Toorage Ahadizad v Trevor Emerton [2002] ACTSC 20 (28 March 2002)
CATCHWORDS
MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC – driving in manner dangerous to public – whether continuing to drive whilst sneezing is dangerous – factors relevant – onus of proof – whether need for medical evidence.
APPEAL – appeal from conviction by Magistrate – whether Magistrate mistook onus of proof once involuntariness raised.
Motor Traffic Act 1936, s 129
Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149
Jiminez v the Queen (1991) 173 CLR 572
Ryan v R (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 217
R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT
No. SCA 55 of 2000
Judge: Miles CJ
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 28 March 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SCA 55 of 2000
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT
BETWEEN:TOORAGE AHADIZAD
Appellant
AND:TREVOR EMERTON
Respondent
ORDER
Judge: Miles CJ
Date: 28 March 2002
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be dismissed.
The appellant appeals against a conviction for driving in a manner dangerous to the public contrary to s129(1) of the Motor Traffic Act 1936 on the grounds that (1) the Magistrate erred in the consideration of whether the appellant’s actions were involuntary and (2) the Magistrate erred in the application of the onus of proof when involuntariness had been raised.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Magistrate found that the appellant was driving a car south along Boddington Crescent, Kambah at 5:30 am on Thursday 19, October 1999 with the headlights on, at a speed of 60 kilometres per hour. As he passed the Carleton Street shops, the appellant felt an irritation but did not consider it an indication that he would suffer a sneezing attack. Some 350 metres after that, he did suffer a six second sneezing attack, travelling a distance something in excess of 100 metres whilst sneezing and with his eyes mostly closed. By the time the sneezing attack had finished, the appellant’s vehicle had mounted the kerb of the incorrect side of the road and had travelled a further 18 metres. The appellant then regained control of his vehicle and attempted to move back to the correct side of the road and in the process collided with an oncoming vehicle which had moved in a similar attempt to avoid collision.
WAS THE APPELLANT’S CONDUCT INVOLUNTARY?
The Magistrate gave an ex tempore judgment in which he concluded that “continuing to drive whilst suffering a sneezing fit constituted driving in a manner dangerous”.
The appellant submits that in considering whether the appellant’s actions were involuntary the Magistrate ought have taken into account that there was no warning of the sneezing attack and the severity of the imminent attack. The presence of a warning before an involuntary episode that is not acted on may indicate dangerous driving from the time of the warning until the time the involuntary episode begins:
“A driver…
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- Case
- [2002] ACTSC 20
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues were whether the appellant's act of sneezing while driving constituted a dangerous manner, what factors should be considered in determining dangerousness, and what onus of proof applies in such cases. Specifically, the appeal questioned whether the Magistrate had correctly applied the onus of proof when the defence of involuntariness was raised. The court had to determine if medical evidence was required to substantiate the appellant's claim that the sneezing was involuntary.
The court found that sneezing while driving could indeed be dangerous, depending on the circumstances. It considered several factors, including the appellant's awareness of the sneezing, the potential for distraction, and the risk of losing control of the vehicle. The court held that while medical evidence could be relevant, it was not strictly necessary to prove involuntariness if other evidence supported the claim. Regarding the onus of proof, the court concluded that the Magistrate had not erred in shifting the onus to the appellant once involuntariness was raised. The evidence presented did not sufficiently support the defence of involuntariness, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The appeal be dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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