Tesseract International Pty Ltd v Pascale Construction Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

TESSERACT INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD v PASCALE CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD

[2021] SASCA 8

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Kelly, the Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice Livesey)

9 March 2021

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - ILLEGAL AND VOID CONTRACTS

The appellant is a company that provides engineering consultancy services.  In October 2015, it entered into a contract with the respondent building company, pursuant to which it was engaged to review tender documentation and provide an engineering design for the construction of a warehouse in conformity with that documentation.  The contract consists of a standard form contract, and included dispute resolution provisions, as well as several special conditions agreed between the parties that had the effect of modifying some of the clauses of those provisions.  Clauses 20 and 21 of the contract provided for conciliation and arbitration processes, respectively, while clause 22 provided that the Conciliator’s or Arbitrator’s decision will be binding on the parties.

A dispute arose between the parties, with the respondent alleging that the engineering designs prepared by the appellant were defective and that it has consequently suffered loss and damage.  In correspondence, the respondent noted that clause 21 of the contract provided for the referral of any dispute between the parties to arbitration, in the event that the dispute could not be resolved by conciliation pursuant to the provisions of clause 20.  By way of response, the appellant noted that its position was that it was not possible for either party to participate in the processes described in clauses 20, 21 and 22 of the contract as those clauses are void for uncertainty.

In December 2019, the appellant issued proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking relief, inter alia, in the form of a declaration that clauses 20, 21 and 22 of the contract are void for uncertainty.  A Master of this Court rejected the appellant’s contentions, and subsequently made an order dismissing the proceedings.

The appellant’s appeal from the Master’s decision relies upon one ground, to the effect that the Master erred in law in failing to hold that clauses 20, 21 and 22 of the contract are void for uncertainty.  The appellant contends that there is an inherent contradiction between a conciliation process and a process that is intended to be determinative and binding, and, in any event, contends that to the extent the parties intended the clause 20 conciliation process to be binding, this cannot be reconciled with the existence of the arbitration process contemplated by clause 21.

Held, per Doyle JA (Kelly P and Livesey JA agreeing), dismissing the appeal:

1.      While clause 20 contemplates a process that can be described as determinative and binding, and hence not in conformity with the usual concept of a conciliation process, the use of the label ‘conciliation’ does not of itself give rise to any uncertainty.  It is not the labels that…

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Details
Case
[2021] SASCA 8
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the construction of dispute resolution clauses within a contract between Tesseract International Pty Ltd (appellant) and Pascale Construction Pty Ltd (respondent). The appellant argued that clauses 20, 21, and 22 of the agreement were void for uncertainty because the "dispute conciliation" process, as described, operated as a binding expert determination, thereby precluding any subsequent arbitration under clause 21. The appellant contended that this created an irreconcilable tension between the two dispute resolution mechanisms, rendering them inoperable and allowing them to bypass these processes and litigate directly.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the dispute resolution provisions, specifically the interplay between conciliation and arbitration, were so uncertain as to be void. The appellant's primary contention was that the conciliation process, culminating in a written and binding decision, necessarily resolved the dispute, leaving no room for the arbitration process stipulated in clause 21. This, the appellant argued, created an inherent conflict and uncertainty in the contractual scheme.

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, comprising Doyle JA, Kelly P, and Livesey JA, dismissed the appeal. The court reasoned that the label "conciliation" did not, of itself, create uncertainty. Instead, the substance of the parties' agreement governed the interpretation. The court found no difficulty or tension in the operation of clauses 20 and 21, holding that they were intended to operate consecutively. The conciliation process was considered determinative and binding, but subject to arbitration if a party did not accept the conciliator's decision and wished to pursue arbitration. The court emphasised a reluctance to find agreements void for uncertainty, particularly in commercial contexts, and favoured a business-like interpretation that gives effect to the parties' bargain.

The appeal was dismissed. The court concluded that the dispute resolution provisions were capable of a commercially sensible interpretation and were not void for uncertainty. Consequently, the appellant was bound by the agreed dispute resolution mechanisms.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held, per Doyle JA (Kelly P and Livesey JA agreeing), dismissing the appeal:

1. While clause 20 contemplates a process that can be described as determinative and binding, and hence not in conformity with the usual concept of a conciliation process, the use of the label ‘conciliation’ does not of itself give rise to any uncertainty. It is not the labels that the parties have used, but the substance of what they have agreed, that governs the construction task.

2. There is no difficulty or tension in the operation of clauses 20 and 21. It is clear from the structure and terms of the dispute resolution provisions that the conciliation process in clause 20 and the arbitration process in clause 21 operate as consecutive processes, with the conciliation process being determinative and binding, subject to arbitration; and the arbitration process being available if one or both parties do not accept the conciliator’s decision and wish to pursue a resolution of the dispute through arbitration.

Background

Background to the litigation

Tesseract International Pty Ltd (Tesseract) and Pascale Construction Pty Ltd (Pascale) entered into a contract for the construction of a project. The contract included specific provisions for dispute resolution, which involved a process of dispute conciliation followed by arbitration if the conciliation process did not resolve the dispute. Tesseract argued that the dispute resolution clauses, particularly the conciliation provisions, were uncertain and rendered the entire agreement void for uncertainty. They contended that the conciliation process would inevitably result in a binding written decision, thereby making the arbitration clause redundant. Tesseract also argued that the contract did not clarify how the conciliation and arbitration processes were intended to operate, or how the parties could reconcile them, suggesting that the contract was poorly drafted and incapable of producing a commercially sensible result.

Pascale, on the other hand, maintained that the dispute resolution clauses were clear and operable. It argued that the conciliation process described in the contract was determinative and binding, but this did not render the arbitration clause ineffective. Instead, the conciliation and arbitration processes were intended to operate consecutively, with arbitration being available if the conciliator’s decision was not accepted by one or both parties. The case thus centred on the interpretation of the dispute resolution clauses and whether they were sufficiently clear to be enforceable, or if their uncertainties rendered the contract void.

This matter is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia, originally brought by Tesseract International Pty Ltd against Pascale Construction Pty Ltd. The initial proceedings in the Supreme Court involved disputes concerning the interpretation of certain clauses in a contract between the parties, specifically clauses 20, 21, and 22 which outline the dispute resolution mechanisms. After a detailed examination of the contractual terms and the parties' submissions, the Supreme Court found in favour of Pascale Construction Pty Ltd. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Tesseract International Pty Ltd appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard by Doyle JA, with Kelly P and Livesey JA concurring, and the appeal was dismissed. Key procedural steps included the filing of the appeal, the submission of written and oral arguments by both parties, and the Court of Appeal's consideration of the evidence and arguments presented. The Court of Appeal focused on the proper construction of the dispute resolution clauses and whether they were void for uncertainty.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, I add that because I have accepted the respondent’s primary contention as to the proper construction of the dispute resolution provisions, I do not consider it necessary to address its submissions as to the mechanisms available to courts, in appropriate cases, to rescue dispute resolution clauses from a finding that they are void for uncertainty by reading down or severing the offending aspects of those provisions.Conclusion For the reasons set out, I would dismiss the appeal.LIVESEY JA: I agree with Doyle JA. I agree that the appeal must be dismissed. In this case, the appellant contends that because the operation of clauses 20, 21 and 22 is uncertain, it follows that those parts of the agreement are void for uncertainty. That problem arises, the appellant says, because the “dispute conciliation” provisions operate as an expert determination, culminating in a conciliator’s decision which is in writing and binding on the parties.[22] [22] See clauses 22.4 and 22.6. Because dispute conciliation inevitably results in a binding written decision, the appellant says there is no scope for a subsequent reference to arbitration. The dispute conciliator will necessarily have resolved the dispute. In those circumstances, there is no scope for the operation of clause 21.1:If the dispute is not resolved by dispute conciliation either party may refer the dispute to arbitration by notifying in writing the other party. In addition, the appellant says that there cannot be two binding dispute resolution processes: conciliation and arbitration. The agreement does not explain how these are to operate or how they can be reconciled. For example, are they alternatives? If so, how is a choice made? It is because of uncertainties such as these that the appellant maintains that it may ignore these processes and litigate in the usual way before a court. In my opinion, this is a good example of a poorly drafted agreement which, nevertheless, is capable of being given a business-like interpretation so as to produce a commercially sensible result.[23] The court is reluctant to find that an agreement is void for uncertainty and will only do so as a last resort.[24] This may be regarded as a corollary of the “strong bias” which favours holding parties to their bargain.[25] Parties will be held to their bargain unless the relevant provisions are “so obscure and so incapable of any definite or precise meaning that the court is unable to attribute to the parties any particular contractual intention”.[26] [23] Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy (2014) 251 CLR 640, [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).[24] Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 429, 436-437 (Barwick CJ); Brown v Gould [1972] Ch 53, 61-62 (Megarry J).[25] Huddart Parker Ltd v Ship Mill Hill (1950) 81 CLR 502, 508-509 (Dixon J).[26] G Scammell & Nephew Ltd v HC & JG Ouston [1941] AC 251, 268 (Lord Wright). When ascertaining the intention of the parties, undertaking a process of construction, “no narrow or pedantic approach is warranted, particularly in the case of commercial arrangements”.[27] In an appropriate case that may warrant taking a liberal construction to the ordinary meaning of the words used.[28][27] Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 429, 436-437 (Barwick CJ), see also Masonic Homes Ltd v Oppedisano & Platinum Property Retirement Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 196, [55] (Doyle J).[28] Rinehart v Welker (2012) 95 NSWLR 221, [117]-[120] (Bathurst CJ). See also Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 45, [164] (Allsop J), Nearmap Ltd v Spookfish Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1790, [67] (Bergin CJ in Eq) and Lepcanfin Pty Ltd v Lepfin Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 155, [85]-[89] (Bell P).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court in Tesseract International Pty Ltd v Pascale Construction Pty Ltd was tasked with interpreting the dispute resolution clauses in an agreement between the parties. The appellant argued that the clauses were void for uncertainty due to the potential for conflict between the conciliation and arbitration processes. However, the Court found that the agreement could be given a business-like interpretation, producing a commercially sensible result. The Court applied the principle that it is reluctant to find an agreement void for uncertainty, doing so only as a last resort, and only when the relevant provisions are "so obscure and so incapable of any definite or precise meaning that the court is unable to attribute to the parties any particular contractual intention."

The Court first considered whether the labelling of the dispute resolution process as "conciliation" in clause 20 introduced uncertainty that rendered the clause void. The Court held that it did not, as it is not the labels that the parties have used, but the substance of what they have agreed, that governs the construction task. The Court emphasized that a liberal construction approach should be adopted when interpreting commercial agreements, and that no narrow or pedantic approach is warranted. This principle was supported by authorities such as Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd and Masonic Homes Ltd v Oppedisano & Platinum Property Retirement Pty Ltd.

The Court then examined whether there was a conflict or inconsistency between the conciliation process outlined in clause 20 and the arbitration process outlined in clause 21. The Court held that there was no difficulty or tension in the operation of the clauses, as the conciliation process in clause 20 and the arbitration process in clause 21 operate as consecutive processes, with the conciliation process being determinative and binding, subject to arbitration. The Court found that the agreement provided for a commercially sensible arrangement, where the conciliation process would be the primary means of dispute resolution, with arbitration available as a subsequent process if one or both parties did not accept the conciliator's decision.

The Court also considered whether the court should adopt a liberal construction approach in interpreting the agreement, considering the context of commercial arrangements and the principle of holding parties to their bargain. The Court held that it should, as this principle is supported by authorities such as Huddart Parker Ltd v Ship Mill Hill and G Scammell & Nephew Ltd v HC & JG Ouston. The Court found that the agreement could be given a business-like interpretation, producing a commercially sensible result.

Finally, the Court considered whether the court should refrain from finding the agreement void for uncertainty unless the relevant provisions are "so obscure and so incapable of any definite or precise meaning that the court is unable to attribute to the parties any particular contractual intention." The Court held that it should, as this principle is supported by authorities such as Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy and Brown v Gould. The Court found that the agreement was not so obscure and incapable of any definite or precise meaning that the court was unable to attribute to the parties any particular contractual intention.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a court is reluctant to find an agreement void for uncertainty and will only do so as a last resort, and only when the relevant provisions are "so obscure and so incapable of any definite or precise meaning that the court is unable to attribute to the parties any particular contractual intention." The Court adopted a liberal construction approach in interpreting the agreement, considering the context of commercial arrangements and the principle of holding parties to their bargain. The Court found that the agreement could be given a business-like interpretation, producing a commercially sensible result. The Court also held that the labelling of the dispute resolution process as "conciliation" does not introduce uncertainty that renders the clause void, as it is the substance of what the parties have agreed that governs the construction task.