FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tomson v Minister for Finance and Deregulation
[2013] FCA 664
Citation: Tomson v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2013] FCA 664 Parties: PETER TOMSON and KIM TOMSON v MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION File number: NSD 1289 of 2012 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 11 July 2013 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – application by two persons for “act of grace payment” under s 33(1) of Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) after failed prosecution under Customs Act 1901 (Cth) of one of them – where new application refused by delegate – where earlier application for act of grace payment by one of those persons on different basis refused by Minister without giving reasons – whether refusal of new application improper exercise of power or exercise of discretionary power in accordance with a policy without regard to the merits of the particular case or so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power (ss 5(1)(e), (f) and 5(2)(g) of Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)) – where both applications by common applicant on some similar but not identical facts and circumstances – where new application expressly abandoned basis of prior rejected application – whether new application considered on its own merits or refusal decision based on prior application without regard to new information and claim by additional applicant – where delegate referred to Departmental policy that earlier decision would be reconsidered only if pertinent new evidence/facts/arguments presented – where delegate refused to reconsider new application – whether new application substantially differed from prior application
Held: delegate’s reasons did not reflect consideration of new application including new applicant or new information
Legislation: Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) ss 33, 62
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(e) and (j), 5(2)(f), (g) and (j), 16
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 255
Cases cited: Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291 applied
Klein v Domus Pty Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 467 applied
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164 applied
Tomson v Boitano [2011] NSWSC 527 referred to
Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981 appliedSZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 563 applied
Date of hearing: 7 February 2013 Date of last submissions: 4 July 2013 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 51 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr D A Lloyd Solicitor for the Applicants: Accentro Legal Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr N Gouliaditis of the Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1289 of 2012
BETWEEN: PETER TOMSON
First ApplicantKIM TOMSON
Second ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 JULY 2013
WHERE MADE:
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 664
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Minister had exercised his discretion unreasonably by failing to give proper consideration to the plaintiff's second application for compensation. The court found that the Minister had proceeded on the basis that the issues raised in the second application had already been considered by a previous decision-maker, and that there was no new information warranting reconsideration. However, the court found that the Minister had not given adequate consideration to whether the second application did in fact raise new issues or present new information that warranted reconsideration. The court held that the Minister's failure to properly consider the second application was a failure to exercise his discretion reasonably, and therefore the decision to deny the second application was unlawful.
The court quashed the decision to deny the plaintiff's second application for an act of grace payment and remitted the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration. The court found that the Minister must properly consider the merits of the second application, having regard to the scope and purpose of section 33 of the FMA Act, and its real object. The court emphasised that the Minister must exercise his discretion reasonably, and must understand his statutory powers and obligations. The court noted that even where some reasons have been provided for a decision, it may still be possible for a court to infer that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion if the result is unreasonable or plainly unjust.
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Background to the litigation
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There is nothing to suggest that any other provision of the FMA Act or any matter arising by implication from it affects the breadth of the factors that the Finance Minister is entitled to take into account, or limits or otherwise conditions what she must have regard to, when considering the exercise of the discretion under s 33. Nonetheless, the Finance Minister must exercise her discretion reasonably, having regard to the scope and purpose of s 33 the FMA Act and its real object: Li 297 ALR at 247 [67] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ, see too at 236 [23]-[24] per French CJ and 257-258 [109]-[112] per Gageler J. A decision-maker must understand his or her statutory powers and obligations: Li 297 ALR at 248 [71]. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ went on to say (297 ALR at 249 [72], 250 [76]):“[72]… Further, in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [(1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41], Mason J considered that the preferred ground for setting aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to an irrelevant factor of no importance, is that the decision is “manifestly unreasonable”. Whether a decision-maker be regarded, by reference to the scope and purpose of the statute, as having committed a particular error in reasoning, given disproportionate weight to some factor or reasoned illogically or irrationally, the final conclusion will in each case be that the decision-maker has been unreasonable in a legal sense....[76]As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v R [(1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505] that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion “if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust”. The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.”Consideration Dr Verney’s letter of 14 May 2012 and his statement of reasons both proceeded on the basis that the issues raised in the 2012 application had been fully considered by Senator Colbeck when he made his decision in 2006 to reject the 2005 application. Dr Verney identified that Senator Colbeck’s earlier consideration was one reason why he had decided to exercise, what he termed, his discretion not to reconsider the request for an act of grace statement. The second basis which Dr Verney said he had for that exercise of discretion was that the information in the 2012 application “… did not represent new information that warranted reconsideration” (emphasis added). Dr Verney identified, as a matter that he had taken into account in that exercise of his discretion, a policy that generally a request for a payment under s 33(1) would not be reconsidered unless it could be shown that the decision-maker had made a serious mistake or relevant new information warranting reconsideration were provided.