JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: TOMCSANYI -v- NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD [2019] WASCA 154
CORAM: MURPHY JA
MITCHELL JA
HEARD: 26 SEPTEMBER 2019
DELIVERED : 26 SEPTEMBER 2019
PUBLISHED : 3 OCTOBER 2019
FILE NO/S: CACV 110 of 2019
BETWEEN: LEWIS MICHAEL TOMCSANYI
First Appellant
MICHELLE ELIZABETH TOMCSANYI
Second Appellant
AND
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: KENNETH MARTIN J
Citation: TOMCSANYI -v- NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD [No 2] [2019] WASC 343
File Number : CIV 1427 of 2014
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Injunction - Stay pending appeal - Whether any grounds of appeal had any reasonable prospect of succeeding - Balance of convenience
Practice and procedure - Issue of second Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order after expiration of 12 months of the making of the first Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order - Whether power to issue second order - Whether power properly exercised - Whether power to make ancillary injunctive orders to prevent frustration of the court's processes
Legislation:
Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA), s 7(2), s 94, s 95, s 102
Result:
Appellant's application for injunction dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
| First Appellant | : | In Person |
| Second Appellant | : | In Person |
| Respondent | : | Mr W C J Zappia |
Solicitors:
| First Appellant | : | In Person |
| Second Appellant | : | In Person |
| Respondent | : | Allens |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Sandra Elias [2017] VSC 663; (2017) 53 VR 251
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Kenney [No 2] [2016] WASC 415
Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1972] HCA 74; (1972) 126 CLR 161
T v B [2018] WASCA 157
Tomcsanyi v National Australia Bank Ltd [2015] WASC 448
Tomcsanyi v National Australia Bank Ltd [2017] WASCA 140
Tomcsanyi v National Australia Bank Ltd [No 2] [2019] WASC 343
REASONS OF THE COURT:
Introduction
This matter came to a hearing on 26 September 2019 by way of a registrar's notice to attend dated 20 September 2019 to consider the appellants' application filed 19 September 2019.
The appellants' application filed 19 September 2019 was for orders expressed as follows:
1.URGENT INJUNCTION.
2.Interim Orders that will immediately restrain NAB or any of its Agents from any further dealings or the sale of the property at 60 Woylie Road, Kordabup, location No 4308, 4309 and 4331, and to preserve the property until the Appeal is heard.
3.Costs.
The application was supported by affidavits sworn by the first appellant (Mr Tomcsanyi) on 19 September 2019 and 24 September 2019.
The substantive appeal is against the decision of Kenneth Martin J in Tomcsanyi v National Australia Bank Ltd [No 2][1] (primary decision). By that decision, his Honour granted the respondent's (NAB's) application seeking leave to issue a second Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order (PSD Order) against Mr Tomcsanyi as the registered proprietor of two adjoining properties located at 60…
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- Case
- [2019] WASCA 154
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the appellants had a reasonable prospect of success on appeal and if the balance of convenience favoured staying the execution of the judgment pending the appeal. The primary issue was whether the trial judge had correctly interpreted section 102 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 and whether there were grounds to issue a second Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order after the initial 12-month period had expired. The court also had to consider whether the trial judge had the power to issue such an order and whether he had exercised that power appropriately.
In assessing the appellants' application for a stay, the court considered the merits of their appeal, the interpretation of the statute, and the conduct of the trial judge. The court found that the appellants had not demonstrated that the grounds of appeal had any reasonable prospect of success. Furthermore, the court held that the trial judge's interpretation of section 102 was consistent with the statutory language and that the power to issue a second order was properly exercised. The court concluded that the balance of convenience did not favour staying the execution of the judgment pending the appeal.
The court dismissed the application for a stay and made an order that the appellants pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court also noted that the trial judge's conduct did not constitute grounds for an appeal or a stay, as the appellants had not demonstrated any bias or procedural unfairness.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The affidavit of Mr Tomcsanyi in support of the appellants' application also seeks to rely on s 102 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act, which provides:102.Duration and renewal of orders and warrants(1) Each of the following operates for 12 months after the day on which it is made or issued - (a)a property (seizure and delivery) order;(b) a property (seizure and sale) order; (c)a warrant issued under section 29(4) or 89(4).(2) A person in whose favour such an order operates may from time to time apply to the court that made it for the order's operation to be extended.(3)The judgment creditor in proceedings in which such a warrant was issued may from time to time apply to the court that made it for the warrant's operation to be extended.(4)On such an application, the court may extend the operation of the order or warrant for a period set by the court that is not longer than 12 months.(5)An order made under subsection (4) has no effect if it is made after the order or warrant referred to in subsection (1) has ceased to operate. In his affidavit sworn 19 September 2019, Mr Tomcsanyi said that:There are, but not limited to, three reasons for my Appeal, that is, the hearing conducted by [Kenneth] Martin J was 1. Biased, 2 Procedural Fairness, and 3. no Confidence in [Kenneth] Martin J. [Kenneth] Martin J's conduct was contumelious, having knowingly disregard the Law.1.Biased - [Kenneth] Martin J lead NAB's entire Defence from the bench, telling NAB's Lawyers what he could do for them, which he did without NAB, or their Lawyers, asking for any of it.2.No Procedural Fairness - This is where [Kenneth] Martin J refused to accept the meaning of Black Letter Law - [Kenneth] Martin J failed procedural fairness. When I read what was a simple unambiguous Section 102 of the Civil Judgment Enforcements Act 2004 [sic], which as published states the following:'102. Duration and renewal of orders and warrants(1)Each of the following has effect for 12 months after the day on which it is made or issued - (a)a property (seizure and delivery) order; …'[Kenneth] Martin J refused to accept its simple meaning in Black Written Law. When I challenged [Kenneth] Martin J as to which bit of Legislation supports his version, he answered 'it's not in any Act or Legislation its common sense'.[Kenneth] Martin J refused to listen to any discussion or explanation with my plight in my Matter.3.No Confidence - After arguing with me, and I made it quite clear I was not accepting anything he said regarding Section 102 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004, he asked me to be seated while he addressed NAB's Lawyers. In a simple Layman's Terms, the following is roughly what [Kenneth] Martin J said to NAB's Lawyers:a)Do not ask me for any new orders as it is impossible for me to give them because you have had them before. The Matter is finished and any new Orders can't be given because of res judicata.b)[Kenneth] Martin J then told NAB's Lawyers he would consider Leave for contempt, to which I objected to stating that I was charged with Trespass not Contempt, in the Albany Magistrates Court and found Not Guilty. I can't be charged for doing the same thing twice in two difference [sic] Courts.c)[Kenneth] Martin J, realising I might be right, he then looked at NAB's Lawyers and said 'I would consider Leave to the bank for new Orders if they requested them, to which I objected, saying this was in absolute breach of Section 102 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004.…Summary:…I was denied procedural fairness by:-[Kenneth] Martin J's biased opinion;-[Kenneth] Martin J's incorrect interpretation of the Law;-[Kenneth] Martin J's displayed wilful blindness in my Matter;-[Kenneth] Martin J's refusal to deal with any argument I tried to present to him.-[Kenneth] Martin J's serious attempt to falsely claim I was in Contempt of Court.-[Kenneth] Martin J's inability to provide the Black Written Law in a Court.-[Kenneth] Martin J's Orders reflect his own emotional state, not the state of Black Written Law.-[Kenneth] Martin J defamed my character by claiming I was a threat in Court.-[Kenneth] Martin J then listed a 'Warning' in his Orders.