The Queen v Mutlu Yildiz , Melissa Yilmaz and

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THE QUEEN v MUTLU YILDIZ , MELISSA YILMAZ and
RIZA YILMAZ
[2002] ACTSC 41 (22 May 2002)

CATCHWORDS

APPLICATION – application for stay of proceedings under indictment – grounds of application – current prejudicial effect of past adverse publicity on potential jurors – reasons for dismissing application – totality of past publicity not found to be unfairly prejudicial – past publicity not so adverse as to prejudice any further jury considering further indictment.

APPLICATION – application to conduct survey of potential jurors – grounds of application – question of current prejudicial effect of past adverse publicity on potential jurors – irreversible tainting of potential pool of jurors – reasons for dismissing application – proposed survey unlikely to yield any useful result – totality of past publicity not found to be unfairly prejudicial – effect of conducting the proposed survey on the prejudice of a jury – risk of creating prejudice rather than revealing the extent of it.

EVIDENCE – admissibility of results of surveys and opinion polls – survey material not automatically excluded because based on a collation of hearsay statements – conclusions drawn from the survey must be such as would be admissible if each respondent gave direct evidence of it – methodology and reliability of the survey need expert verification – necessary to seek approval of the Court before conducting a survey.

Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976 (Cth)
Supreme Court Act 1933
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Hoban’s Glynde Pty Ltd v Firle Hotel Pty Ltd (1973) 4 SASR 503
Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse Brothers Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR 36
Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313
Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Limited (1992) 39 FCR 348
Daniel v Western Australia [2000] FCA 858; 178 ALR 542
Bush v The Queen (1993) 43 FCR 549
R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592

Chesterman, M, Chan, J, and Hampton, S, “Managing Prejudicial Publicity” Justice Research Centre, Law and Justice Foundation of NSW, February 2001

THE QUEEN v MUTLU YILDIZ, MELISSA YILMAZ and RIZA YILMAZ,

No. SCC 260 of 1999; SCC 261 of 1999; SCC 262 of 1999

Judge:  Higgins J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date of order:       25 March 2002
Date of judgment:               22 May 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  )              No SCC 260 of 1999
  )                   SCC 261 of 1999
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY  )                   SCC 262 of 1999

THE QUEEN

v  

MUTLU YILDIZ                

MELISSA YILMAZ

RIZA YILMAZ

ORDER

Judge:  Higgins J
Date of order:  25 March 2002
Place:  Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The application to carry out the proposed survey and to stay the proceedings be dismissed.

  2. The parties will be heard as to the extent, if any, to which the publication of these reasons should be restricted.

  1. On 25 March 2002, the accused, Riza Yilmaz, Melissa Yilmaz and Mutlu Yildiz, applied for a stay of proceedings pending against them upon an indictment dated 10 October 2001 upon which a date for trial is yet to be…

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Details
Case
[2002] ACTSC 41
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved the accused, Riza Yilmaz, Melissa Yilmaz, and Mutlu Yildiz, who applied for a stay of proceedings and for a survey of potential jurors. The stay of proceedings was sought due to concerns about the prejudicial effect of past adverse publicity on potential jurors. The survey was requested to determine the extent of prejudice within the potential juror pool. The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the past publicity was unfairly prejudicial and whether a survey of potential jurors was necessary and would yield useful results.

The court found that the publicity, while extensive, did not unfairly prejudice the accused. The publicity had not irreversibly tainted the potential juror pool, and the risk of prejudice was minimal. The court also found that a survey would not yield useful results and could create more prejudice than it would reveal. The proposed survey questions would be cryptic and suggestive of negative attitudes without proper context. The court relied on case law and a study on managing prejudicial publicity to conclude that jurors could assess the evidence critically and follow the trial judge's instructions.

The court dismissed the application to stay the proceedings and to conduct the survey. It found that the publicity did not unfairly prejudice the accused and that a survey was unnecessary and potentially harmful. The court also noted that the proposed survey questions would likely create more prejudice than they would reveal. The court certified that the preceding eighty numbered paragraphs were a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 13 October 1998, Abdullah Al-Ghamdi, the First Secretary to the Royal Saudi Embassy, was found dead in his Kingston apartment. There were 36 stab wounds on his body and two severe slash wounds to the throat. A small air rifle pellet was found under the skin at the back of his head, but it was inflicted after his death and did not contribute to his demise. The investigation into his death was treated as a murder inquiry, and reports appeared in the media detailing the progress of the investigation. Some reports contained allegations adverse to the deceased, while others portrayed him in a more favourable light.

In December 1998, Murat Kurt and Mutlu Yildiz were charged with being knowingly concerned in the murder of an "internationally protected person." On 9 June 1999, Melissa Yilmaz (then Moussa) and Riza Yilmaz were also charged with the murder. All four were eventually presented before the ACT Magistrates Court charged in respect of the death of Mr Al-Ghamdi. The Crown case was presented to the court on 29 June 1999, and the trial commenced on 10 July 2000.

The Crown case alleged that the four accused had gone to Canberra with the intent to punish Mr Al-Ghamdi for harassment and threats made against Melissa Yilmaz. The group had allegedly agreed to confront and intimidate the deceased. However, the plan went awry, leading to the stabbing and slashing of the deceased. The trial concluded with the acquittal of the three accused on 11 August 2000, after a five and a half hour deliberation by the jury.

Subsequent to the acquittal, there was extensive publicity regarding the case, including allegations that the accused had "got away with murder" and should be punished for another offence. The publicity included suggestions that charges less than murder or manslaughter, such as aggravated burglary, might be proffered against the accused. On 19 October 2001, charges of aggravated burglary were laid against the accused.

In response to the publicity and its potential impact on the jury pool, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings and for permission to conduct a survey of potential jurors. The court dismissed both applications, finding that the publicity did not unfairly prejudice the potential jurors and that conducting a survey could create or support a negative attitude towards the accused. The court also noted that the capacity of jurors to resist pre-trial publicity had been demonstrated in various studies, and that the instructions given by the trial judge would ensure a fair trial for the accused.

The matter came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory as an application for a stay of proceedings and to conduct a survey of potential jurors. The accused, Riza Yilmaz, Melissa Yilmaz, and Mutlu Yildiz, sought a stay of proceedings due to the prejudicial effect of past adverse publicity on potential jurors. They also sought permission to conduct a survey to ascertain the extent of this prejudice. The court dismissed both applications, finding that the totality of the past publicity was not unfairly prejudicial and that the proposed survey was unlikely to yield any useful result. The court concluded that the accused had not demonstrated that the publicity was so adverse as to prejudice any future jury considering the present indictment.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the past adverse publicity has unfairly prejudiced potential jurors to the extent that a fair trial for the accused is not possible.
2. Whether the proposed survey of potential jurors would yield useful results and if so, whether it should be conducted with or without court approval.
3. What is the legal standard for the admissibility of survey results and opinion polls in court, and does the proposed survey meet these standards?
4. Whether the publicity subsequent to the trial has created an irreparable unfair prejudice against the accused that would affect their right to a fair trial.

Held
1. Whether the past adverse publicity has unfairly prejudiced potential jurors to the extent that a fair trial for the accused is not possible.
The court concluded that the totality of the previous publicity does not support an assumption that the publicity has been unfairly prejudicial, nor that some recollection of it in the minds of some potential jurors would undermine the fair trial of the accused.

2. Whether the proposed survey of potential jurors would yield useful results and if so, whether it should be conducted with or without court approval.
The court concluded that the proposed survey would be unlikely to yield any useful result and carries with it some risk of creating prejudice rather than merely revealing the extent of it.

3. What is the legal standard for the admissibility of survey results and opinion polls in court, and does the proposed survey meet these standards?
The court concluded that the conclusions to be drawn from the survey must be such as would be admissible if each respondent gave direct evidence of it and the methodology and reliability of the survey would need expert verification. The proposed survey does not meet these standards.

4. Whether the publicity subsequent to the trial has created an irreparable unfair prejudice against the accused that would affect their right to a fair trial.
The court concluded that the publicity accorded the accused since their acquittal has been sustained and frequent, but it has not been uniformly adverse and has not created an irreparable unfair prejudice against the accused that would affect their right to a fair trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court, in dismissing the application for a stay of proceedings and the proposed survey of potential jurors, reasoned that the totality of past adverse publicity did not unfairly prejudice the potential jurors to the extent that a fair trial for the accused was not possible. The court considered the legal principles surrounding the prejudicial effect of publicity on potential jurors, as well as the admissibility of survey results and opinion polls in court. The court found that the publicity up to, and including, the acquittal of the accused was not so adverse as to prejudice any future jury asked to consider the present indictment. Furthermore, the court held that the proposed survey was unlikely to yield useful results and could potentially create prejudice rather than revealing the extent of it. The court relied on authorities such as Mason CJ and Toohey J in R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592, which emphasized the integrity of the system of trial by jury and the effect on the jury of the instructions given by the trial judge.

The court also considered the legal standard for the admissibility of survey results and opinion polls in court, holding that such evidence would not be automatically excluded if based on a collation of hearsay statements. However, the methodology and reliability of the survey would need expert verification, and the conclusions drawn from the survey must be such as would be admissible if each respondent gave direct evidence of it. The court found that the proposed survey did not meet these standards, and thus, it was dismissed.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the totality of past adverse publicity, placed in a proper legal context, does not necessarily unfairly prejudice potential jurors, and a proposed survey of potential jurors may not be conducted without court approval, even if it aims to reveal the extent of prejudice. The court departed from the suggestion that the unfair prejudice engendered by the publicity should be deemed "irreparable" and instead held that the capacity of jurors to resist pre-trial publicity should be considered.