Valve Corporation v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minici v Commonwealth of Australia (as represented by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development) [2017] FCAFC 24

Appeal from: Commonwealth of Australia (as represented by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development) v Minici & Anor [2015] FCCA 3271
File number: NSD 64 of 2016
Judges: KENNY, ROBERTSON AND GRIFFITHS JJ
Date of judgment: 2 March 2017
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether the Federal Circuit Court (Commonwealth Tenancy Disputes) Instrument 2015 (Cth) (Instrument) was ultra vires s 10AA(3) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) to make provision for and in relation to all or any of specified matters in respect of a Commonwealth tenancy dispute – whether a provision of the Instrument commenced before the day the Instrument was registered for the purposes of s 12 of the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – claimed errors in fact-finding by primary judge – claimed errors in primary judge’s exercise of discretion in s 94 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) that it was appropriate to make a termination order for a residential tenancy agreement – whether error by the primary judge in suspending the order for vacant possession – whether to grant application that, in an appeal, the Court receive further evidence

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – separation of judicial and executive powers – where Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) conferring power on State Tribunal was made the applicable law for Commonwealth tenancy disputes in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia involving land in New South Wales – whether acquisition of property other than on just terms – whether there was a “matter” within the meaning of Ch III of the Constitution – whether it was beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to make s 10AA of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) and the Federal Circuit Court (Commonwealth Tenancy Disputes) Instrument 2015 (Cth)

LANDLORD AND TENANT – application by Commonwealth as lessor to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for a termination order for a residential tenancy agreement where the tenant had been in continual possession of the same residential premises for a period of 20 years or more – whether predominant use of premises for the purposes of agriculture within s 7(h) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) – whether errors in primary judge’s exercise of discretion in s 94 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) that it was appropriate to make a termination order for a residential tenancy agreement

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an adjournment – whether leave should be granted to amend grounds of appeal – whether to grant application that, in an appeal, the Court receive further evidence  

Legislation:

Constitution ss 51(i), 51(xxxi), Ch III

Airports Act 1996 (Cth)

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) ss 10AA, 85

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

Federal…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellants, Mr and Mrs Minici, appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) that granted the Commonwealth's application for an order terminating a residential tenancy agreement. The court was required to determine whether the FCCA had jurisdiction to make the orders sought by the Commonwealth and whether the Federal Circuit Court (Commonwealth Tenancy Disputes) Instrument 2015 (Cth) was unauthorised and ultra vires. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the predominant use of the premises was for agricultural purposes and if the pre-conditions to the exercise of the FCCA's power under s 94 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) were satisfied.

The court found that the primary judge's reasons for judgment were well-reasoned and did not disclose any error. The court held that the predominant use of the premises was not for agricultural purposes, and therefore, the 2010 RTA applied. The court also found that the FCCA was satisfied that it was appropriate to make a termination order, and the primary judge exercised his discretion correctly. The court rejected the appellants' submissions that the primary judge was required to give separate consideration to the determination of the day on which vacant possession was to be given. The court held that the primary judge was applying s 83 of the 2010 RTA, making an order for possession of the residential premises and specifying the day on which the order was to take effect. The court also found that there was ample power available to the primary judge to make the order for vacant possession in the terms he did.

In summary, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to the appellants to amend their notice of appeal dated 5 March 2016 (notice of appeal) to add grounds 12, 13 and 14.

2. As to ground 11 in the notice of appeal, leave be granted to the appellants to amend the notice of appeal to add the following ground:

The primary judge erred in not having sufficient regard to expert evidence including, but not limited to, that of Simone Fogarty.

but otherwise leave to amend to add ground 11 be refused.

3. Leave be refused to the appellants to amend the notice of appeal to add grounds 15, 16 and 17.

4. The appeal be dismissed.

5. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As to the second of these matters, ground 14, that the appellants believed that Badgerys Creek was not being considered as a site for the airport, we do not see this as having a foundation in the evidence. Objectively, the residential tenancy agreement in respect of the premises was entered into on 27 November 2007, expiring on 28 July 2009, and containing cl 42 which we have set out at [3] above. We reject the submission that because the lessor did not plead that express provision for termination that it was legally irrelevant to rely upon it in evidence. As the primary judge pointed out at [4], the application to that Court was not a pleading. The application to adduce further evidence on appeal On this appeal the appellants sought to adduce the following further evidence:1. Affidavit of Mrs Maria Minici dated 11 January 2016;2. Affidavit of Ms Sandra Uren dated 6 March 2016;3. Further affidavit of Ms Sandra Uren dated 6 March 2016;4. Affidavit of Dr Anthony Green dated 9 March 2016;5. Affidavit of Mr Kingsley Liu dated 1 February 2016; and6. Affidavit of Mr Kingsley Liu dated 9 March 2016. Section 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act provides, so far as relevant, that in an appeal, the Court shall have regard to the evidence given in the proceedings out of which the appeal arose, and has power in its discretion, to receive further evidence. The principles to be applied were considered in August v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 85 at [116] and[119] as follows:[116]The Court’s power to receive further evidence is contained in s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The authorities make it clear that in exercising the discretion the Court is not constrained by the factors relevant at common law as enunciated in Orr v Holmes and Another [1948] HCA 16; (1948) 76 CLR 632 and Council of the City of Greater Wollongong v Cowan[1955] HCA 16; (1955) 93 CLR 435. That is not to say that the common law factors are not relevant, only that they are not the only relevant factors. In many cases it would be most material to consider whether the evidence could have been called at trial and, if it could have been, the reasons it was not, and the extent to which the further evidence had the ability to affect the result.… [119]In addition to the above matters, it should be noted that it is well-established by the authorities that the power in s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) and equivalent sections in other Acts is a remedial power and that an important consideration in terms of the exercise of the power is whether the further evidence would have produced a different result had it been available at the trial or, at least, was likely to have produced a different result: CDJ v VAJ; Sharp v Rangott [2008] FCAFC 45; (2008) 167 FCR 225 at 228–229 [8] per Gray and North JJ; at 248 [92] per Besanko J. In CDJ v VAJ [1998] HCA 67; 197 CLR 172, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ said, at 202: … it is highly unlikely that Parliament in conferring jurisdiction on the Full Court to hear appeals intended that s 93A(2) should be construed in a way that would have the practical effect of obliterating the distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction. Nor can the availability of further evidence relevant to the issues in the appeal be treated as equivalent to a ground of appeal, proof of which prima facie entitles the appellant to a new trial. The power to admit the further evidence exists to serve the demands of justice. Ordinarily, where it is alleged that the admission of new evidence requires a new trial, justice will not be served unless the Full Court is satisfied that the further evidence would have produced a different result if it had been available at the trial. Without that condition being satisfied, it could seldom, if ever, be in the interests of justice to deprive the respondent of the benefit of the orders made by the trial judge and put that person to the expense, inconvenience and worry of a new trial.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants relied on Shannon v Commonwealth [2014] FCAFC 108; 318 ALR 420. In our opinion, the principles are not in doubt but each exercise of discretion to grant or refuse an adjournment must depend on the particular circumstances of the case.The primary judge’s reasons for judgment summarised The primary judge’s reasons for judgment are recorded as Commonwealth of Australia (as represented by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development) v Minici [2015] FCCA 3271 (Minici). Mr and Mrs Minici argued below that the FCCA lacked jurisdiction to make the orders sought by the Commonwealth because the legislation which purported to grant the FCCA jurisdiction was unconstitutional. They also contended that the Federal Circuit Court (Commonwealth Tenancy Disputes) Instrument 2015 (Cth) (the Instrument) was unauthorised and was ultra vires. In particular, the following jurisdictional and constitutional issues were raised by them: (a)at the date of Commonwealth’s application to the FCCA, there was no “matter” within the meaning of Ch III of the Constitution and s 5 of the Federal Circuit Courtof Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (FCCA Act) which the FCCA was required to resolve;(b)there was no power in the Parliament under the Constitution to make either the Federal Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2015 (Cth) or the Instrument to confer upon the FCCA the power to resolve the alleged dispute which was the subject of the Commonwealth’s application because to do so impaired the separation of powers principle in the Constitution;(c)there was no power under s 51 of the Constitution for the Parliament to make a law with respect Mr and Mrs Minici’s property;(d)assuming that the Federal Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2015 (Cth) was valid, the Instrument was unauthorised and ultra vires; and(e)the Federal Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2015 (Cth) was invalid as being contrary to s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution because it was a law for the acquisition of property other than on just terms. It is convenient now to summarise the primary judge’s reasons for judgment relating to matters which specifically concerned Mr and Mrs Minici. In broad terms, those matters were: (a)whether the Minicis’ property was predominantly used for agricultural purposes, in which event the 2010 RTA would not apply (see s 7(h) of that Act);(b)the nature of the Court’s powers under s 94 of the 2010 RTA and whether the pre-conditions to the exercise of that power were satisfied in relation to Mr and Mrs Minici; and(c)whether the FCCA was satisfied that it was appropriate to make a termination order and the test to be applied in determining that matter. Predominant use of premises The primary judge found, at [8], that the predominant use of the premises was not for the purpose of agriculture. His Honour did so while referring to affidavits filed by Mr and Mrs Minici. Mr Minici gave evidence that he was retired and that his health was not good. Mrs Minici’s affidavit was in English notwithstanding that she deposed that she did not speak and cannot read or write English. The primary judge noted the balance of her affidavit was almost exactly the same as that of Mr Dattilo, who was a party in other proceedings. His Honour found, at [10], that Mr Dattilo is Mrs Minici’s brother. Mrs Minici gave evidence that their property had been used as a market garden, comprising 52 acres with a house which was surrounded by an electric fence to keep the cows out. She stated that she and her husband had built garages, sheds and a dam on the land and that her husband had made money by keeping “about 10 Murray Gray (sic) cattle on the land, including a bull” and “breeding and fattening calves for sale”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Secondly, as to the primary judge’s observations regarding Mrs Minici’s failure to attend for cross-examination as required by the Commonwealth, the respondent submitted that the primary judge correctly relied upon the limitations in the medical certificate produced by Mrs Minici. Consideration We have considered some of these grounds above, in relation to the expert evidence and the evidence of Mr Azar. We do not repeat what we have there written. We turn to consider the remaining issues. It may be recalled that the primary judge said, in his reasons for judgment in this matter at [74]-[75], that in the circumstances to which he referred, he considered that it was appropriate that the residential tenancy agreement be terminated and that there be an order for vacant possession which was to take effect 75 days from the date of judgment. He therefore ordered, by orders made on 11 December 2015, that the residential tenancy agreement be terminated forthwith; vacant possession of the premises be given to the applicant Commonwealth on or before 18 December 2015; and that the order for vacant possession be suspended until 24 February 2016. We do not accept the appellant’s submission that the primary judge was required to give “separate” consideration to the determination of the day on which vacant possession was to be given. The primary judge recognised that there was a discretion to make the termination order and a discretion to determine the day on which vacant possession was to be given. The form of the orders demonstrates this recognition. So also does what the primary judge said at [17], repeating what he had said in Rigney, at [140], which we have set out at [33] above. We also do not accept the appellants’ submission that this part of the reasons of the primary judge disclosed a further error in stating that there was “no explicit guidance in the Tenancies Act as to the date on which possession should be ordered” in light of, as we would read it, the operation of cl 8(2) of the Instrument. If s 94(4) of the 2010 RTA had applied, the explicit guidance would have been (in the present case of continual possession for a period of 20 years or more) that vacant possession must not be ordered to be given earlier than 90 days after the order is made. In oral submissions attention was given to the form of the order made by the primary judge that vacant possession be given on or before 18 December 2015, but that the order for vacant possession be suspended until 24 February 2016. The appellants submitted that this form of order disclosed error. In our opinion, the primary judge was applying s 83 of the 2010 RTA, that is, making an order for possession of the residential premises and specifying the day on which the order was to take effect. So much appears from Rigney at [140]. In our opinion, the words in s 83(1) “specifying the day on which the order takes or took effect” refer to the order for possession. Also, the definition of “termination order” in s 80 of the 2010 RTA states that it means an order terminating a residential tenancy agreement together with an order for possession of the residential premises. The primary judge was making clear that the order for possession was not to take effect on the same day as the order terminating the residential tenancy agreement. We also note that under s 85 of the FCCA Act it was provided that the Rules of Court may make provision for or in relation to the stay of proceedings under judgments of the FCCA. By r 29.04 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) a party bound by a judgment or order may apply to the court for an order that the judgment or order be stayed and by r 29.12 a party may apply to the court for a stay of execution of the judgment or order. It is also relevant that s 8(2) of the Instrument provided that, when making a termination order, the court may make such orders as it considers appropriate in relation to the day vacant possession of the premises is to be given to the landlord. In our opinion, there was ample power available to the primary judge to make the order for vacant possession in the terms he did.