University of Queensland v Y

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

University of Queensland & Anor v Y [2020] QCA 216

PARTIES:

UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND
(first appellant)
DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND
(second appellant)
v
Y
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 13319 of 2019
SC No 10347 of 2019

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2019] QSC 282 (Lyons SJA)

DELIVERED ON:

2 October 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 May 2020

JUDGES:

McMurdo and Mullins JJA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

1.   The appeal against Order 1 made on 21 November 2019 be dismissed.

2.   The appeal against Order 2 made on that date be allowed and that order be set aside.

3.   Within 14 days of the delivery of this judgment, each party file and serve written submissions, not exceeding three pages in length, as to the costs in the Trial Division and of this appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – POWERS OF COURT UNDER JUDICIAL REVIEW LEGISLATION – DIRECTION TO ACT OR REFRAIN FROM ACTING – where, until last December, the respondent was a student at the first appellant – where, at the time of his graduation, the respondent was subject to an internal disciplinary proceeding – where the disciplinary proceeding arose from a complaint from a fellow student that the respondent had sexually assaulted her – where the respondent challenged the disciplinary proceeding on the sole basis that it could not involve a determination that the respondent had engaged in conduct, if that conduct was not only in breach of the University’s rules, but also a criminal offence of a sexual nature – where the disciplinary proceeding was restrained by a permanent injunction granted in the Trial Division – whether the injunction should have been granted

EDUCATION – INSTITUTIONS – UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS – OTHER MATTERS – where the appellants seek to have the injunction set aside so that the disciplinary process may resume – where the respondent argues that, having now graduated, he is no longer subject to the first appellant’s disciplinary regime – whether, on the correct construction of the first appellant’s policies, the respondent remains subject to the disciplinary regime

Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 352; [2015] HCA 7, considered
Griffith University v Tang
(2005) 221 CLR 99; [2005] HCA 7, cited
Hunter Development Corporation v Save Our Rail NSW Incorporated(No 2) (2016) 93 NSWLR 704; [2016] NSWCA 375, applied

COUNSEL:

D Kelly QC, with D Marckwald, for the appellants
A D Scott for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Corrs Chambers Westgarth for the appellants
Mulcahy Ryan Lawyers for the respondent

  1. McMURDO JA:  Until last December, the respondent to this appeal, whom I will call Y, was a student at the University of Queensland.  He graduated on 10 December 2019, and has no intention to enrol for further study with the University.  At the time of his graduation, he was…

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Details
Case
[2020] QCA 216
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of University of Queensland v Y involved a dispute between a university and a former student, Y. Y had been subject to a disciplinary proceeding by the university which was restrained by a permanent injunction in the Trial Division. The university sought to have the injunction set aside so that the disciplinary process could resume. Y argued that, having graduated, he was no longer subject to the university's disciplinary regime. The court had to decide whether, on the correct construction of the university's policies, Y remained subject to the disciplinary regime and whether the injunction should remain in place.

The court held that the injunction should remain in place and the appeal against that order should be dismissed. The court agreed with the primary judge's analysis that the allegations against Y were specific allegations of sexual assault that could be categorised as a number of counts of sexual assaults, rather than merely allegations of harassment or bullying. The court also agreed with the primary judge's characterisation of the allegations and considered that "any determination of whether the policies of the University had been breached as particularised and as referred to the Board could only be determined after there had been a determination as to whether a criminal offence of [a] sexual nature has been committed."

The court considered the correctness of the judgment of the primary judge and concluded that the question should be considered. The court noted that the question raised by the university's appeal was fully argued and had a potential importance for cases beyond the present one. The court also noted that the university had been ordered to pay Y's costs of the proceeding at first instance and that the correctness of the judgment had a significance that went beyond this case.

The court ordered that the appeal against Order 1 made on 21 November 2019 be dismissed and that the appeal against Order 2 made on that date be allowed and that order be set aside. The court also ordered that within 14 days of the delivery of this judgment, each party file and serve written submissions, not exceeding three pages in length, as to the costs in the Trial Division and of this appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal against Order 1 made on 21 November 2019 be dismissed.

2. The appeal against Order 2 made on that date be allowed and that order be set aside.

3. Within 14 days of the delivery of this judgment, each party file and serve written submissions, not exceeding three pages in length, as to the costs in the Trial Division and of this appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Consequently, there is a demonstrated basis for enjoining the University from proceeding further against Y. For this reason at least, the injunction should remain in place and the appeal against that order should be dismissed.Should the primary judgment be reviewed? The University argues that there is utility in considering the correctness of the judgment of the primary judge, firstly because the University was ordered to pay Y’s costs of the proceeding at first instance. It is further submitted that the correctness of the judgment has a significance that goes beyond this case, warranting the opinion of this Court being given. Given my conclusion on the first question, the University’s appeal against the injunction should be dismissed, regardless of the correctness of the decision of the primary judge. However the correctness of that decision is not an abstract question of law without any consequence for the present parties. That is because of its relevance to the existing costs order against the University, and consequently, there is a discretion to determine the question: see Hunter Development Corporation v Save Our Rail NSW Incorporated (No 2).[19] It was suggested, in the written submissions for Y, that this applied only where the costs in question were “substantial”. This was said to be supported by the same passage from Hunter Development Corporation to which I have just referred. In my view, that is not the case. In any event, it may be readily inferred that the costs of the proceeding in the Trial Division were substantial rather than minimal.[19][2016] NSWCA 375; (2016) 93 NSWLR 704 at 713-715 [38]-[46]. The question raised by the University’s appeal was fully argued and it has a potential importance for cases beyond the present one. For those reasons, the question should be considered.The reasoning of the primary judge The primary judge noted that ultimately the allegations against Y had not been formulated as a breach of the Sexual Misconduct Policy. However, she considered that “all of the relevant policies and procedures of the University are interlinked and need to be considered together in order to provide a context and an understanding of the approach of the University with respect to sexual misconduct as a whole.”[20] I agree with that analysis.[20]Judgment [43]. I also agree with her Honour’s characterisation of the allegations, namely that they were specific allegations of sexual assault that could be categorised as a number of counts of sexual assaults,[21] rather than merely allegations of harassment or bullying.[22] Consequently, as her Honour said, there could be no determination of these allegations without a determination of whether the acts had occurred as alleged, without consent.[23][21]Judgment [45].[22]Judgment [47], [48].[23]Judgment [50]. Her Honour considered that “any determination of whether the policies of the University had been breached as particularised and as referred to the Board could only be determined after there had been a determination as to whether a criminal offence of [a] sexual nature has been committed.”[24] With one qualification, I agree. Whether a criminal offence had been committed in this case could involve the operation of s 24 of the Criminal Code on a question of consent, whereas the University’s policies and procedures contain no similar provision.[24]Judgment [51].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established