Tavita v Queensland Police Services

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[2009] QDC 213

DISTRICT COURT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION

JUDGE ROBIN QC

No 1699 of 2009

FAATAMALII TOMMY TAVITA Appellant
and
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICES Respondent
BRISBANE
..DATE 01/07/2009
ORDER

CATCHWORDS: Justices Act 1886 s 222 - with parties' agreement, offender's sentence appeal determined on the return of his application for appeal bail, appeal allowed.

1-1

HIS HONOUR: This is an appeal under section 222 of the

1

Justices Act 1886 by Mr Tavita against a sentence imposed in the Western Districts Magistrates Court at Richlands on the 24th of June 2009 in respect of an offence of disqualified driving which was his second.

10

The sentence was one of four months' imprisonment suspended for an operational period of two years after two months being served. A two year disqualification from holding a driving licence was also imposed.

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It is common ground at the Bar table that the sentence might be seen as excessive, Miss Litchen for the respondent in her fair submissions suggesting that a six months' Intensive

Correction Order would have suited the case.

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The matter comes before the Court today as an application for bail by the appellant. Miss Litchen conceded that bail ought to be granted. There has been discussion from the outset

about the appeal proper being brought on today. From the

Court's point of view, there may be difficulties about that, 40
given the statutory periods of notice of an appeal hearing
which the Justices Act requires. See s 223d(3). The Court
took the view that as a means of bringing the matter before a
Judge, a formal bail application ought to be made.
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In the circumstances it would be a reproach to the whole system to accede to the bail application and require the parties to return again at some future date for the purposes

1-2 ORDER 60

of the appeal being heard. Now that the Court is

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appropriately seized of the matter, I think the appeal ought

to be determined in a final way, given the parties' agreement.

Mr Christie's submissions, which were directed to the bail

issue essentially, contain a great deal bearing on prospects 10
of success of the appeal which is a relevant factor.

Some precedents for appeals such as the present are collected helpfully, including my decision in Noon v. Wilson [2006] QDC 168, also Appleton [2004] QDC 465, Peto [2005] QDC 141, McIvor

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v. Rourke [2007] QDC 095, Rogers v. Harding and Peel [2007]
QDC 112 and Ebb v. Donaldson [2008] QDC 155.
A community-based order could not be made, in my view, without
consent indicated by the appellant. Mr Christie hasn't had 30
the opportunity to speak with him. In the circumstances, I
form the judgment it's not necessary to go through the
exercise which was pursued in a similar matter of Vickers in
the Court last week of arranging Mr Tavita's attendance by
video link from the Brisbane Correctional Centre where we 40
understand he is.
At both…
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Details
Case
[2009] QDC 213
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Fa'atamalii Tommy Tavita, the appellant, appealed against his sentence in the Western Districts Magistrates Court at Richlands. The sentence was imposed on 24 June 2009, and involved four months' imprisonment suspended for an operational period of two years after two months being served, and a two-year disqualification from holding a driving licence. The appeal was brought under section 222 of the Justices Act 1886, with the consent of both parties. The main issue before the court was whether the sentence was excessive. The court noted that the respondent conceded that the sentence might be seen as excessive and suggested that a six months' Intensive Correction Order would have been more appropriate.

The court found that the sentence was indeed excessive, and the appeal was allowed. The court advanced the date at which the Magistrate's sentence should be suspended until the day of the hearing. However, the court overlooked that the appellant had six days of custody yet to run in respect of another offence dealt with by the Magistrate, which was a breach of a protection order under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989. The court set aside the sentence for the breach of protection order and decided not to impose further punishment or record a conviction, given the time spent in custody by reference to the breach offence. The court also corrected some errors in the notice of appeal and the transcript of the sentence proceedings.

The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, vary the date at which the four months' imprisonment ordered for disqualified driving was suspended for two and a half years from two months to eight days, set aside the sentence for breach of protection order, and declare eight days spent in custody from 23 June 2009 to 1 July 2009 as time for which the appellant ought to have credit. The court also granted leave to both the applicant and respondent to read and file their written outlines of submissions.

Background

Background to the litigation

Faatamaalii Tommy Tavita was convicted by the Western Districts Magistrates Court at Richlands on 24 June 2009 of disqualified driving, which was his second offence. He was sentenced to four months' imprisonment, suspended for a period of two years, and a two-year disqualification from holding a driving licence. The sentence was deemed potentially excessive, with an alternative six-month Intensive Correction Order suggested as more suitable. The case came before the District Court as an application for bail by Tavita. The respondent did not oppose the bail application, and the Court proceeded to determine the appeal on the return of the bail application, in agreement with the parties. Tavita was already in custody for another offence, a breach of a protection order under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989, for which he faced a maximum penalty of 40 penalty units or one year's imprisonment. The appellant had already had one breach and was placed on a recognisance of $400. The circumstances of the breach involved Tavita being in the family home, which was strictly prohibited by the protection order. The respondent conceded that bail should be granted and that the appeal against sentence should be allowed, given the non-custodial outcome suitable for the case. The Court advanced the date at which the Magistrate's sentence should be suspended until the day of the bail application. However, the Court overlooked that Tavita had six days of custody remaining for the breach of the protection order. The respondent did not object to the bail application, and the appellant's lawyer did not draw attention to the oversight, as the primary goal of the application was to secure bail for his client. The circumstances of the breach were minor, and it was hoped that Tavita's partner would take steps to have the order set aside if she wished for the family to be reunited without the appellant being under threat of further breach proceedings. If not, and there was another breach, the maximum penalty would increase to two years. Tavita's employment as a security officer was cited as a reason for avoiding a conviction, and the respondent seemed sympathetic to this. The Court decided not to impose further punishment and set aside the recording of a conviction inherent in the breach. The circumstances were such that the appellant was already going into custody for a term of two months, and it seemed sensible and expedient to mark the Court's disapproval of the conduct by pronouncing imprisonment, which would involve no extra disadvantage to Tavita.

This case before the Queensland District Court is an appeal under section 222 of the Justices Act 1886 by Faatamalii Tommy Tavita against a sentence imposed by the Western Districts Magistrates Court at Richlands on June 24, 2009, concerning an offence of disqualified driving, which was his second offence. The sentence imposed was four months' imprisonment, suspended for an operational period of two years after two months being served, and a two-year disqualification from holding a driving licence. The appeal was heard in the District Court's appellate jurisdiction by Judge Robin QC. The respondent conceded that bail should be granted, and the appeal proper was brought on the same day. The Court took the view that as a means of bringing the matter before a judge, a formal bail application ought to be made. In the circumstances, the Court decided to determine the appeal in a final way, given the parties' agreement. The appeal was allowed, and the order of the Magistrate was varied by changing the date at which the four months' imprisonment was suspended for two and a half years from two months, as set by the Magistrate, to eight days. The recording of the conviction for breach of protection order was set aside, and the appellant was granted credit for the eight days spent in custody.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the sentence imposed by the Western Districts Magistrates Court excessive and inappropriate for the offence of disqualified driving, warranting an appeal?
2. In the context of the appeal, was it appropriate to consider and determine the merits of the appeal on the return of the appellant's application for appeal bail, given the statutory periods for notice of an appeal hearing?
3. Did the court have the authority to vary the date at which the Magistrate's sentence should be suspended, and was this variation justified in the circumstances?
4. Was it appropriate to set aside the sentence for the breach of a protection order, and to not impose further punishment or record a conviction in respect of this offence?
5. Should the recording of the conviction for the breach of protection order be set aside, considering the appellant's employment as a security officer and the potential disadvantages in the social and economic spheres?

Held
1. The court concluded that the sentence imposed by the Western Districts Magistrates Court was excessive and inappropriate for the offence of disqualified driving, leading to the appeal being allowed.
2. The court determined the merits of the appeal on the return of the appellant's application for appeal bail, despite statutory periods for notice of an appeal hearing, given the parties' agreement.
3. The court varied the date at which the Magistrate's sentence should be suspended, from two months to eight days, and found this variation justified in the circumstances.
4. The court set aside the sentence for the breach of a protection order and decided not to impose further punishment or record a conviction in respect of this offence.
5. The court set aside the recording of the conviction for the breach of protection order, considering the appellant's employment as a security officer and the potential disadvantages in the social and economic spheres.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Tavita v Queensland Police Services, the District Court addressed multiple issues concerning the sentence imposed by the Western Districts Magistrates Court. The first issue concerned the excessiveness of the sentence. The appellant was sentenced to four months imprisonment, suspended for two years after serving two months, and a two-year disqualification from holding a driving licence for the offence of disqualified driving, which was his second offence. The court accepted the contention that the sentence might be seen as excessive, with the respondent suggesting that a six-month Intensive Correction Order would have been more appropriate. The District Court found the appeal to be likely successful and allowed the appeal, varying the suspension date of the sentence to expedite the appellant's release.

The second issue revolved around the appropriateness of considering the merits of the appeal upon the return of the appellant's application for appeal bail. Given statutory periods for notice of an appeal hearing as required by the Justices Act, the court determined that it would be more efficient to hear and determine the appeal at that moment rather than requiring the parties to return at a later date. Both parties agreed to this approach, and the appeal was allowed.

Thirdly, the court addressed whether it had the authority to vary the date at which the Magistrate's sentence should be suspended, and if this variation was justified. The court found that it did have the authority to make such a variation, and it was justified to bring the matter before the court expeditiously to release the appellant. The court varied the date, allowing the appeal and adjusting the suspension date to expedite the appellant's release.

Fourthly, the court considered whether it was appropriate to set aside the sentence for the breach of a protection order and to not impose further punishment or record a conviction in respect of this offence. The court found that given the appellant's concurrent incarceration for the disqualified driving offence, it was appropriate to set aside the sentence for the breach of protection order and not impose further punishment or record a conviction for this offence.

Finally, the court considered whether the recording of the conviction for the breach of the protection order should be set aside, considering the appellant's employment as a security officer and the potential disadvantages in the social and economic spheres. The court accepted that recording a conviction would involve disadvantage to the appellant in these areas and set aside the recording of the conviction.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that in certain circumstances, where the appeal is likely to succeed and where expeditious action is necessary to avoid a potential injustice, the court has the authority to adjust the suspension date of a sentence, set aside sentences for concurrent offences, and set aside the recording of convictions to avoid undue social and economic disadvantages. The court also emphasized the importance of procedural accuracy in legal documents, highlighting the potential consequences of errors in notices of appeal.