Tincknell v Duthy Homes Pty Ltd; Duthy Homes Pty Ltd v Tincknell

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

TINCKNELL & ANOR v DUTHY HOMES PTY LTD & ANOR; DUTHY HOMES PTY LTD & ANOR v TINCKNELL & ANOR

[2020] SASCFC 24

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Peek, The Honourable Justice Parker and The Honourable Justice Doyle)

17 April 2020

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW

CONTRACTS - BUILDING, ENGINEERING AND RELATED CONTRACTS - PERFORMANCE OF WORK - REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT - DAMAGES

TRADE AND COMMERCE - COMPETITION, FAIR TRADING AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION - CONSUMER PROTECTION - MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT OR FALSE REPRESENTATIONS

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW - PARTICULAR CASES - OTHER MATTERS - COSTS

Appeal against a decision of a Judge of the District Court concerning the construction of a residential home at Mannum.  The contract price of the house was $2.3 Million.

The Builder commenced proceedings against the Owners seeking payment of the final progress claim. The Owners cross-claimed claiming that the Builder was in breach of contract and statutory warranties. They sought the cost of remedial works, as well as damages for pain and suffering, delay, and breach of the Trade Practices Act. They sought damages against the Builder’s director, in his personal capacity, for negligence and as an accessory to the Builder’s breach of the Trade Practices Act. They asserted that the works were not practically complete.

The Judge found that the house was practically complete on 26 February 2013. The Judge made remedial orders where she found it appropriate and where remedial orders were not appropriate, her Honour awarded the Owners compensation. Her Honour found that certain rectification costs claimed by the Owners were unreasonable and on that basis the Owners were not entitled to damages for breach of contract or breach of statutory warranty. The Judge dismissed the Owners’ claim for delay damages, pain and suffering and breaches of the Trade Practices Act. The Judge awarded the Owners the sum of $32,106.07 in back charges and dismissed the remainder of the Owner’s claims for back charges. The Judge held that the Builder was entitled to the final progress claim, plus the difference between the ‘float’ for variations, less those items where a remedial work order was inappropriate. The Judge awarded the Builder the sum of $173,049.41 plus interest. The Builder was awarded 60 per cent of its costs on a party/party basis.

On appeal, the Owners contend that the Judge erred, inter alia, by:

1.  dismissing the claims for defective waterproofing, termite protection and tiling on the external balcony;

2.  dismissing the claims for delay damages and damages for breach of the Trade Practices Act;

3.  finding that the works had reached practical completion on 26 February 2013;

4.  finding that the Builder be permitted to carry out remedial work in respect of the hot water system in accordance with the recommendations of the Builder’s expert rather…

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Details
Case
[2020] SASCFC 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a dispute between the owners of a property, Mr and Mrs Tincknell, and the builder, Duthy Homes Pty Ltd, and its director, Mr Chris Duthy. The core of the dispute revolved around alleged defective waterproofing in a newly constructed three-storey house. The owners sought damages for the cost of remedial work, while the builder contended that the work was not defective and that any minor departures from the design were insignificant. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge erred in dismissing the owners' claim for damages related to defective waterproofing. Specifically, the court had to determine if the judge was correct in finding a lack of proportionality between the cost of the proposed remedial work and the benefit it would achieve, thereby refusing to award damages based on the estimated cost of rectification. This required the court to consider the principles established in *Bellgrove v Eldridge* regarding the assessment of damages for defective building work.

The court's reasoning focused on the application of the *Bellgrove v Eldridge* principles. These principles establish that the prima facie measure of damages for defective building work is the cost of remedial work necessary to bring the work into conformity with the contract. However, this cost must also represent a reasonable course to adopt. If the remedial work, while necessary to conform with specifications, would not be a reasonable response to the deficiency, the measure of loss may be the diminution in the building's value. The court noted that whether remedial work is necessary and reasonable is a question of fact and degree, and that in certain circumstances, the nature of the defendant's conduct might be relevant to the assessment of reasonableness. The trial judge had found that the proposed remedial work for the waterproofing was disproportionate to the benefit it would achieve, leading to the dismissal of the owners' claim.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's decision. It found that the judge had correctly applied the principles from *Bellgrove v Eldridge* and that her Honour's conclusion regarding the lack of proportionality between the cost of remedial work and its benefit was a finding of fact open to her on the evidence. Consequently, the owners' appeal on this ground was dismissed. The court also addressed the builder's appeal against the costs orders, finding them to be reasonable and just in the circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The Builder has sought permission to appeal against the costs orders made by the Judge. The Builder complains that the award of costs was unreasonable and unjust and the Judge should not have departed from the ordinary rule that the successful party is entitled to the costs of the proceedings. The substantive appeal and the costs appeal were heard together. Background The appellants/Owners, Mr and Mrs Tincknell, own land at 9 River Lane, Mannum.[1] The first respondent/Builder is a building company. The second respondent, Mr Chris Duthy, is the director of the Builder. [1] Mr Tincknell passed away after the conclusion of the trial but before the appeal was heard. The house comprises three floors facing the banks of the Murray River. The ground floor comprises a garage, rainwater tank holding area, bathroom and study, lift well and an entrance foyer. The first floor comprises four separate units, each containing a bedroom/living area, kitchen and ensuite. The second floor comprises the main bedroom, ensuite, meal area, living room, kitchen, formal lounge bar area, storeroom, laundry and bathroom and large outdoor patio area. At the time of entering into the Contract, the Owners lived in a house they owned at Dernancourt. They also owned a holiday home at 84 River Lane, Mannum. The Owners intended to reside in the newly built home at 9 River Lane upon its completion. They contend that they intended to sell both their Dernancourt house and the holiday home and invest the net proceeds of those sales. By the time the building works commenced, the Owners were living permanently at the holiday home, i.e. very close to the building site. Prior to engaging the Builder, Mr Tincknell engaged Artec Building Designers (Artec) and engineers Trevor John & Associates (the engineers) to draw up preliminary designs and plans. These designs and plans were approved by the local council and provided to Mr Duthy for tender. In March 2010, Mr Duthy provided a quote to the Owners together with the Builder’s specifications. Mr Tincknell accepted the quote and provided a second version of the specifications incorporating his handwritten amendments. Mr Duthy later provided Mr Tincknell with a third version of the Builder’s specifications dated 30 August 2010 which incorporated only those amendments he agreed to. The Owners entered into a preliminary works contract with Mr Duthy in his personal capacity in July 2010. The preliminary contract provided for the commencement of earth works. The work performed under that contract is not the subject of dispute between the parties. The Owners and the Builder entered into the Contract on 7 October 2010. The Contract consists of the Housing Industry Association (HIA) Building Specification, the HIA Building Schedule and the Builder’s Building Specification dated 30 August 2010. The contract price included the sum of $38,132 as a ‘float’ to provide for future variations to the works.[2] At trial, the Builder accepted that its claim for variations against the Owners was confined to the sum of $33,301.90. An issue remained as to which party was entitled to the balance of the float. [2] “The works” is defined at cl 1.1.11 of the Contract as “the construction works shown in the contract documents”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ground 2 asserts that the Judge erred in dismissing the Owners’ claim for defective waterproofing and in finding that there was a lack of proportionality between the proposed rectification work and the benefit it would achieve. Under this Ground the Owners assert that the Judge should have found that they were entitled to damages of $198,913, based on the cost estimate of Mr Sale.[3] [3] Christopher Sale is a quality surveyor retained by the Owners to provide an opinion on “the amount that it would cost to carry out remedial work so as to bring the work into compliance with the Contract”. Reasons for judgment The Judge noted that the waterproofing claim was the focus of much of the evidence at trial. There was a divergence in the opinions expressed by the two experts, Mr Prider[4] and Mr Goldfinch.[5] There was also a dispute as to whether the engineer’s original waterproofing design was achievable. [4] Philip Prider is an engineer engaged by the Owners to inspect the works and provide a report concerning ‘any and all engineering work that you consider to be defective and incomplete’.[5] John Goldfinch is an engineer and a director of FMG Engineering, engaged by the Builder to respond to Mr Prider’s report. The Judge noted that the requirements relevant to waterproofing were incorporated into the original drawings. The original design provided for a high‑density polyethylene (HDPE) sheet to be installed beneath the ground floor footings, to be lapped and taped with heat welded joints up the external walls and for a Nylex strip drain to be installed to collect and dispose of groundwater. Amendments were made to the design after the works commenced. The Owners asserted that the amendments were to accommodate the Builder’s alleged non‑compliance with the installation of the Nylex strip drain. The Owners contended that the waterproofing was not carried out in accordance with the new design in that there is a weakness at the interface between the Fortecon and HDPE membranes through which water can enter. The Owners contended that the external walls of the house were not adequately waterproofed to prevent uncontrolled water entry. They contended that there has been entry of water into the ground floor through the northern and western sides of the house. The Owners sought the cost of remedial work in the sum of $198,913. The Builder contended that there were deficiencies in the original design which made amendments necessary. The waterproofing work was done in accordance with the new design. It contended that the waterproofing treatments were extensive and completely done. The Builder also asserted that there had been no entry of water through the walls and there was no independent evidence of any water leaks. An occasion when there was water on the garage floor was unrelated to waterproofing. Minor departures from the design specification were de minimis. The Builder further asserted that waterproofing is guaranteed by Nova, the company that installed the system and provided a warranty for the waterproofing treatment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Builder asserts that the Owners knew, because they had watched the house being built, the construction methods and the waterproofing. If there is any waterproofing defect it is latent. The work is not defective and no remedial work is necessary. The Builder asserts that the Judge’s application of the principles described is orthodox and well-reasoned. Consideration The key question in relation to the issue of waterproofing is whether the Judge erred by dismissing the claim for damages because of her Honour’s conclusion that there was a lack of proportionality between the cost of the proposed remedial work and the benefit that it would achieve. The decision in Wheeler does not assist the Owners as the case was decided on the particular facts. The question is whether the Judge correctly applied the principles stated by the High Court in Bellgrove v Eldridge.[7] In that case a builder had constructed a house with defective foundations. The issue before the High Court was whether it was appropriate to award damages assessed by reference to the cost of rectification, which would involve the demolition and re‑erection of the house. Alternatively, should damages be assessed in recognition of the cost that would be incurred in rectifying the defective foundations by underpinning. A further alternative was whether damages should be assessed by reference to the diminution in value of the house caused by the defective foundations. [7] (1954) 90 CLR 613. The High Court stated the following principles:·The prima facie position is that where building work is defective and remedial work is required so as to ensure conformity with the specification, the measure of damages will be the cost of the remedial work required to put the plaintiff in the same position as if the contract had been properly performed;·In some cases that may require demolition of the building and its re‑erection;·Not only must the work be necessary to conform with the specifications but the performance of that work must also be a reasonable course to adopt;·Where remedial works are required to conform with the specifications but would not constitute a reasonable response to the deficiency, the true measure of the owner’s loss will be the diminution in value of the building;·Whether remedial work is necessary and reasonable is a question of fact. The High Court found in Bellgrove that because the defective foundations were a serious risk to the stability of the house, the demolition and re‑erection of the building was both necessary and reasonable. The Judge referred to the observation made by the High Court in Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd to the effect that the test of “unreasonableness” will only be satisfied by “fairly exceptional circumstances”.[8][8] (2009) 236 CLR 272 at [17]. In Stone v Chappel Doyle J (with Kourakis CJ and Hinton J agreeing) suggested that if the unreasonableness qualification is justified in part by reference to the unfairness of the burden to be imposed upon the defendant, it may be that this permits consideration of the nature or quality of the breach by the defendant.[9] Doyle J suggested if the defendant’s conduct was “intentional, sharp, cynical, profit-driven or opportunistic, then it would be more difficult for the defendant to satisfy a court that the burden sought to be imposed upon it was unreasonable”.[10] Doyle J went on to suggest that while there was merit in this approach to the unreasonableness qualification, this approach had not been expressly adopted in the Australian authorities. The matter had been left to be resolved as a question of fact and degree to be decided in light of the circumstances of the individual case.[9] (2017) 128 SASR 165. [10] Ibid at [253].