyfriend, Mr O.
By her affidavit filed 16 May 2025 the mother denied that she has any intention to relocate anywhere with the children. For present purposes, this evidence of the mother is accepted.
In the circumstances, the father’s pursuit of this topic appears entirely unwarranted.
Communications between the father and the children
By his affidavit filed 4 April 2025, the father annexes various text communications between himself and the children.
Of particular concern is a text exchange between the father and the child X on 2 March 2025 (starting at 9:39 pm) regarding the children’s club sporting commitments (Annexure “MRV3” to the father’s affidavit filed 4 April 2025). Whilst not expressing a final view about those communications, it appears that both parents have inveigled the child X into the adult dispute. This is because it appears that the mother has conveyed information to X which he has repeated to the father, and otherwise the father’s comments to X in the text exchange are entirely derogatory of the mother and appear to leave nothing to X’s imagination as to the negative views the father holds towards the mother. That communication is set out in full:
FROM [X] TO THE FATHER: FROM THE FATHER TO [X]:
The girls are not playing netball anymore and I’m also not playing soccer this season
I am sorry [X] for you and the girls, it shouldn’t be that way.
And it doesn’t have to be.
Why has your mother made that decision?
Mum said because of your action
What action?
She has made that decision, no-one else.
You suing everybody apparently
So she is punishing you, it is called child abuse.
That is what she is doing. She is angry with me and is taking it out on all of you.
Mum saying you doing the same thing
Her friends are not children
As I said if they did nothing wrong then the judge will throw the book at me.
She said what […] do to you
Oh so let’s punish my children because a friend is upset.
She said no your punishing us
She is the one stopping you playing sport.
She said no your are because your not paying matenance
Didn’t allow you to play tennis
She said mum can’t be in the same place at once
Oh so another excuse
Okay
I am more than happy to take you or girls to your sporting activities.
Mum said your not allowed to since you upset the icl
But she doesn’t allow it, you might ask her why
Mum said it’s not her decision
Lie
I’m feeling tired dad I’m going to bed night dad
Night [X]
(As per the original)
On 25 March 2025 the father sent an email to the mother’s solicitor and the ICL regarding his text exchange the previous evening with X (presumably on 24 March 2025); albeit the Court does not appear to have a copy of that text exchange, and it is not clear whether is it the same text exchange referred to above or whether there was an entirely different text exchange between the father and X regarding the children’s extracurricular sporting activities.
In that email communication the father makes derogatory remarks about the mother but additionally inflammatory and disrespectful to comments directed to the legal representatives. That communication from the father to the mother’s solicitor reads:
Text messages with [X] last night shows the depth of depravity this pathetic mentally sick individual will go to punish the children because she is upset with me.
Don’t waste your client’s money responding with a letter that tries to explain away the evidence.
I strongly suggest the Mother immediately enrol the children in Soccer and Netball, she has told them they can’t play because of me.
I remind you of the first Notice to Admit whether the Mother acknowledged the importance of [X] playing sport.
No point in expecting the ICL to act at this juncture is there.
I am preparing fresh Notices to Admit including one to be served on the ICL, a written complaint to the Chief Justice, an appeal, updated financial statement and a fresh application for both parenting and property.
So go ahead see how not responding to this disgusting abuse immediately works for both of you.
(As per the original)
(Annexure “MRV5” to the father’s affidavit filed 4 April 2025)
Child Support
In the father’s affidavit filed 4 April 2025, he annexed a copy of a communication from the mother’s solicitor to himself and the ICL dated 26 March 2025 (referred to earlier in these reasons). In addition to the matters already referred to in that communication, the mother additionally put the ICL and the father on notice that the mother was not receiving child support from the father for the children and that she had not received any child support for “a considerable period of time”. As such, the mother indicated that she was not in a position to fund the children’s extracurricular sporting activities.
The father responded to this communication shortly thereafter in the following terms:
Your client is a pathetic deceitful liar!
Her disgusting excuses for stopping them playing sport changed multiple times in a matter of minutes and I will be exhibiting [X's] SMS’s the other night.
I am paying child support, I am a few weeks late this month because money is tight at the moment but will pay this Friday when have a couple of settlements.
Your offer to help pay the cost of cleaning up the house from settlement proceeds now IS OF NO ASSISTANCE WHEN I AM PAYING THE MONEY OUT NOW.
I WILL PAY FOR THE CHILDREN SPORTING ACTIVITIES AND NOT PAY OTHER BILLS BUT GIVEN YOUR A CLIENT IS A DISGUSTING LIAR WHO LOVES PLAYING THE VICTIM AND WANTS EVERYONE TO FEEL SORRY FOR HER there is absolutely no way I will pay her but instant I will pay the clubs direct.
You have until COB 27/03/2025 to accept this offer.
ICL WHY DON”T YOU ACTUALLY DO SOMETHING ON THIS ISSUE, YOU HAVE DONE NOTHING FOR MONTHS IN BREACH OF YOUR PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
YOU HAVE TAKEN NINE MONTHS TO GET AROUND ORGANISING TO SEE THE KIDS!
RESIGN.
(As per the original)
(Annexure “MRV7” to the father’s affidavit filed 4 April 2025)
This communication by the father is abhorrent, leaving the reader in no doubt as to his derogatory views of the mother. Moreover, the communication stands as an acknowledgement in the father’s own words as to his failure to meet his child support obligations at all, or in a timely manner.
During the hearing, the father confirmed that he is presently in arrears of child support.
Meeting between the ICL and the children
It is apparent that on 16 and/or 17 April 2025 the ICL met with the children.
The father is disparaging of the ICL for not informing him or the Court as to the outcome of that meeting.
What the father fails to appreciate however, is that the ICL is not bound to inform the Court, and by inference the parties, of any of his discussions with the children (s 68LA(6) of the Act).
Accordingly, any criticisms that the father makes for not informing either himself, the mother or the Court about his meetings with the children is entirely baseless and unwarranted.
Notices to Admit filed by the father
On 27 March 2025, the father filed a Notice to Admit directed to the mother.
The mother responded with a Notice Disputing a Fact or Document on 2 April 2025, in which she essentially denied or claimed as irrelevant, or vague almost the entirety of that Notice to Admit. The only part of the father’s Notice to Admit that the mother agreed was item 52 in which the father set out:
The Applicant [mother] has failed to keep the Respondent [father] informed of when [Y] and [Z] will be receiving the counselling the Court has ordered they receive.
In making an admission to this assertion, the mother set out:
True. The Respondent’s [father’s] behaviour has rendered it impossible for the Applicant [mother] to engage with the Respondent in any meaningful manner. The administration of this Notice to Admit to the Applicant and the contents of this Notice to Admit, evidence the Respondent’s [father’s] dysfunction, irrationality and lack of child-focus.
On 1 April 2025 the father filed a Notice to Admit directed to the ICL.
On 9 April 2025, the ICL filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking ostensibly orders to “dismiss” the Notice to Admit directed to the ICL.
In the lead up to the filing of that application by the ICL, the ICL gave notice to the father that he intended to bring such an application. In response to this notice, the father sent various email communications to the ICL. Again, those communications by the father were abhorrent, and they are replete with ridicule and baseless criticisms. Those communications from the father shall be set out, to understand the gravamen of the Court’s concerns.

The first email the father sent was on 7 April 2025 (Annexure “ICL-2” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 9 April 2025), in which the father set out:
ICL
. know why you take every step in these proceedings, the hidden agenda behind it is immediately clear to me and provides further evidence of your bias.
Of course you would highlight the need for the transcript of an all day hearing knowing full well that likely will be unaffordable and so this is your attempt to damage my appeal prospects.
Given this is the ICL attitude, you have forced me to issue a further Notice to Admit on the other parties where I will go into detail of what happened in the proceedings.
Any party that does not fulfill their obligations in answering the Notice to Admit will be used as a basis to seek for them to pay or reimburse the cost of the Transcript, in part or in full.
(As per the original)
The second email the father sent was on 8 April 2025 (Annexure “ICL-4” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 9 April 2025), in which the father having received the application filed by the ICL on 8 April 2025, set out:
[Mr T]
Go your hardest, I look forward to exposing your gross incompetence including disgusting bias against the children’s father, at the highest level.
The fact you can’t simply admit to your past egregious actions and inactions says a lot at the extent of your dereliction of duties.
The facts I seek confirmation are all highly relevant to my long foreshadowed application to eject you with prejudice from the current position you hold in name only.
I will have to check the rules around the Chorley exemption, do you need to look that concept up?
(As per the original)
In response to the application of the ICL to deal with the father’s Notice to Admit, the father filed a Response on 5 May 2025, in which he sought orders to discharge the ICL. As shall be discussed further in these reasons, that application was entirely without merit.
The interlocutory applications before the Court
As earlier outlined, since the making of the interlocutory parenting orders on 28 February 2025, the father has filed four further interlocutory parenting applications.
In addition to the interlocutory parenting applications filed by the father, the ICL also filed an Application in a Proceeding on 9 April 2025. The focus of this application was to deal with a Notice to Admit that had been served on the ICL by the father on 1 April 2025.
The mother has not filed any fresh interlocutory parenting applications in her own right. She has, however, filed one Response containing the responses to the first three of the interlocutory parenting applications filed by the father.
For ease, I shall group the applications together when identifying them hereunder. I otherwise shall deal with the topics covered by the applications when determining them, as I have done earlier in these reasons.
The first application filed by the father following the orders made 28 February 2025
By his Application in a Proceeding filed 4 April 2025 (and sealed on 8 April 2025), the father seeks the following orders:
1.The Respondent Mother is to enrol [Y] and [Z] in a local netball club forthwith.
2.The Respondent is to do all things necessary to enable [Y] and [Z] to attend practice and games for the chosen netball club.
3.The Applicant Father is to take [Y] and [Z] to their netball commitments if the Respondent is unable to with handover to be at the [Suburb R] police station.
4.The Respondent must give the Applicant timely advanced notice if his assistance is required.
5.The Applicant is free to liaise with that netball club and attend the relevant netball club games.
6.The Applicant is to play that club’s fees direct to the club if the Respondent is unable to do so.
7.The Respondent is to enrol [X] in a local soccer club team forthwith.
8.The Respondent is to do all things necessary to enable [X] to attend practice and games for the relevant soccer club.
9.The Applicant is to take [X] to his soccer club commitments if the Respondent is unable to do so.
10.The Applicant is free to liaise with that soccer club and attend the relevant soccer club games.
11.The Applicant is to pay that club's fees direct to the club if the Respondent is unable to do so.
12.The Respondent is forthwith to provide SIM cards to [Y] and [Z] for their mobile phones.
13.The Respondent is to allow and encourage [Y] and [Z] to communicate with the Applicant on their mobile phones.
14.The Respondent is forthwith to organise [W's] Ipad and the relevant communication software on there.
15.The Respondent is forthwith to organise counselling for [Y] and [Z] as previously ordered and to keep the Applicant informed on a timely basis of their progress.
16.The Respondent is injuncted not to prevent the children from playing sport.
17.An enforcement hearing be arranged for the Respondent’s continual breach of parenting orders.
(As per the original)
The affidavit filed by the father in support of this application is light on sworn evidence and is otherwise a vehicle to annex various communications (some of which have been referred to earlier in these reasons). Doing the best that I can to discern what evidence in that document might be directed to the orders sought by the father, it appears that the evidence is in support of the orders sought at paragraphs 1 – 12 and 16 of this application, and that there is no evidence put before the Court in relation to paragraphs 13-15 and 17.
The mother filed a Response to this application on 16 May 2025, collectively with the Response filed in relation to the second interlocutory parenting application filed by the father and shall be dealt with below.
The second application filed by the father following the orders made 28 February 2025
By his Application in a Proceeding sealed 16 April 2025, the father sought the following orders:
1.This Application be urgently heard.
2.The Applicant mother is injuncted not to travel overseas with the children.
3.The Applicant mother is injuncted not to relocate the children outside of the Adelaide greater metropolitan area.
4.The Applicant mother is injuncted not to travel interstate with the children without the prior approval of this Court.
(As per the original)
Again, the father’s affidavit filed in support of that application is light on sworn evidence and otherwise serves as a vehicle to attach documents the father seemingly considered supported the making of the orders he sought. In this instance the father deposed to one of the children advising him at a recent contact centre visit that the mother was taking the children on a trip to the United States without his approval and consent. The father otherwise annexed to that affidavit a copy of an email exchange between the father and the mother’s former partner, Mr O, in which Mr O advised the father that the mother was intending on taking the children to New Zealand to live as she has “a ridiculous fantasy of being with a Mauri man” (Annexure “MRV1” to the father’s affidavit filed 15 April 2025).
The mother filed a Response to this second application on 16 May 2025, in which she responded to the orders sought in the father’s Application in a Proceeding filed 8 April 2025, that filed 16 April 2025, and that filed 8 May 2025. By that Response, the mother asks the Court to make the following orders:
1.That the Application in a proceeding filed by the Respondent father on 8 April 2025 be dismissed.
2.That the Application in a Proceeding filed by the Respondent father on 16 April 2025 be dismissed.
3.The children [W], [X], [Y] AND [Z] shall spend time with the Respondent father each alternate Saturday, between 2.00pm and 4.30pm unsupervised, with all handovers to occur at the [OO Children’s Contact Service] or such other location as the Applicant mother and the Respondent father agree in writing.
4.The Respondent father shall pay the costs of the Aplicant mother in respect to:
4.1The Application in a Proceeding filed by the Respondent father on 8 April 2025;
4.2 The Application in a Proceeding filed by the ICL on 8 April 2025;
4.3 The Application in a Proceeding filed by the Respondent father on 16 April 2025; and
4.4 The Application in a Proceeding filed by the Respondent father on 8 May 2025
5.In accordance with the Court Scale and fixed in such amounts as the Court thinks fit, payable within 30 days of the conclusion of these proceedings.
6.Such further or other orders as the Court thinks fit.
(As per the original)
The third application filed by the father following the orders made 28 February 2025
By his Application in a Proceeding sealed 8 May 2025, the father sought the following orders:
1.The children except [V] to spend 4 hours each weekend unsupervised off-site time with the Father with handover to take place at the [OO Children’s Contact Centre].
2.After six such visits unless the other parties make applications to the contrary then time spent will increase to full day an overnight with the father.
(As per the original)
The affidavit of the father filed in support of this application on 2 May 2025 is again brief on the evidence deposed by the father and otherwise again serves as a vehicle for the father to annex documents in particular email exchanges between the father and Mr O.
In addition, the father’s affidavit annexes a long email sent by the father to the Court’s “Customer Service” setting out a lengthy and detailed complaint about the Court Child Expert, Ms P (Annexure “MRV3” to the father’s affidavit filed 2 May 2025).
The fourth application filed by the father following the orders made 28 February 2025
By his Application in a Proceeding sealed 6 June 2025, the father sought the following orders:
1.The following order be made in Chambers on unless any party objects by filing a Response to this Application by 4pm on 5 June 2025.
2.The children [W], [X], [Y] and [Z] commencing 7 June 2025 and continuing thereon fortnightly shall spend time with the Respondent father unsupervised between 2:00pm and 4:30pm, will all handovers to occur at the [OO Children’s Contact Service].
(As per the original)
The mother has not filed a formal response to this application.
The interlocutory application filed by the ICL
As earlier identified, on 1 April 2025 the father served a Notice to Admit upon the ICL.
By that document the father set out in 94 separate paragraphs, allegations against the ICL and otherwise his assertions/submissions as to a range of matters.
It is not necessary to set out the entirety of this document. The document however is of little assistance to the Court as it simply contains the father’s perceptions as against factual contentions which are capable of being accepted by the Court. Importantly the statements made by the father are not ones which are capable of being accepted by the ICL. The first 12 paragraphs are exemplary of the entire document and these observations of the Court, and accordingly are set out:
1.The ICL in its oral submissions in Court has never acknowledged the intervention order placed against the mother not to commit family violence against the children in the form of discouraging them having a relationship with their children.
2.The ICL has failed in its written submissions to acknowledge that fact either.
3.The Court Child expert report makes no allowance when weighing up the childrens testimony to the expert of the fact the Court deemed necessary an injunction against the mother not to commit family violence.
4.The ICL has failed to acknowledge that fact.
5.The ICL has failed to acknowledge that fact due to its bias against the children having a relationship with the father.
6.The ICL in its submissions to date has taken no account in the orders it seeks to of the risk of the children staying with the mother given that injunction.
7.The ICL when weighing up the risk of the children having contact with their father has not factored the reduction in risk in the children not spending time with their mother
8.The ICL has not adequately take into account the importance of the children having a relationship with the non-custodial parent.
9.The LSC upon being first being engaged by the Court as the ICL contacted the father and requested an upfront payment of more than $8,000.00.
10.The LSC in that communication by any unbiased reading of it implied that payment was required for the ICL to take the matter on.
11.The Father did not make that payment due to has he stated at the time his financial position.
12.The ICL was annoyed by the father's refusal and this showed in a bias in its actions since against the children having a relationship with their father.
…
(As per the original)
By the Application in a Proceeding filed by the ICL on 9 April 2025, the ICL now seeks the following orders in relation to the father’s Notice to Admit filed 1 April 2025:
1.That the Notice to Admit served by the respondent father upon the Independent Children’s Lawyer on 1 April 2025 be dismissed.
2.The Court do declare that the ICL’s refusal to respond to the respondent father’s Notice to Admit does not mean that any facts are admitted by such refusal.
3.That the respondent father be restrained and hereby injuncted from issuing further Notices to Admit upon the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
4.That the respondent father pays the costs incurred by the Independent Children’s Lawyer incidental to this application.
The father filed a Response to this application on 5 May 2025. By that Response the father seeks the following orders:
1.Application in the Proceeding filed by the ICL on 9 April 2025 be dismissed.
2.The ICL [Mr T] be removed from this file.
3.The relevant professional body be informed of [Mr T’s] conduct on this file.
4.[Mr T] be personally liable for all costs incurred by the parties of and incidental with this Application.
5.In the alternative the ICL to pay all costs of the parties of and incidental to this application.
(As per the original)
By the father’s affidavit filed in support of that application the father deposed:
1.I am the Respondent in the main proceedings.
2.I first became concerned about the conduct of the ICL when the summary it prepared of the mandatory notifications received include a police report over an argument over having the television on in the lounge room but did not mention the police investigation into sexual assault on [Y] likely witnessed by the other children.
3.Almost all of the ICL conduct raises legitimate concerns about a bias against the children having a relationship with their father.
4.The ICL interviews the five children in or around 17 April 2025.
5.I have received no report from [Mr T] as how those interviews went despite requesting he do so.
6.I have in a number of emails over extended period of time asked for [Mr T] to step aside because of his obvious bias.
7.The Notice to Admit served on the ICL was of relevance to this issue.
(As per the original)
The ICL filed an affidavit directed to responding to the father’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025. That affidavit is in essence serves as a vehicle to annex a swathe of communications the ICL has variously received from the father in these proceedings, together with communications from the mother’s former partner, Mr O.
Of some importance for present purposes:
(a)There is a series of communications between the father and Court Child Services (“CCS”) regarding the preparation of the family report as ordered on 28 February 2025. The tone of these communications from the father is belligerent, intimidatory and threatening, and ignores the orders of the Court made 28 February 2025 for the preparation of a report. The communications include:
(i)An email from the father to CCS dated 4 March 2025, in which he set out:
To be clear
I will strongly object to the previous court child expert being appointed to perform the task given her apprehended bias against me and the logical and factual errors in her report which were all highly prejudicial to me as well as the way it was conducted.
I will be likely to appeal the recent decision and your failure to provide the sought assurance will be another grounds of appeal of the orders.
(As per the original)
(Annexure “ICL-2” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025)
(ii)An email from the father to CCS dated 22 April 2025, in which he set out:
CCS National Report Admin Team
I refer to my email below and by this email the applicant solicitors have now received a copy.
I require a response within 7 days to this email, failure to do so will result in further action been taken including filing a complaint or seeking orders against the CCS.
The response may be to address my enquiries elsewhere.
Firstly I need to be in formed what are Court Child Expert [Ms P] professional qualifications, is she a psychologist or a social worker?
Her Honour Kari said if I have concerns in paragraph 113 of her recent judgment that this expert has failed to comply with her professional obligations in the preparation of the Child Impact report dated 4 August 2023, she has in multiple aspects, then the expert can be referred
by a party to the relevant professional regulatory body, well that is pretty difficult when I don't even know what her professional qualifications are.

I refer to your Family Reports FAQ which was attached in your email and in particular where it states under the heading What if I don't agree with what is written in the Family Report? and it states within you should write to the family consultant at the
address shown on your court correspondence.
I have been given no way of contacting this expert, I am assuming if a family consultant is contactable to the parties then so would a Court Child Expert. I require you within the timeframe above to provide me her contact details.
This is because I wish to access her records of the interviews, whatever form they are in, she conducted which formed the basis of her Child Impact Report released on 4 August 2023.
I require to see those records so I can determine if I will call her as a witness in the final hearing and as evidence for the complaint I will lodge against her relevant professional body.
I put the Court and the other parties on notice that I intend to have my own private professional family assessment arranged and ask if the applicant mother will cooperate in that occurring or whether I will need to seek orders, I give the applicant mother 7 days to respond indicating their position.
I can only assume the CCS team employ family consultants who are incompetent and biased based on the performance of this expert and it was too my great detriment, and to the children having an ongoing relationship with their father.
I will not make that mistake again and will not attend any interviews arranged by a family consultant appointed by the CCS unless the professional expert I appoint can also attend as an observer so that I am protected against any CCS appointed expert incompetence including bias?
Ideally I envisage there will then be a conference of experts.
I await the courtesy of an appropriately detailed response within the required timeframe….
(As per the original)
(Annexure “ICL-16” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025)
(b)On 11 March 2025 the father sent a long email to the ICL and the mother’s solicitor setting out a detailed critique of the reasons delivered 28 February 2025 (Annexure “ICL-4” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025). In the absence of a successful appeal of those orders, these criticisms are without merit, and the communication was entirely unnecessary and unhelpful.
(c)The father also forwarded to the mother’s solicitor communications in relation to proceedings in the state court referred to in the earlier orders made by Judge Dickson in early 2024 in which the father is named as the Plaintiff and the defendant is named as BB Pty Ltd (Annexure “ICL-16” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025). The message forwarding those communications reads “A warning for the other parties of what I am capable of achieving and my determination to do so”. On any view, this appears to be a threat of some sort. In that forwarded communication the father amongst other things sets out:
•…I have the supreme court of appeal the top court in sa running around like headless chickens…
•So I have progressed from appearing in the highest court in SA to attending these judges private chambers. What a privilege.
(Annexure “ICL-5” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025)
(d)The father’s various communications to the ICL and the mother’s solicitors are replete with derogatory and offensive comments seemingly intended to denigrate and/or ridicule and/or intimidate the legal representatives, including but not limited to the following examples:
(i)“I will put on the Court file as well unfortunately for you as it will hamper Tredders…” - presumably a reference to the mother’s counsel, Mr Tredrea, followed by:
Shortly I will file a Notice to Admit on the ICL which will draw all the evidence nicely of his gross incompetence including bias and lackadaisical attitude to be attached to the application for his removal which I will also be forwarding to the relevant CEO and government minister as well.
(Annexure “ICL-10” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025)
(ii)At annexure “ICL-11” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025:
It is with great pleasure ICL I serve the attached Notice to Admit on you.
I warn you not to try and avoid answering what has been put to you.
I look forward to getting the response back and analysing it.
(iii)The following email chain to the ICL (Annexure “ICL-12” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025):
…
[Mr T]
Only parties can make applications and you are a party, there is no doubt whatsoever about that as the Court records and practice show. I look forward to the ICL lodging an application as a party with an affidavit stating it is not a party. I will immediately seek to have the application struck out on that basis or alternatively seek to have a new ICL appointed as the current ICL has abandoned its position.
Delightful.
On Tue, 8 Apr 2025 at 18:56, [Mr Vaughan] […] wrote:
[Mr T]
Your bluff has failed. As though given your clear prejudice against me, which the Notice to Admit will clearly demonstrate or I will catch you out for lying, you would have given me any advance notice of filing the application.if you thought your prospects were good.
So I know you know you are on at least shaky ground.
(As per the original)
(iv)Allegations that counsel for the mother has attempted to “mislead the court” (Annexure “ICL-17” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025).
(v)The comment “…why is the Applicant mother paying for incompetent submissions which were going nowhere…” (Annexure “ICL-17” to the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025).
(e)The father has made comments throughout the communication threatening further legal proceedings and complaint processes including:
•… I will exhaust ALL legal options in enforcing these concessions [on 22 April 2025].
•Any attempt whether by this Court or a party to silence me and take my legal rights will fail, the fact alone that I will strongly resist any such attempts to disenfranchise me will be going to the High Court as a test case if necessary is a basis for such an application to be summarily dismissed.
•The applicant mothers lawyers should not be tempted by the urgings of HH for them to do her dirty work and the delightful prospect of tens of thousands of dollars in extra fees for them, to lodge such an application and the applicant mother should give the necessary instructions for them not to do so.
•[Directed to the ICL] Just wondering if you have a psychiatrist in mind that I can ask you to be referred to? I guess it wont [sic] be from the same list that you seek the court to order me to attend or anyone else you regard as being of similar ilk.
(see annexures “ICL-17” and “ICL-19” of the ICL’s affidavit filed 30 May 2025)

The father by his affidavit handed up to the Court at the hearing on 2 July 2025 annexed a series of communications between himself and the child W’s speech therapist. Presumably, the father hoped that communication might have conveyed something positive about him and/or negative about the mother and/or the speech therapist. All it has done however is serve to increase the Court’s concern about the father’s belligerent manner and threats to make reports about the professionals engaged with this family, and in particular in this instance those that support the children. What is most troubling about these communications however is that it also places W’s therapist in a precarious position, and may well lead her to cease providing support to W; something that could in no way be in W’s best interests.
Discussion
As identified earlier in these reasons, and during the hearing on 2 July 2025, other than the withdrawal of the “on-site unsupervised” service provided by the contact service, there have been no changes since the orders made 28 February 2025 so as to warrant the Court revisiting the parenting arrangements for the children.
The conduct of the father, however, since those orders were made appears to have significantly deteriorated (as discussed throughout these reasons), both in the manner that he has conducted himself in the proceedings (including as to his submissions during the hearing), and as to the communications that he has engaged in with the children, the mother’s solicitor, the ICL and the Court. This deterioration in the father’s behaviour gives rise to a significant apprehension that the father has become entrenched and that he either has an inability to understand the impact of his behaviour on others, or that he entirely understands the impact of his behaviour and proceeds regardless and/or without the ability to control his own behaviour. Whatever the case may be, the father’s conduct is deeply concerning and presents significant risks of harm to the children if they were exposed to the father’s behaviour in an unsupervised setting. This is because there would be no capacity for intervention by a professional supervisor to protect the children if the father was behaving inappropriately (including but not limited to his communications) towards or in the presence of the children.
The father’s text communications with the children (referred to earlier in these reasons) is particularly troubling. As a result, the Court holds very significant concerns about the father’s inability to shield the children from the parenting dispute, and his extreme and fixed negative views of the mother.
When taken together, all of these factors increase, rather than reduce, the Court’s concerns about the risks of harm to the children presented by the father, to that discussed in the reasons of 28 February 2025.
Time Spending
During the hearing, and whilst invited by the Court to clarify the interlocutory parenting orders that he was seeking, the father refused to do so. As a result, the Court was unclear as to exactly which orders the father was pursuing.
Where time spending with the children is concerned, this was particularly unhelpful as it is not clear to the Court whether the father is seeking four hours unsupervised time each week with the children or two and a half hours unsupervised time each fortnight; the latter being the very offer made by the mother on 9 April 2025.
The mother’s position, during the hearing was that she maintained the offer put in correspondence sent to the father on 9 April 2025; namely a period of two and a half hours unsupervised time with the children each fortnight.
During the hearing, the ICL was unable to support the orders promoted by the parties. This is because the ICL holds significant concerns about the risk factors presented by the father as identified in the reasons of 28 February 2025. In addition, the ICL considers that the father’s conduct since the making of those orders is indicative of not only the father’s entrenchment, but in addition the ICL apprehends that the risks associated with the father have increased. As earlier identified, this latter view is one which the Court presently holds on the evidence presently available.
As identified by the Court during the hearing, the court is not bound to adopt any of the proposals promoted by the parties, or indeed the ICL ((U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 at [284]–[285] and [263]), as referred to in Oberlin& Infeld (2021) FLC 94-017 at [22]).
Where there has been no amelioration of the concerns identified by the Court in the reasons delivered 28 February 2025, but rather an escalation of the concerns, there is no basis upon which the Court can now suddenly form the view that it would be in the children’s best interests to spend unsupervised time with the father. The filing of multiple applications by the father for unsupervised time spending, it having been refused by the orders made 28 February 2025, does not make the Court any more amenable to making such orders now, than it was a mere four months ago.
In the absence of any proposal for supervised time spending by the parties, the Court is left with limited options.
The Court is cognisant that the parties have exhausted the limits of services that the OO Children’s Contact Service are willing and able to provide. In the circumstances, the Court is left with little alternative but to fashion, as best it can, orders for supervised time spending in the hope that it can be arranged. Failing a service materialising, however, the Court accepts that the effect of the orders may well be that there is no time spending between the children and the father. At this stage, given the risk factors that have been identified concerning the father, this is preferrable to any ongoing and regular unsupervised time spending arrangement between the children and the father.
Accordingly, the previous parenting orders which provided for supervised time spending shall be varied to remove reference to the specific service provider and the “on-site unsupervised” arrangement. The ICL shall be directed by order to make enquiries of an available service and to thereafter liaise with the parties with a view to them each enrolling in the service for the purposes of the father’s time spending with the children.
Extra-curricular activities
As identified earlier in these reasons, the children Y and Z have now been enrolled by the mother to play club netball at their previous club. In addition, the child X has now been enrolled to play tennis.
During the hearing on 2 July 2025 the father did not cavil with these arrangements.
Accordingly, no parenting orders are necessary in this regard.
Therapy for Y and Z
The father has sought specific orders regarding therapy for the children Y and Z. As earlier identified however, he has not put on any evidence to support the making of the orders that he seeks.
By her affidavit filed 16 May 2025 the mother deposed (at paragraphs 17-18) that:
(a)Y, Z and X have all attended counselling with L Organisation.
(b)X’s counselling has concluded.
(c)Y and Z were placed on a waitlist of five months’ duration, for further counselling but have refused to attend, and instead can access a counsellor at school should they wish to do so.
In all of these circumstances, there does not appear to be a basis to make the orders promoted by the father at this stage.
Injunctions sought by the father
As identified earlier in these reasons, the father seeks a range of injunctions directed to preventing the mother from relocating the children, and seemingly from any travel.
It is the mother’s position that not only does she have no intention of relocating, but additionally she says that her financial circumstances are parlous and that she can ill afford the cost of travel, let alone relocating at least four of the children to New Zealand. This position is accepted at this stage.
Having considered all of the communications between the father and Mr O, there appears to be no proper and/or reasonable foundation for Mr O and, in turn, the father to apprehend that the mother will either travel out of Australia with the children and/or relocate them.
Accordingly, the orders and injunctions promoted by the father in this regard will not be made.
Communication between the father and the children
The father has sought a range of orders directed towards the children having mobile phones/SIM cards, and thereafter the mother facilitating the children communicating with the father.
The Court however does not consider that any such orders are in the children’s best interests. This is because to date, as evidenced by the communications between the father and the child X referred to earlier in these reasons, the father appears unable to shield the children from his extreme negative views of the mother, and/or from embroiling the children in the parental dispute.
In addition, the Court is satisfied that should the children wish to communicate with the father, the mother shall facilitate the same, as she appears to have done in the past.
W's Ipad
The father sought orders directed to ensuring that the child W has an Ipad.
This is a topic about which the Court held some concerns previously, and in particular as to the mother making the device available to W for the purposes of his time spending with the father.
However, when regard is had to the letter from W's Speech Pathologist annexed to the mother’s affidavit filed 16 May 2025 (Annexure “MSV4”), it would appear that the extent to which W relies upon this device may have previously been misunderstood and/or exaggerated. Significantly, W's Speech Pathologist identifies that he does not use the iPad “spontaneously… to communicate needs, wants or for social interaction”. Rather the device is used “when prompted” to “say hello, wave goodbye” and otherwise with assistance to recognise photos to choose snacks after school, engage in stories and “to express his understanding of what’s happening by picture matching (photos of the story)”.
In addition, when regard is had to the communications between the father and W’s speech pathologist annexed to the father’s affidavit handed to the Court on 2 July 2025, it does not appear that the speech pathologist raises any concerns about W’s access to an iPad and/or the mother facilitating his needs in that regard.
As a result, it does not appear that any parenting orders are necessary to regulate this issue.
Conclusion
For all of the reasons discussed, the only parenting orders that shall be made are those amendments to Order 1 made 28 February 2025..
Orders shall otherwise be made dismissing all extant applications for parenting orders.
APPLICATIONS RELATING TO THE ICL
I have already discussed the applications of each the ICL and the father stemming from the Notice to Admit filed by the father and directed to the ICL.
In determining this topic, the Court has had regard to all of those documents referred to earlier in these reasons regarding the applications for parenting orders.
The application of the ICL to deal with the Notice to Admit filed by the father
It is the position of the ICL that because the ICL is not a party to the proceedings, the ICL cannot be served with a Notice to Admit. These submissions are accepted for the following reasons.
Firstly, Part 8.1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”) sets out the procedure for Admissions. Relevantly, r 8.01 sets out that a Notice to Admit can be served on a “party” to proceedings.
Secondly, the Court has long held that an ICL is not a party to parenting proceedings (Re JJT; Ex parte Victoria Legal Aid (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 207 and 225–226).
In all of these circumstances I am satisfied that there is no basis for a Notice to Admit directed to the ICL to be served and/or filed. Moreover, I consider that doing so is an abuse of process, as is using the ICL’s refusal to respond as a basis for filing an application to have the ICL discharged.
Leaving aside the fundamental flaws already identified with the substance of the Notice to Admit which would have properly grounded orders uplifting the same from the court file, an order shall be made uplifting the Notice to Admit filed by the father and directed to the ICL.
The father’s application to have the ICL “removed” & associated orders
The basis of the father’s application to have the ICL “removed” is unclear. At best the Court understands that the father considers that the ICL is in some way biased against him, and/or has not executed the role of ICL diligently.
Giving the best possible gloss to the Notice to Admit filed by the father on 1 April 2025 directed to the ICL, the Court shall, for the purposes of these reasons, treat this document as the father’s submissions in support of his application to have the ICL removed.
The Court certainly has the power to discharge the appointment of an ICL (Lim & Zong (2021) FLC 94-048 at [17] (“Lim & Zong”).
In Holinski & Holinski [2025] FedCFamC1F 143 (at [13]) Riethmuller J identified:
In Lloyd & Lloyd and Child Representative (2000) FLC 93-045, Holden CJ listed circumstances likely to form a basis for discharging an ICL, saying (at [11]):
(i)if there is evidence that the separate representative had, in any way, acted contrary to the children's interests;
(ii)if there is evidence before the Court that the separate representative had acted incompetently in a professional sense;
(iii) if it is apparent that the separate representative has demonstrated a lack of professional objectivity; or
(iv) if to continue to act would involve a breach of a fiduciary duty or a conflict of interest.
Similarly, Tree J in Lim & Zong (at [21]), set out the factors which might inform the Court exercising discretion to discharge the appointment of an ICL in the following terms:
•It is not inconsistent with the independent and professional discharge of an Independent Children's Lawyer’s obligations for her or him to advocate that a particular course of action adverse to, or inconsistent with, the position of a party, ought be taken by the court;
•Whilst in a unique position, the Independent Children's Lawyer owes the same professional obligations to the Court as does any licenced legal practitioner;
•On occasion, the Independent Children's Lawyer will be in an invidious position, but nonetheless they should be no less courageous, no less firm and no less cogent, in advocating for results or findings;
•Inevitably the role of the Independent Children's Lawyer involves an exercise of professional judgment which may, on occasion, be precarious and difficult;
•It is not appropriate for a litigant to endeavour to micro-manage the Independent Children's Lawyer, or critique every step that they take;
•It is certainly not the case that, even if an Independent Children's Lawyer does make a mistake, the Court will necessarily accede to an application to have them discharged. Significantly more than that is required;
•It is inevitable that the high standards of competence which the Court expects of Independent Children's Lawyers are not always met. Independent Children's Lawyers are, like anybody, liable to human frailty;
•A court should be slow to discharge an Independent Children's Lawyer on the basis of largely unsubstantiated complaints of one of the parties.
(Footnotes omitted)
The duties of an ICL are set out in s 68LA of the Act, which provides:
General nature of role of independent children’s lawyer
(2)       The independent children’s lawyer must:
(a) form an independent view, based on the evidence available to the independent children’s lawyer, of what is in the best interests of the child; and
(b) act in relation to the proceedings in what the independent children’s lawyer believes to be the best interests of the child.
(3) The independent children’s lawyer must, if satisfied that the adoption of a particular course of action is in the best interests of the child, make a submission to the court suggesting the adoption of that course of action.
(4)       The independent children’s lawyer:
(a)       is not the child’s legal representative; and
(b) is not obliged to act on the child’s instructions in relation to the proceedings.
Specific duties of independent children’s lawyer
(5)       The independent children’s lawyer must:
(a)       act impartially in dealings with the parties to the proceedings; and
(b) ensure that any views expressed by the child in relation to the matters to which the proceedings relate are fully put before the court; and
(c) if a report or other document that relates to the child is to be used in the proceedings:
(i) analyse the report or other document to identify those matters in the report or other document that the independent children’s lawyer considers to be the most significant ones for determining what is in the best interests of the child; and
(ii) ensure that those matters are properly drawn to the court’s attention; and
(d) endeavour to minimise the trauma to the child associated with the proceedings; and
(e) facilitate an agreed resolution of matters at issue in the proceedings to the extent to which doing so is in the best interests of the child.
Requirement to meet with the child and give the child the opportunity to express their views
(5A) Subject to subsection (5B), the independent children’s lawyer must perform the following duties (not necessarily at the same time):
(a)       meet with the child;
(b) provide the child with an opportunity to express any views in relation to the matters to which the proceedings relate.
Note: A person cannot require a child to express the child’s views in relation to any matter (see section 60CE).
(5AA) The independent children’s lawyer has discretion in relation to the following matters (subject to any order or direction of the court with respect to the matter, for example under paragraph 68L(2)(b) or paragraph (5D)(b) of this section):
(a)       when, how often and how meetings with the child take place;
(b) when, how often and how the child is provided with an opportunity to express views.
(5B)     The independent children’s lawyer is not required to perform a duty if:
(a)       the child is under 5 years of age; or
(b)the child does not want to meet with the independent children’s lawyer, or express their views (as the case requires); or
(c) there are exceptional circumstances that justify not performing the duty.
(5C) Without limiting paragraph (5B)(c), exceptional circumstances for the purposes of that paragraph include that performing the duty, would:
(a) expose the child to a risk of physical or psychological harm that cannot be safely managed; or
(b)       have a significant adverse effect on the wellbeing of the child.
(5D) If the independent children’s lawyer proposes not to perform a duty because of paragraph (5B)(c), the court must do the following before making final orders:
(a) determine whether it is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist that justify not performing the duty;
(b) if the court determines that those circumstances do not exist—make an order requiring the independent children’s lawyer to meet with the child or provide the child with an opportunity to express their views (as the case requires).
Note: The court may also make such other orders it considers necessary to secure the independent representation of the child’s interests (see paragraph 68L(2)(b)).
Disclosure of information
(6)       Subject to subsection (7), the independent children’s lawyer:
(a)       is not under an obligation to disclose to the court; and
(b)       cannot be required to disclose to the court;
any information that the child communicates to the independent children’s lawyer.
(7) The independent children’s lawyer may disclose to the court any information that the child communicates to the independent children’s lawyer if the independent children’s lawyer considers the disclosure to be in the best interests of the child.
(8) Subsection (7) applies even if the disclosure is made against the wishes of the child.

(Footnotes omitted)

By way of update, the father discloses in his financial statement filed 7 May 2025:
(a)His only source of income is an amount of $800 per week from an unidentified “business/partnership/company/trust’, together with an amount of $38 per week from a “share farmer” who leases the “[Town E] blocks”.
(b)His combined expenses far exceed his income and total $1,078.50 (excluding any Part N expenses with the father not even including that part of the form).
(c)His 50 per cent share of each of the Town E blocks are listed as valued at $100,000 and $200,000 respectively, a total value of $105,000 less than the value recorded in the “husband’s value” column at item 2 of the balance sheet outlined in her Honour’s judgment at [48].
(d)The father’s bank account now only has a balance of $500, a total of $22,900 less than the balance recorded in her Honour’s judgment at item 6.
(e)The two motor vehicles, which now appear to be agreed at the value of $8,000 rather than $9,000.
(f)The balance of the Vaughan Superannuation Fund now being $135,000, an increase of approximately $34,000.
(g)With respect to liabilities, the home loan for the Suburb C property, the credit cards, the Loan with AA Company, the purported personal loan from Ms U and the costs arising from the Supeme Court judgment are not listed on the father’s financial statement. The father lists only two liabilities being “SA WATER, REVENUESA, COUNCILS, LOAN FOR LISTING OF PROPERTY” at $10,000 and “ATO, LAND TITLES OFFICE, PLANNING CONSULTANT” at $25,000. Curiously, the total value of the liabilities is recorded as $358,000. It is unclear which liabilities this total relates to and the respective value of each liability.
The issues now falling for determination
In summary, the principal financial relief now pressed by the mother is that the Town E blocks be sold. It appears that the mother wishes to satisfy the orders for the payment of $50,000 to her pursuant to Order 2 made 27 March 2024 from the sale of the Town E blocks, but in addition the mother asks the Court to disburse the additional sum of $50,000 to each of the parties by way of partial property settlement from the proceeds of the sale of the Town E blocks.
The father opposes any application for the sale of the Town E blocks, and despite his applications before the Court, as best can be discerned from his response to a question posed of him during the hearing on 2 July 2025, he suggests that the mother ought wait until the mortgagee sale of the Suburb C property for the payment of $50,000 to made to her.
As earlier identified, at the hearing on 9 May 2025, the father submitted in opposition to the orders sought by the mother for the sale of the Town E blocks, that the “[Lot 2]” be transferred to the mother to do with as she pleases and that the father either personally or that the self-managed superannuation fund retain the “[Lot 1]”. This however was not the position advanced by the father when he filed his Amended Response on 27 May 2025 (annexed to the father’s affidavit filed 23 May 2025).
Whatever the position of the father now is (that advanced at the hearing on 9 May 2025, or that contained in the Amended Response “placed on the court file”), the father has put no cogent evidence before the Court capable of satisfying the Court with any certainty as to how the Town E blocks are held (for example no certificates of title and/or financial statements for the self-managed superannuation fund evidencing which block is held by the superannuation fund and which is not), and his Financial Statement filed 7 May 2025 is of no assistance in this regard. Indeed, at the hearing on 9 May 2025 the father could not, when asked, identify which of the Town E blocks is the “[Lot 1]” and which is the “[Lot 2]”. The father seemingly attempted to deal with this latter difficulty by annexing a “Decision Notification Form” relating to “[…]” (presumably claiming this to be the “[Lot 1]”) to his affidavit filed 23 May 2025, however this document does not change the position that the Court does not know how each block is held.
In addition, and in accordance with paragraph 1A of her Amended Application in a Proceeding filed 4 March 2025, the mother also seeks orders in default pursuant to r 10.27 which have the effect of the father being prohibited from taking any further steps in the proceedings until he has complied with the orders for the sale of the former matrimonial home.
Discussion
Financial Relief
The legal principles with respect to applications of this nature were correctly identified by Judge Dickson in her reasons on 27 March 2025 (at [49]-[62]). I do not propose to repeat them.
Whilst there have been recent amendments to Part VIII of the Act (Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth)), those amendments do not substantially alter those factors to be taken into account by the Court when considering whether or not to exercise discretion to make an interlocutory order for partial property settlement.
As repeatedly identified in these reasons, the father is in default of his obligation to make payment in the amount of $50,000 to the mother. In addition, I am satisfied that on the father’s own evidence he has frustrated the default mechanism provided for by Judge Dickson in Orders 3-5 made 27 March 2024, as practically amended by Orders 1-4 made 7 August 2024, to meet that payment.
In light of the father’s contumelious failure to abide orders of the Court, it is now clear that an alternate avenue needs to be taken to provide the mother with those funds.
Whilst the father might wish to retain at least one of the Town E blocks in the superannuation fund or personally (depending on how the Town E blocks are held), his failure to abide orders of the Court has rendered his preference to do so futile.
Orders shall be made providing for the sale of the Town E blocks, with the mother to be in control of that sale process. This is because the Court has no confidence whatsoever that the father will abide the orders of the Court for the sale of the Town E blocks (for all of the reasons discussed throughout these reasons). The proceeds from that sale of the Town E blocks shall be applied to the extant order for the payment of $50,000 to the mother, and thereafter the funds are to be preserved.
I have taken the view that it is necessary at this stage to preserve the balance of the sale proceeds from the sale of the Town E blocks, until such time that there is clarity as to both how those properties are held, and the particulars of the self-managed superannuation fund.
To that end, it appears from the evidence before the Court that the father has not complied with his obligations for disclosure together with various obligations imposed upon him by orders of the Court, including orders that would regularise the self-managed superannuation fund. As best as can be discerned, the extant orders are:
(a)Order 8 made 27 March 2024, which provided for valuations of the Town E blocks;
(b)Orders 14-15 made 27 March 2024 requiring the father to prepare and finalise the financial statements of the self-managed superannuation fund for the financial years ending 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 (noting draft financial statements appear to have been prepared but no returns lodged);
(c)Order 16 made 27 March 2025 requiring the father to keep the mother informed of the quantum of costs payable by him arising from orders made in proceedings he is engaged in, in the Supreme Court of South Australia (Vaughan v BB Pty Ltd); and
(d)Order 2 made 9 September 2024 requiring the father to produce bank statements for the bank account of the self-managed superannuation fund from 1 July 2021 to the present.
In all of these circumstances, both the mother and the Court are left in the dark as to the father’s dealings, particularly as they relate to the self-managed superannuation fund. Importantly, the Court is also left in the dark and unable to discern the parties’ legal and equitable interests in property, nor their liabilities as now codified in s 79(3) of the Act.
The mother asks the Court to make orders to enable her to instruct accountants to bring the self-managed superannuation fund’s affairs in order. Again, it appears appropriate in all of the circumstances that this occur. Firstly, because it is step necessary to enable the Court to understand the parties’ legal and equitable interests in property, and their liabilities. Secondly, the father’s abject failure to not only abide orders of the Court, but also to properly manage the self-managed superannuation fund, likely rendering it non-compliant (and thus pregnant with concomitant financial and taxation consequences), renders the Court with little confidence that the father will deal with these issues.
In circumstances where the mother is to undertake this process, it appears appropriate that the costs of her doing so (particularly accounting costs) be borne from the sale proceeds of the Town E blocks, as it is likely that those costs will ultimately be costs borne by the superannuation fund and/or the parties in any event.
Whilst the mother has sought orders that she pay any costs orders relating to the proceedings the father is pursuing in the Supreme Court of South Australia (Vaughan v BB Pty Ltd), from the proceeds of the sale of the Town E property, I do not at this stage, and in the absence of clarity from the father about what those costs actually are (again, his recently filed Financial Statement provides no assistance), consider it appropriate to make this order at this stage.
I otherwise at this stage decline to make any further orders pursuant to s 79 and/or s 80 of the Act as promoted by either party as I do not consider that it would be just and equitable to do so.
For the reasons already given, and for the sake of clarity, I specifically decline to make orders disbursing any further funds to the mother and/or the father from the sale of the Town E blocks. I do so on the basis, that until such time that there is clarity as to the ownership of each of the Town E blocks and any amounts necessary to be paid into the self-managed superannuation fund, it would not be proper to release any funds to the parties which might render the self-managed superannuation fund non-compliant, and/or which might not be capable of claw back at a later stage.
To that end, a variation shall be made to Order 5 made 27 March 2024 so as to discharge Order 5(c). This is because the payment to the mother shall be met from the sale of the Town E blocks and not from the sale of the Suburb C property.
I also specifically decline to make any of the orders sought by the father. Not only are many of the orders he has sought now otiose, they are in many instances incomprehensible and/or incapable of enforcement. I specifically identify the following as falling in that category:
(a)All of the orders sought in the Application in a Proceeding sealed 27 May 2025;
(b)The extant orders sought in the Response filed 2 November 2024;
(c)All of the orders sought in the Response filed 2 May 2025 and that in the Amended Response “placed on the court file” on 12 May 2025 and annexed to the father’s affidavit filed 23 May 2025.
I am conscious that in dismissing the father’s applications that he has sought orders for discovery of certain documents by the mother. There is, however, no evidence before the Court that the mother has not complied with her obligations as to disclosure.
Both parties are reminded of their obligations for disclosure which, aside from the provisions in the rules, are now also found in s 71B of the Act.
Orders pursuant to Rule 10.27
I do not propose to repeat those matters set out at [17]-[19] of the reasons published 28 February 2025.
For all of the reasons discussed herein, I am satisfied that the father is in default within the meaning of r 10.26 as a result of his failure to comply with Order 2 made 27 March 2024, and Orders 1, 3 and 4 of the orders made 7 August 2024, together with those orders identified at [186] herein.
In light of the same, orders shall be made in accordance with r 10.27 as sought by the mother which provide for the father to be prohibited from taking any further step in the financial proceedings until such time as he has complied with the orders for the sale of the Suburb C property.
I am cognisant that in making this order there is some overlap between this order and the harmful proceedings orders that I intend to make as discussed in the reasons that follow. This overlap however is not a reason to decline to make either order.
HARMFUL PROCEEDINGS
Documents relied upon
At the hearing on 2 July 2025 the Court indicated that the whole of the court file was before the Court in relation to the consideration of the making of a harmful proceedings order pursuant to s 102QAC (in accordance with s 102QAC(3)).
That being said, the documents referred to throughout these reasons alone would, in my view, be sufficient to warrant the making of a harmful proceedings order.
Notice that the Court was considering making an order pursuant to Part XIB of the Act
At a hearing in the proceedings on 17 April 2025, the Court made orders of its own volition directed to addressing the father’s conduct in the litigation, in the following terms:
6.At the adjourned hearing on 2 July 2025, the Court shall give consideration as to whether to make an order pursuant to Part XIB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in relation to the father and to that extent the parties are directed to be in a position to make submissions regarding the same at the adjourned hearing.
Legal Principles
The power of the court to make a harmful proceedings order is found in s 102QAC of the Act (which is found in Part XIB of the Act), which provides:
Making harmful proceedings orders
(1) A court exercising jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act may make an order (a harmful proceedings order) prohibiting a party (the first party) to the proceedings from instituting proceedings under this Act against another party to the proceedings without the leave of the court under section 102QAG, if the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
(a) the other party would suffer harm if the first party instituted further proceedings against the other party; or
(b)in the case of child‑related proceedings (within the meaning of Part VII)—the child who is the subject of the proceedings would suffer harm if the first party instituted further proceedings against the other party.
Note: Proceedings includes cross‑proceedings and incidental proceedings (see subsection 4(1)).
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), harm may include, but is not limited to, the following:
(a)       psychological harm or oppression;
(b)       major mental distress;
(c)       a detrimental effect on the other party’s capacity to care for a child;
(d)       financial harm.
(3) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (1), the court may have regard to:
(a) the history of the proceedings under this Act between the first party and the other party; and
(b) whether the first party has frequently instituted or conducted proceedings against the other party in any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted, and orders made, before the commencement of this section); and
(c) the cumulative effect, or any potential cumulative effect, of any harm resulting from the proceedings referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b).
(4) The court may make a harmful proceedings order on its own initiative or on application by a party to the proceedings.
(5) The court must not make a harmful proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.
(6)       An order made under subsection (1) is a final order.
Order about notifying other party in relation to application for leave etc.
(7) If the court makes an order under subsection (1), the court must also make an order as to whether the court is to notify the other party, in the event that the first party makes an application under section 102QAE for leave to institute proceedings against the other party, of either or both of the following:
(a)       that the application has been made;
(b) if the application is dismissed—that the application has been dismissed.
(8) The court must have regard to the wishes of the other party in making an order under subsection (7).
The power to make a harmful proceedings order can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings, interlocutory or final (per Judge Brown in Lamport & Garside [2024] FedCFamC2F 1007 at [132] endorsed by Austin J when dismissing an appeal from the making of that harmful proceedings order in Garside [2024] FedCFamC1A 250).
The decision whether or not to make a harmful proceedings order is discretionary, so long as the preconditions in s 102QAC(1) and (5) are met.
The power to make a harmful proceedings order was a new provision inserted in the Act when amendments came into force on 6 May 2024, as a result of the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth).
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth), on the topic of harmful proceedings orders, relevantly variously identified:
(a)In the General Outline:
7. The Bill will provide a new mechanism for the court to respond to and deter a known form of harassment, that being the repetitive filing of applications by one party to oppress another party. Often termed ‘systems abuse’, this tactic can be employed by perpetrators of family violence to manipulate the legal system to exert control over, threaten and harass a current or former partner. This can have substantial detrimental impacts on the physical and psychological health of the respondent, and on any children involved in proceedings. The Bill will provide the courts with a new power to scrutinise the impact of the institution of further proceedings to prevent systems abuse occurring.
(b)And specifically in relation to the relevant provisions:
319.Item 6 also inserts a new Division 1B [sic] which contains provisions relating to the court’s new power to make harmful proceedings orders. The purpose of this measure is to protect the respondent and/or children who are the subject of proceedings from the harmful impact of frequent and unnecessary applications filed by an applicant. This measure aims to limit systems abuse, which is a form of family violence that is prevalent in the family law system.
Discussion
Whilst the Court identified to the parties at the hearing on 17 April 2025 that it was considering exercising powers pursuant to Part XIB of the Act of its own volition, it is now understood that mother, with the endorsement of the ICL, now asks the Court to make a harmful proceedings order directed to the father.
In relation to s 102QAC(5), I am satisfied that the father has been given the opportunity to be heard in relation to the making of a harmful proceedings order in circumstances where:
(a)As already identified, by Order 6 made 17 April 2025, the father was put on notice that the Court was contemplating making any of the orders provided for in Part XIB of the Act and invited the parties to be in a position to make submissions regarding the same at the hearing on 2 July 2025.
(b)On 20 June 2025, the mother filed written submissions in readiness for the hearing on 2 July 2025. At page 5 under the heading “Section 102QAC” the mother specifically asked the Court to make a harmful proceedings order directed to the father, and in doing so identified s 102QAC of the Act.
(c)Also on 20 June 2025, the ICL filed written submissions in readiness for the hearing on 2 July 2025, supporting the making of a harmful proceedings order directed to the father.
(d)At the hearing on 2 July 2025 the father was invited to make submissions regarding the making of a harmful proceedings order. The father, however, vociferously declined to do so (much as he declined to do so in his Outline of Case document filed 20 June 2025), submitting to the Court that he would not participate in the hearing further and thereafter leaving the hearing. That the father chose to do so is a circumstance of his own making and it does not amount to a denial of the opportunity of being heard

In relation to s 102QAC(1) all that the Court need be satisfied of is that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the mother, and or the children would suffer harm if the father instituted further proceedings under the Act.
I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the mother might suffer harm within the meaning of s 102QAC(2)(d), and, in particular, that she might suffer financial harm.
(a)I do so with reference to the extraordinary quantum of the legal costs incurred to date by the mother in the proceedings, all with little progress towards a resolution of the substantive proceedings and with no end in sight.
(b)In particular, the Court would have to have some significant apprehension that the costs the mother has incurred since the hearing in these proceedings on 28 November 2024, totalling in excess of $60,000, are, in light of the disposition of the interlocutory applications the subject of these reasons, likely to have been largely unnecessary.
(c)I am satisfied for all of the reasons discussed herein and in the reasons delivered on 28 February 2025 that at least one of the reasons for the mother’s high legal expenses is a result of the numerous applications, affidavits and other documents filed by the father in the proceedings, together with the correspondence that he has sent, sometimes numerous times a day as identified earlier in these reasons.
(d)In addition, I am cognisant that the father has failed to comply with orders of the Court directed to alleviating the mother’s parlous financial circumstances (the partial property order of $50,000), such circumstance born from the father controlling all of the matrimonial assets to the exclusion of the mother and compounded by the father’s own admission that he has not met his obligations to pay the mother child support.
(e)In the mother’s affidavit filed 16 May 2025 she relevantly deposed:
23.The Respondent’s [father’s] behaviours in litigation has caused financial harm and distress in relation to the incursion of legal fees out of all proportion to what is at stake. This will negatively impact my ability to purchase a home at the end of the proceedings from property settlement funds, and will substantially delay the finalisation of the proceedings and my ability to purchase a home.
(f)In light of all the matters discussed in these reasons, it would appear that the mother’s apprehensions as to her ability to financially recover from these proceedings once she has paid all of her legal fees has some significant force and merit.
I am also satisfied that the mother might suffer harm within the meaning of s 102QAC(2)(b); namely the possibility of major mental distress, and s 102QAC(a), namely psychological harm.
(a)In her affidavit filed 16 May 2025, the mother relevantly deposed:
24.The abusive matters constantly raised by the Respondent [father] in his filed documents and in hearings have caused me emotional distress and harm. This causes me to be fearful of what actions the Respondent [father] might take if he continues to be unsuccessful in these proceedings, as he has brought multiple applications in this Court, applications by way of Response, and an application in the [Magistrates Court].
(b)Whilst the Court does not have expert evidence supporting the mother’s view that she has suffered emotional distress and harm, the Court would have to apprehend that it is possible that not only is the mother’s self-assessment accurate, but importantly, that prolonged and costly litigation under the Act such as these reasons bear out, may have a deleterious impact upon psychological functioning of the mother and/or cause her major mental distress.
(c)Here, as discussed throughout these reasons and the reasons of 28 February 2025, not only is the Court satisfied that the litigation has been protracted, but additionally it is apparent that the litigation has been punctuated by the father’s non-compliance with orders, repeated unmeritorious applications, derogatory communications and intimidation and threats from the father directed to the mother, her legal representatives and seemingly any professional or other person associated with the mother and/or the children, foreseeably, these combination of factors may cause the mother to suffer from major mental distress and/or cause an impairment of her psychological functioning.
Moreover, I am satisfied that should the mother suffer the major mental distress and/or psychological harm and/or financial harm that I have referred to, I am also satisfied any such harm also carries with it the possibility of having a detrimental effect upon the mother’s capacity to care for the parties four children as envisaged in s 102QAC(2)(c); including but not limited to her ability to house the children and provide for their needs in every way.
At the hearing on 2 July 2025, the mother indicated that in accordance with s 102QAC(7) she did not wish to be notified of any application the father may bring pursuant to s 102QAE.
Finally, I have had regard to the fact that the substantive proceedings are extant and will need to be finalised at some stage. The making of a harmful proceedings order directed to the father does not prevent him from pursuing his application for final orders which remains before the court, nor from amending the same in due course; generally, or particularly if an order was made giving him leave to do so, as the court would ordinarily order as part of orders made to prepare for the final hearing.
As the entirety of these reasons bear out, the father’s conduct of the entire proceedings before the Court is deeply concerning. In every sense, it would appear that the circumstances envisaged by the parliament in the extracts of the Explanatory Memorandum, which lay at the heart of the creation of the power to make a harmful proceedings order, applies to these proceedings.
For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the court to exercise discretion to make a harmful proceedings order directed to the father.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons discussed, I now make those orders that appear at the commencement of these reasons.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and nineteen (219) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Kari.
Associate:
Dated: 10 July 2025

File number(s):	ADC 5154 of 2022
Judgment of:	KARI J
Date of judgment:	10 July 2025
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – Child related proceedings – Where interlocutory parenting orders were made 28 February 2025 for the father to spend supervised time with four children in an “on-site unsupervised” program at a children’s contact service – Where the father has since filed four separate interlocutory parenting applications – Where the service can no longer facilitate time – Where the risk factors previously identified have not been ameliorated – Where the Court is not bound by the proposals of the parties nor the Independent Children’s Lawyer – Supervised time to remain – Minor variation to previous order FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Independent Children’s Lawyer – Where the father served the Independent Children's Lawyer (“ICL”) with a Notice to Admit – Where the ICL seeks dismissal of the Notice to Admit – Where the father asks the Court to discharge the ICL – Where the ICL has discharged their obligations pursuant to s 68L of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Notice to Admit uplifted and father’s application dismissed FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Where the father is in default of orders made in March 2024 to pay to the mother the sum of $50,000 – Where the orders provided for the sale of the former matrimonial home in default of payment – Where the father has frustrated the default provisions of the orders – Where the mother seeks orders for the sale of alternate property – Orders made for alternate property to be sold and the mother to be paid the partial property settlement from the proceeds of sale FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Default – Where the father has failed to comply with orders – Where the mother seeks an order pursuant to r 10.27 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) – Order made prohibiting the father from taking any further step in the financial proceedings until the sale of the former matrimonial home FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Harmful proceedings – Where the Court apprehends the litigation is being unnecessarily delayed by the continual filing of applications and documents by the father – Where much of the father’s communications with the mother’s solicitors and ICL are derogatory, inflammatory, offensive and contain threats – Where the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the mother and/or children would suffer harm if the father instituted further proceedings – Order made pursuant to s 102QAC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) prohibiting the father from instituting proceedings under the Act
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt XIB, ss 68LA, 71B, 79, 80, 102QAC Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth) Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) Pt 8.1, rr 8.01, 10.26, 10.27 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth)
Cases cited:	Garside [2024] FedCFamC1A 250 Holinski & Holinski [2025] FedCFamC1F 143 Lamport & Garside [2024] FedCFamC2F 1007 Lim & Zong (2021) FLC 94-048 Oberlin& Infeld (2021) FLC 94-017 Re JJT; Ex parte Victoria Legal Aid (1998) 195 CLR 184 U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 Vaughan & Vaughan (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 371 Vaughan & Vaughan (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 129
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	219
Date of hearing:	28 November 2024, 9 May 2025, 2 July 2025
Place:	Adelaide
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Tredrea
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Camatta Lempens Pty Ltd
The Respondent:	Litigant in person
Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Mr Hemsley
Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Legal Services Commission of South Australia

ADC 5154 of 2022
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MS VAUGHAN Applicant
AND:	MR VAUGHAN Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

ORDER MADE BY:	KARI J
DATE OF ORDER:	10 JULY 2025