| WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION | ||
| DETERMINATION AS TO COSTS | ||
| CITATION: | Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd v Christensen (No 2) [2016] NSWWCCPD 20 | |
| APPELLANT: | Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd | |
| RESPONDENT: | Penelope Christensen | |
| INSURER: | Allianz Australia Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd | |
| FILE NUMBER: | A1-5286/13 | |
| ARBITRATOR: | Mr J Wynyard | |
| DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: | 8 September 2015 25 February 2016 | |
| DATE OF COSTS DECISION: | 8 April 2016 | |
| SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: | Section 341 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998, as it stood prior to the amendments introduced by the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012; jurisdiction to award costs | |
| PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: | President Judge Keating | |
| HEARING: | On the papers | |
| REPRESENTATION: | Appellant: | HWL Ebsworth Lawyers |
| Respondent: | Edwards Michael Powell Lawyers | |
| ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL: | 1. The appellant employer is to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed. Costs of the original proceedings before the Arbitrator and any subsequent proceedings, in respect of apportionment, should follow the event. | |
INTRODUCTION
This matter has been reopened following an application made by the respondent widow, to the appeal in Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd v Christensen [2016] NSWWCCPD 14 (appeal decision), seeking that an order for costs of the proceedings be made in her favour.
In particular, it concerns the Commission’s jurisdiction to award costs pursuant to s 341 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act), as it stood prior to amendment by the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (the amending Act).
BACKGROUND
The appeal concerned a claim for a lump sum death benefit under s 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). That claim was commenced by the legal representatives of the deceased worker’s widow on 8 September 2011.
The deceased died from cardiac arrest, a disease which the widow claimed was contracted in the course of the deceased’s employment and to which his employment was a substantial contributing factor. The basis of the claim was that the deceased’s work conditions gave rise to a deterioration in his state of health and contraction of a viral illness, which caused or aggravated ventricular fibrillation leading to the cardiac arrest. The employer, Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd, denied the claim relying upon ss 9A and 11A of the 1987 Act.
On 28 March 2013, the widow lodged an Application in Respect of Death of Worker (originating application) in the Commission. The application was registered in the Commission on 2 April 2013. The matter proceeded to hearing on four separate occasions, before a determination was issued.
On 8 September 2015, the Arbitrator issued a Certificate of Determination finding the employer liable pursuant to s 25 of the 1987 Act. The question of apportionment of compensation between dependants was deferred to permit the provision of appropriate submissions from the deceased’s two children. In respect of costs, the only order entered by the Arbitrator was as follows:
“4. I certify this matter as being complex, the reasons for which I trust are self explanatory. I…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd v Christensen (No 2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2016] NSWWCCPD 20
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the statutory provisions governing the award of costs and the general principles applicable to such awards. It noted that section 341 provided for the payment of costs by one party to another in certain circumstances, but the precise scope of the Court's discretion was unclear. The Court held that, based on the plain language of the statute and the context in which it was enacted, the Court did indeed have the authority to award costs to the respondent in the appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the costs of the original proceedings before the Arbitrator and any subsequent proceedings should follow the event, meaning that the party that was unsuccessful in those proceedings should bear the costs. This interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the legislation, which was to ensure that the injured worker could seek redress without being unduly burdened by costs.
In light of the above, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the employer was to pay the employee’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed. The costs of the original proceedings before the Arbitrator and any subsequent proceedings were to be determined in accordance with the event, meaning that the party that was unsuccessful in those proceedings would bear the costs. This decision clarified the scope of the Court's jurisdiction to award costs in workers' compensation cases and provided guidance on the apportionment of costs in such proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant employer is to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed. Costs of the original proceedings before the Arbitrator and any subsequent proceedings, in respect of apportionment, should follow the event.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated with an arbitration hearing where the Arbitrator awarded compensation to Mr. Christensen and ordered the employer to pay his costs. Dissatisfied with the decision, Tudor Capital Australia Pty Ltd appealed to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which dismissed the appeal. The employer then appealed to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. The Court of Appeal heard arguments on the employer's challenge to the award of costs under Section 341 of the Act, prior to its amendment by the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to award costs under Section 341 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998, as it stood prior to the amendments introduced by the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012.
2. If the Court has jurisdiction, what are the appropriate costs to be awarded to the respondent in the context of this appeal.
Held
1. The Court concluded that it has jurisdiction to award costs under Section 341 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998, as it stood prior to the amendments introduced by the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012.
2. The Court determined that the appropriate costs to be awarded to the respondent in the context of this appeal are the costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court first addressed the issue of its jurisdiction to award costs under Section 341 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998. The Court noted that prior to the amendments introduced by the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012, Section 341 provided for the award of costs in proceedings before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Court found that this provision remained applicable to the instant appeal as it was commenced before the amendments took effect. Therefore, the Court concluded it had the jurisdiction to award costs under the old law.
In considering the appropriate costs to be awarded, the Court referred to the principle that costs should follow the event, a well-established principle in Australian jurisprudence. The Court emphasised that costs of the appeal should be awarded to the respondent as they were the prevailing party in the appeal. The Court rejected the argument that the costs of the original proceedings before the Arbitrator and any subsequent proceedings should be awarded to the respondent. The Court reasoned that these costs should be apportioned in accordance with the outcome of the proceedings, which was to be determined in further proceedings. Consequently, the Court ordered the appellant employer to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed, and that costs of the original proceedings and any subsequent proceedings should follow the event. This decision adhered to the principle of costs following the event and recognised the respondent’s success in the appeal.