The Public Trustee as Litigation Guardian for Imre Pinter v Newman

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE AS LITIGATION GUARDIAN FOR IMRE PINTER v NEWMAN

[2012] SASCFC 18

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Kourakis and The Honourable Justice Blue)

8 March 2012

PROCEDURE - COSTS - APPEALS AS TO COSTS - DISCRETION

PROCEDURE - COSTS - SCALES OF COSTS - SCALE APPLICABLE

Appeal against a decision of a District Court Judge with respect to an order for costs - plaintiff suffered grave personal injuries as a result of a road collision in 2005, when the plaintiff's vehicle was struck by a semi-trailer driven by the defendant - the defendant's vehicle was insured by the Victorian compulsory third party insurer - an action for negligence claiming damages and loss was instituted in 2009 and the proceedings settled on 22 October 2010, the third day of trial, following the Judge's approval of a compromise - where defendant was to pay costs and disbursements to be agreed or taxed - where parties could not agree as to the scale of costs applicable - where defendant argued that appropriate scale was that of party-party and plaintiff argued that appropriate scale was that of solicitor-client - District Court Judge ordered that plaintiff recover costs to be taxed on a party-party scale - whether Judge in error in so ordering - whether a letter sent by plaintiff to the defendant's insurer on 10 December 2008 addressing the claim for damages, amounted to a "Rule 33" notice for the purposes of Rule 33 of the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) - whether an order ought to be made that the plaintiff recover interest on costs backdated to the date on which the proceedings were first issued.

Consideration of the history of Rule 33 and the principles applicable to orders for costs departing from the general rule that costs be paid on a party-party scale.

Held:  appeal dismissed - no basis shown to interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the District Court Judge in ordering that the plaintiff recover costs on a party-party scale - the 10 December 2008 letter did not constitute a Rule 33 notice - the defendant did not act in a way that would justify any special order as to interest on costs backdated to the date of issues of proceedings.

District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 3, r 4, r 33, r 117 and r 264; District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 40 and s 42; District Court Rules 1992 (SA) r 6A and r 101, referred to.
Kenneally v Pouras [2007] SASC 303; John S Hayes & Associates Pty Ltd v Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 201; Flinders Diamonds Ltd v Tiger International Resources Inc (No 2) [2006] SASC 180; Colgate-Palmolive Co Pty Ltd v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225; Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; IW v City of Perth (1996)…

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Details
Case
[2012] SASCFC 18
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Public Trustee, acting as litigation guardian for Imre Pinter, appealed a decision of a District Court Judge regarding costs. The dispute arose from a negligence action concerning a road collision in 2005, which resulted in Mr Pinter sustaining severe personal injuries. The proceedings settled on the third day of trial, with the defendant ordered to pay costs and disbursements. The parties could not agree on the applicable scale of costs, with the plaintiff arguing for a solicitor-client scale and the defendant for a party-party scale.

The central legal issues before the appellate court were whether the District Court Judge erred in ordering that the plaintiff recover costs on a party-party scale, and whether a letter sent by the plaintiff to the defendant's insurer on 10 December 2008 constituted a valid "Rule 33" notice under the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA). Additionally, the court considered whether an order for interest on costs, backdated to the commencement of proceedings, ought to be made.

The appellate court affirmed the District Court Judge's reasoning that the plaintiff's letter of 10 December 2008 did not comply with Rule 33 of the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA). The Judge found that while the letter detailed the claim's liability and quantum, it was sent to the defendant's insurer (the TAC) rather than directly to the defendant, as required by the plain wording of Rule 33(2). The court noted that the Rule explicitly mandates service on the defendant, with a copy to the insurer only in specific circumstances. Consequently, the defendant could not be found to have failed to comply with Rule 33(4), as the notice was not properly served. The court also found no justification for special orders regarding interest on costs.

The appeal was dismissed, and the court indicated it would hear the parties on the matter of costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the decision of a Judge of the District Court with respect to an order for costs. Background Imre Pinter sustained grave personal injuries when involved in a road collision on 5 September 2005. Mr Pinter’s vehicle was the subject of a heavy collision when struck by a semi-trailer driven by the defendant, David William Newman. The defendant’s vehicle was insured by the Victorian compulsory third party insurer. Mr Pinter issued proceedings through the Public Trustee acting as his litigation guardian.[1] In the proceedings, it was alleged that Mr Pinter’s injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant. [1] In these reasons for convenience reference is made to the appellant as either the plaintiff or Mr Pinter. The defendant denied that he had been negligent as alleged and raised the issues of whether Mr Pinter was a driver or a passenger and whether he had been wearing a seat belt. The claimed damages were also in dispute. The proceedings settled on 22 October 2010, the third day of trial, following the Judge’s approval of a compromise. Judgment was entered for $2,800,000.00, this amount being in addition to all amounts paid on behalf of the defendant to the date of judgment. In addition, the defendant was ordered to pay costs and disbursements to be agreed or taxed. In the event that agreement could not be reached on costs, the proceedings would be referred to the Court for further directions. The dispute between the parties related to the scale of costs said to be applicable. The plaintiff sought costs on a solicitor-client basis. The defendant contended that the appropriate scale was that of party-party. The plaintiff contended that he had made an offer by letter dated 10 December 2008 in accordance with Rule 33 of the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), that the defendant did not comply with his obligations under that Rule and that as a consequence, the Court should award costs on a solicitor-client scale. The defendant contended that the plaintiff had not complied with Rule 33, that the defendant had done so and that in any event the circumstances did not warrant an order being made for costs to be taxed on a solicitor-client scale. The parties did not reach agreement. The Judge heard further argument and ordered that the plaintiff recover costs to be taxed on the party-party scale. The Judge concluded that the letter dated 10 December 2008 did not comply with the provisions of Rule 33:[2] In my view, the plaintiff’s letter dated 10 December 2008 complies with Rule 33(2) except for the fact that it was sent to the TAC rather than the defendant. The letter set out a formulation of the plaintiff’s claim on both liability and quantum. It was a detailed formulation of some six pages and it annexed a number of supporting documents. It is not strictly necessary to state that the letter is an offer under Rule 33 although, had this been done, it may have avoided the confusion that has arisen in this matter. The confusion was compounded by the error in the originating process. I further note that the plaintiff did not comply with Rule 33(6)(b) by filing the asserted notice and response in a suppressed file.…It is my view that the provision of the notice to the defendant’s insurer is not sufficient for compliance with Rule 33(2). The plain wording of the Rule 33(2) makes it clear that the notice must be served on the defendant. If there were any doubt about that proposition, it is sufficient to note Rule 33(3) which requires a plaintiff to send a copy of the notice and accompanying materials to the defendant’s insurer in circumstances where the plaintiff is aware of the identity of that insurer. I also note that the TAC, in its letter dated 12 February 2009, informed the plaintiff’s solicitors that any proceedings should be served direct upon the defendant. This should have alerted the plaintiff’s solicitors to the need to serve the Rule 33 notice upon the defendant. The defendant was entitled to be served with the Rule 33 notice just as he is entitled to be served with the originating process.Given the notice was not served on the defendant, it cannot be said that the defendant has not complied with Rule 33(4). Any asserted deficiencies with the response from TAC dated 12 February 2009 can hardly be said to be those of the defendant.[2] The Public Trustee as Litigation Guardian for Imre Pinter v Newman [2011] SADC 113, [10], [14]-[15].Statutory Provisions Concerning Costs

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons earlier identified, we do not consider that the defendant acted in a way that would justify any special order as to interest on costs backdated to the date of issue of proceedings.Conclusion We dismiss the appeal. We will hear the parties as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the appeal, the Court addressed three primary issues: the appropriate scale of costs, the compliance with Rule 33 of the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), and the imposition of interest on costs. The first issue concerned the scale of costs applicable in the case, with the plaintiff arguing for a solicitor-client scale and the defendant advocating for a party-party scale. The Court found that the District Court Judge did not err in ordering that the plaintiff recover costs to be taxed on a party-party scale. The Court held that the letter sent by the plaintiff to the defendant's insurer on 10 December 2008 did not constitute a "Rule 33" notice because it was not served on the defendant as required by Rule 33(2). This conclusion was supported by the plain wording of the rule and the fact that the plaintiff did not comply with Rule 33(6)(b) by filing the notice in a suppressed file. The Court's reasoning was based on the need for the defendant to be served with the Rule 33 notice just as they are entitled to be served with the originating process.

The second issue was whether the letter sent by the plaintiff to the defendant's insurer on 10 December 2008 amounted to a "Rule 33" notice for the purposes of Rule 33 of the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA). The Court concluded that the letter did not comply with the provisions of Rule 33 because it was sent to the defendant's insurer rather than the defendant himself. The Court emphasized that the plain wording of Rule 33(2) makes it clear that the notice must be served on the defendant, and this requirement was not met in this case. The Court also noted that the plaintiff did not comply with Rule 33(6)(b) by filing the notice in a suppressed file, which further compounded the confusion in the matter.

The third issue was whether an order should be made that the plaintiff recover interest on costs backdated to the date on which the proceedings were first issued. The Court determined that there were no grounds to justify any special order as to interest on costs backdated to the date of issue of proceedings. The Court found that the defendant had not acted in a way that would warrant such an order, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The Court concluded that the parties would be heard as to costs.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in cases where parties cannot agree on the scale of costs, the Court has discretion to determine the appropriate scale based on the circumstances of the case. Additionally, a "Rule 33" notice must be served on the defendant, not merely on the defendant's insurer, to be considered valid. Finally, the imposition of interest on costs backdated to the date of issue of proceedings requires a special justification, which was not present in this case. The Court's decision followed established principles of costs and statutory provisions concerning costs, while distinguishing the specific circumstances of this case from prior authority.