FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minici v Commonwealth of Australia (as represented by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development) [2017] FCAFC 24
Appeal from: Commonwealth of Australia (as represented by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development) v Minici & Anor [2015] FCCA 3271 File number: NSD 64 of 2016 Judges: KENNY, ROBERTSON AND GRIFFITHS JJ Date of judgment: 2 March 2017 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether the Federal Circuit Court (Commonwealth Tenancy Disputes) Instrument 2015 (Cth) (Instrument) was ultra vires s 10AA(3) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) to make provision for and in relation to all or any of specified matters in respect of a Commonwealth tenancy dispute – whether a provision of the Instrument commenced before the day the Instrument was registered for the purposes of s 12 of the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – claimed errors in fact-finding by primary judge – claimed errors in primary judge’s exercise of discretion in s 94 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) that it was appropriate to make a termination order for a residential tenancy agreement – whether error by the primary judge in suspending the order for vacant possession – whether to grant application that, in an appeal, the Court receive further evidence
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – separation of judicial and executive powers – where Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) conferring power on State Tribunal was made the applicable law for Commonwealth tenancy disputes in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia involving land in New South Wales – whether acquisition of property other than on just terms – whether there was a “matter” within the meaning of Ch III of the Constitution – whether it was beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to make s 10AA of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) and the Federal Circuit Court (Commonwealth Tenancy Disputes) Instrument 2015 (Cth)
LANDLORD AND TENANT – application by Commonwealth as lessor to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for a termination order for a residential tenancy agreement where the tenant had been in continual possession of the same residential premises for a period of 20 years or more – whether predominant use of premises for the purposes of agriculture within s 7(h) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) – whether errors in primary judge’s exercise of discretion in s 94 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) that it was appropriate to make a termination order for a residential tenancy agreement
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an adjournment – whether leave should be granted to amend grounds of appeal – whether to grant application that, in an appeal, the Court receive further evidence
Legislation: Constitution ss 51(i), 51(xxxi), Ch III
Airports Act 1996 (Cth)
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) ss 10AA, 85
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 24
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge's reasons for judgment were well-reasoned and did not disclose any error. The court held that the predominant use of the premises was not for agricultural purposes, and therefore, the 2010 RTA applied. The court also found that the FCCA was satisfied that it was appropriate to make a termination order, and the primary judge exercised his discretion correctly. The court rejected the appellants' submissions that the primary judge was required to give separate consideration to the determination of the day on which vacant possession was to be given. The court held that the primary judge was applying s 83 of the 2010 RTA, making an order for possession of the residential premises and specifying the day on which the order was to take effect. The court also found that there was ample power available to the primary judge to make the order for vacant possession in the terms he did.
In summary, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave be granted to the appellants to amend their notice of appeal dated 5 March 2016 (notice of appeal) to add grounds 12, 13 and 14.
2. As to ground 11 in the notice of appeal, leave be granted to the appellants to amend the notice of appeal to add the following ground:
The primary judge erred in not having sufficient regard to expert evidence including, but not limited to, that of Simone Fogarty.
but otherwise leave to amend to add ground 11 be refused.
3. Leave be refused to the appellants to amend the notice of appeal to add grounds 15, 16 and 17.
4. The appeal be dismissed.
5. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Secondly, as to the primary judge’s observations regarding Mrs Minici’s failure to attend for cross-examination as required by the Commonwealth, the respondent submitted that the primary judge correctly relied upon the limitations in the medical certificate produced by Mrs Minici. Consideration We have considered some of these grounds above, in relation to the expert evidence and the evidence of Mr Azar. We do not repeat what we have there written. We turn to consider the remaining issues. It may be recalled that the primary judge said, in his reasons for judgment in this matter at [74]-[75], that in the circumstances to which he referred, he considered that it was appropriate that the residential tenancy agreement be terminated and that there be an order for vacant possession which was to take effect 75 days from the date of judgment. He therefore ordered, by orders made on 11 December 2015, that the residential tenancy agreement be terminated forthwith; vacant possession of the premises be given to the applicant Commonwealth on or before 18 December 2015; and that the order for vacant possession be suspended until 24 February 2016. We do not accept the appellant’s submission that the primary judge was required to give “separate” consideration to the determination of the day on which vacant possession was to be given. The primary judge recognised that there was a discretion to make the termination order and a discretion to determine the day on which vacant possession was to be given. The form of the orders demonstrates this recognition. So also does what the primary judge said at [17], repeating what he had said in Rigney, at [140], which we have set out at [33] above. We also do not accept the appellants’ submission that this part of the reasons of the primary judge disclosed a further error in stating that there was “no explicit guidance in the Tenancies Act as to the date on which possession should be ordered” in light of, as we would read it, the operation of cl 8(2) of the Instrument. If s 94(4) of the 2010 RTA had applied, the explicit guidance would have been (in the present case of continual possession for a period of 20 years or more) that vacant possession must not be ordered to be given earlier than 90 days after the order is made. In oral submissions attention was given to the form of the order made by the primary judge that vacant possession be given on or before 18 December 2015, but that the order for vacant possession be suspended until 24 February 2016. The appellants submitted that this form of order disclosed error. In our opinion, the primary judge was applying s 83 of the 2010 RTA, that is, making an order for possession of the residential premises and specifying the day on which the order was to take effect. So much appears from Rigney at [140]. In our opinion, the words in s 83(1) “specifying the day on which the order takes or took effect” refer to the order for possession. Also, the definition of “termination order” in s 80 of the 2010 RTA states that it means an order terminating a residential tenancy agreement together with an order for possession of the residential premises. The primary judge was making clear that the order for possession was not to take effect on the same day as the order terminating the residential tenancy agreement. We also note that under s 85 of the FCCA Act it was provided that the Rules of Court may make provision for or in relation to the stay of proceedings under judgments of the FCCA. By r 29.04 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) a party bound by a judgment or order may apply to the court for an order that the judgment or order be stayed and by r 29.12 a party may apply to the court for a stay of execution of the judgment or order. It is also relevant that s 8(2) of the Instrument provided that, when making a termination order, the court may make such orders as it considers appropriate in relation to the day vacant possession of the premises is to be given to the landlord. In our opinion, there was ample power available to the primary judge to make the order for vacant possession in the terms he did.