Tomcsanyi v National Australia Bank Ltd [No 2] - [2019] WASC 343

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   TOMCSANYI -v- NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD [No 2] [2019] WASC 343
CORAM:   KENNETH MARTIN J
HEARD:   4 & 6 SEPTEMBER 2019
DELIVERED          :   6 SEPTEMBER 2019
PUBLISHED           :   20 SEPTEMBER 2019
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1427 of 2014
BETWEEN:   LEWIS MICHAEL TOMCSANYI
Plaintiff
AND
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD
Defendant

Catchwords:

Property - Possession - Seizure and delivery by sheriff - Mortgagee in possession exercising power of sale - Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) - Unlawful retaking of possession by formerly dispossessed mortgagor/owner 12 months from issue of seizure and delivery order being issued - Whether a further Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order can be issued - Leave granted for further Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order to be filed by judgment creditor - Whether court can issue associated ancillary restraint orders

Legislation:

Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA)

Result:

Application granted
Defendant granted leave to file a further Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order
Further ancillary restraining orders made

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff	:	In person
Defendant	:	Mr W C J Zappia

Solicitors:

Plaintiff	:	In person
Defendant	:	Allens

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Sandra Elias [2017] VSC 663
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Kenney [No 2] [2016] WASC 416
Perpetual Ltd v Field [2010] VSC 445
Perpetual Trustees Victoria v Allen [2012] WASC 258
Tomcsanyi v National Australia Bank Ltd [2015] WASC 448
Tomcsanyi v National Australia Bank Ltd [2017] WASCA 140
Tomcsanyi v Yuswak [2015] WASC 111

KENNETH MARTIN J:

(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 6 September 2019 and has been edited from the transcript.)

This is the defendant bank's application, by notice of motion dated 4 September 2019, seeking leave to issue a second Property (Search and Delivery) Order (PSD Order) against the registered proprietor of two adjoining properties located at 60 Woylie Road, Kordabup (together, the Denmark Farm), Mr Lewis Michael Tomcsanyi, the plaintiff in this matter.

Procedural history

That application is brought in circumstances where a previous PSD Order (the first PSD Order) was issued by this court and was duly perfected by the sheriff. That was an order issued by this court on 22 March 2018 under s 95 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) commanding the sheriff to seize and then to deliver property to a judgment creditor, namely, to the defendant bank.
It had become necessary for the defendant bank to seek the first PSD Order from the court under s 95 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act as an earlier possession order made against Mr Tomcsanyi by this court was not complied with. After a trial in this court, Acting Master Gething gave reasons for decision of 30 November 2015 (see Tomcsanyi v National Australia Bank Ltd [2015] WASC 448). Then, under subsequent orders post trial of 4 December 2015, the learned Acting Master ordered Mr Tomcsanyi to deliver over possession of the Denmark Farm to the defendant bank, by 12 February 2016 (the December 2015 orders). That was not done.
Mr Tomcsanyi appealed against the result of his trial. His appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal of this State on 2 February 2017. In reasons delivered on 27 July 2017, the appeal was dismissed (see Tomcsanyi v National Australia Bank Ltd [2017] WASCA 140). However, because much time had elapsed between 2015 and 2017, the orders of the Court of Appeal extended the time for Mr Tomcsanyi's compliance with the December 2015 orders (which required Mr Tomcsanyi to deliver over possession of the Demark Farm to the defendant bank by 12 February 2016) until 2 October 2017. Still, the extended time limit to hand over possession of the Denmark Farm was not complied with by Mr Tomcsanyi.
There followed an application by Mr Tomcsanyi made to the High Court of Australia seeking special leave to appeal against the orders of the Court of Appeal. But by a decision of Keane and Edelman JJ, authenticated on 20 November 2017, Mr Tomcsanyi's application for special leave was refused. Hence, the orders of the Court of Appeal requiring Mr Tomcsanyi to give possession of the Denmark Farm to the defendant bank by 2 October 2017 remained in place, unaffected. Notwithstanding the unsuccessful appeals, Mr Tomcsanyi has not complied with the court's orders to deliver possession.
That impasse led to the court issuing the first PSD Order by way of the enforcement of the court's possession orders. The first PSD Order had commanded the sheriff to take possession of the Denmark Farm and deliver possession over to the defendant bank as the judgment creditor.
The sheriff, accompanied by police and representatives of the defendant bank did just that on 12 September 2018. This evidence is collected in the affidavit of Ms Alicia Maria Salvo affirmed on 29 August 2019 (the Salvo affidavit) read by the defendant bank in support of the present application and is uncontradicted. See, for instance, attachment AMS18 at page 210 of the Salvo affidavit. At that time in September 2018, the external locks (ie, gates) of the Denmark Farm were recoded and keys were given (by the sheriff) to the defendant bank's real estate agents. The first PSD Order was duly perfected by the delivery of possession to the defendant bank's real estate agents and was thus 'spent'.
Ten months passed. The position remained unaltered as regards the defendant bank holding possession of the Denmark Farm as it had obtained from the sheriff. Arrangements were then made by the defendant bank for the Denmark Farm to be sold off to a third party and a contract of sale entered.
However, on 23 July 2019 Mr Tomcsanyi emailed one of the defendant bank's Perth lawyers, Mr Philip Blaxill. Mr Tomcsanyi advised him that he had changed the locks to the Denmark Farm (see Salvo affidavit, AMS20).
By another email communication of 29 July 2019 to the lawyers for the defendant bank, Mr Tomcsanyi said that he would use whatever force was necessary to defend himself and his properties (see Salvo affidavit, AMS23). That was a particularly serious threat, given a past history of concerning conduct by Mr Tomcsanyi.
On 27 August 2014 Mr Tomcsanyi had been convicted following a trial in the Magistrates Court at Albany of two counts of discharging a firearm in a manner to cause fear to a person contrary to s 23(9a) of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA). That had happened when two persons acting as receivers appointed by the defendant bank had driven onto the Denmark Farm and were then confronted by Mr Tomcsanyi, who discharged his rifle into the air.
An appeal against that summary conviction was heard before Hall J of this court (see Tomcsanyi v Yuswak [2015] WASC 111). Mr Tomcsanyi was seeking to overturn his conviction. The appeal was heard, but ultimately dismissed as his Honour's reasons demonstrate.
So, in circumstances where Mr Tomcsanyi had been convicted of discharging a firearm in 2014, his email communication of 29 July 2019 saying that he would use whatever force was necessary to defend himself and his properties, carried a particularly ominous tone.
In any event, it appears that on 2 August 2019 after Mr Tomcsanyi's email communication of 29 July 2019, representatives of the defendant bank, accompanied by a neighbour (who had some of his 300 cows grazing on the Denmark Farm) and a local locksmith, Mr Tim Wilkinson, attended the Denmark Farm on behalf of the defendant bank. At that time they retrieved the neighbour's cattle and changed the locks back to effectively recapture possession of the Denmark Farm for the defendant bank back from Mr Tomcsanyi (see Salvo affidavit, par 33). That all came about with an accompanying attendance of local police.
However, that possession position was to change, yet again. On 5 August 2019 Mr Tomcsanyi attended at Mr Wilkinson's locksmith premises and spoke to Mr Wilkinson. Mr Tomcsanyi had advised Mr Wilkinson he had removed one of the locksmith's etched padlocks and had put his own locks back on again (see Salvo affidavit, par 34).
On 7 August 2019, a Mr Paul Wagner, the managing director of Allmain Consultants & Property (who were engaged by the defendant bank to assist in exercising its power of sale) received a call from Mr Tomcsanyi who stated that he had replaced all padlocks on the Denmark Farm and, further, that there 'would be trouble' if his padlocks were removed (see Salvo affidavit, AMS28 at page 273).
Then, on 13 August 2019, Mr Tomcsanyi wrote to the lawyers for the defendant bank, advising:
I Lewis M Tomcsanyi state that I am in possession of my Denmark farms and it is my locks and property on all perimeter gates of my Denmark farms.
(See Salvo affidavit, AMS30 at page 287.)
Hence, there is clear, essentially uncontradicted evidence before me, of the unilateral steps taken by Mr Tomcsanyi on 23 July 2019 to change the gate locks on the Denmark Farm back to his favour, and then again on 5 August 2019, doing very much the same thing after the defendant bank had exercised, in effect, a self-help remedy to try and recapture possession of the Denmark Farm on 2 August 2019.

A further PSD Order under the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act

The present application is made to the court on the defendant bank's notice of motion, in the amended terms I have discussed with counsel during the course of the hearings.
The first question that arises is whether it is open, under the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act, for a further PSD Order to be issued. The terms of the Act itself at pt 5 div 1, which deal with such order, are silent on that issue. If it can be done, the second question that arises is whether orders by way of ancillary or consequential restraints can be added to the further PSD Order to essentially protect against and entrench a further recaptured possession of the property by the sheriff under the further PSD Order.
Both questions are the subject of consideration in other Australian courts. Although the enforcement regimes for the enforcement of property are not precisely the same as the enforcement regime in Western Australia (which is governed by the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act), broadly speaking, the enforcement of a court's orders for the possession of land may be effected by the use of common law writs of possession, writs of restoration or writs of restitution. That reflects a common law position derived from England, as inherited by the Australian States, then later made as the subject of local remodelling across the various States.
For the State of Victoria, the court rules govern the issue of a 'warrant of possession' which, for all intents and purposes, I would assess to be closely akin in concept to a statutory enforcement order by the issue of a PSD Order in Western Australia, as is issued by the court (when requested) to the sheriff under s 95 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act.
In Perpetual Ltd v Field [2010] VSC 445, Mukhtar AsJ essentially concluded that it was open to the court to issue a second warrant of possession, in the face of an unlawful retaking of possession by a recalcitrant land owner. To explain, I incorporate [5] - [7] of his Honour's reasons:
On 12 May 2010, the plaintiff issued a warrant of possession to the sheriff which gave the sheriff a warrant to enter the land and cause the plaintiff to have possession of it. Under s 20 of the Sheriff Act, the sheriff is empowered, in accordance with that warrant, to enter the land for the purpose of taking possession.
On 21 September 2010, the sheriff executed the warrant, gave possession to the plaintiff, and departed. Thus, execution was complete. But, the second defendant has since re-entered or re‑taken possession of the land and will not surrender possession. Putting to one side the possible availability of proceedings for contempt of court, or a civil or criminal proceeding in trespass, the question is whether the Court can give leave to the plaintiff to issue a fresh warrant under the authority of which the sheriff can re-take possession of the land. The plaintiff does not wish to exercise self‑help or prolong matters with more Court proceedings.
There is no provision in the Rules to deal with this situation. I do not think r 66.15 can be invoked as I do not construe it as being designed to meet this situation. That rule empowers the Court to 'make such order as it thinks fit in aid of the enforcement of a warrant of execution'. The connotation of that rule, in my view, is that when read as a whole, it does not apply where the warrant has been already been [sic] exercised or spent as has occurred here.
At [11], the learned associate judge said:
The judgment for possession is valid and it subsists. The warrant already issued has been completed or, as I say, spent. I see no reason in principle why the judgment should not continue to form a legal basis for the issuing of another warrant of possession. This is a more convenient course than creating a species of warrant not known by the rules of Court, or the Supreme Court Act or the Sheriff Act. Once the Court's leave is obtained, the plaintiff as the judgment creditor can take the responsibility of preparing and issuing the warrant as a known form in the Court.
His Honour made further observations at [12] (which I do not read) and then said, at [13] - [14]:
I would give the plaintiff leave to file another warrant of possession for the land which is the subject of this proceeding.
In order to conspicuously distinguish the newly issued warrant from the first one, I suggest that the new warrant state under the heading wording such as 'Issued by leave of the court granted on [a particular date]'.
By what I would assess as very close in principle analogy, it seems to me that this court is necessarily empowered, as a matter of implication from the terms of s 95 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act, to issue further PSD Orders to the sheriff, where that becomes necessary. The present situation of such enforcement orders being required is rather exceptional. It is unusual for a PSD Order, issued by way of enforcement and carried out by the sheriff, to be interfered with later by a subsequent retaking of possession by a land owner. So it is unsurprising that the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act does not explicitly say that there is the power for the court to issue further PSD Orders.
Nevertheless, I am well satisfied overall that there is nothing, as a matter of policy or principle, to inhibit further PSD Orders being made, where they are needed. Moreover, what is said by s 7 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act, as mentioned by s 7(2), in terms of the rules of common law or equity still being applicable in Western Australia, to the extent that they are consistent with what is said in the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act about the new 2004 regime by way of enforcement, supports that view. The present circumstances of an unlawful retaking of possession by the landowner post seizure and delivery of property to the mortgagee could have been dealt with and redressed historically at common law by the issue by the court of a writ of restitution, commanding the sheriff to restore possession to an unlawfully dispossessed judgment creditor. To achieve that same outcome, I see nothing to inhibit s 95 from being redeployed, when needed.
So on the first question, in terms of an issue of a further PSD Order, I am left satisfied, first, that the power exists as a matter of implication under the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act for such an order to be made under s 95(1), and second, that as a matter of policy the orders of the court must not be permitted to be rendered sterile in their intended effect, or allowed to be undermined by an act of unlawful interference.
I am satisfied in the present circumstances, on facts which are all uncontradicted before me, that it is fully appropriate for the court to issue a second PSD Order at the defendant bank's request, commanding the sheriff to act and to once again seize the Denmark Farm and to again then deliver possession of the Denmark Farm over to the defendant bank.

Ancillary retraining relief

The next question is whether or not restraint relief against Mr Tomcsanyi can and should be ordered to accompany the court's second PSD Order. In that respect, a further decision of Mukhtar AsJ, referred to in the case authorities cited before me today by the defendant bank, also assists. It provides me with analogous and persuasive authority from Victoria to the effect that this may also be done, where needed.
I refer to the further decision of Mukhtar AsJ in ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Sandra Elias [2017] VSC 663. I set out below his Honour's reasons, which refer to r 66.15 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (VIC), but also to the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (which his Honour found he could exercise at [9]). Mukhtar AsJ said at [2] - [5], [8] - [9]:
In Perpetual Ltd v Field, I considered the question of the procedural step to be taken in this Court in the situation where a warrant of possession is executed; the judgment creditor is given actual possession (and therefore the warrant is spent); and later, the judgment debtor returns into possession by one means or another including a re-changing of locks or a prevention of re‑entry.
In Field¸ I put to one side the possible availability of proceedings for contempt of court, or of a civil or criminal proceeding in trespass and looked to whether the Court could give leave to the judgment creditor to issue a fresh warrant under the authority of which the Sheriff could re-take possession of the land. The problem is there is no provision in the Rules to deal with this situation. Rule 66.15 empowers the Court to 'make such order as it thinks fit in aid of the enforcement of a warrant of execution'. But my view remains that, properly construed, that rule does not apply where the warrant has already been exercised or spent. After looking at some methods used in past cases, my judgment in Field concludes with the view that as the judgment for possession is valid and still subsists, there was no reason in principle why the judgment should not continue to form a legal basis for the issuing of another warrant of possession. Departing from the view taken in an earlier case, I viewed it as undesirable to create a new species of warrant (such as 'warrant of restitution' or 'warrant of restoration'). The solution in my view was to give leave to file a new warrant of possession.
Giving such leave ought be sufficient to enable the plaintiff here to arrange for the Sheriff to recover possession of the mortgaged land. The difficulty lies with the ancillary orders sought by the plaintiff 'in aid of execution of the warrant' to restrain the defendant and her husband Mr Phillip Elias from re-entering or remaining on the property after the warrant is enforced for the second time. On the facts, there is a manifestly reasonable basis for that apprehension.
The orders I have made enable the plaintiff to regain possession and in addition, by way of deterrent, make a restraining order against the defendant and Phillip Elias prohibiting them from making another re-entry and interfering with the future exercise of the power of sale. By these reasons, I shall expose the legal basis on which the restraining order has been made.
...
The events which occurred subsequently are stated in a comprehensive affidavit sworn by Sarah Jane Rogers on behalf of the bank on 6 October 2017. I need not rehearse its precise contents. It is sufficient to say that in August 2017, that is shortly after the bank took possession, the bank offered to come to an arrangement with the defendant to hand back possession of the mortgaged property if arrears were paid with costs outstanding by 10 November 2017 and a repayment of the account in full by the same date. The borrower seemed not to be interested in such an arrangement. Come mid-August 2017, the bank discovered that a new padlock and chain had been fitted to the front gate. Later, a much bigger chain and padlock was fitted which prevented the bank's contractor from being able to cut through them and gain access to the property. In September 2017, the bank's agents attended the property to remove the chain and padlock and re-secure possession. A male person arrived at the property sating he was the owner and blocked the gate entrance. On about 12 September 2017, the bank by its solicitors wrote to the defendant asserting the bank's right to vacant possession of the property, and requested the defendant to vacate the property and surrender the keys by 19 September 2017 failing which the bank would apply for another warrant of possession as well as retraining orders prohibiting the defendant from re-entering the property. The defendant and her husband have not surrendered the keys and have not made any further contact with the bank.
By a summons filed on 9 October 2017, the bank seeks an order permitting the issue of another warrant commanding the Sheriff to enter the land and restore the plaintiff into possession, and for an order to restrain the defendant and Mr Philip Elias (who is known to the defendant in previous dealings on the mortgage accounts) from making any attempt to re-enter and remain on the property, or to restrain them from preventing, hindering or interfering with the plaintiff in retaking possession and in the exercise of its power of sale. On 17 October 2017, Judd J referred the hearing of the summons to an Associate Judge under r 77.05. In the outcome, I have made the restraining order in exercise of original jurisdiction under the rules. The exercise of inherent jurisdiction is also within the authority of an Associate Judge.

On the question whether ancillary restraint orders could be made, his Honour concluded in the affirmative and said at [14] of his reasons:
The facts as I have recited them justify the making of a restraining order under r 66.15. The judgment for possession stands, not having been set aside. The defendant and Mr Philip Elias and possibly those acting on their instructions are acting in defiance of the court's processes of enforcement. The evidence I think clearly gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that a re-entry by the sheriff will result in them, again, re‑entering themselves. The same facts I think would justify a quia timet injunction. The restraining order as sought ought operate as a deterrent.
Finally, his Honour said, at [16]:
It is enough to say that what has occurred here is frustrating and defying the Court's processes of enforcement of judgments lawfully obtained. If there should be any doubt about the availability of r 66.15 to deal with that wrongdoing then I would hold the very same orders as sought could be made in exercise of the Court's inherent jurisdiction. In either case the order can be made not only as against the judgment debtor but 'any other person'.
Mukhtar AsJ therefore extended his orders to include not only a person who had been breaching them, but her partner, Mr Elias.
By close analogy here then, I am left fully satisfied here as regards Mr Tomcsanyi, given what has occurred and from all the evidence which stands as essentially uncontradicted, that there is presently a serious threat, if a further PSD Order is issued (as I propose to issue), of a future act of interference against the defendant bank's possession likely to be taken by Mr Tomcsanyi, or by persons associated with him - sufficient to justify the associated restraint orders as are now requested by the defendant bank (that I propose to issue against Mr Tomcsanyi).
The real threat of a future interference emerges by reason of Mr Tomcsanyi's repeatedly expressed position many times at the hearing about the duration of PSD Orders lasting only 12 months and which he interprets as essentially allowing a registered proprietor (such as himself) to later physically interfere with the enjoyment of the possession to land which has been seized and then delivered over by a sheriff to a judgment creditor (such as to this defendant bank), once 12 months runs and the PSD Order is not renewed, albeit fully implemented by the sheriff before the running of 12 months.
I did attempt at the hearings to explain to Mr Tomcsanyi why I would reject that view of how s 95 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act operates. I told Mr Tomcsanyi, essentially, that his permissive post 12‑month expiry of the PSD Order view does not accord with the text of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act, that there is case authority directly against the very point, all of which meant there was a total lack of merit in this argument, albeit the local case authority was in the context of a contempt application against the unlawful repossessor.
Indeed, I read out to Mr Tomcsanyi what Le Miere J had said about the very same 12‑month PSD Order expiry view in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Kenney [No 2] [2016] WASC 416 [23] in these terms:
No competent solicitor would have told Mr Kenney that where a property (seizure and delivery) order has been executed and possession has been given to a judgment creditor, the registered proprietor becomes entitled to resume possession of the property 12 months after the day on which the order was made if the judgment creditor has not sold or otherwise dealt with the property in the meantime …
[See also Beech J (as his Honour then was) in Perpetual Trustees Victoria v Allen [2012] WASC 258reference as regards a contempt sanction which the defendant bank does not seek presently.]
I fully agree with Le Miere J's observations above. With respect, they accord both with common sense and practicality. Mr Tomcsanyi's PSD 12‑month PSD Order expiry view, if accepted, would diminish the utility of perfected PSD Orders and effectively see them rendered sterile as against future unlawful dispossession conduct. That result, of course, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and is not acceptable.
Despite this, Mr Tomcsanyi told me firmly and repeatedly at the hearing that he would not accept that position about PSD Orders (see ts 261 - 266). So be it. Mr Tomcsanyi takes and acts on that view, at his peril. By such conduct, he is also potentially exposed to a sanction under s 96 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act, but which, as I have said, the defendant bank does not press against him at this time. As a matter of present practicality, the defendant bank only seeks now to get back and secure the possession of the Denmark Farm it once held as soon as possible, so it can then deliver over clean possession to the third party to whom it has exercised its power of sale, as mortgagee.
So, in terms of the threat then of future interference against a second PSD Order once issued to the sheriff, I am satisfied on the evidence of past conduct before me and Mr Tomcsanyi's resolutely expressed attitude to PSD Orders that there is a firm basis established for further ancillary restraint orders to issue as are sought by the defendant bank against Mr Tomcsanyi.
I discussed the terms of the ancillary orders with counsel today by way of a modification of par 3 of the notice of motion as originally filed. For clarity I record the orders which should issue again by way of enforcement.
I will read out all orders, given that Mr Tomcsanyi is in person, and for his benefit they should actually be recorded as issuing now against him in these terms:
1.The defendant has leave to apply for a further Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order under section 95(1) of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) (Act) in terms of the Form 6 attached as Annexure A in respect of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Volume 1895 Folio 652 and Certificate of Title Volume 1789 Folio 527 (together, the Denmark farm).
2.The defendant's application for a further Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order under section 95(1) of the Act in terms of the Form attached as Annexure A is granted.
3.Pursuant to section 95(3) of the Act, further or alternatively the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, Mr Lewis Michael Tomcsanyi (the Judgment Debtor) whether by himself, his employees, his agents or otherwise is hereby restrained until further order from
(a)accessing or entering onto the Denmark Farm other than with the:
(i)written consent and express written authorisation of the Defendant, given by its employees or agents or given by any person who purchases the Denmark Farm from the Defendant and becomes its registered owner (New Registered Owner); and then
(ii)only under the direct supervision of either the Defendant (by its employees or agents) or after the settlement of the sale of the Denmark Farm, any New Registered Owner; and
(b)engaging in any conduct or taking any steps, personally or by others, to obstruct, disturb or interfere with:
(i)the Defendant's right to possession of the Denmark Farm; and/or
(ii)the settlement of the sale of the Denmark Farm pursuant to the contract for the sale of land dated 1 July 2019.
4.The costs of the application made by the notice of motion be paid by the Judgment Debtor, on a party/party basis to be taxed, if not agreed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
DW
Associate to the Honourable Justice Martin
20 SEPTEMBER 2019