SZVHP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZVHP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 270

Appeal from: SZVHP v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 3001
File number: NSD 1412 of 2015
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 15 February 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Refugee Review Tribunal made incorrect findings of fact which contributed to an adverse credibility finding – held no jurisdictional error for a wrong finding of fact – both incorrect findings of fact had merely given some additional support to overall findings of Tribunal  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135

Cordelia Holdings Pty Limited v Newkey Investments Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 48

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609

SZVHP v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 3001

Date of hearing: 15 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 45
Counsel for the Appellants: The first appellant appeared in person and represented her family
Counsel for the First Respondent: G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1412 of 2015
BETWEEN:

SZVHP

First Appellant

SZVHQ

Second Appellant

SZVHR

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The first and second appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse the appellants’ claim for constitutional writ relief against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 23 September 2014 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants’ protection visas:  SZVHP v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 3001. Throughout the process before the delegate and the Tribunal, the appellants were represented by their migration agent, who also made submissions and lodged other evidence in support of the appellants’ claims.

    Background

  2. The appellants are a wife, her husband and their infant son.  The wife was the principal applicant for a protection visa.  The wife and her husband were citizens of the People’s Republic of China.  She claimed that her family and upbringing were Christian and that when she was 17 she received a call from the Holy Spirit and committed to be baptised.  Both the wife and husband arrived in Australia on student visas, the husband in October 2005, and then studied at high school until February 2007, and the wife in 2008.  They met in October 2008 in Australia.

  3. In January 2009, the wife claimed that she…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 270
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants, a wife and her husband and their infant son, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse their claim for constitutional writ relief against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant them protection visas. The appellants were represented throughout the process before the delegate and the Tribunal by their migration agent, who made submissions and lodged other evidence in support of the appellants’ claims. The wife was the principal applicant for a protection visa and claimed to be a Christian who had been targeted by the police in China because of her religious beliefs. The Tribunal found that the wife’s claims for protection were not credible because of inconsistencies in her evidence.

The legal issues in the case were whether the Tribunal had erred in relation to its findings about the wife’s evidence concerning the Bibles being left in sight and whether it was fair of the Tribunal to find that her evidence was inconsistent. The wife argued that the Tribunal had misjudged her on this point and that that may have affected its whole approach. The court considered whether the Tribunal’s findings were based on proper principles and whether the erroneous finding was a matter of central logical importance to the overall finding about credibility or whether it merely provided additional support for a conclusion as to credibility that the judge had reached on other grounds.

The court held that the Tribunal’s findings were based on proper principles and that the erroneous finding was not a matter of central logical importance to the overall finding about credibility. The court held that the Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to when the wife knew she was pregnant was unhappily expressed but that it was plain to see how it arrived at its decision. The court held that the wife’s evidence about the Bibles being left in sight was not credible because of inconsistencies in her evidence that the Tribunal detailed. The court held that the wife’s claims for protection were not credible because of inconsistencies in her evidence and that the Tribunal’s decision was not based on an erroneous finding of fact.

The appeal was dismissed, and the first and second appellants were ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The first and second appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse the appellants’ claim for constitutional writ relief against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 23 September 2014 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants’ protection visas: SZVHP v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 3001. Throughout the process before the delegate and the Tribunal, the appellants were represented by their migration agent, who also made submissions and lodged other evidence in support of the appellants’ claims.Background The appellants are a wife, her husband and their infant son. The wife was the principal applicant for a protection visa. The wife and her husband were citizens of the People’s Republic of China. She claimed that her family and upbringing were Christian and that when she was 17 she received a call from the Holy Spirit and committed to be baptised. Both the wife and husband arrived in Australia on student visas, the husband in October 2005, and then studied at high school until February 2007, and the wife in 2008. They met in October 2008 in Australia. In January 2009, the wife claimed that she had been told that her grandmother had suffered a stroke and was in a critical condition. She took leave from school here and returned to China to visit her grandmother. The wife claimed that while in China many Christian brothers and sisters visited her grandmother at the family house and prayed for her. She claimed that on the evening of 20 February 2009, a visiting priest from Shanghai and about 12 other fellow Christians came to the family’s house and held a gathering to pray for the grandmother. She claimed that her father had received a call warning him that the police were coming and that he had told the priest and the others to go, but that some had stayed. She claimed that, there had been chaos at the time and that within a few moments of the receipt of the call, the police arrived. In her protection visa application, she claimed that that the police had said that they had received a report that an illegal religious gathering was being held in the house, and they asked for her father but he had already left. She claimed that the police saw some Bibles and hymn books scattered in the house and then put those in a bag saying that they needed to take them away. The wife claimed that the police also took her and four other people back to the police station and asked her mother to tell her father to report to them immediately when he came back. She claimed that the police asked her questions at the police station, including where her father and the priest had gone and where they usually held the meetings. She claimed that the police interrogated her about those present at her home and threatened her that, if she would not co-operate, they would not let her go back, to Australia. She claimed that she did not give the police relevant details, but that, because of her thyroid condition and her high fever, they sent her to hospital, where her illness was confirmed, and that the next day she was permitted to go home. She claimed that she had signed a confession of wrongdoing and gave the police an undertaking she would not again participate in an illegal gathering. She claimed that when she went home her mother told her that her father had been detained by the police, that the family was worried about her and had organised for her to return earlier to Australia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants lodged their protection visa applications on 15 October 2012 when the wife was four to five months pregnant. The marriage had occurred five days earlier.The delegate’s decision The delegate was not satisfied, among other things, about the wife being a Christian. He found that she did not know the address of the Padstow church and that it was a considerable distance from where she lived in Auburn, at which there was a Mandarin-speaking church that she could have attended. He found that although the wife had stated she had been attending the Padstow church since 2009, she had not provided any letter of support from that church. The delegate gave no weight to two unsigned letters from others, that she had provided, who claimed that they were churchgoers. He also did not find her reasons convincing as to why she had chosen to marry in a civil ceremony at someone’s home in October 2012, despite attending the church, as she claimed, for nearly four years. Ultimately, the delegate found that the wife’s account of the police raid on her parent’s home was not credible and her knowledge of Christianity was not commensurate with someone who claimed to have grown up in a Christian family and had been attending church to learn the Bible from an early age. Accordingly, the delegate found that the wife did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and was not entitled to a protection visa on the basis of her claims under the Refugee Convention or because she was at real risk of suffering significant harm entitling her to complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).The proceedings in the Tribunal The appellants provided further evidence to the Tribunal, including a number of letters from attendees at the Padstow church and two from the pastor. Neither of the pastor’s letters stated when the appellants, and in particular the wife, had first started to attend at that church. The Tribunal found that the appellants had not married in the Padstow church because its guidelines provided that it did not officiate at weddings for couples who were cohabitating before marriage and who had not both been baptised. It found that the husband had not been baptised. The Tribunal did not find the wife’s claims for protection were credible because of inconsistencies in her evidence that it detailed. It found that the wife had given inconsistent evidence about there being Bibles left on tables and chairs at the time of the police raid at the family home in February 2009. The Tribunal asserted that, in the wife’s statement accompanying her protection visa application, she had claimed that the Bibles were in a bag. The Minister conceded before the trial judge that that finding was wrong, as indeed it was. However the Tribunal made a finding that the wife’s evidence in that respect was inconsistent. It then went on to make a finding that, in any event, if persons had left Bibles on tables and chairs as the wife claimed, that conduct would have been inconsistent with her claim that her father had received a warning call that the police were coming and had told the priest and others to go, although some remained. The Tribunal found that if the wife’s parents and fellow Christians at the house were aware of the police coming because they were holding an illegal Christian gathering, “the first thing they would have done would have been to hide the evidence of their gathering because they were Christian”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The wife argued before me that the Tribunal had erred in relation to its findings about her evidence concerning the Bibles being left in sight and that it was not fair of the Tribunal to find that her evidence was inconsistent because she had been consistent on that point. She argued that the Tribunal had misjudged her on this point and that that may have affected its whole approach.Consideration When a Court is considering the exercise of its powers in reviewing an administrative decision it must not be concerned with looseness in language or unhappy phrasing of the reasons of the administrative decision-maker. The reasons for an administrative decision should not be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error. The reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and should not be scrutinised on over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether there is some inadequacy that may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In that context, a court reviewing a decision of the present kind, in respect of claims for protection visas, must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ and Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. The reasoning of the Tribunal in relation to when the wife knew she was pregnant is unhappily expressed. It is, however, plain to see how it arrived at its decision. It began with the reasoning that, as it recorded, the wife had said at the hearing that she had stopped working when she was pregnant because she had high blood pressure and a thyroid problem. The Tribunal appears to have taken as an accurate starting point that the wife had stopped working in April 2012, as she claimed in the protection visa. Although it found, in the passage I have set out at [19] above, that the wife knew she was pregnant from April 2012, I am of opinion that it is likely that the Tribunal was linking that date to when the wife actually stopped working, which was not a matter that was explored in any detail in the hearing. In any event, the Tribunal made a finding that:Even accepting her evidence that she did not know for three months, she would have known by August [2012] but did not marry until October. While it is difficult to imagine that a woman could know she was pregnant 10 months before giving birth, I think the unhappy phrasing of the Tribunal’s reasons stemmed from its having taken as its starting point the wife’s acceptance that she had stopped work when she knew she was pregnant. The likelihood is that she was confused about the date of her stopping work. Where a court makes a finding that a person’s evidence is not credible for a number of reasons that it then states, one of which is shown to be erroneous, an appeal court will consider whether the erroneous finding was a matter of central logical importance to the overall finding about credibility or whether it merely provided additional support for a conclusion as to credibility that the judge had reached on other grounds. Where the error is not one about some fact vital to the resolution of the case or is not of such a nature as to have a cascading effect on the judge’s resolution of the larger issues in the case, the error will not undermine the overall finding: Cordelia Holdings Pty Limited v Newkey Investments Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 48 at [60]-[61] per Black CJ, and French and Tamberlin JJ.