Noon v Wilson
[2006] QDC 168
•05/06/2006
[2006] QDC 168
DISTRICT COURT
CIVIL JURISDICTION
JUDGE ROBIN QC
No 693 of 2006
| IAN RICHARD NOON | Appellant |
| and | |
| KENNETH JAMES WILSON | Respondent |
BRISBANE
..DATE 05/06/2006
ORDER
CATCHWORDS: Appeal against sentence under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 - sentence of one month's imprisonment for a first offence of disqualified driving (on occasion of third incident of driving under the influence for which 47 year old offender received probation) held out of the range, or manifestly excessive - sentence should be ordered to be suspended.
HIS HONOUR: The respondent, represented by
Mr Hungerford-Symes, indicated to the court that there was no
lack of sympathy in that quarter for the plight of the
appellant. Notwithstanding, it was submitted that this appeal
against sentence under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 ought
not to succeed because the sentence was not manifestly
excessive or perhaps, putting it another way, that it came
within range.
It is a sentence of one month's imprisonment imposed by a
Magistrate on the 13th of March this year in respect of an
offence of disqualified driving, which happened on the 24th of
February this year, in association with an offence of driving
a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .22.
For that offence the penalty was one of two years probation
which the Magistrate apparently attempted to defer until the
imprisonment was completed. That would seem to be an
unorthodox approach. In practice nothing much will turn on it
and the parameters of the appeal do not extend far enough to
permit regularisation.
The appellant is 47. The making of the probation order is an
indication that the circumstances were unusual. A 47 year old
is not normally placed on a sentence of that nature. In the
appellant's case the explanation lies in his serious problems
with alcohol to which it seems, on the basis of reference
material, he turned in response to stressors in his life
related to employment in a professional field in which
important responsibilities were thrust upon him.
He has taken steps to deal with his difficulties, including
abandoning that employment for rather different work in which
he is giving great satisfaction to his employer, which happens
to be a school. There is an impressive reference from the
principal expressing his appreciation of the appellant's
qualities as a man. There is a similar lengthy reference from
his wife explaining the difficulties which from time to time
have blighted family relations.
There is also a reference from a psychologist which confirms
that the appellant has been active in pursuing rehabilitation
programs, through Alcoholics Anonymous, for example. The last
reference before the Magistrate was from an institution in
Northern New South Wales known as the Buttery which provides
long term residential programs for those with difficulties
like the appellant's. He is on a waiting list but is unable
to undertake the program while there are court proceedings
hanging over him. Therein lies the explanation for the
unusually early hearing of this appeal.
The failure to date of the efforts at rehabilitation which the
appellant has made, apparently assiduously, is reflected in
there being two prior convictions for driving while under the
influence. The first relates to an offence on the 1st of
October 2004 when the blood alcohol concentration was .189.
When the matter came to court 20 days later the Magistrate's
orders were a fine of $1,200 and disqualification for 10
months. It appears that 10 months passed without incident.
However, there is another offence of driving under the
influence with a blood alcohol concentration of .145
on the 21st of January 2006, which was dealt with in the
Magistrates Court on the 17th of February by a fine of $1,300
and a disqualification of 15 months. Only a week later the
appellant was caught again with the consequences outlined
above. This time a three year disqualification has been
imposed by the Magistrate, not the subject of appeal. The
appeal relates to the sentence of one month's imprisonment for
what is a first offence of disqualified driving.
The appellant has no general criminal history. The only
traffic matters not mentioned are speeding offences, one in
1988, the other in 2004.
It is the case that by a whisker, or a sip, as the Magistrate
said, the appellant avoided coming within the mandatory
sentencing regime which would have confronted him if the blood
alcohol concentration on the 21st of January this year had
been .15.
The court has not been provided with any information as to
sentencing ranges for the offence of disqualified driving. A
judge's general experience is likely to involve scrutiny of
criminal histories and traffic histories in particular. I
would venture to say that it is unusual for a first offender
to be sentenced to imprisonment. The maximum penalty
available is 18 months imprisonment.
In the matter of Hey [2006] QCA 23 it seems the offender had
three offences of disqualified driving without being sentenced
to imprisonment. On the next occasion when he was caught,
also adversely affected by alcohol, tragically, his driving
led to the death of a woman. In dissenting in an
unsuccessful Attorney's appeal, Chesterman J said at
paragraphs [40] ff:
"There was nothing spontaneous or inadvertent about the
respondent's conduct on the day he killed Mrs
Williamson. He chose to drive when he knew it was
unlawful for him to do so. He chose to drink when he
knew it was dangerous to do so. Mrs Williamson's death
is a direct consequence of the respondent's refusal to
accept that the law applied to him, and that the
disqualification orders had been made to safeguard the
public. He disregarded the legal prohibition and
disdained the public's safety.
In my opinion the court should be merciless when dealing
with people who behave in this way. It is a matter of
considerable regret that the respondent was not dealt
with appropriately on the occasions when he appeared
before the Magistrates Court on charges of driving whilst
disqualified and intoxicated. He had amply demonstrated
his contempt for previous disqualification orders and had
given clear proof that he was a danger on the roads.
There was clearly no point in imposing further
disqualifications. He should have been jailed for a
brief period to make him realise the seriousness and
unacceptability of his conduct. If he did not, and
reoffended, he should have been jailed for a substantial
period. It is distinctly possible that Mrs Williamson
might be alive today had that course been followed.
The imposition of severe punishments on those who drive
dangerously, and thereby kill or maim others, is required
as a means of reducing the number of traffic accidents
which result in death or serious injury. Lengthy periods
of imprisonment play an important role in deterring those
who contemplate driving while disqualified, and while
intoxicated."
The Magistrate here made a point of referring to his Honour's
comments in her reasons for judgment. That had the
commendable purpose, in my opinion, of drawing to the
appellant's attention that he simply must not drive while he
was "banned", to use the Magistrate's term. The warnings she
gave were entirely appropriate. It is hardly impressive that
the offence which lead to the sentence under appeal occurred
only a week after the disqualification.
In the appellant's case, the circumstances are somewhat unusual and reveal offending somewhat less brazen than it seems at first blush. The appellant was so ashamed of the way in which he used alcohol that when he felt driven to seek solace in it, he would, on occasions at least, drive somewhere secluded in his vehicle and drink in it away from the observation of his family. That indeed is what was happening on the 24th of February of this year when he was found at about 9.30 p.m., not driving but in the place where he had gone - presumably to drink. It is simply not known whether the actual driving, preceding his being found by police, which seems to have passed without event, had actually put anyone in danger. There is a marked contrast here with Mr Hey.
It seems to me that the Magistrate became distracted in the
sentencing task by reference to Chesterman J's views, which of
course were not a binding precedent in the circumstances,
since the other members of the court cannot be regarded as
endorsing the sentiments expressed by his Honour. They
would command assent by many and appear to have coincided
with the Magistrate's own views. It shouldn't be forgotten
what the tragic context of their being expressed was.
Although Mr Hungerford-Symes mounted a strong argument that
the sentence was not manifestly excessive, it seems to me that
it was. It is the first instance of "disobedience of a
court's order", as it was called by way of a convenient means
of describing driving while disqualified, in the appellant's
history.
It simply cannot be said, on the basis of that single
incident, that he is a person inclined to ignore court
orders and therefore requires punishment. His exemplary
record in relation to the general criminal law and his life in
his family, workplace and the community generally seems to me
to suggest the offending, the concern of this court, was out
of character.
I think Mr Hungerford-Symes is right that there could hardly
have been a complaint if the imprisonment was attached by the
Magistrate to the other offence. At one point Mr Reid
appeared to me to be disavowing a technical separation out of
matters along those lines, but in his reply he seemed willing
to take advantage of it. This court should take into account the whole of the appellant's history. That does not, in my opinion, mean that the appealed sentence can be justified because it might have been appropriate for the other offence.
He pointed to the sentencing considerations in section 78(2)
of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995
which, it seems to me, all tend to favour his client and I
would say that even of "(b) the public interest"; I am not
persuaded that is served here by incarceration of the
appellant.
Other sentencing principles appear in section 9 of the
Penalties and Sentences Act, in particular in subsection
(2)(a), whereby a sentence of imprisonment is regarded as one
of last resort, one that allows the offender to stay in the
community is preferable.
The qualifications imposed by subsection (3) are not relevant
here. I think the sentence was out of range and manifestly
excessive in involving actual incarceration of a person whose
record is like the appellant's for a first offence of
disqualified driving. Mr Reid accepted that the same
observation will be hard to make in respect of any subsequent
offence of that nature. I agree with that, but the appeal
ought to be allowed and the Magistrate's sentence of one
month's imprisonment changed by the addition to it of an order
that it be suspended immediately for an operational period of
two years. That is going to be roughly equivalent with the
probation period. It is to be hoped that the appellant is
fully cognisant of the risk that's faced by him. If he is
not sure he can avoid driving his motor vehicle, he might be
well advised to dispose of it. There is no order as to costs.
(I was grateful to be corroborated by the Court Reporter in my
recollection of an incident in a local Magistrates Court in
recent weeks in which a woman - it was reportedly a woman -
was punished for driving while disqualified and left the court
to drive home in her vehicle; she was observed doing it
apparently and returned to the court where she was convicted
of a second instance of that offence and punished by a much
greater fine - if the report in the media was correct, the
reporter recalled she had two children in the vehicle. That
incident is, on the face of it, more brazen than the
appellant's. He might be justified in regarding himself as
unfairly dealt with in comparison).
-----
4