VAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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VAO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 31

VAO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 161

NOTE: CHANGES TO THE MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION (MNC)

The Federal Court adopted a new medium neutral citation (FCAFC) for Full Court judgments effective from 1 January 2002.  Single Judge judgments will not be affected and will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.

The transitional arrangements are as follows:

  • All Full Court judgments delivered prior to 1 January 2002 will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.
  • All Full Court judgments delivered between 1 January 2002 to 30 April 2002 have been assigned parallel medium neutral citations in both the FCA and FCAFC series. 
  • All Full Court judgments delivered from 1 May 2002 will contain the FCAFC medium neutral citation only.

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VAO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 161

MIGRATION – protection visa – whether primary judge erred in dismissing application to review decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Tribunal bound to take into account evidence put to it in appellant’s brother’s application for protection visa where that evidence was not put before it in appellant’s application – whether Tribunal’s reliance on “country information” not current at the time of its decision involved an error of law – whether Tribunal’s decision affected by actual bias – discussion of difference, if any, between “invincible” and “actual” bias

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s425, s476

Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17, (2001) 178 ALR 421, ALR 438, applied

Australian Workers Union v Bowen (No 2) (1948) 77 CLR 601, referred to

Adlam v Bauer (1999) 93 IR 114, [1999] FCA 1504, referred to

Haritou v Skourdoumbis [2002] FCA 116, referred to

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, [2000] HCA 48, referred to

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30, (2001) 180 ALR 1, applied

Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 56, (2001) 105 FCR 212, followed

Algama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1884, followed

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, applied

Chaddha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 92, referred to

VAO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 1122 OF 2001

SUNDBERG, MARSHALL AND WEINBERG JJ
MELBOURNE
27 FEBRUARY 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 1122 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

VAO
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SUNDBERG, MARSHALL AND WEINBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 161
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of VAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved an appeal against the decision of Gray J, who dismissed the appellant’s application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The RRT had concluded that the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, was not entitled to a protection visa. The appellant's claim for a protection visa was based on the fear of persecution due to politically motivated violence against him, stemming from his support for the United National Party (UNP) and his role as a rural organiser. The court was required to determine whether the RRT's decision was legally sound, particularly in light of concerns regarding procedural fairness and the use of non-current country information.

The central legal issues addressed by the court were whether the RRT had denied the appellant natural justice by not considering evidence from his brother's case and whether the RRT erred in using non-current country information. The court found that while the RRT had not followed proper procedural fairness by not informing the appellant that evidence from his brother's case would not be considered, this breach did not fall within the grounds available under section 476(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which excludes denial of natural justice from the listed grounds for review. Additionally, the court ruled that the RRT did not commit a legal error by using non-current country information, as it was used to evaluate the credibility of the appellant’s claims rather than to make findings about the current situation in Sri Lanka.

Gray J concluded that while the RRT’s approach raised concerns about fairness, it did not reach the level of invincibly biased decision-making that would warrant overturning the RRT’s decision. The court held that the RRT had not acted in a manner that rendered its decision unjust. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a judgment of Gray J in which his Honour dismissed the appellant’s application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”). The RRT decided that the appellant was not entitled to a protection visa.Factual Background The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka and is of Sinhalese ethnicity. He entered Australia on 7 September 1998. On 5 October 1998, he lodged an application for a protection visa. The basis of his claim was that he feared persecution upon return to Sri Lanka on account of politically motivated violence being directed at him. Put shortly, the appellant relied upon the following matters in support of his application:· he had suffered persecution in Sri Lanka as a consequence of his and his family’s support for the United National Party (“the UNP”).· he was an active member of the UNP and was a rural organiser for the UNP in his local area.· during his time as a rural organiser he was attacked and threatened with death by political opponents in circumstances where the police took no action despite his complaints.· in March 1998, the police raided his family home and questioned family members about documents alleged to have been in the possession of his brother.· in June 1998, he was kidnapped, held for three days and tortured during interrogation by unknown people with reference to the documents sought in the March 1998 raid. He received a death threat. Another complaint to the police went unheeded.· after those incidents he received threatening phone calls and the family home was pelted with stones at night. On 30 October 1998 his application for a protection visa was refused by a delegate of the respondent. An application for a review of that decision was made to the RRT. The RRT held a hearing on 13 April 2000 in respect of the appellant. The hearing commenced at 12.15 pm and concluded at 3.15 pm. The same RRT member heard an application for review of the decision of a delegate of the respondent in respect of the appellant’s brother, from 3.35 pm to 6.40 pm on the same day. The appellant placed material before the RRT which had not been before the delegate. This material included references from UNP officials and a collection of newspaper articles about politically motivated violence in Sri Lanka. On 30 June 2000, the RRT decided to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant a protection visa to the appellant. On the same day, his brother’s application was also rejected.The RRT decision in summary The RRT set out, in its reasons for decision, the appellant’s claims and summarised the evidence he advanced in support of those claims. Although some of the claims related to the appellant’s brother’s involvement in the UNP, the RRT made no reference in its decision in the appellant’s case to any evidence given by his brother in his brother’s case. The RRT was prepared to find that the appellant “may have been a member of the UNP” and “may have suffered some harassment around the time of the 1997 elections, as this was common and localised”. It otherwise disbelieved the appellant’s claims about the extent of his political profile and his experience of adverse treatment at the hands of his political opponents.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG, MARSHALL AND WEINBERG JJ
On 30 June 2000, the RRT decided to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant a protection visa to the appellant. On the same day, his brother’s application was also rejected.The RRT decision in summary The RRT set out, in its reasons for decision, the appellant’s claims and summarised the evidence he advanced in support of those claims. Although some of the claims related to the appellant’s brother’s involvement in the UNP, the RRT made no reference in its decision in the appellant’s case to any evidence given by his brother in his brother’s case. The RRT was prepared to find that the appellant “may have been a member of the UNP” and “may have suffered some harassment around the time of the 1997 elections, as this was common and localised”. It otherwise disbelieved the appellant’s claims about the extent of his political profile and his experience of adverse treatment at the hands of his political opponents. The RRT placed no weight on the letters of support for the appellant written by UNP officials. It did not regard the newspaper cuttings as being of any assistance to his case. The RRT formed an adverse view of the appellant’s credibility in several material respects.The issues before Gray J which remain live on the appeal Gray J determined inter alia that:· it was apparent that the RRT had taken care not to take into account the evidence given by the appellant’s brother, in his case, in relation to the appellant. It was probable that the way in which the Tribunal acted had led to a denial of natural justice to the appellant. Procedural fairness required that the RRT at least inform him that it did not propose to take into account the evidence in his brother’s case when considering the evidence in his own case unless that evidence was formally placed before it. However, denial of natural justice was specifically excluded from the grounds available under s476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) by s476(2)(a).· the RRT did not err in law by using “country information” which was not current at the time of its decision when arriving at that decision. At [78] Gray J said:-“The Tribunal was using the information it obtained to evaluate the truth of the applicants’ claim as to what happened to them. The information was relevant to that issue. Counsel was unable to point to any obligation on the Tribunal to seek out, or to act upon, more recent information.”· an examination of the RRT’s reasons, and of the way in which it had conducted its hearings in relation to the appellant and his brother, gave rise to “considerable disquiet” about its approach. It was clear that the appellant had not had what could be regarded as a fair hearing. The RRT had set out to ensure that he would be found not to be a person to whom protection obligations were owed, if it could reach such a conclusion. However, that left open the possibility that it would have found in his favour if it had been persuaded, against its inclination, that his case was good. In those circumstances it could not be said that the RRT was “invincibly biased”.The legislative regime

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SUNDBERG, MARSHALL AND WEINBERG JJ

The court began by addressing the issue of whether the RRT's failure to consider evidence from the appellant's brother constituted a denial of natural justice. The court noted that the RRT had taken care not to take into account the evidence given by the appellant's brother in his case, in relation to the appellant. However, the court found that this did not lead to a denial of natural justice because procedural fairness only required the RRT to inform the appellant that it did not propose to take into account the evidence in his brother's case when considering the evidence in his own case unless that evidence was formally placed before it. The court also noted that denial of natural justice was specifically excluded from the grounds available under s476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by s476(2)(a).

The court then turned to the issue of whether the RRT erred in law by using country information that was not current at the time of its decision. The court found that the RRT did not err in law because the information was relevant to evaluating the truth of the appellant's claims. The court noted that counsel was unable to point to any obligation on the Tribunal to seek out, or to act upon, more recent information.

Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the RRT was invincibly biased in its approach to the appellant's case. The court found that the RRT was not invincibly biased because an examination of the RRT's reasons, and of the way in which it had conducted its hearings in relation to the appellant and his brother, gave rise to "considerable disquiet" about its approach. However, the court noted that the RRT had set out to ensure that the appellant would be found not to be a person to whom protection obligations were owed, if it could reach such a conclusion. The court concluded that in those circumstances it could not be said that the RRT was "invincibly biased".

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the RRT's failure to consider evidence from the appellant's brother in the appellant's case did not constitute a denial of natural justice, that the RRT did not err in law by using country information that was not current at the time of its decision, and that the RRT was not invincibly biased in its approach to the appellant's case. The court did not depart from or follow any prior authority in reaching these conclusions.