Legal Research
Cases
Temple v Woolworths Group Limited

Temple v Woolworths Group Limited

Case [2022] NSWPICPD 16 9 May 2022

Injuries Pursuant to ss 4(a) and 4(b) of the 1987 Act

Type to search within this case.

DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY A MEMBER
CITATION:	Temple v Woolworths Group Limited [2022] NSWPICPD 16
APPELLANT:	Rebeccah Temple
FIRST RESPONDENT:	Woolworths Group Limited
SECOND RESPONDENT:	Allstaff Australia Pty Ltd
FIRST RESPONDENT’S INSURER:	Employers Mutual Limited as agent for Woolworths Limited Workers Compensation Self Insurance Scheme
SECOND RESPONDENT’S INSURER:	AAI Limited t/as GIO
FILE NUMBER:	A1-W862/21
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:	Deputy President Elizabeth Wood
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:	9 May 2022
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:	1. The Certificate of Determination dated 11 August 2021 is revoked. 2. The matter is remitted to a different Member for re-determination.
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION – distinction between injuries pursuant to ss 4(a) and 4(b) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) – application of s 16 of the 1987 Act – Australian Conveyor Engineering Pty Ltd v Mecha Engineering Pty Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 606; Rail Services Australia v Dimovski & Anor [2004] NSWCA 267 discussed and applied
HEARING:	On the papers
REPRESENTATION:	Appellant:
Mr R Brown, counsel
Turner Freeman Lawyers
First Respondent:
Mr Andrew Parker, counsel
Turks Legal
Second Respondent:
Ms L Goodman, counsel
Gair Legal
DECISION UNDER APPEAL
MEMBER:	Ms K Haddock
DATE OF MEMBER’S DECISION:	11 August 2021

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Ms Rebeccah Temple (the appellant) was employed by Allstaff Pty Ltd (the second respondent), which was a company providing labour for hire to Woolworths Group Limited (the first respondent). The appellant was employed as a store person, performing picking and packing duties. On 9 November 2017, the appellant injured her back when she was hit by a reversing forklift vehicle. The second respondent accepted liability for the injury, paid the appellant weekly compensation for a period and paid her treatment expenses. The appellant returned to her pre-injury duties by 27 March 2018.
On 3 June 2019, the appellant commenced to work full-time (36 hours over a four-day period) with the first respondent, performing essentially the same work and in the same location as she had done while in the employ of the second respondent. The appellant asserted that the work she was performing with the first respondent caused her to experience back pain. She alleged that she ceased work early on 18 July 2020 because of back pain, which was a day prior to the commencement of her annual leave. On 21 July 2020, the appellant felt an immediate onset of increased back pain at home when she lifted a basket of dry laundry. Following that event, she sought treatment from Nepean Hospital and her general practitioner. She was referred for radiological investigations and for specialist review. She did not return to work.
The appellant lodged a claim for compensation with the second respondent, who denied liability. She then commenced proceedings in the Commission against both the first and second respondents. She alleged a frank injury on 9 November 2017 when employed by the second respondent. She further alleged an injury in the form of a disease or an aggravation of a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Temple v Woolworths Group Limited

Details

AGLC: Temple v Woolworths Group Limited [2022] NSWPICPD 16
Case: [2022] NSWPICPD 16
Decision Date: 9 May 2022

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Temple v Woolworths Group Limited, the dispute arose in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, with the primary concern being the distinction between injuries that are compensable under sections 4(a) and 4(b) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. The appellant, Temple, sought compensation for injuries sustained during the course of employment. The respondent, Woolworths Group Limited, contested the claim on the grounds that the injuries were not compensable under the specified sections of the Act. The case hinged on the interpretation and application of section 16 of the 1987 Act, which pertains to the distinction between injuries caused by accidents and those arising out of employment.

The legal issues before the court involved the precise interpretation of sections 4(a) and 4(b) of the 1987 Act and how they applied to the facts of this case. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the injuries suffered by Temple were caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, thus qualifying under section 4(a), or whether they were due to an injury caused by a disease arising out of and in the course of employment, qualifying under section 4(b). The court also had to consider the application of section 16, which delineates the conditions under which an injury is compensable under either section 4(a) or 4(b). Relevant case law, including Australian Conveyor Engineering Pty Ltd v Mecha Engineering Pty Ltd and Rail Services Australia v Dimovski & Anor, was examined to provide context and guidance on the statutory interpretation.

The court found that the injuries sustained by Temple were indeed caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and thus fell under the purview of section 4(a). The court relied on the precedent set in Australian Conveyor Engineering Pty Ltd v Mecha Engineering Pty Ltd, which emphasised the need for a causal link between the injury and the employment. Additionally, the court's interpretation was influenced by the reasoning in Rail Services Australia v Dimovski & Anor, which highlighted the importance of the statutory language in determining compensability. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the primary court was upheld. The final orders reflected the court's determination that Temple's injuries were compensable under section 4(a) of the 1987 Act.

Orders