SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Toodayan & Anor v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner Queensland [2018] QCA 349
PARTIES:
NADEEM TOODAYAN
(first appellant)
ZAHEER TOODAYAN
(second appellant)
v
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMISSIONER QUEENSLAND
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 211 of 2018
SC No 510 of 2017DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
Miscellaneous Application – CivilORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2017] QSC 301 (Martin J)DELIVERED ON:
14 December 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
14 May 2018
JUDGES:
Fraser and Philippides JJA and Burns J
ORDERS:
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The decision of the delegate rejecting the appellants’ complaint is set aside.
3. There be no order as to costs.
CATCHWORDS:
HUMAN RIGHTS – JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – where the appellants worked as interns at the Princess Alexandra Hospital – where the appellants made complaints to the respondent alleging discrimination arising out of a police investigation and the related conduct of hospital staff – where a delegate of the respondent rejected the complaints on the basis that they were misconceived or lacking in substance under s 139(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) – where an application for judicial review was dismissed – whether the primary judge erred by failing to find that the delegate applied the wrong test when rejecting the complaint under s 139(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) – whether the primary judge erred by finding that the evidence before the delegate did not establish a contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 24AA, s 27A(8)
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 6, s 7, s 9, s 10, s 134, s 136, ss 139 – 143, s 154A, ss 156 – 158, s 164, s 164A, s 166, ss 168 – 169, s 174A, s 174B, ss 175 – 193A, ss 204 – 208, s 244
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 20(2)(f)Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41, cited
Black & White (Quick Service) Taxis Ltd v Sailor & Anor[2008] QSC 77, cited
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232; [2005] QCA 227, cited
Langley v Niland [1981] 2 NSWLR 104, cited
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal & Ors; ex parte Hardiman & Ors (1980) 144 CLR 13; [1980] HCA 13, cited
Sharma v Legal Aid (Qld) [2002] FCAFC 196, cited
State Electricity Commission v Rabel & Ors [1998] 1 VR 102; [1996] VSC 78, citedCOUNSEL:
N J Derrington for the appellants
J A Ball (sol) for the respondent
J M Horton QC appointed amicus curiae, as contradictorSOLICITORS:
Antigone Legal for the appellants
Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland for the respondent
FRASER JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Burns J and the orders proposed by his Honour.
PHILIPPIDES JA: I agree with the orders proposed by Burns J, for the reasons given by his Honour.
BURNS J: The…
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- Case
- [2018] QCA 349
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the delegate applied the wrong test when rejecting the complaint under section 139(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) and whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the evidence before the delegate did not establish a contravention of the Act. The court held that the appellants' contention that the delegate applied the wrong test when rejecting their complaint was correct. However, the primary judge did not err in finding that the evidence before the delegate did not establish a contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). The court found that the primary judge had correctly identified that the statutory test was not to be glossed in the ways contended by the appellants but had not directed sufficient attention to all the evidence before the Commission to support an inference of discrimination.
The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the delegate rejecting the appellants' complaint was set aside. The court held that the statutory test under section 139(b) required the commissioner to form an opinion based on the reasonably sufficient details provided in the complaint, if proved, to indicate a contravention that was neither misconceived nor lacking in substance. The court found that the primary judge's error was in not sufficiently considering all the evidence before the Commission. As the respondent took no active part in the appeal, there was no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The decision of the delegate rejecting the appellants’ complaint is set aside.
3. There be no order as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There are other provisions of the ADA that may be engaged to reject, stay or lapse complaints where the complaint is, or has been, the subject of a proceeding in a court or tribunal (ss 140 and 168A) or where the complainant appears to “lose interest” (ss 160(1) and 169). However, those provisions aside, the only power to reject or lapse a complaint because it is frivolous, trivial, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance arises under ss 139 and 168.Consideration As s 136(b) ADA provides, a complaint must set out “reasonably sufficient details to indicate an alleged contravention”. There is no requirement at the lodgement stage to support a complaint with evidence, although that no doubt commonly occurs to varying degrees. When the complaint is supplemented with supporting material, that material will of course also form part of the details to be considered by the commissioner. Furthermore, on receipt of a complaint, the commissioner may request further information or documents and such a request may extend to a request of the complainant for supporting evidence in order to assist in the formation of the opinion required under s 139(b), although there will be limited time to do so because the commissioner must decide whether to accept or reject a complaint within 28 days of its receipt. But, however the complaint is constituted and whatever the commissioner does after it is received, it is plain that the obligation on the part of the complainant at this early stage does not extend beyond the provision of reasonably sufficient details to indicate a contravention. It is also to be observed that, although the statutory test is expressed in the same way, s 139 operates differently to s 168. In the first place, s 168 will only be engaged after the complaint has been accepted, a written response has been invited from the respondent and any attempt at conciliation has taken place. In addition, the commissioner may by that stage have investigated the complaint. Because such a complaint will already have been accepted under s 141 following consideration by the commissioner whether it was, relevantly, misconceived or lacking in substance, s 168 will only be engaged where something has emerged, either from the respondent or from the investigation, to change the commissioner’s opinion. But, even more importantly, if under s 168(1) the commissioner forms the reasonable opinion that the complaint is, relevantly, misconceived or lacking in substance, the complainant must show cause to the commissioner’s satisfaction why that is not so to avoid the complaint lapsing under s 168(4) whereas, under s 139, there is no onus on the complainant to prove anything. The nature of the commissioner’s task under s 139(b) is informed by these statutory features as well as the protective purpose of the legislation.[55] A complaint cannot be expected to “allege the relevant facts with the particularity of an indictment or of a pleading”.[56] Nor should it be assumed that the details supplied are comprehensive or that they aspire to do any more than indicate what is intended to later be proved to establish the complaint. Thus, when forming an opinion under that provision, the question for the commissioner is whether the details provided in and with the complaint, if proved at a hearing of the tribunal, are indicative of a contravention that is neither misconceived nor lacking in substance. A complaint will be “misconceived” if it is based on a false conception or notion such as an allegation of discrimination on the basis of an attribute that is not protected by the ADA and “lacking in substance” where the detail provided in the complaint fails to point to conduct on the part of the named respondent that is capable, if proved, of amounting to a contravention under the ADA. Obviously, because rejection will deprive the complainant of a hearing, it must clearly appear that the complaint is misconceived or lacking in substance before the requisite opinion may reasonably be formed.[55]Section 6(1) ADA. And see Black & White (Quick Service) Taxis Ltd v Sailor & Anor [2008] QSC 77, [36].[56]Langley v Niland [1981] 2 NSWLR 104, 108. And see: State Electricity Commission v Rabel & Ors [1998] 1 VR 102, 116-117; Black & White (Quick Service) Taxis Ltd v Sailor & Anor (Ibid), [32].