HELENA MARIE TALACKO, ALEXANDRA BENNETT, MARTIN TALACKO, ROWENA TALACKO AND MARGARET HELEN TALACKO
Plaintiffs
v
JAN EMIL TALACKO, DAVID TALACKO, PAUL ANTHONY TALACKO AND JUDITH GAIL TALACKO
Defendants
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JUDGE:
Kyrou J
WHERE HELD:
Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:
10 August 2009
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
10 August 2009
DATE OF REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:
21 August 2009
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:
Talacko v Talacko
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
[2009] VSC 349
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MAREVA ORDER – Requirements for obtaining – Foreign assets – First defendant executed transfers of land located overseas to second and third defendants living overseas – Gifts – Scope of Mareva orders in relation to foreign assets – Whether exceptional circumstances required – Whether impugned transaction can be reversed before final hearing – Meaning of ‘status quo’ – Meaning of ‘good arguable case’ – Proper law of causes of action.
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APPEARANCES:
Counsel
Solicitors
For the Plaintiffs
Mr S J Howells
Holding Redlich
For the Firstnamed Defendant
Mr D J Williams
Findlay Arthur Phillips
No appearance for the Second, Third and Fourthnamed Defendants
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
On 10 August 2009, I made Mareva type orders against the first three defendants in the exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction (‘August Order’). At that time, I said that I would deliver my reasons for the August Order on 21 August 2009. These are my reasons.
The August Order is set out in the annexure to these reasons. The properties affected by the August Order, which are located in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Germany, are listed in attachment A to that order (‘Properties’).
The August Order follows a number of earlier interim orders that I have made in respect of the Properties both in this proceeding (‘2009 proceeding’) and in proceeding number 1793 of 1998 (‘1998 proceeding’), from which the 2009 proceeding stems.
Background
The plaintiffs in the 2009 proceeding are also plaintiffs in the 1998 proceeding. The first defendant in the 2009 proceeding (‘Jan Talacko’) is the sole defendant in the 1998 proceeding.
The 1998 proceeding was commenced by the plaintiffs on 2 October 1998 to enforce an agreement that they alleged was made in 1990 between the first plaintiff (‘Helena Talacko’), Jan Talacko and their late brother, Peter Talacko, in respect of the Properties. The Properties, which had been owned by the parents of Jan, Helena and Peter Talacko, were confiscated by the Communist regimes of Czechoslovakia and East Germany progressively from 1948. After those regimes fell in the late 1980s, the governments of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the re-unified Germany passed laws for the restitution of confiscated properties. Interests in the Properties were transferred to Jan Talacko under the restitution laws. The plaintiffs alleged that Jan Talacko had agreed to hold the Properties on behalf of himself and his siblings in equal shares and that he had breached that agreement. Their claim was based on breaches of contract, trust and fiduciary…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Talacko v Talacko [2009] VSC 349
Case
[2009] VSC 349
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Talacko v Talacko involved a dispute between the first plaintiff and the first, second and third defendants, with the first defendant also being a party to the action. The first plaintiff sought to obtain a Mareva order against the first defendant, as well as the second and third defendants, to restrain them from disposing of certain assets, specifically foreign property. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria.
The legal issues before the court were whether the court had the power to grant a Mareva order over foreign assets and whether exceptional circumstances were required to do so. The court also needed to determine whether the impugned transaction could be reversed before the final hearing and what constituted the meaning of ‘status quo’ and ‘good arguable case’. Furthermore, the court had to consider the proper law of the causes of action.
The court found that a Mareva order could be granted over foreign assets if there was a good arguable case that the defendants had assets within the jurisdiction and that the defendants were about to dissipate those assets. The court held that exceptional circumstances were not required to obtain a Mareva order over foreign assets. The court also found that the impugned transaction could be reversed before the final hearing and that the meaning of ‘status quo’ was to maintain the existing state of affairs. The court held that a ‘good arguable case’ was a case that had sufficient merit to justify the grant of the order.
The court granted the first plaintiff’s application for a Mareva order over the foreign assets of the first, second and third defendants. The court held that the first defendant had executed transfers of land located overseas to the second and third defendants, which were gifts, and that the first plaintiff had a good arguable case that the defendants had assets within the jurisdiction and that they were about to dissipate those assets. The court further held that the meaning of ‘good arguable case’ was a case that had sufficient merit to justify the grant of the order and that the proper law of the causes of action was the law of the forum.