The Queen v Casimiro and The Queen v Pinto (No 2)

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CITATION:The Queen v Casimiro and

The Queen v Pinto (No 2) [2020] NTSC 46

PARTIES:THE QUEEN

v

CASIMIRO, Pedro Michael

and

THE QUEEN

v

PINTO, Abel

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction

FILE NO:21852872 and 21852871

DELIVERED:  28 July 2020

HEARING DATE:  17 June 2020

JUDGMENT OF:  Kelly J

CATCHWORDS:

EVIDENCE – Whether exculpatory admissions made by an accused against a co-accused should be excluded under s 135 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act – s 137 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act only applies to evidence adduced by the prosecutor in the case against the defendant against whom the evidence is adduced – It has no application to evidence adduced by the prosecutor against one defendant which is prejudicial to a co-accused in a joint trial of co-defendants - Under s 135 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act by contrast the Court may refused to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it might be unfairly prejudicial to any party

Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act2011 (NT) s 9(1), s 55, s 59, s 76, s 81 (2), s 98, s 111(1), s 135, s 137
Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) s 120

IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300, applied

Aytugrual v The Queen (2012) 247 CLR 170; Flowers v The Queen (2005) 189 FLR 423; Lui Mei Lin v The Queen [1989] 1 AC 288; Middleton v R (1998) 19 WAR 179; Nguyen v The Queen [2020] HCA 23; Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; R v Bauer (2018) 92 ALJR 846; R v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155; R v Lowery and King (No 3) [1972] VR 939; R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667; R v Pearce (1979) 69 Cr App R 365; Singh v The Queen [2019] NTCCA 8; Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598, Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, referred

Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence (Interim) Report, Report No 26 (1985) vol 1, 755

Williams, Anderson, Marychurch and Roy Uniform Evidence in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2017); John Anderson and Peter Bayne, Uniform Evidence Law, Text and Essential Cases (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2016); Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (Thomson Reuters, 14th ed, 2019)

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Crown:C Dixon

Accused (Casimiro):                   J Adams

Accused (Pinto):  M Thomas

Solicitors:

Crown:Director of Public Prosecutions

Accused (Casimiro):                   Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission

Accused (Pinto):  Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission

Judgment category classification:    B

Judgment ID Number:  Kel2009

Number of pages:  28

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

The Queen v Casimiro and The Queen v Pinto (No 2) [2020] NTSC 46

No. 21852872 and 21852871

BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN

AND:

PEDRO MICHAEL CASIMIRO

AND BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN

AND:

ABEL PINTO

CORAM:    KELLY J

REASONS FOR…

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Details
Case
[2020] NTSC 46
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The defendants, Casimiro and Pinto, were charged with an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The trial judge excluded certain statements made by Casimiro in his police interview as they were either hearsay or speculative. The Crown objected to the admission of certain statements made by Casimiro as they were prejudicial to Pinto. The issue was whether the statements were admissible under the Uniform Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The court had to decide whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to any party. The court found that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Pinto, and thus the evidence was excluded.

The court held that the evidence was relevant as it was capable of supporting an inference of a common purpose between Casimiro and Pinto to assault the victim. However, the court found that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Pinto. The court held that the evidence was inadmissible under s 135 of the Evidence Act as it was prejudicial to Pinto. The court held that the evidence was not admissible under s 137 of the Evidence Act as it was not adduced by the prosecutor in the case against Pinto. The court held that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Pinto. The court excluded the evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Crown has objected to the admission of a passage on page 24 of the transcript in which Mr Casimiro talks about someone telling him that Mr Pinto told them he had put his knife down a drain. This is objected to as second hand hearsay, and this was effectively conceded by Mr Adams for Mr Casimiro.[13] That passage will be excluded.Possible tendency evidence The Crown has objected to the admission of the following passages on page 28 of the transcript.· “Q: Um – are you aware of Mr Pinto stabbing anyone else? A: Yep I am, yep. Q: Are you? A: Yep. Q: So prior to this occasion you went out with him? On that night? A: Ah – I don’t wanna go into it, sir.”· “Q: Ah – but you’re aware of previous occasions, and you don’t have to go into ‘em but you’re aware that he has carried a knife before, and he’s used it on people, is that fair to say? A: Yeah.” Mr Adams for Mr Casimiro conceded that the statement was objectionable unless Mr Casimiro was permitted to adduce tendency evidence in relation to Mr Pinto. He indicated that he was investigating the possibility of serving a tendency notice. He has since advised that no tendency notice will be served. Therefore, on the basis of the concession by counsel for Mr Casimiro, those statements will be excluded.Lay opinion and speculation The Crown objects to the underlined parts of the following statements on page 3 of the transcript.· I was hesitant on catching up with him [ie Pinto] because I’d been through some dramas with him before and – um – I didn’t really have a good time with him ‘cause he’s – um – so – so, somewhat of a – of a standover person.· … he [ie Pinto] had made friends with – ah – my family friends ….. And he used them as – um – I forgot the – ah – word to say it but he used them as sorta like bait to, for me to catch up with him. Ms Dixon for the Crown submitted that these two statements were neither exculpatory nor inculpatory and so did not necessarily fall within the general rule that the Crown must take the good with the bad. Rather the first statement (to the effect that Mr Pinto was “a standover person”) is inadmissible lay opinion evidence (s 76); and the second statement (that Mr Pinto used Mr Casimiro’s friends as bait) is mere speculation. The Crown also contended that neither statement was evidence that could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding (s 55); and that, even if otherwise relevant and admissible, both should be excluded under s 135 as whatever probative value they may have is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to Mr Pinto. Mr Adams, for Mr Casimiro contended that the evidence was relevant for the following reason. Mr Casimiro and Mr Pinto were out socialising; the jury might therefore infer that they were on friendly terms and might for that reason more readily draw inferences supportive of there having been a common purpose between them to assault the victim. Mr Casimiro wants evidence put before the jury that he was only in Mr Pinto’s company out of fear, and contends that that is relevant to the issue of common purpose. I accept that those statements could be relevant for that purpose – ie they are prima facie admissible under UEA s 55.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established