Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd v Christensen

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WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
Status: Appeal to the Court of Appeal allowed. Matter remitted to the Commission constituted    by a Presidential member - Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd v Christensen [2017] NSWCA 260
CITATION: Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd v Christensen [2016] NSWWCCPD 14
APPELLANT: Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd
RESPONDENT: Penelope Christensen
INSURER: Allianz Australia Workers Compensation (NSW) Limited
FILE NUMBER: A1-5286/13
ARBITRATOR: Mr J Wynyard
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 8 September 2015
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 25 February 2016
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Section 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; causation of death of worker; onus of proof; proof in the absence of scientific certainty; consideration of EMI (Australia) Ltd v Bes [1970] 2 NSWR 238 and Tubemakers of Australia v Fernandez (1976) 10 ALR 303; standard of proof; factual error; s 9A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; need to engage with evidence and to state reasons for findings in circumstances when there is conflicting expert evidence
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Deputy President Kevin O'Grady
HEARING: On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Respondent: Edwards Michael Powell Lawyers
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:

1.     The Arbitrator’s findings and orders found in the Certificate of Determination dated 8 September 2015 are confirmed.

2.     The matter is remitted to Arbitrator Wynyard for further directions and hearing concerning the question of apportionment.

INTRODUCTION

  1. The late Grant Andrew Christensen (the deceased) died at his home on 8 September 2008 suddenly and unexpectedly. These proceedings were commenced by the widow of the deceased, Ms Penelope Christensen (the respondent), against the deceased’s employer at the date of death, Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd (the appellant). The appellant had earlier declined liability following Mrs Christensen’s claim against it, seeking compensation benefits pursuant to s 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). Mrs Christensen and the two children of her marriage to the deceased, Dylan and Patrick, were at all material times dependent upon the deceased for support.

  2. The deceased had been employed as a Portfolio Manager by the appellant, which is a corporate member of an internationally established hedge fund business founded in the United States of America. It was the respondent’s allegation that the deceased’s death resulted from an injury arising out of or in the course of that employment. Briefly stated, it was the respondent’s case that the prevailing conditions of employment experienced by the deceased in the months before his death were such that he was subjected to considerable stress, had been working very hard and was missing regular sleep. Those, and other circumstances, had given rise to a deterioration in the deceased’s state of health, he became run down and, as put by counsel, his immune system had become “debilitated”. As a consequence of his then state of health generally, he contracted a viral illness. It was the respondent’s case that, on the probabilities, that viral illness caused or aggravated ventricular fibrillation leading to cardiac…

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Details
Case
[2016] NSWWCCPD 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd sought review of a decision made by an arbitrator in a workers compensation claim brought by the estate of a deceased worker, Christensen. The primary issue in the case was whether the Arbitrator correctly assessed the causation of the worker's death, considering the standard of proof required and the conflicting expert evidence presented. The Arbitrator had concluded that the worker's employment conditions caused emotional stress leading to a viral illness, which subsequently caused his death. Tudor Capital argued that the Arbitrator had reversed the onus of proof and applied an incorrect standard of proof in making these findings.

The court had to determine if the Arbitrator had erred in law by reversing the onus of proof or by applying an incorrect standard of proof. The Arbitrator's approach was to consider the possibility, rather than certainty, of causation, consistent with previous cases such as EMI (Australia) Ltd v Bes and Tubemakers of Australia v Fernandez. The court examined whether the Arbitrator had sufficiently engaged with the conflicting expert evidence and provided adequate reasons for preferring one expert's evidence over another, as required by Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd. The court also had to consider whether the Arbitrator's findings demonstrated a factual error in assessing the evidence.

The court found that the Arbitrator had correctly applied the principles from Bes and Fernandez concerning the standard of proof in the absence of scientific certainty. The Arbitrator had adequately engaged with the conflicting expert evidence and provided reasons for preferring the evidence supporting the worker's claims. The court confirmed that there was no factual error in the Arbitrator's assessment. However, the court identified a need for further consideration of the apportionment of liability, which led to the decision to remit the matter back to the Arbitrator for further directions and hearing on this issue.

The court confirmed the Arbitrator's findings and orders, while remitting the matter for further consideration of apportionment. The decision underscores the importance of correctly applying the standard of proof in workers compensation cases and the necessity for arbitrators to provide clear reasons for their findings when faced with conflicting expert evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Arbitrator’s findings and orders found in the Certificate of Determination dated 8 September 2015 are confirmed.

2. The matter is remitted to Arbitrator Wynyard for further directions and hearing concerning the question of apportionment.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Arbitrator’s statement quoted immediately above was made almost immediately following his summary of that stated by Herron CJ in Bes including his Honour’s observation that “if medical science is prepared to say that it is a possible view, then in my opinion the judge after examining the lay evidence may decide that it is probable.” (emphasis added) Commencing at [230] of the Arbitrator’s Reasons, it appears that reference is being made to his acceptance of the respondent’s case concerning work conditions. The difficulty to which I have earlier referred (at [77] above) arises at [245] of Reasons where it was stated by the Arbitrator, before his final consideration of the conflicting medical evidence, as follows:“I am satisfied that the temporal events described in these reasons caused emotional stress to the deceased of such a nature that he suffered a viral illness during at least the week before his death - probably, on the evidence before me, more in the nature of two weeks. That illness most likely caused T cell infiltration into the myocardium at the time that the deceased became breathless, a few hours before his death.” The Commission is not, under this ground, dealing with a suggested failure on the part of the Arbitrator to provide sufficient or adequate reasons for his conclusions, but rather is required to ascertain whether the complaints concerning reversal of the onus and application of a wrong standard of proof are made out. Before embarking upon that task, I make the observation that, upon examination of the nature of the issues raised before the Arbitrator, it is demonstrated, in my opinion, that the principles concerning the correct approach to the question of proof where medical science provides no certainty (as in Bes) are plainly relevant to the first issue, being the question of the existence or otherwise of a causal nexus between the deceased’s work conditions and his contraction of a virus. The second issue, which concerned the question as to the probable cause of death, was the subject of conflicting expert evidence and, notwithstanding the approach taken by the parties, raises an additional question to that addressed in Bes and the other authorities, which deal with postulation of a possibility rather than a certainty as to the existence of a relevant causal nexus. The appellant appears to acknowledge that additional question, which involves the requirements to address the evidence and the need to give reasons, in its argument advanced in support of ground five. There it is asserted that the Arbitrator wrongly rejected the evidence of Professor Keogh and reliance is placed upon the decision in Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 174; 60 NSWLR 127 (Wiki) in which the Court addressed the need to engage with the evidence and to explain the basis of preference for one expert’s evidence over that of another. I have earlier (at [71]) made reference to the appellant’s argument concerning reversal of the onus as being demonstrated by the Arbitrator’s statements at [271] of his Reasons.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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