1. Appeal dismissed; 2. Appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal
CATCHWORDS:
Workers Compensation Act 1987, s9(A) - Whether employment a substantial contributing factor to injury - Whether error of law in process where trial judge preferred one expert over the other - Proper approach where Court faced with competing hypotheses as to cause of an injury - Capacity of a trial judge to draw inferences which depend at least in part on intuition - Adequacy of trial judge's reasons - Consideration of interplay between the requirement of "contributing factor" in s 4(b)(ii) and "substantial contributing factor" in s 9(A) of Workers Compensation Act 1987
Graham Murray (Appellant) Ronald Shillingsworth (Respondent)
FILE NUMBER(S):
CA 40187/06
COUNSEL:
SG Campbell SC, Ms DR Moore (Appellant) M Daley (Respondent)
SOLICITORS:
Hunt & Hunt (Appellant) Brydens Law Office (Liverpool) (Respondent)
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
RJ4094/02
LOWER COURTJUDICIAL OFFICER:
Bishop J
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
27/02/06
CA 40187/06 RJ4094/2002
HODGSON JA SANTOW JA EINSTEIN J
Wednesday 20 December 2006
MURRAY V SHILLINGSWORTH
The respondent suffered a cerebral haemorrhage in the course of his employment working for the appellant as a cotton chipper on 13 January 1997.
The respondent unsuccessfully brought proceedings in the former Compensation Court seeking weekly benefits compensation and lump sum compensation pursuant to s 66 and 67 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. The respondent successfully appealed to this Court, setting aside the award. The matter was remitted for rehearing in the District Court.
On the rehearing, Bishop J entered a verdict in favour of the respondent. The appellant appealed on the following grounds:
1. The trial judge misdirected himself as to the onus of proof.
2. The trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for accepting one medical hypothesis as to the aetiology of the respondent’s stroke over the others.
3. The…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Murray v Shillingsworth [2006] NSWCA 367
Case
[2006] NSWCA 367
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal in *Murray v Shillingsworth* concerned a dispute over a workers compensation claim. The appellant, Murray, sought to overturn a decision of the primary judge that had dismissed his claim for compensation. The respondent was Shillingsworth.
The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge had erred in law by preferring one expert witness's opinion over another, and what the proper approach was when faced with competing hypotheses regarding the cause of an injury. The Court also considered the capacity of a trial judge to draw inferences that might rely on intuition, and the adequacy of the primary judge's reasons. Furthermore, the Court examined the interplay between the requirement of a "contributing factor" under s 4(b)(ii) and a "substantial contributing factor" under s 9(A) of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987*.
The Court of Appeal found no error of law in the primary judge's decision. It held that a trial judge is entitled to prefer one expert opinion over another, provided that preference is adequately reasoned. The Court affirmed that a judge may draw inferences that are not solely based on logical deduction but may also involve an element of intuition, provided these inferences are supported by the evidence. The Court concluded that the primary judge's reasons were adequate and that the finding that the employment was not a substantial contributing factor to the injury was open to the judge on the evidence.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal dismissed; 2. Appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal