FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Telstra Corporation Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 2) [2007] FCA 493
COMPETITION LAW – exercise of the Commission’s power to issue a Part A competition notice pursuant to s 151AKA(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and written notice pursuant to s 151AKA(10) of the Act – whether competition notice circular, uncertain and fails to specify matters required by s 151AKA(2) – sophisticated carrier would understand terminology used in notices – competition notice states with sufficient clarity that carrier has engaged in at least one instance of anti-competitive conduct of a kind described in the notice – s 151AKA(2) complied with – allegation that s 151AKA(10) notice uncertain, circular and does not describe a kind of anti-competitive conduct – s 151AKA(10) notice describes with sufficient clarity a kind of anti-competitive conduct – whether kind of anti-competitive conduct specified in s 151AKA(10) notice differs in substance from kind of anti-competitive conduct described in competition notice – s 151AKA(10) notice describes the kind of anti-competitive conduct by reference to Retail Customers, a “weighted average” and the bundled Retail Fixed Services Market – competition notice describes the kind of anti-competitive conduct by reference to Lower Spend Customers and supply of services by means other than a bundle – difference of substance in kind of anti-competitive conduct described – failure by the Commission to comply with s 151AKA(10) – Commission not entitled to issue Part A competition notice
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – jurisdiction – whether “decision” to issue a s 151AKA(10) notice is reviewable pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – satisfaction of s 151AKA(10) by the Commission involves no reviewable “decision” under s 5 but is reviewable “conduct” under s 6 of the ADJR Act – also reviewable pursuant to s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act – whether Commission obliged to provide Telstra with statement of reasons pursuant to s 13 of the ADJR Act – decision to issue competition notice may result in the bringing of proceedings for the recovery of pecuniary penalties (para (f) of Sch 2 to the ADJR Act) – no obligation to provide reasons for either decision
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS – whether s 151AKA(10) of the Act exhaustively defines the requirement of procedural fairness – obligation to accord procedural fairness at common law not displaced by s 151AKA(10) – Telstra was not given an opportunity to be heard in respect of differences of substance between the s 151AKA(10) notice and Part A competition notice – Telstra was not given an opportunity to be heard in respect of issues or material adverse to Telstra and not apparent from the Consultation Notice – seriousness of the consequences of a Part A competition notice – denial of procedural fairness
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Pt XIB, ss 151AB, 151AJ, 151AK, 151AKA, 151AO, 151AOA, 151AOB, 151AP, 151AQ, 151AS, 151BC, 151BX, 151BY, 151CB, 151CC, 151CE
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5,…
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- Case
- [2007] FCA 493
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act). Specifically, the court had to determine whether the ACCC's decision to issue a Consultation Notice, as a precursor to a Competition Notice, was a reviewable decision under the ADJR Act. Telstra argued that the Consultation Notice was a necessary step that impacted its legal rights and obligations, thus making it a reviewable decision. Conversely, the ACCC contended that the Consultation Notice was merely a procedural step and not a substantive decision.
The court found that the issuance of the Consultation Notice was not a reviewable decision under s 5 of the ADJR Act. The court reasoned that the notice was a procedural step required under the Act to be given before issuing a Competition Notice, involving no substantive determination. The court also concluded that the conduct in issuing the Consultation Notice was not reviewable under s 6 of the ADJR Act because it was essentially procedural and not substantive. Therefore, the court held that there was no reviewable decision or conduct in issuing the Consultation Notice.
No further orders were made as the court determined that there was no valid ground for review regarding the issuance of the Consultation Notice. The parties were directed to submit proposed orders to give effect to the court's reasons within 14 days.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The parties submit proposed orders to give effect to these reasons within 14 days.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BENNETT J
Telstra submits that the decision to issue the Consultation Notice depended upon the exercise of a specific statutory power under s 151AKA(10) of the Act, which decision gave rise to a legal right to put submissions to the Commission and legal obligation on the Commission to consider those submissions. It was a prerequisite to the issue of a Competition Notice and therefore had, according to Telstra, operative effect and impacted directly on Telstra’s legal rights and obligations. Further, Telstra submits that an extension of time to review that decision should be granted as the Commission has pointed to no prejudice arising from such an extension being granted. Optus consents to an extension of time being granted. Consideration As Mason CJ observed in Bond, a reviewable decision for the purposes of s 5 of the ADJR Act is ‘a decision which the statute requires or authorizes rather than merely a step taken in the course of reasoning on the way to the making of the ultimate decision’ (at 336). It is the case that s 151AKA(10) of the Act requires a notice under that section to be given prior to the issue of a Part A competition notice pursuant to s 151AKA(2). However, the satisfaction of that statutory prerequisite involves no “decision” of an administrative character. In order to comply with s 151AKA(10) the Commission must, as I have noted, give a notice stating that the Commission proposes to issue a Part A competition notice (s 151AKA(10)(a)(i)), describing in summary form the kind of anti-competitive conduct proposed there to be specified (s 151AKA(10)(a)(ii)) and inviting the carrier to make a submission within the specified time limit (s 151AKA(10)(a)(iii)). The Commission must then consider any submission received within time (s 151AKA(10)(b)). The discharge of those statutory obligations involves no determination of a substantive nature. The issue of a s 151AKA(10) notice is an action taken prior to the ultimate decision to issue a Part A competition notice upon satisfaction of the “reason to believe” threshold. That action is procedural in character and involves no “decision” within the meaning of s 5 of the ADJR Act. It follows that, there being no relevant “decision”, it is unnecessary to consider whether an extension of time should be granted under the ADJR Act to review the “decision” to issue the Consultation Notice. That leaves for consideration whether the Commission’s conduct in issuing the Consultation Notice is reviewable “conduct” within s 6 of the ADJR Act. No specific time limit applies to the review of conduct. “Conduct” engaged in for the purpose of making a decision includes ‘the doing of any act or thing preparatory to the making of the decision’, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation (s 3(5) of the ADJR Act). It ‘points to action taken, rather than a decision made, for the purpose of making a reviewable decision’. Conduct is ‘essentially procedural and not substantive in character’ (Bond at 341–2).