Tomson v Minister for Finance and Deregulation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tomson v Minister for Finance and Deregulation
[2013] FCA 664

Citation: Tomson v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2013] FCA 664
Parties: PETER TOMSON and KIM TOMSON v MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
File number: NSD 1289 of 2012
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 11 July 2013
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – application by two persons for “act of grace payment” under s 33(1) of Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) after failed prosecution under Customs Act 1901 (Cth) of one of them – where new application refused by delegate – where earlier application for act of grace payment by one of those persons on different basis refused by Minister without giving reasons – whether refusal of new application improper exercise of power or exercise of discretionary power in accordance with a policy without regard to the merits of the particular case or so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power (ss 5(1)(e), (f) and 5(2)(g) of Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)) – where both applications by common applicant on some similar but not identical facts and circumstances – where new application expressly abandoned basis of prior rejected application – whether new application considered on its own merits or refusal decision based on prior application without regard to new information and claim by additional applicant – where delegate referred to Departmental policy that earlier decision would be reconsidered only if pertinent new evidence/facts/arguments presented – where delegate refused to reconsider new application – whether new application substantially differed from prior application

Held:  delegate’s reasons did not reflect consideration of new application including new applicant or new information  

Legislation:

Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) ss 33, 62
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(e) and (j), 5(2)(f), (g) and (j), 16
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 255

Cases cited:

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291 applied
Klein v Domus Pty Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 467 applied
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164 applied
Tomson v Boitano [2011] NSWSC 527 referred to
Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981 applied

SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 563 applied

Date of hearing: 7 February 2013
Date of last submissions: 4 July 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 51
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr D A Lloyd
Solicitor for the Applicants: Accentro Legal
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr N Gouliaditis of the Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1289 of 2012

BETWEEN:

PETER TOMSON
First Applicant

KIM TOMSON
Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JULY 2013

WHERE MADE:

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 664
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Tomson v Minister for Finance and Deregulation, the plaintiff sought compensation from the Australian Government for losses they had incurred due to the seizure of their imported clothing stock by the Australian Customs Service, and the subsequent unsuccessful prosecution of the plaintiff for customs offences. The plaintiff had previously applied for an act of grace payment under section 33 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act) but had been denied. The plaintiff subsequently made a second application, which was also denied. The plaintiff challenged the legality of the decision to deny the second application for an act of grace payment. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Minister for Finance and Deregulation had exercised his discretion under section 33 of the FMA Act unreasonably, by failing to adequately consider the plaintiff's second application for compensation.

The court held that the Minister had exercised his discretion unreasonably by failing to give proper consideration to the plaintiff's second application for compensation. The court found that the Minister had proceeded on the basis that the issues raised in the second application had already been considered by a previous decision-maker, and that there was no new information warranting reconsideration. However, the court found that the Minister had not given adequate consideration to whether the second application did in fact raise new issues or present new information that warranted reconsideration. The court held that the Minister's failure to properly consider the second application was a failure to exercise his discretion reasonably, and therefore the decision to deny the second application was unlawful.

The court quashed the decision to deny the plaintiff's second application for an act of grace payment and remitted the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration. The court found that the Minister must properly consider the merits of the second application, having regard to the scope and purpose of section 33 of the FMA Act, and its real object. The court emphasised that the Minister must exercise his discretion reasonably, and must understand his statutory powers and obligations. The court noted that even where some reasons have been provided for a decision, it may still be possible for a court to infer that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion if the result is unreasonable or plainly unjust.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Relevantly, s 5(1)(e) of the ADJR Act provided that a ground for an order of review was that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which the decision purported to be made. The reference to an improper exercise of a power included relevantly, first, an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of a particular case (s 5(2)(f)) and, secondly, an exercise of a power that was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power (s 5(2)(g)).Background In 1987 Mr and Mrs Tomson were operating two retail clothing shops in Cabramatta and Bankstown in Western Sydney. They imported all their stock for sale in the shops. Between July 1987 and March 1988 the Australian Customs Service (Customs) seized five shipments of clothing stock that Mr Tomson had imported into Australia. Customs suspected that Mr Tomson had undervalued the goods in his applications to import them in order to defraud the revenue. Customs referred their concerns to the Commonwealth Director of Prosecutions (the DPP). In the meantime, after Mr Tomson’s attempts to import stock had been blocked by Customs’ seizures of his overseas acquisitions, he had to buy what he claimed was more expensive, locally produced stock to sell in the shops. Mr Tomson claimed that the profitability of the two shops in which he and his wife worked was adversely affected. In February 1990, the DPP advised Customs that there was insufficient evidence to justify any prosecution of Mr Tomson under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). However, the DPP suggested that there was potentially sufficient evidence to warrant commencing proceedings for offences under the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). The DPP recommended that Customs refer the matter to the Australian Government Solicitor. Ultimately, the Australian Government Solicitor advised Customs that there was a prima facie case for prosecutions under the Customs Act. Between July 1992 and September 1992, Customs commenced prosecutions in the Local Court of New South Wales by laying informations against Mr Tomson on multiple counts under the Customs Act. The informations relied on the then provisions in s 255 of the Customs Act that permitted the prosecutor to aver matters of fact and of mixed fact and law. The averments were deemed to be prima facie evidence of the matters avered. After hearing the Local Court proceedings, the Magistrate dismissed each information against Mr Tomson on 27 June 1995. The Magistrate refused to order costs against Customs. However, the Supreme Court of New South Wales quashed that decision and remitted the question of costs back to the Local Court. In the end, Customs agreed to pay Mr Tomson $100,000 in respect of his claim for costs. In May 2004, the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs of the House of Representatives tabled its report on Modern-day usage of averments in Customs prosecutions (the Report). The Report included a dissenting report by one member of the Committee, the Hon Duncan Kerr MP. The Report considered the circumstances of Mr Tomson’s prosecution in detail and made the following recommendation:“Given the reprehensible handling exhibited by the Australian Customs Service over the course of the investigation and failed prosecution of Mr Tomson, the Committee recommends that Mr Tomson receive appropriate compensation for commercial losses directly attributable to the seizure of the goods and to the lapse of time before the resolution of the costs issue between the parties in 1998.” (Recommendation 6)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Government’s response drew attention to s 33 of the FMA Act and continued:“Individual claims for an act of grace payment are considered on their own merits. Evaluation of any claim includes a consideration of whether the claimant acted reasonably in relation to their dealings with the particular Commonwealth agency or to what extent, if any, the claimant contributed to the loss, or what steps they took to minimise or contain that loss.In accordance with relevant provisions in the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, Mr Tomson will need to substantiate that the loss he claims to have suffered arose as a direct consequence of the actions or decisions of the Australian Customs Service.” (emphasis added) On 1 December 2006, Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance and Administration wrote to the Minister for Justice and Customs (Senator Colbeck’s letter). Senator Colbeck was responding to representations that another Senator had made based on a letter from Mr Rodda dated 30 June 2006. Senator Colbeck had stated there that he did not consider that any new information had been provided to him by Mr Rodda to warrant reconsideration of Mr Tomson’s case. The letter stated, apparently addressing the requirement of the Government’s response emphasised in [17] above:“Mr Tomson’s request for an act of grace payment was considered on its own merits and he has not substantiated that the losses he claims to have suffered arose as a direct consequence of the actions or decisions of [Customs].” (emphasis added)The 2009 policy for s 33 application In November 2009, the Minister’s Department (the Department) published Finance Circular 2009/09 (the policy circular) entitled “Discretionary Compensation and Waiver of Debt Mechanisms” updating an earlier circular on those matters. The purposes of the circular were to give an overview of the mechanism for, among others, making act of grace payments under s 33 of the FMA Act and to provide guidance to agencies on how the mechanisms operated. Attachment B to the circular dealt with the mechanism under s 33 of the FMA Act. It explained that:·it was a non-exhaustive guide that described the principles and processes that underlay decisions to approve or decline applications;·“The key features of the act of grace mechanism are:·each request is considered on its individual merits;…·that it is appropriate in cases where there is a moral, rather than legal, obligation to the person or body concerned; and·decisions do not establish precedents;”·prior to preparing a written report for the decision-maker to consider, the Department would ensure, in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness, that the applicant had been provided with an opportunity to comment on the material that the decision-maker would consider;·the power under s 33 was “generally a remedy of last resort” and used only where there is no other viable remedy to provide redress in the circumstances;·the decision-maker would determine the amount of any payment under s 33 “having regard to the circumstances of the request, and the general principle in determining the actual level of payment will be based on restoring as far as possible the applicant to the position he or she would have been in had the special circumstances not arisen;”·“For applications that are declined, applicants can seek a review of the decision. However, reconsideration of the decision will only be conducted if pertinent new evidence/facts/arguments are presented.”The nature of Mr and Mrs Tomson’s application in 2012

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There is nothing to suggest that any other provision of the FMA Act or any matter arising by implication from it affects the breadth of the factors that the Finance Minister is entitled to take into account, or limits or otherwise conditions what she must have regard to, when considering the exercise of the discretion under s 33. Nonetheless, the Finance Minister must exercise her discretion reasonably, having regard to the scope and purpose of s 33 the FMA Act and its real object: Li 297 ALR at 247 [67] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ, see too at 236 [23]-[24] per French CJ and 257-258 [109]-[112] per Gageler J. A decision-maker must understand his or her statutory powers and obligations: Li 297 ALR at 248 [71]. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ went on to say (297 ALR at 249 [72], 250 [76]):“[72]… Further, in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [(1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41], Mason J considered that the preferred ground for setting aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to an irrelevant factor of no importance, is that the decision is “manifestly unreasonable”. Whether a decision-maker be regarded, by reference to the scope and purpose of the statute, as having committed a particular error in reasoning, given disproportionate weight to some factor or reasoned illogically or irrationally, the final conclusion will in each case be that the decision-maker has been unreasonable in a legal sense....[76]As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v R [(1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505] that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion “if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust”. The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.”Consideration Dr Verney’s letter of 14 May 2012 and his statement of reasons both proceeded on the basis that the issues raised in the 2012 application had been fully considered by Senator Colbeck when he made his decision in 2006 to reject the 2005 application. Dr Verney identified that Senator Colbeck’s earlier consideration was one reason why he had decided to exercise, what he termed, his discretion not to reconsider the request for an act of grace statement. The second basis which Dr Verney said he had for that exercise of discretion was that the information in the 2012 application “… did not represent new information that warranted reconsideration” (emphasis added). Dr Verney identified, as a matter that he had taken into account in that exercise of his discretion, a policy that generally a request for a payment under s 33(1) would not be reconsidered unless it could be shown that the decision-maker had made a serious mistake or relevant new information warranting reconsideration were provided.