Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman Networks Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman Networks Ltd [2006] FCAFC 41

CONTEMPT OF COURT – question of law referred by primary judge to Full Court – question whether, ‘having regard to nature and terms of’ order alleged to have been disobeyed, a determination of contempt may be made in respect of the contraventions alleged in the statement of charge – order the subject of pending appeal – order must be obeyed until set aside – different possible meanings of ‘equivocal’ and ‘ambiguous’ in relation to orders in earlier cases on contempt – discussion of orders whose meaning is obscure as a matter of construction of their terms, and orders shown to be uncertain or ambiguous in their operation in the context of the facts proved by the evidence – referred question answered, Yes.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25(6)

Federal Court Rules O 37 r 2

Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483 considered
Coflexip SA v Stolt Comex Seaway MS Ltd [1999] FSR 473 cited
Commodore Business Machines Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 92 ALR 563 cited
Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd v M.W.A. Holdings Pty Ltd (1970) 180 CLR 160 cited
Iberian Trust Ltd v Founders Trust and Investment Co [1932] 2 KB 87 considered
ICI Australia Operations Pty Limited v Trade Practices Commission (1992) 38 FCR 248 referred to
Interlego A.G. v Toltoys Pty Ltd (1973) 130 CLR 461 cited
Johnson v Walton [1990] 1 FLR 350 cited
Life Insurance Company of Australia Limited v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60 applied
Little v Lewis [1987] VR 798 cited
McNair Anderson Associates Pty Ltd v Hinch [1985] VR 309 cited
Microsoft Corporation v Goodview Electronics Pty Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 578 referred to
Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No 1) (1996) 69 FCR 117 considered
Microsoft Corporation v Plato Technology Limited [1999] FSR 834 cited
Mikasa (N.S.W.) Pty Ltd v Festival Stores (1972) 127 CLR 617 referred to
NATB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 506 cited

Raffles v Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H&C 906 referred to
Redwing Ltd v Redwing Forest Products Ltd (1947) 177 LT Rep 387 considered
Repatriation Commission v Nation (1995) 57 FCR 25 cited
Stancomb v Trowbridge Urban District Council [1910] 2 Ch 190 cited
Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel (1961) 106 CLR 588 cited
Welcome Real‑Time SA v Catuity Inc (No 2) (2001) AIPC 91,736 referred to
Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 cited

UNIVERSAL MUSIC AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED AND ORS v
SHARMAN NETWORKS LTD AND ORS

NSD 110 of 2004

BRANSON, LINDGREN AND FINKELSTEIN JJ

23 MARCH 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 110 of 2004

BETWEEN:

UNIVERSAL MUSIC AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
FIRST APPLICANT

FESTIVAL RECORDS PTY LTD AND MUSHROOM RECORDS PTY LTD TRADING AS FESTIVAL MUSHROOM RECORDS
SECOND APPLICANT

EMI MUSIC AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
THIRD APPLICANT

SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED
FOURTH…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 41
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and other music companies brought an action against Sharman Networks Ltd and others, alleging that they infringed copyright in their sound recordings through the Kazaa file-sharing system. The primary judge found that the defendants had indeed infringed copyright and issued an order to prevent further infringement. However, the defendants continued to operate Kazaa in a manner that violated the court order, leading to a contempt of court charge. The defendants argued that the court order was unclear and therefore could not be the basis for a contempt charge. The Full Court was asked to decide whether the court order could support a contempt charge.

The court held that the order was clear enough to support a contempt charge. The order explicitly prohibited certain actions related to the Kazaa system, and the defendants' continued operation of Kazaa in violation of the order demonstrated their contempt. The court rejected the argument that the order was too vague to support a contempt charge, emphasizing that the defendants' actions were in clear violation of the order's terms. The court also noted that the defendants had the opportunity to seek clarification of the order but chose not to do so.

The Full Court answered the referred question in the affirmative, stating that a determination of contempt could be made based on the alleged contraventions of the order. The court reserved the issue of costs associated with the referred question of law, deciding that it should be determined by the judge hearing the contempt charges, or by the primary judge if the charges were not proceeded with. The court emphasized the importance of clear and precise court orders to ensure that they can be effectively enforced and that any violations can be properly addressed as contempt of court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The following question reserved for the consideration of a Full Court, namely:

‘[W]hether, having regard to the nature and terms of order 4 made on 5 September 2005, a determination of contempt of court may be made in respect of the contraventions of that order alleged in the statement of charge’

be answered ‘Yes’.

2. The costs of the referred question of law, including the costs of 30 January 2006, be reserved to the judge who hears the charge of contempt, or should the charge not be proceeded with, to the primary judge, or, should it prove inconvenient or impossible for the primary judge to rule on the appropriate costs order, to another judge of the Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below I have concluded that the question of law referred to the Court should be answered, Yes.BACKGROUND The applicants claim copyright in their respective sound recordings pursuant to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (‘the Act’). At trial the applicants alleged, in effect, that each of the respondents had infringed the copyright of the applicants respectively by authorising the doing in Australia by users of the Kazaa internet file sharing system (‘Kazaa’) of acts comprised in the copyright in 98 identified sound recordings. After a lengthy trial, the learned primary judge made orders on 5 September 2005 which included the following orders:‘2.It be declared that each of the six respondents named below (‘the infringing respondents’) have infringed the copyright in each of the sound recordings whose title appears in column 2 of the attached Schedule, being a copyright of the applicant (‘the relevant applicant’) whose name is set out in the same row as the title of that sound recording in column 4 of that Schedule by:(i)authorising the doing in Australia by Kazaa users of the following acts (‘the infringing acts’) in relation to the said sound recording:(a)making a copy of the sound recording;(b)communicating the recording to the public;in each case, without the licence of the relevant applicant; and(ii)entering into a common design, with each of the other infringing respondents, to carry out, procure or direct the said authorisation;The infringing respondents are Sharman Networks Ltd, LEF Interactive Pty Ltd, Nicola Anne Hemming, Altnet Inc, Brilliant Digital Entertainment Inc and Kevin Glen Bermeister.3.It be declared that each of the infringing respondents threatens to infringe the copyright of the applicants in other sound recordings by:(i)authorising the doing in Australia by Kazaa users of the infringing acts; in each case, without the licence of the applicant who is the relevant copyright owner; and(ii)entering into a common design with each of the other infringing respondents, to carry out, procure or direct the said authorisation. No party exercised the liberty to apply reserved to the parties by order 8 above. On 10 October 2005 the Court extended the stay of Order 4 until 5 December 2005. Pursuant to order 1 of further orders made by the primary judge on 24 November 2005, the stay was ‘dissolved at midnight on 5 December 2005’. Although order 2 of the orders made by his Honour on 24 November 2005 granted a conditional further stay of Order 4 no reliance for present purposes is placed on this order. It may be assumed, for present purposes, not to have come into effect. On 30 January 2006 the primary judge had a number of notices of motion before him, including a notice of motion filed by the applicants on 9 December 2005 seeking punishment for contempt of court of those respondents against whom findings had been made on 5 September 2005 (‘the infringing respondents’). The statement of charge filed on 9 December 2005 makes identical allegations against each of the infringing respondents. Those allegations are that since midnight on 5 December 2005:‘(a)[he, she or it] has operated or participated in the operation of the Kazaa Internet file‑sharing system including by:(i)supplying, or permitting the supply of, KMD to Internet users in Australia and elsewhere;(ii)permitting users of KMD in Australia and elsewhere to use KMD so as to make copies of sound recordings of which the applicants are the copyright owners;(iii)permitting users of KMD in Australia and elsewhere to use KMD to communicate to the public sound recordings of which the applicants are the copyright owners;(iv)supplying, or permitting the supply of, advertising to users of KMD in Australia and elsewhere;(v)supplying, or permitting the supply of, Gold files to users of KMD in Australia and elsewhere;without the licence of the relevant copyright owner.(b)the Kazaa Internet file‑sharing system has not been modified pursuant to any protocol in accordance with order 5 of the 5 September Orders.’

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the above reasons I reject the contention of the infringing respondents that Order 4 is incapable of founding a charge of contempt because it is drawn in terms which reproduce the requirements of the Act rather than in terms which proscribe particular conduct. CONCLUSION ON REFERRED QUESTION For the reasons given above, particularly at [39], I conclude that the answer to the question of law referred to this Court should be answered, Yes.COSTS On 30 January 2006, when reserving the question of law for the consideration of this Court, the primary judge also reserved for the determination of this Court the costs of 30 January 2006. I agree that the costs of 30 January 2006 should be regarded as costs of and incidental to the costs of the question of law reserved for the consideration of this Court. However, it is, in my view, premature to determine the appropriate costs order on the reserved question of law. If the charges of contempt are proceeded with, it may be appropriate (I do not say that it would be appropriate) for the costs of the reserved question of law to be costs in the cause on those charges. If the charges of contempt are not proceeded with, or are not proceeded with to finality, different considerations might come into play. The appropriate costs order, in my view, is that the costs of the referred question of law, including the costs of 30 January 2006, be reserved to the judge before whom the contempt charges are heard, or should these charges not be proceeded with, to the primary judge or, should it prove inconvenient or impossible for his Honour to rule on the appropriate costs order, to another judge of the Court. I have reached Branson J’s conclusion substantially for the reasons given by her Honour. We are required to address the question of law referred, in an evidentiary vacuum. I would emphasise the words in the question referred, ‘having regard [only] to the nature and terms of Order 4’ and ‘may be made’ (my emphasis). At [39] of her reasons, Branson J refers to facts, at this stage hypothetical, which demonstrate why the question of law should be answered ‘yes’. If an order restrains a person from doing something ‘in daylight’ and the person does the thing at midday in broad daylight, it is no answer to a charge of contempt that the order might have had an uncertain application requiring a dismissal of the charge if the evidence had shown that the person did the thing at twilight. The facts hypothesised would have suggested that the potential uncertainty of operation could have been avoided if the order had been expressed in terms of hours of the day, rather than in terms of ‘in daylight’. This does not signify, however, that ‘the nature and terms’ of the order were such that a charge of contempt was always destined to fail. Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No. 1) (1996) 69 FCR 117 was a case of uncertainty of operation. That uncertainty arose from the failure of the order to address at all the question of the consent or licence of the copyright owner. In terms of the distinction made by Isaacs J in Life Insurance Company of Australia Ltd v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60 at 78-79 (quoted by Branson J at [29]), the problem was one of ambiguity of ‘interpretation’ (due to the order’s incompleteness of expression), rather than one of ‘construction’. Importantly, the alleged contemnor had put in issue at trial the question whether the copyright owner had consented. I agree with Branson J’s description (at [36]) of the ratio decidendi of Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No 1).